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author | dependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com> | 2021-05-20 10:10:22 +0000 |
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committer | GitHub <noreply@github.com> | 2021-05-20 10:10:22 +0000 |
commit | 26652111b8600cd43401b02628491c2a9a7a7341 (patch) | |
tree | 89dce2ec0815f248d9c9b4494626bb7ace4741a5 /vendor/github.com/opencontainers | |
parent | 49a99be5b6bd50aa0e7b4cf53ec042b0ffd9edf2 (diff) | |
download | podman-26652111b8600cd43401b02628491c2a9a7a7341.tar.gz podman-26652111b8600cd43401b02628491c2a9a7a7341.tar.bz2 podman-26652111b8600cd43401b02628491c2a9a7a7341.zip |
Bump github.com/opencontainers/runc from 1.0.0-rc94 to 1.0.0-rc95
Bumps [github.com/opencontainers/runc](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc) from 1.0.0-rc94 to 1.0.0-rc95.
- [Release notes](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/releases)
- [Commits](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/compare/v1.0.0-rc94...v1.0.0-rc95)
Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'vendor/github.com/opencontainers')
-rw-r--r-- | vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/config.go | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils/utils.go | 54 |
2 files changed, 58 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/config.go b/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/config.go index 042ba1a2e..14a096038 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/config.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/config.go @@ -31,9 +31,10 @@ type IDMap struct { // for syscalls. Additional architectures can be added by specifying them in // Architectures. type Seccomp struct { - DefaultAction Action `json:"default_action"` - Architectures []string `json:"architectures"` - Syscalls []*Syscall `json:"syscalls"` + DefaultAction Action `json:"default_action"` + Architectures []string `json:"architectures"` + Syscalls []*Syscall `json:"syscalls"` + DefaultErrnoRet *uint `json:"default_errno_ret"` } // Action is taken upon rule match in Seccomp diff --git a/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils/utils.go b/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils/utils.go index 1b72b7a1c..cd78f23e1 100644 --- a/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils/utils.go +++ b/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils/utils.go @@ -3,12 +3,15 @@ package utils import ( "encoding/binary" "encoding/json" + "fmt" "io" "os" "path/filepath" + "strconv" "strings" "unsafe" + "github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin" "golang.org/x/sys/unix" ) @@ -88,6 +91,57 @@ func CleanPath(path string) string { return filepath.Clean(path) } +// stripRoot returns the passed path, stripping the root path if it was +// (lexicially) inside it. Note that both passed paths will always be treated +// as absolute, and the returned path will also always be absolute. In +// addition, the paths are cleaned before stripping the root. +func stripRoot(root, path string) string { + // Make the paths clean and absolute. + root, path = CleanPath("/"+root), CleanPath("/"+path) + switch { + case path == root: + path = "/" + case root == "/": + // do nothing + case strings.HasPrefix(path, root+"/"): + path = strings.TrimPrefix(path, root+"/") + } + return CleanPath("/" + path) +} + +// WithProcfd runs the passed closure with a procfd path (/proc/self/fd/...) +// corresponding to the unsafePath resolved within the root. Before passing the +// fd, this path is verified to have been inside the root -- so operating on it +// through the passed fdpath should be safe. Do not access this path through +// the original path strings, and do not attempt to use the pathname outside of +// the passed closure (the file handle will be freed once the closure returns). +func WithProcfd(root, unsafePath string, fn func(procfd string) error) error { + // Remove the root then forcefully resolve inside the root. + unsafePath = stripRoot(root, unsafePath) + path, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("resolving path inside rootfs failed: %v", err) + } + + // Open the target path. + fh, err := os.OpenFile(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("open o_path procfd: %w", err) + } + defer fh.Close() + + // Double-check the path is the one we expected. + procfd := "/proc/self/fd/" + strconv.Itoa(int(fh.Fd())) + if realpath, err := os.Readlink(procfd); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("procfd verification failed: %w", err) + } else if realpath != path { + return fmt.Errorf("possibly malicious path detected -- refusing to operate on %s", realpath) + } + + // Run the closure. + return fn(procfd) +} + // SearchLabels searches a list of key-value pairs for the provided key and // returns the corresponding value. The pairs must be separated with '='. func SearchLabels(labels []string, query string) string { |