vendor: update everything

* If possible, update each dependency to the latest available version.

* Use releases over commit IDs and avoid vendoring branches.

Signed-off-by: Valentin Rothberg <rothberg@redhat.com>

20 files changed, 2717 insertions, 226 deletions

diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go
index 2d14c2a78..cb8fbc57b 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
-// We have a implementation in amd64 assembly so this code is only run on
+// We have an implementation in amd64 assembly so this code is only run on
 // non-amd64 platforms. The amd64 assembly does not support gccgo.
 // +build !amd64 gccgo appengine
 
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/keys.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/keys.go
index 68b14c6ae..3e2518600 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/keys.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/keys.go
@@ -325,16 +325,14 @@ func ReadEntity(packets *packet.Reader) (*Entity, error) {
 		if e.PrivateKey, ok = p.(*packet.PrivateKey); !ok {
 			packets.Unread(p)
 			return nil, errors.StructuralError("first packet was not a public/private key")
-		} else {
-			e.PrimaryKey = &e.PrivateKey.PublicKey
 		}
+		e.PrimaryKey = &e.PrivateKey.PublicKey
 	}
 
 	if !e.PrimaryKey.PubKeyAlgo.CanSign() {
 		return nil, errors.StructuralError("primary key cannot be used for signatures")
 	}
 
-	var current *Identity
 	var revocations []*packet.Signature
 EachPacket:
 	for {
@@ -347,32 +345,8 @@ EachPacket:
 
 		switch pkt := p.(type) {
 		case *packet.UserId:
-			current = new(Identity)
-			current.Name = pkt.Id
-			current.UserId = pkt
-			e.Identities[pkt.Id] = current
-
-			for {
-				p, err = packets.Next()
-				if err == io.EOF {
-					return nil, io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
-				} else if err != nil {
-					return nil, err
-				}
-
-				sig, ok := p.(*packet.Signature)
-				if !ok {
-					return nil, errors.StructuralError("user ID packet not followed by self-signature")
-				}
-
-				if (sig.SigType == packet.SigTypePositiveCert || sig.SigType == packet.SigTypeGenericCert) && sig.IssuerKeyId != nil && *sig.IssuerKeyId == e.PrimaryKey.KeyId {
-					if err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyUserIdSignature(pkt.Id, e.PrimaryKey, sig); err != nil {
-						return nil, errors.StructuralError("user ID self-signature invalid: " + err.Error())
-					}
-					current.SelfSignature = sig
-					break
-				}
-				current.Signatures = append(current.Signatures, sig)
+			if err := addUserID(e, packets, pkt); err != nil {
+				return nil, err
 			}
 		case *packet.Signature:
 			if pkt.SigType == packet.SigTypeKeyRevocation {
@@ -381,11 +355,9 @@ EachPacket:
 				// TODO: RFC4880 5.2.1 permits signatures
 				// directly on keys (eg. to bind additional
 				// revocation keys).
-			} else if current == nil {
-				return nil, errors.StructuralError("signature packet found before user id packet")
-			} else {
-				current.Signatures = append(current.Signatures, pkt)
 			}
+			// Else, ignoring the signature as it does not follow anything
+			// we would know to attach it to.
 		case *packet.PrivateKey:
 			if pkt.IsSubkey == false {
 				packets.Unread(p)
@@ -426,33 +398,105 @@ EachPacket:
 	return e, nil
 }
 
+func addUserID(e *Entity, packets *packet.Reader, pkt *packet.UserId) error {
+	// Make a new Identity object, that we might wind up throwing away.
+	// We'll only add it if we get a valid self-signature over this
+	// userID.
+	identity := new(Identity)
+	identity.Name = pkt.Id
+	identity.UserId = pkt
+
+	for {
+		p, err := packets.Next()
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			break
+		} else if err != nil {
+			return err
+		}
+
+		sig, ok := p.(*packet.Signature)
+		if !ok {
+			packets.Unread(p)
+			break
+		}
+
+		if (sig.SigType == packet.SigTypePositiveCert || sig.SigType == packet.SigTypeGenericCert) && sig.IssuerKeyId != nil && *sig.IssuerKeyId == e.PrimaryKey.KeyId {
+			if err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyUserIdSignature(pkt.Id, e.PrimaryKey, sig); err != nil {
+				return errors.StructuralError("user ID self-signature invalid: " + err.Error())
+			}
+			identity.SelfSignature = sig
+			e.Identities[pkt.Id] = identity
+		} else {
+			identity.Signatures = append(identity.Signatures, sig)
+		}
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
 func addSubkey(e *Entity, packets *packet.Reader, pub *packet.PublicKey, priv *packet.PrivateKey) error {
 	var subKey Subkey
 	subKey.PublicKey = pub
 	subKey.PrivateKey = priv
-	p, err := packets.Next()
-	if err == io.EOF {
-		return io.ErrUnexpectedEOF
-	}
-	if err != nil {
-		return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
+
+	for {
+		p, err := packets.Next()
+		if err == io.EOF {
+			break
+		} else if err != nil {
+			return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
+		}
+
+		sig, ok := p.(*packet.Signature)
+		if !ok {
+			packets.Unread(p)
+			break
+		}
+
+		if sig.SigType != packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding && sig.SigType != packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation {
+			return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature with wrong type")
+		}
+
+		if err := e.PrimaryKey.VerifyKeySignature(subKey.PublicKey, sig); err != nil {
+			return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
+		}
+
+		switch sig.SigType {
+		case packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation:
+			subKey.Sig = sig
+		case packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding:
+
+			if shouldReplaceSubkeySig(subKey.Sig, sig) {
+				subKey.Sig = sig
+			}
+		}
 	}
-	var ok bool
-	subKey.Sig, ok = p.(*packet.Signature)
-	if !ok {
+
+	if subKey.Sig == nil {
 		return errors.StructuralError("subkey packet not followed by signature")
 	}
-	if subKey.Sig.SigType != packet.SigTypeSubkeyBinding && subKey.Sig.SigType != packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation {
-		return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature with wrong type")
-	}
-	err = e.PrimaryKey.VerifyKeySignature(subKey.PublicKey, subKey.Sig)
-	if err != nil {
-		return errors.StructuralError("subkey signature invalid: " + err.Error())
-	}
+
 	e.Subkeys = append(e.Subkeys, subKey)
+
 	return nil
 }
 
+func shouldReplaceSubkeySig(existingSig, potentialNewSig *packet.Signature) bool {
+	if potentialNewSig == nil {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	if existingSig == nil {
+		return true
+	}
+
+	if existingSig.SigType == packet.SigTypeSubkeyRevocation {
+		return false // never override a revocation signature
+	}
+
+	return potentialNewSig.CreationTime.After(existingSig.CreationTime)
+}
+
 const defaultRSAKeyBits = 2048
 
 // NewEntity returns an Entity that contains a fresh RSA/RSA keypair with a
@@ -487,7 +531,7 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
 	}
 	isPrimaryId := true
 	e.Identities[uid.Id] = &Identity{
-		Name:   uid.Name,
+		Name:   uid.Id,
 		UserId: uid,
 		SelfSignature: &packet.Signature{
 			CreationTime: currentTime,
@@ -501,6 +545,10 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
 			IssuerKeyId:  &e.PrimaryKey.KeyId,
 		},
 	}
+	err = e.Identities[uid.Id].SelfSignature.SignUserId(uid.Id, e.PrimaryKey, e.PrivateKey, config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 
 	// If the user passes in a DefaultHash via packet.Config,
 	// set the PreferredHash for the SelfSignature.
@@ -508,6 +556,11 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
 		e.Identities[uid.Id].SelfSignature.PreferredHash = []uint8{hashToHashId(config.DefaultHash)}
 	}
 
+	// Likewise for DefaultCipher.
+	if config != nil && config.DefaultCipher != 0 {
+		e.Identities[uid.Id].SelfSignature.PreferredSymmetric = []uint8{uint8(config.DefaultCipher)}
+	}
+
 	e.Subkeys = make([]Subkey, 1)
 	e.Subkeys[0] = Subkey{
 		PublicKey:  packet.NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &encryptingPriv.PublicKey),
@@ -525,13 +578,16 @@ func NewEntity(name, comment, email string, config *packet.Config) (*Entity, err
 	}
 	e.Subkeys[0].PublicKey.IsSubkey = true
 	e.Subkeys[0].PrivateKey.IsSubkey = true
-
+	err = e.Subkeys[0].Sig.SignKey(e.Subkeys[0].PublicKey, e.PrivateKey, config)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 	return e, nil
 }
 
-// SerializePrivate serializes an Entity, including private key material, to
-// the given Writer. For now, it must only be used on an Entity returned from
-// NewEntity.
+// SerializePrivate serializes an Entity, including private key material, but
+// excluding signatures from other entities, to the given Writer.
+// Identities and subkeys are re-signed in case they changed since NewEntry.
 // If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
 func (e *Entity) SerializePrivate(w io.Writer, config *packet.Config) (err error) {
 	err = e.PrivateKey.Serialize(w)
@@ -569,8 +625,8 @@ func (e *Entity) SerializePrivate(w io.Writer, config *packet.Config) (err error
 	return nil
 }
 
-// Serialize writes the public part of the given Entity to w. (No private
-// key material will be output).
+// Serialize writes the public part of the given Entity to w, including
+// signatures from other entities. No private key material will be output.
 func (e *Entity) Serialize(w io.Writer) error {
 	err := e.PrimaryKey.Serialize(w)
 	if err != nil {
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/encrypted_key.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/encrypted_key.go
index 266840d05..02b372cf3 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/encrypted_key.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/encrypted_key.go
@@ -42,12 +42,18 @@ func (e *EncryptedKey) parse(r io.Reader) (err error) {
 	switch e.Algo {
 	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
 		e.encryptedMPI1.bytes, e.encryptedMPI1.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
 	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
 		e.encryptedMPI1.bytes, e.encryptedMPI1.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
 		if err != nil {
 			return
 		}
 		e.encryptedMPI2.bytes, e.encryptedMPI2.bitLength, err = readMPI(r)
+		if err != nil {
+			return
+		}
 	}
 	_, err = consumeAll(r)
 	return
@@ -72,7 +78,8 @@ func (e *EncryptedKey) Decrypt(priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) error {
 	// padding oracle attacks.
 	switch priv.PubKeyAlgo {
 	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly:
-		b, err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15(config.Random(), priv.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey), e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)
+		k := priv.PrivateKey.(*rsa.PrivateKey)
+		b, err = rsa.DecryptPKCS1v15(config.Random(), k, padToKeySize(&k.PublicKey, e.encryptedMPI1.bytes))
 	case PubKeyAlgoElGamal:
 		c1 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI1.bytes)
 		c2 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(e.encryptedMPI2.bytes)
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/packet.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/packet.go
index 3eded93f0..5af64c542 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/packet.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/packet.go
@@ -11,10 +11,12 @@ import (
 	"crypto/aes"
 	"crypto/cipher"
 	"crypto/des"
-	"golang.org/x/crypto/cast5"
-	"golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors"
+	"crypto/rsa"
 	"io"
 	"math/big"
+
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/cast5"
+	"golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors"
 )
 
 // readFull is the same as io.ReadFull except that reading zero bytes returns
@@ -402,14 +404,16 @@ const (
 type PublicKeyAlgorithm uint8
 
 const (
-	PubKeyAlgoRSA            PublicKeyAlgorithm = 1
-	PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly PublicKeyAlgorithm = 2
-	PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly    PublicKeyAlgorithm = 3
-	PubKeyAlgoElGamal        PublicKeyAlgorithm = 16
-	PubKeyAlgoDSA            PublicKeyAlgorithm = 17
+	PubKeyAlgoRSA     PublicKeyAlgorithm = 1
+	PubKeyAlgoElGamal PublicKeyAlgorithm = 16
+	PubKeyAlgoDSA     PublicKeyAlgorithm = 17
 	// RFC 6637, Section 5.
 	PubKeyAlgoECDH  PublicKeyAlgorithm = 18
 	PubKeyAlgoECDSA PublicKeyAlgorithm = 19
+
+	// Deprecated in RFC 4880, Section 13.5. Use key flags instead.
+	PubKeyAlgoRSAEncryptOnly PublicKeyAlgorithm = 2
+	PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly    PublicKeyAlgorithm = 3
 )
 
 // CanEncrypt returns true if it's possible to encrypt a message to a public
@@ -500,19 +504,17 @@ func readMPI(r io.Reader) (mpi []byte, bitLength uint16, err error) {
 	numBytes := (int(bitLength) + 7) / 8
 	mpi = make([]byte, numBytes)
 	_, err = readFull(r, mpi)
-	return
-}
-
-// mpiLength returns the length of the given *big.Int when serialized as an
-// MPI.
-func mpiLength(n *big.Int) (mpiLengthInBytes int) {
-	mpiLengthInBytes = 2 /* MPI length */
-	mpiLengthInBytes += (n.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	// According to RFC 4880 3.2. we should check that the MPI has no leading
+	// zeroes (at least when not an encrypted MPI?), but this implementation
+	// does generate leading zeroes, so we keep accepting them.
 	return
 }
 
 // writeMPI serializes a big integer to w.
 func writeMPI(w io.Writer, bitLength uint16, mpiBytes []byte) (err error) {
+	// Note that we can produce leading zeroes, in violation of RFC 4880 3.2.
+	// Implementations seem to be tolerant of them, and stripping them would
+	// make it complex to guarantee matching re-serialization.
 	_, err = w.Write([]byte{byte(bitLength >> 8), byte(bitLength)})
 	if err == nil {
 		_, err = w.Write(mpiBytes)
@@ -525,6 +527,18 @@ func writeBig(w io.Writer, i *big.Int) error {
 	return writeMPI(w, uint16(i.BitLen()), i.Bytes())
 }
 
+// padToKeySize left-pads a MPI with zeroes to match the length of the
+// specified RSA public.
+func padToKeySize(pub *rsa.PublicKey, b []byte) []byte {
+	k := (pub.N.BitLen() + 7) / 8
+	if len(b) >= k {
+		return b
+	}
+	bb := make([]byte, k)
+	copy(bb[len(bb)-len(b):], b)
+	return bb
+}
+
 // CompressionAlgo Represents the different compression algorithms
 // supported by OpenPGP (except for BZIP2, which is not currently
 // supported). See Section 9.3 of RFC 4880.
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go
index 34734cc63..bd31cceac 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/private_key.go
@@ -64,14 +64,19 @@ func NewECDSAPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, priv *ecdsa.PrivateKey) *PrivateK
 	return pk
 }
 
-// NewSignerPrivateKey creates a sign-only PrivateKey from a crypto.Signer that
+// NewSignerPrivateKey creates a PrivateKey from a crypto.Signer that
 // implements RSA or ECDSA.
 func NewSignerPrivateKey(currentTime time.Time, signer crypto.Signer) *PrivateKey {
 	pk := new(PrivateKey)
+	// In general, the public Keys should be used as pointers. We still
+	// type-switch on the values, for backwards-compatibility.
 	switch pubkey := signer.Public().(type) {
+	case *rsa.PublicKey:
+		pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, pubkey)
 	case rsa.PublicKey:
 		pk.PublicKey = *NewRSAPublicKey(currentTime, &pubkey)
-		pk.PubKeyAlgo = PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly
+	case *ecdsa.PublicKey:
+		pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, pubkey)
 	case ecdsa.PublicKey:
 		pk.PublicKey = *NewECDSAPublicKey(currentTime, &pubkey)
 	default:
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/public_key.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/public_key.go
index ead26233d..fcd5f5251 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/public_key.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/public_key.go
@@ -244,7 +244,12 @@ func NewECDSAPublicKey(creationTime time.Time, pub *ecdsa.PublicKey) *PublicKey
 	}
 
 	pk.ec.p.bytes = elliptic.Marshal(pub.Curve, pub.X, pub.Y)
-	pk.ec.p.bitLength = uint16(8 * len(pk.ec.p.bytes))
+
+	// The bit length is 3 (for the 0x04 specifying an uncompressed key)
+	// plus two field elements (for x and y), which are rounded up to the
+	// nearest byte. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6637#section-6
+	fieldBytes := (pub.Curve.Params().BitSize + 7) & ^7
+	pk.ec.p.bitLength = uint16(3 + fieldBytes + fieldBytes)
 
 	pk.setFingerPrintAndKeyId()
 	return pk
@@ -515,7 +520,7 @@ func (pk *PublicKey) VerifySignature(signed hash.Hash, sig *Signature) (err erro
 	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
 	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
 		rsaPublicKey, _ := pk.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
-		err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, sig.RSASignature.bytes)
+		err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, padToKeySize(rsaPublicKey, sig.RSASignature.bytes))
 		if err != nil {
 			return errors.SignatureError("RSA verification failure")
 		}
@@ -566,7 +571,7 @@ func (pk *PublicKey) VerifySignatureV3(signed hash.Hash, sig *SignatureV3) (err
 	switch pk.PubKeyAlgo {
 	case PubKeyAlgoRSA, PubKeyAlgoRSASignOnly:
 		rsaPublicKey := pk.PublicKey.(*rsa.PublicKey)
-		if err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, sig.RSASignature.bytes); err != nil {
+		if err = rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15(rsaPublicKey, sig.Hash, hashBytes, padToKeySize(rsaPublicKey, sig.RSASignature.bytes)); err != nil {
 			return errors.SignatureError("RSA verification failure")
 		}
 		return
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/signature.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/signature.go
index 6ce0cbedb..b2a24a532 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/signature.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/signature.go
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ func (sig *Signature) Sign(h hash.Hash, priv *PrivateKey, config *Config) (err e
 			r, s, err = ecdsa.Sign(config.Random(), pk, digest)
 		} else {
 			var b []byte
-			b, err = priv.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(config.Random(), digest, nil)
+			b, err = priv.PrivateKey.(crypto.Signer).Sign(config.Random(), digest, sig.Hash)
 			if err == nil {
 				r, s, err = unwrapECDSASig(b)
 			}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/userattribute.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/userattribute.go
index 96a2b382a..d19ffbc78 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/userattribute.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet/userattribute.go
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ func (uat *UserAttribute) Serialize(w io.Writer) (err error) {
 
 // ImageData returns zero or more byte slices, each containing
 // JPEG File Interchange Format (JFIF), for each photo in the
-// the user attribute packet.
+// user attribute packet.
 func (uat *UserAttribute) ImageData() (imageData [][]byte) {
 	for _, sp := range uat.Contents {
 		if sp.SubType == UserAttrImageSubpacket && len(sp.Contents) > 16 {
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/write.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/write.go
index 65a304cc8..4ee71784e 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/write.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/write.go
@@ -164,12 +164,12 @@ func hashToHashId(h crypto.Hash) uint8 {
 	return v
 }
 
-// Encrypt encrypts a message to a number of recipients and, optionally, signs
-// it. hints contains optional information, that is also encrypted, that aids
-// the recipients in processing the message. The resulting WriteCloser must
-// be closed after the contents of the file have been written.
-// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
-func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHints, config *packet.Config) (plaintext io.WriteCloser, err error) {
+// writeAndSign writes the data as a payload package and, optionally, signs
+// it. hints contains optional information, that is also encrypted,
+// that aids the recipients in processing the message. The resulting
+// WriteCloser must be closed after the contents of the file have been
+// written. If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func writeAndSign(payload io.WriteCloser, candidateHashes []uint8, signed *Entity, hints *FileHints, config *packet.Config) (plaintext io.WriteCloser, err error) {
 	var signer *packet.PrivateKey
 	if signed != nil {
 		signKey, ok := signed.signingKey(config.Now())
@@ -185,6 +185,83 @@ func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHint
 		}
 	}
 
+	var hash crypto.Hash
+	for _, hashId := range candidateHashes {
+		if h, ok := s2k.HashIdToHash(hashId); ok && h.Available() {
+			hash = h
+			break
+		}
+	}
+
+	// If the hash specified by config is a candidate, we'll use that.
+	if configuredHash := config.Hash(); configuredHash.Available() {
+		for _, hashId := range candidateHashes {
+			if h, ok := s2k.HashIdToHash(hashId); ok && h == configuredHash {
+				hash = h
+				break
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if hash == 0 {
+		hashId := candidateHashes[0]
+		name, ok := s2k.HashIdToString(hashId)
+		if !ok {
+			name = "#" + strconv.Itoa(int(hashId))
+		}
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("cannot encrypt because no candidate hash functions are compiled in. (Wanted " + name + " in this case.)")
+	}
+
+	if signer != nil {
+		ops := &packet.OnePassSignature{
+			SigType:    packet.SigTypeBinary,
+			Hash:       hash,
+			PubKeyAlgo: signer.PubKeyAlgo,
+			KeyId:      signer.KeyId,
+			IsLast:     true,
+		}
+		if err := ops.Serialize(payload); err != nil {
+			return nil, err
+		}
+	}
+
+	if hints == nil {
+		hints = &FileHints{}
+	}
+
+	w := payload
+	if signer != nil {
+		// If we need to write a signature packet after the literal
+		// data then we need to stop literalData from closing
+		// encryptedData.
+		w = noOpCloser{w}
+
+	}
+	var epochSeconds uint32
+	if !hints.ModTime.IsZero() {
+		epochSeconds = uint32(hints.ModTime.Unix())
+	}
+	literalData, err := packet.SerializeLiteral(w, hints.IsBinary, hints.FileName, epochSeconds)
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
+
+	if signer != nil {
+		return signatureWriter{payload, literalData, hash, hash.New(), signer, config}, nil
+	}
+	return literalData, nil
+}
+
+// Encrypt encrypts a message to a number of recipients and, optionally, signs
+// it. hints contains optional information, that is also encrypted, that aids
+// the recipients in processing the message. The resulting WriteCloser must
+// be closed after the contents of the file have been written.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHints, config *packet.Config) (plaintext io.WriteCloser, err error) {
+	if len(to) == 0 {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("no encryption recipient provided")
+	}
+
 	// These are the possible ciphers that we'll use for the message.
 	candidateCiphers := []uint8{
 		uint8(packet.CipherAES128),
@@ -194,6 +271,7 @@ func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHint
 	// These are the possible hash functions that we'll use for the signature.
 	candidateHashes := []uint8{
 		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA256),
+		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA384),
 		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA512),
 		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA1),
 		hashToHashId(crypto.RIPEMD160),
@@ -241,33 +319,6 @@ func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHint
 		}
 	}
 
-	var hash crypto.Hash
-	for _, hashId := range candidateHashes {
-		if h, ok := s2k.HashIdToHash(hashId); ok && h.Available() {
-			hash = h
-			break
-		}
-	}
-
-	// If the hash specified by config is a candidate, we'll use that.
-	if configuredHash := config.Hash(); configuredHash.Available() {
-		for _, hashId := range candidateHashes {
-			if h, ok := s2k.HashIdToHash(hashId); ok && h == configuredHash {
-				hash = h
-				break
-			}
-		}
-	}
-
-	if hash == 0 {
-		hashId := candidateHashes[0]
-		name, ok := s2k.HashIdToString(hashId)
-		if !ok {
-			name = "#" + strconv.Itoa(int(hashId))
-		}
-		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("cannot encrypt because no candidate hash functions are compiled in. (Wanted " + name + " in this case.)")
-	}
-
 	symKey := make([]byte, cipher.KeySize())
 	if _, err := io.ReadFull(config.Random(), symKey); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
@@ -279,49 +330,38 @@ func Encrypt(ciphertext io.Writer, to []*Entity, signed *Entity, hints *FileHint
 		}
 	}
 
-	encryptedData, err := packet.SerializeSymmetricallyEncrypted(ciphertext, cipher, symKey, config)
+	payload, err := packet.SerializeSymmetricallyEncrypted(ciphertext, cipher, symKey, config)
 	if err != nil {
 		return
 	}
 
-	if signer != nil {
-		ops := &packet.OnePassSignature{
-			SigType:    packet.SigTypeBinary,
-			Hash:       hash,
-			PubKeyAlgo: signer.PubKeyAlgo,
-			KeyId:      signer.KeyId,
-			IsLast:     true,
-		}
-		if err := ops.Serialize(encryptedData); err != nil {
-			return nil, err
-		}
-	}
+	return writeAndSign(payload, candidateHashes, signed, hints, config)
+}
 
-	if hints == nil {
-		hints = &FileHints{}
+// Sign signs a message. The resulting WriteCloser must be closed after the
+// contents of the file have been written.  hints contains optional information
+// that aids the recipients in processing the message.
+// If config is nil, sensible defaults will be used.
+func Sign(output io.Writer, signed *Entity, hints *FileHints, config *packet.Config) (input io.WriteCloser, err error) {
+	if signed == nil {
+		return nil, errors.InvalidArgumentError("no signer provided")
 	}
 
-	w := encryptedData
-	if signer != nil {
-		// If we need to write a signature packet after the literal
-		// data then we need to stop literalData from closing
-		// encryptedData.
-		w = noOpCloser{encryptedData}
-
-	}
-	var epochSeconds uint32
-	if !hints.ModTime.IsZero() {
-		epochSeconds = uint32(hints.ModTime.Unix())
-	}
-	literalData, err := packet.SerializeLiteral(w, hints.IsBinary, hints.FileName, epochSeconds)
-	if err != nil {
-		return nil, err
+	// These are the possible hash functions that we'll use for the signature.
+	candidateHashes := []uint8{
+		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA256),
+		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA384),
+		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA512),
+		hashToHashId(crypto.SHA1),
+		hashToHashId(crypto.RIPEMD160),
 	}
-
-	if signer != nil {
-		return signatureWriter{encryptedData, literalData, hash, hash.New(), signer, config}, nil
+	defaultHashes := candidateHashes[len(candidateHashes)-1:]
+	preferredHashes := signed.primaryIdentity().SelfSignature.PreferredHash
+	if len(preferredHashes) == 0 {
+		preferredHashes = defaultHashes
 	}
-	return literalData, nil
+	candidateHashes = intersectPreferences(candidateHashes, preferredHashes)
+	return writeAndSign(noOpCloser{output}, candidateHashes, signed, hints, config)
 }
 
 // signatureWriter hashes the contents of a message while passing it along to
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/otr/libotr_test_helper.c b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/otr/libotr_test_helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b3ca072d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/otr/libotr_test_helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// This code can be compiled and used to test the otr package against libotr.
+// See otr_test.go.
+
+// +build ignore
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <proto.h>
+#include <message.h>
+#include <privkey.h>
+
+static int g_session_established = 0;
+
+OtrlPolicy policy(void *opdata, ConnContext *context) {
+  return OTRL_POLICY_ALWAYS;
+}
+
+int is_logged_in(void *opdata, const char *accountname, const char *protocol,
+                 const char *recipient) {
+  return 1;
+}
+
+void inject_message(void *opdata, const char *accountname, const char *protocol,
+                    const char *recipient, const char *message) {
+  printf("%s\n", message);
+  fflush(stdout);
+  fprintf(stderr, "libotr helper sent: %s\n", message);
+}
+
+void update_context_list(void *opdata) {}
+
+void new_fingerprint(void *opdata, OtrlUserState us, const char *accountname,
+                     const char *protocol, const char *username,
+                     unsigned char fingerprint[20]) {
+  fprintf(stderr, "NEW FINGERPRINT\n");
+  g_session_established = 1;
+}
+
+void write_fingerprints(void *opdata) {}
+
+void gone_secure(void *opdata, ConnContext *context) {}
+
+void gone_insecure(void *opdata, ConnContext *context) {}
+
+void still_secure(void *opdata, ConnContext *context, int is_reply) {}
+
+int max_message_size(void *opdata, ConnContext *context) { return 99999; }
+
+const char *account_name(void *opdata, const char *account,
+                         const char *protocol) {
+  return "ACCOUNT";
+}
+
+void account_name_free(void *opdata, const char *account_name) {}
+
+const char *error_message(void *opdata, ConnContext *context,
+                          OtrlErrorCode err_code) {
+  return "ERR";
+}
+
+void error_message_free(void *opdata, const char *msg) {}
+
+void resent_msg_prefix_free(void *opdata, const char *prefix) {}
+
+void handle_smp_event(void *opdata, OtrlSMPEvent smp_event,
+                      ConnContext *context, unsigned short progress_event,
+                      char *question) {}
+
+void handle_msg_event(void *opdata, OtrlMessageEvent msg_event,
+                      ConnContext *context, const char *message,
+                      gcry_error_t err) {
+  fprintf(stderr, "msg event: %d %s\n", msg_event, message);
+}
+
+OtrlMessageAppOps uiops = {
+    policy,
+    NULL,
+    is_logged_in,
+    inject_message,
+    update_context_list,
+    new_fingerprint,
+    write_fingerprints,
+    gone_secure,
+    gone_insecure,
+    still_secure,
+    max_message_size,
+    account_name,
+    account_name_free,
+    NULL, /* received_symkey */
+    error_message,
+    error_message_free,
+    NULL, /* resent_msg_prefix */
+    resent_msg_prefix_free,
+    handle_smp_event,
+    handle_msg_event,
+    NULL /* create_instag */,
+    NULL /* convert_msg */,
+    NULL /* convert_free */,
+    NULL /* timer_control */,
+};
+
+static const char kPrivateKeyData[] =
+    "(privkeys (account (name \"account\") (protocol proto) (private-key (dsa "
+    "(p "
+    "#00FC07ABCF0DC916AFF6E9AE47BEF60C7AB9B4D6B2469E436630E36F8A489BE812486A09F"
+    "30B71224508654940A835301ACC525A4FF133FC152CC53DCC59D65C30A54F1993FE13FE63E"
+    "5823D4C746DB21B90F9B9C00B49EC7404AB1D929BA7FBA12F2E45C6E0A651689750E8528AB"
+    "8C031D3561FECEE72EBB4A090D450A9B7A857#) (q "
+    "#00997BD266EF7B1F60A5C23F3A741F2AEFD07A2081#) (g "
+    "#535E360E8A95EBA46A4F7DE50AD6E9B2A6DB785A66B64EB9F20338D2A3E8FB0E94725848F"
+    "1AA6CC567CB83A1CC517EC806F2E92EAE71457E80B2210A189B91250779434B41FC8A8873F"
+    "6DB94BEA7D177F5D59E7E114EE10A49CFD9CEF88AE43387023B672927BA74B04EB6BBB5E57"
+    "597766A2F9CE3857D7ACE3E1E3BC1FC6F26#) (y "
+    "#0AC8670AD767D7A8D9D14CC1AC6744CD7D76F993B77FFD9E39DF01E5A6536EF65E775FCEF"
+    "2A983E2A19BD6415500F6979715D9FD1257E1FE2B6F5E1E74B333079E7C880D39868462A93"
+    "454B41877BE62E5EF0A041C2EE9C9E76BD1E12AE25D9628DECB097025DD625EF49C3258A1A"
+    "3C0FF501E3DC673B76D7BABF349009B6ECF#) (x "
+    "#14D0345A3562C480A039E3C72764F72D79043216#)))))\n";
+
+int main() {
+  OTRL_INIT;
+
+  // We have to write the private key information to a file because the libotr
+  // API demands a filename to read from.
+  const char *tmpdir = "/tmp";
+  if (getenv("TMP")) {
+    tmpdir = getenv("TMP");
+  }
+
+  char private_key_file[256];
+  snprintf(private_key_file, sizeof(private_key_file),
+           "%s/libotr_test_helper_privatekeys-XXXXXX", tmpdir);
+  int fd = mkstemp(private_key_file);
+  if (fd == -1) {
+    perror("creating temp file");
+  }
+  write(fd, kPrivateKeyData, sizeof(kPrivateKeyData) - 1);
+  close(fd);
+
+  OtrlUserState userstate = otrl_userstate_create();
+  otrl_privkey_read(userstate, private_key_file);
+  unlink(private_key_file);
+
+  fprintf(stderr, "libotr helper started\n");
+
+  char buf[4096];
+
+  for (;;) {
+    char *message = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin);
+    if (strlen(message) == 0) {
+      break;
+    }
+    message[strlen(message) - 1] = 0;
+    fprintf(stderr, "libotr helper got: %s\n", message);
+
+    char *newmessage = NULL;
+    OtrlTLV *tlvs;
+    int ignore_message = otrl_message_receiving(
+        userstate, &uiops, NULL, "account", "proto", "peer", message,
+        &newmessage, &tlvs, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+    if (tlvs) {
+      otrl_tlv_free(tlvs);
+    }
+
+    if (newmessage != NULL) {
+      fprintf(stderr, "libotr got: %s\n", newmessage);
+      otrl_message_free(newmessage);
+
+      gcry_error_t err;
+      char *newmessage = NULL;
+
+      err = otrl_message_sending(userstate, &uiops, NULL, "account", "proto",
+                                 "peer", 0, "test message", NULL, &newmessage,
+                                 OTRL_FRAGMENT_SEND_SKIP, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+      if (newmessage == NULL) {
+        fprintf(stderr, "libotr didn't encrypt message\n");
+        return 1;
+      }
+      write(1, newmessage, strlen(newmessage));
+      write(1, "\n", 1);
+      fprintf(stderr, "libotr sent: %s\n", newmessage);
+      otrl_message_free(newmessage);
+
+      g_session_established = 0;
+      write(1, "?OTRv2?\n", 8);
+      fprintf(stderr, "libotr sent: ?OTRv2\n");
+    }
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/otr/otr.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/otr/otr.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..173b753db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/otr/otr.go
@@ -0,0 +1,1415 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package otr implements the Off The Record protocol as specified in
+// http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/Protocol-v2-3.1.0.html
+package otr // import "golang.org/x/crypto/otr"
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/dsa"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+	"strconv"
+)
+
+// SecurityChange describes a change in the security state of a Conversation.
+type SecurityChange int
+
+const (
+	NoChange SecurityChange = iota
+	// NewKeys indicates that a key exchange has completed. This occurs
+	// when a conversation first becomes encrypted, and when the keys are
+	// renegotiated within an encrypted conversation.
+	NewKeys
+	// SMPSecretNeeded indicates that the peer has started an
+	// authentication and that we need to supply a secret. Call SMPQuestion
+	// to get the optional, human readable challenge and then Authenticate
+	// to supply the matching secret.
+	SMPSecretNeeded
+	// SMPComplete indicates that an authentication completed. The identity
+	// of the peer has now been confirmed.
+	SMPComplete
+	// SMPFailed indicates that an authentication failed.
+	SMPFailed
+	// ConversationEnded indicates that the peer ended the secure
+	// conversation.
+	ConversationEnded
+)
+
+// QueryMessage can be sent to a peer to start an OTR conversation.
+var QueryMessage = "?OTRv2?"
+
+// ErrorPrefix can be used to make an OTR error by appending an error message
+// to it.
+var ErrorPrefix = "?OTR Error:"
+
+var (
+	fragmentPartSeparator = []byte(",")
+	fragmentPrefix        = []byte("?OTR,")
+	msgPrefix             = []byte("?OTR:")
+	queryMarker           = []byte("?OTR")
+)
+
+// isQuery attempts to parse an OTR query from msg and returns the greatest
+// common version, or 0 if msg is not an OTR query.
+func isQuery(msg []byte) (greatestCommonVersion int) {
+	pos := bytes.Index(msg, queryMarker)
+	if pos == -1 {
+		return 0
+	}
+	for i, c := range msg[pos+len(queryMarker):] {
+		if i == 0 {
+			if c == '?' {
+				// Indicates support for version 1, but we don't
+				// implement that.
+				continue
+			}
+
+			if c != 'v' {
+				// Invalid message
+				return 0
+			}
+
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if c == '?' {
+			// End of message
+			return
+		}
+
+		if c == ' ' || c == '\t' {
+			// Probably an invalid message
+			return 0
+		}
+
+		if c == '2' {
+			greatestCommonVersion = 2
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0
+}
+
+const (
+	statePlaintext = iota
+	stateEncrypted
+	stateFinished
+)
+
+const (
+	authStateNone = iota
+	authStateAwaitingDHKey
+	authStateAwaitingRevealSig
+	authStateAwaitingSig
+)
+
+const (
+	msgTypeDHCommit  = 2
+	msgTypeData      = 3
+	msgTypeDHKey     = 10
+	msgTypeRevealSig = 17
+	msgTypeSig       = 18
+)
+
+const (
+	// If the requested fragment size is less than this, it will be ignored.
+	minFragmentSize = 18
+	// Messages are padded to a multiple of this number of bytes.
+	paddingGranularity = 256
+	// The number of bytes in a Diffie-Hellman private value (320-bits).
+	dhPrivateBytes = 40
+	// The number of bytes needed to represent an element of the DSA
+	// subgroup (160-bits).
+	dsaSubgroupBytes = 20
+	// The number of bytes of the MAC that are sent on the wire (160-bits).
+	macPrefixBytes = 20
+)
+
+// These are the global, common group parameters for OTR.
+var (
+	p       *big.Int // group prime
+	g       *big.Int // group generator
+	q       *big.Int // group order
+	pMinus2 *big.Int
+)
+
+func init() {
+	p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA237327FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16)
+	q, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE487ED5110B4611A62633145C06E0E68948127044533E63A0105DF531D89CD9128A5043CC71A026EF7CA8CD9E69D218D98158536F92F8A1BA7F09AB6B6A8E122F242DABB312F3F637A262174D31BF6B585FFAE5B7A035BF6F71C35FDAD44CFD2D74F9208BE258FF324943328F6722D9EE1003E5C50B1DF82CC6D241B0E2AE9CD348B1FD47E9267AFC1B2AE91EE51D6CB0E3179AB1042A95DCF6A9483B84B4B36B3861AA7255E4C0278BA36046511B993FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16)
+	g = new(big.Int).SetInt64(2)
+	pMinus2 = new(big.Int).Sub(p, g)
+}
+
+// Conversation represents a relation with a peer. The zero value is a valid
+// Conversation, although PrivateKey must be set.
+//
+// When communicating with a peer, all inbound messages should be passed to
+// Conversation.Receive and all outbound messages to Conversation.Send. The
+// Conversation will take care of maintaining the encryption state and
+// negotiating encryption as needed.
+type Conversation struct {
+	// PrivateKey contains the private key to use to sign key exchanges.
+	PrivateKey *PrivateKey
+
+	// Rand can be set to override the entropy source. Otherwise,
+	// crypto/rand will be used.
+	Rand io.Reader
+	// If FragmentSize is set, all messages produced by Receive and Send
+	// will be fragmented into messages of, at most, this number of bytes.
+	FragmentSize int
+
+	// Once Receive has returned NewKeys once, the following fields are
+	// valid.
+	SSID           [8]byte
+	TheirPublicKey PublicKey
+
+	state, authState int
+
+	r       [16]byte
+	x, y    *big.Int
+	gx, gy  *big.Int
+	gxBytes []byte
+	digest  [sha256.Size]byte
+
+	revealKeys, sigKeys akeKeys
+
+	myKeyId         uint32
+	myCurrentDHPub  *big.Int
+	myCurrentDHPriv *big.Int
+	myLastDHPub     *big.Int
+	myLastDHPriv    *big.Int
+
+	theirKeyId        uint32
+	theirCurrentDHPub *big.Int
+	theirLastDHPub    *big.Int
+
+	keySlots [4]keySlot
+
+	myCounter    [8]byte
+	theirLastCtr [8]byte
+	oldMACs      []byte
+
+	k, n int // fragment state
+	frag []byte
+
+	smp smpState
+}
+
+// A keySlot contains key material for a specific (their keyid, my keyid) pair.
+type keySlot struct {
+	// used is true if this slot is valid. If false, it's free for reuse.
+	used                   bool
+	theirKeyId             uint32
+	myKeyId                uint32
+	sendAESKey, recvAESKey []byte
+	sendMACKey, recvMACKey []byte
+	theirLastCtr           [8]byte
+}
+
+// akeKeys are generated during key exchange. There's one set for the reveal
+// signature message and another for the signature message. In the protocol
+// spec the latter are indicated with a prime mark.
+type akeKeys struct {
+	c      [16]byte
+	m1, m2 [32]byte
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) rand() io.Reader {
+	if c.Rand != nil {
+		return c.Rand
+	}
+	return rand.Reader
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) randMPI(buf []byte) *big.Int {
+	_, err := io.ReadFull(c.rand(), buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("otr: short read from random source")
+	}
+
+	return new(big.Int).SetBytes(buf)
+}
+
+// tlv represents the type-length value from the protocol.
+type tlv struct {
+	typ, length uint16
+	data        []byte
+}
+
+const (
+	tlvTypePadding          = 0
+	tlvTypeDisconnected     = 1
+	tlvTypeSMP1             = 2
+	tlvTypeSMP2             = 3
+	tlvTypeSMP3             = 4
+	tlvTypeSMP4             = 5
+	tlvTypeSMPAbort         = 6
+	tlvTypeSMP1WithQuestion = 7
+)
+
+// Receive handles a message from a peer. It returns a human readable message,
+// an indicator of whether that message was encrypted, a hint about the
+// encryption state and zero or more messages to send back to the peer.
+// These messages do not need to be passed to Send before transmission.
+func (c *Conversation) Receive(in []byte) (out []byte, encrypted bool, change SecurityChange, toSend [][]byte, err error) {
+	if bytes.HasPrefix(in, fragmentPrefix) {
+		in, err = c.processFragment(in)
+		if in == nil || err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	if bytes.HasPrefix(in, msgPrefix) && in[len(in)-1] == '.' {
+		in = in[len(msgPrefix) : len(in)-1]
+	} else if version := isQuery(in); version > 0 {
+		c.authState = authStateAwaitingDHKey
+		c.reset()
+		toSend = c.encode(c.generateDHCommit())
+		return
+	} else {
+		// plaintext message
+		out = in
+		return
+	}
+
+	msg := make([]byte, base64.StdEncoding.DecodedLen(len(in)))
+	msgLen, err := base64.StdEncoding.Decode(msg, in)
+	if err != nil {
+		err = errors.New("otr: invalid base64 encoding in message")
+		return
+	}
+	msg = msg[:msgLen]
+
+	// The first two bytes are the protocol version (2)
+	if len(msg) < 3 || msg[0] != 0 || msg[1] != 2 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: invalid OTR message")
+		return
+	}
+
+	msgType := int(msg[2])
+	msg = msg[3:]
+
+	switch msgType {
+	case msgTypeDHCommit:
+		switch c.authState {
+		case authStateNone:
+			c.authState = authStateAwaitingRevealSig
+			if err = c.processDHCommit(msg); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			c.reset()
+			toSend = c.encode(c.generateDHKey())
+			return
+		case authStateAwaitingDHKey:
+			// This is a 'SYN-crossing'. The greater digest wins.
+			var cmp int
+			if cmp, err = c.compareToDHCommit(msg); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			if cmp > 0 {
+				// We win. Retransmit DH commit.
+				toSend = c.encode(c.serializeDHCommit())
+				return
+			} else {
+				// They win. We forget about our DH commit.
+				c.authState = authStateAwaitingRevealSig
+				if err = c.processDHCommit(msg); err != nil {
+					return
+				}
+				c.reset()
+				toSend = c.encode(c.generateDHKey())
+				return
+			}
+		case authStateAwaitingRevealSig:
+			if err = c.processDHCommit(msg); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			toSend = c.encode(c.serializeDHKey())
+		case authStateAwaitingSig:
+			if err = c.processDHCommit(msg); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			c.reset()
+			toSend = c.encode(c.generateDHKey())
+			c.authState = authStateAwaitingRevealSig
+		default:
+			panic("bad state")
+		}
+	case msgTypeDHKey:
+		switch c.authState {
+		case authStateAwaitingDHKey:
+			var isSame bool
+			if isSame, err = c.processDHKey(msg); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			if isSame {
+				err = errors.New("otr: unexpected duplicate DH key")
+				return
+			}
+			toSend = c.encode(c.generateRevealSig())
+			c.authState = authStateAwaitingSig
+		case authStateAwaitingSig:
+			var isSame bool
+			if isSame, err = c.processDHKey(msg); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			if isSame {
+				toSend = c.encode(c.serializeDHKey())
+			}
+		}
+	case msgTypeRevealSig:
+		if c.authState != authStateAwaitingRevealSig {
+			return
+		}
+		if err = c.processRevealSig(msg); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		toSend = c.encode(c.generateSig())
+		c.authState = authStateNone
+		c.state = stateEncrypted
+		change = NewKeys
+	case msgTypeSig:
+		if c.authState != authStateAwaitingSig {
+			return
+		}
+		if err = c.processSig(msg); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		c.authState = authStateNone
+		c.state = stateEncrypted
+		change = NewKeys
+	case msgTypeData:
+		if c.state != stateEncrypted {
+			err = errors.New("otr: encrypted message received without encrypted session established")
+			return
+		}
+		var tlvs []tlv
+		out, tlvs, err = c.processData(msg)
+		encrypted = true
+
+	EachTLV:
+		for _, inTLV := range tlvs {
+			switch inTLV.typ {
+			case tlvTypeDisconnected:
+				change = ConversationEnded
+				c.state = stateFinished
+				break EachTLV
+			case tlvTypeSMP1, tlvTypeSMP2, tlvTypeSMP3, tlvTypeSMP4, tlvTypeSMPAbort, tlvTypeSMP1WithQuestion:
+				var reply tlv
+				var complete bool
+				reply, complete, err = c.processSMP(inTLV)
+				if err == smpSecretMissingError {
+					err = nil
+					change = SMPSecretNeeded
+					c.smp.saved = &inTLV
+					return
+				}
+				if err == smpFailureError {
+					err = nil
+					change = SMPFailed
+				} else if complete {
+					change = SMPComplete
+				}
+				if reply.typ != 0 {
+					toSend = c.encode(c.generateData(nil, &reply))
+				}
+				break EachTLV
+			default:
+				// skip unknown TLVs
+			}
+		}
+	default:
+		err = errors.New("otr: unknown message type " + strconv.Itoa(msgType))
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+// Send takes a human readable message from the local user, possibly encrypts
+// it and returns zero one or more messages to send to the peer.
+func (c *Conversation) Send(msg []byte) ([][]byte, error) {
+	switch c.state {
+	case statePlaintext:
+		return [][]byte{msg}, nil
+	case stateEncrypted:
+		return c.encode(c.generateData(msg, nil)), nil
+	case stateFinished:
+		return nil, errors.New("otr: cannot send message because secure conversation has finished")
+	}
+
+	return nil, errors.New("otr: cannot send message in current state")
+}
+
+// SMPQuestion returns the human readable challenge question from the peer.
+// It's only valid after Receive has returned SMPSecretNeeded.
+func (c *Conversation) SMPQuestion() string {
+	return c.smp.question
+}
+
+// Authenticate begins an authentication with the peer. Authentication involves
+// an optional challenge message and a shared secret. The authentication
+// proceeds until either Receive returns SMPComplete, SMPSecretNeeded (which
+// indicates that a new authentication is happening and thus this one was
+// aborted) or SMPFailed.
+func (c *Conversation) Authenticate(question string, mutualSecret []byte) (toSend [][]byte, err error) {
+	if c.state != stateEncrypted {
+		err = errors.New("otr: can't authenticate a peer without a secure conversation established")
+		return
+	}
+
+	if c.smp.saved != nil {
+		c.calcSMPSecret(mutualSecret, false /* they started it */)
+
+		var out tlv
+		var complete bool
+		out, complete, err = c.processSMP(*c.smp.saved)
+		if complete {
+			panic("SMP completed on the first message")
+		}
+		c.smp.saved = nil
+		if out.typ != 0 {
+			toSend = c.encode(c.generateData(nil, &out))
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
+	c.calcSMPSecret(mutualSecret, true /* we started it */)
+	outs := c.startSMP(question)
+	for _, out := range outs {
+		toSend = append(toSend, c.encode(c.generateData(nil, &out))...)
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// End ends a secure conversation by generating a termination message for
+// the peer and switches to unencrypted communication.
+func (c *Conversation) End() (toSend [][]byte) {
+	switch c.state {
+	case statePlaintext:
+		return nil
+	case stateEncrypted:
+		c.state = statePlaintext
+		return c.encode(c.generateData(nil, &tlv{typ: tlvTypeDisconnected}))
+	case stateFinished:
+		c.state = statePlaintext
+		return nil
+	}
+	panic("unreachable")
+}
+
+// IsEncrypted returns true if a message passed to Send would be encrypted
+// before transmission. This result remains valid until the next call to
+// Receive or End, which may change the state of the Conversation.
+func (c *Conversation) IsEncrypted() bool {
+	return c.state == stateEncrypted
+}
+
+var fragmentError = errors.New("otr: invalid OTR fragment")
+
+// processFragment processes a fragmented OTR message and possibly returns a
+// complete message. Fragmented messages look like "?OTR,k,n,msg," where k is
+// the fragment number (starting from 1), n is the number of fragments in this
+// message and msg is a substring of the base64 encoded message.
+func (c *Conversation) processFragment(in []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
+	in = in[len(fragmentPrefix):] // remove "?OTR,"
+	parts := bytes.Split(in, fragmentPartSeparator)
+	if len(parts) != 4 || len(parts[3]) != 0 {
+		return nil, fragmentError
+	}
+
+	k, err := strconv.Atoi(string(parts[0]))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fragmentError
+	}
+
+	n, err := strconv.Atoi(string(parts[1]))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fragmentError
+	}
+
+	if k < 1 || n < 1 || k > n {
+		return nil, fragmentError
+	}
+
+	if k == 1 {
+		c.frag = append(c.frag[:0], parts[2]...)
+		c.k, c.n = k, n
+	} else if n == c.n && k == c.k+1 {
+		c.frag = append(c.frag, parts[2]...)
+		c.k++
+	} else {
+		c.frag = c.frag[:0]
+		c.n, c.k = 0, 0
+	}
+
+	if c.n > 0 && c.k == c.n {
+		c.n, c.k = 0, 0
+		return c.frag, nil
+	}
+
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateDHCommit() []byte {
+	_, err := io.ReadFull(c.rand(), c.r[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("otr: short read from random source")
+	}
+
+	var xBytes [dhPrivateBytes]byte
+	c.x = c.randMPI(xBytes[:])
+	c.gx = new(big.Int).Exp(g, c.x, p)
+	c.gy = nil
+	c.gxBytes = appendMPI(nil, c.gx)
+
+	h := sha256.New()
+	h.Write(c.gxBytes)
+	h.Sum(c.digest[:0])
+
+	aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(c.r[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	ctr := cipher.NewCTR(aesCipher, iv[:])
+	ctr.XORKeyStream(c.gxBytes, c.gxBytes)
+
+	return c.serializeDHCommit()
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) serializeDHCommit() []byte {
+	var ret []byte
+	ret = appendU16(ret, 2) // protocol version
+	ret = append(ret, msgTypeDHCommit)
+	ret = appendData(ret, c.gxBytes)
+	ret = appendData(ret, c.digest[:])
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processDHCommit(in []byte) error {
+	var ok1, ok2 bool
+	c.gxBytes, in, ok1 = getData(in)
+	digest, in, ok2 := getData(in)
+	if !ok1 || !ok2 || len(in) > 0 {
+		return errors.New("otr: corrupt DH commit message")
+	}
+	copy(c.digest[:], digest)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) compareToDHCommit(in []byte) (int, error) {
+	_, in, ok1 := getData(in)
+	digest, in, ok2 := getData(in)
+	if !ok1 || !ok2 || len(in) > 0 {
+		return 0, errors.New("otr: corrupt DH commit message")
+	}
+	return bytes.Compare(c.digest[:], digest), nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateDHKey() []byte {
+	var yBytes [dhPrivateBytes]byte
+	c.y = c.randMPI(yBytes[:])
+	c.gy = new(big.Int).Exp(g, c.y, p)
+	return c.serializeDHKey()
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) serializeDHKey() []byte {
+	var ret []byte
+	ret = appendU16(ret, 2) // protocol version
+	ret = append(ret, msgTypeDHKey)
+	ret = appendMPI(ret, c.gy)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processDHKey(in []byte) (isSame bool, err error) {
+	gy, in, ok := getMPI(in)
+	if !ok {
+		err = errors.New("otr: corrupt DH key message")
+		return
+	}
+	if gy.Cmp(g) < 0 || gy.Cmp(pMinus2) > 0 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: DH value out of range")
+		return
+	}
+	if c.gy != nil {
+		isSame = c.gy.Cmp(gy) == 0
+		return
+	}
+	c.gy = gy
+	return
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateEncryptedSignature(keys *akeKeys, xFirst bool) ([]byte, []byte) {
+	var xb []byte
+	xb = c.PrivateKey.PublicKey.Serialize(xb)
+
+	var verifyData []byte
+	if xFirst {
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gx)
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gy)
+	} else {
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gy)
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gx)
+	}
+	verifyData = append(verifyData, xb...)
+	verifyData = appendU32(verifyData, c.myKeyId)
+
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, keys.m1[:])
+	mac.Write(verifyData)
+	mb := mac.Sum(nil)
+
+	xb = appendU32(xb, c.myKeyId)
+	xb = append(xb, c.PrivateKey.Sign(c.rand(), mb)...)
+
+	aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(keys.c[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	ctr := cipher.NewCTR(aesCipher, iv[:])
+	ctr.XORKeyStream(xb, xb)
+
+	mac = hmac.New(sha256.New, keys.m2[:])
+	encryptedSig := appendData(nil, xb)
+	mac.Write(encryptedSig)
+
+	return encryptedSig, mac.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateRevealSig() []byte {
+	s := new(big.Int).Exp(c.gy, c.x, p)
+	c.calcAKEKeys(s)
+	c.myKeyId++
+
+	encryptedSig, mac := c.generateEncryptedSignature(&c.revealKeys, true /* gx comes first */)
+
+	c.myCurrentDHPub = c.gx
+	c.myCurrentDHPriv = c.x
+	c.rotateDHKeys()
+	incCounter(&c.myCounter)
+
+	var ret []byte
+	ret = appendU16(ret, 2)
+	ret = append(ret, msgTypeRevealSig)
+	ret = appendData(ret, c.r[:])
+	ret = append(ret, encryptedSig...)
+	ret = append(ret, mac[:20]...)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processEncryptedSig(encryptedSig, theirMAC []byte, keys *akeKeys, xFirst bool) error {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, keys.m2[:])
+	mac.Write(appendData(nil, encryptedSig))
+	myMAC := mac.Sum(nil)[:20]
+
+	if len(myMAC) != len(theirMAC) || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(myMAC, theirMAC) == 0 {
+		return errors.New("bad signature MAC in encrypted signature")
+	}
+
+	aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(keys.c[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	ctr := cipher.NewCTR(aesCipher, iv[:])
+	ctr.XORKeyStream(encryptedSig, encryptedSig)
+
+	sig := encryptedSig
+	sig, ok1 := c.TheirPublicKey.Parse(sig)
+	keyId, sig, ok2 := getU32(sig)
+	if !ok1 || !ok2 {
+		return errors.New("otr: corrupt encrypted signature")
+	}
+
+	var verifyData []byte
+	if xFirst {
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gx)
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gy)
+	} else {
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gy)
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gx)
+	}
+	verifyData = c.TheirPublicKey.Serialize(verifyData)
+	verifyData = appendU32(verifyData, keyId)
+
+	mac = hmac.New(sha256.New, keys.m1[:])
+	mac.Write(verifyData)
+	mb := mac.Sum(nil)
+
+	sig, ok1 = c.TheirPublicKey.Verify(mb, sig)
+	if !ok1 {
+		return errors.New("bad signature in encrypted signature")
+	}
+	if len(sig) > 0 {
+		return errors.New("corrupt encrypted signature")
+	}
+
+	c.theirKeyId = keyId
+	zero(c.theirLastCtr[:])
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processRevealSig(in []byte) error {
+	r, in, ok1 := getData(in)
+	encryptedSig, in, ok2 := getData(in)
+	theirMAC := in
+	if !ok1 || !ok2 || len(theirMAC) != 20 {
+		return errors.New("otr: corrupt reveal signature message")
+	}
+
+	aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errors.New("otr: cannot create AES cipher from reveal signature message: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	ctr := cipher.NewCTR(aesCipher, iv[:])
+	ctr.XORKeyStream(c.gxBytes, c.gxBytes)
+	h := sha256.New()
+	h.Write(c.gxBytes)
+	digest := h.Sum(nil)
+	if len(digest) != len(c.digest) || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(digest, c.digest[:]) == 0 {
+		return errors.New("otr: bad commit MAC in reveal signature message")
+	}
+	var rest []byte
+	c.gx, rest, ok1 = getMPI(c.gxBytes)
+	if !ok1 || len(rest) > 0 {
+		return errors.New("otr: gx corrupt after decryption")
+	}
+	if c.gx.Cmp(g) < 0 || c.gx.Cmp(pMinus2) > 0 {
+		return errors.New("otr: DH value out of range")
+	}
+	s := new(big.Int).Exp(c.gx, c.y, p)
+	c.calcAKEKeys(s)
+
+	if err := c.processEncryptedSig(encryptedSig, theirMAC, &c.revealKeys, true /* gx comes first */); err != nil {
+		return errors.New("otr: in reveal signature message: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	c.theirCurrentDHPub = c.gx
+	c.theirLastDHPub = nil
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateSig() []byte {
+	c.myKeyId++
+
+	encryptedSig, mac := c.generateEncryptedSignature(&c.sigKeys, false /* gy comes first */)
+
+	c.myCurrentDHPub = c.gy
+	c.myCurrentDHPriv = c.y
+	c.rotateDHKeys()
+	incCounter(&c.myCounter)
+
+	var ret []byte
+	ret = appendU16(ret, 2)
+	ret = append(ret, msgTypeSig)
+	ret = append(ret, encryptedSig...)
+	ret = append(ret, mac[:macPrefixBytes]...)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processSig(in []byte) error {
+	encryptedSig, in, ok1 := getData(in)
+	theirMAC := in
+	if !ok1 || len(theirMAC) != macPrefixBytes {
+		return errors.New("otr: corrupt signature message")
+	}
+
+	if err := c.processEncryptedSig(encryptedSig, theirMAC, &c.sigKeys, false /* gy comes first */); err != nil {
+		return errors.New("otr: in signature message: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	c.theirCurrentDHPub = c.gy
+	c.theirLastDHPub = nil
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) rotateDHKeys() {
+	// evict slots using our retired key id
+	for i := range c.keySlots {
+		slot := &c.keySlots[i]
+		if slot.used && slot.myKeyId == c.myKeyId-1 {
+			slot.used = false
+			c.oldMACs = append(c.oldMACs, slot.recvMACKey...)
+		}
+	}
+
+	c.myLastDHPriv = c.myCurrentDHPriv
+	c.myLastDHPub = c.myCurrentDHPub
+
+	var xBytes [dhPrivateBytes]byte
+	c.myCurrentDHPriv = c.randMPI(xBytes[:])
+	c.myCurrentDHPub = new(big.Int).Exp(g, c.myCurrentDHPriv, p)
+	c.myKeyId++
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processData(in []byte) (out []byte, tlvs []tlv, err error) {
+	origIn := in
+	flags, in, ok1 := getU8(in)
+	theirKeyId, in, ok2 := getU32(in)
+	myKeyId, in, ok3 := getU32(in)
+	y, in, ok4 := getMPI(in)
+	counter, in, ok5 := getNBytes(in, 8)
+	encrypted, in, ok6 := getData(in)
+	macedData := origIn[:len(origIn)-len(in)]
+	theirMAC, in, ok7 := getNBytes(in, macPrefixBytes)
+	_, in, ok8 := getData(in)
+	if !ok1 || !ok2 || !ok3 || !ok4 || !ok5 || !ok6 || !ok7 || !ok8 || len(in) > 0 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: corrupt data message")
+		return
+	}
+
+	ignoreErrors := flags&1 != 0
+
+	slot, err := c.calcDataKeys(myKeyId, theirKeyId)
+	if err != nil {
+		if ignoreErrors {
+			err = nil
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
+	mac := hmac.New(sha1.New, slot.recvMACKey)
+	mac.Write([]byte{0, 2, 3})
+	mac.Write(macedData)
+	myMAC := mac.Sum(nil)
+	if len(myMAC) != len(theirMAC) || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(myMAC, theirMAC) == 0 {
+		if !ignoreErrors {
+			err = errors.New("otr: bad MAC on data message")
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
+	if bytes.Compare(counter, slot.theirLastCtr[:]) <= 0 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: counter regressed")
+		return
+	}
+	copy(slot.theirLastCtr[:], counter)
+
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	copy(iv[:], counter)
+	aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(slot.recvAESKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	ctr := cipher.NewCTR(aesCipher, iv[:])
+	ctr.XORKeyStream(encrypted, encrypted)
+	decrypted := encrypted
+
+	if myKeyId == c.myKeyId {
+		c.rotateDHKeys()
+	}
+	if theirKeyId == c.theirKeyId {
+		// evict slots using their retired key id
+		for i := range c.keySlots {
+			slot := &c.keySlots[i]
+			if slot.used && slot.theirKeyId == theirKeyId-1 {
+				slot.used = false
+				c.oldMACs = append(c.oldMACs, slot.recvMACKey...)
+			}
+		}
+
+		c.theirLastDHPub = c.theirCurrentDHPub
+		c.theirKeyId++
+		c.theirCurrentDHPub = y
+	}
+
+	if nulPos := bytes.IndexByte(decrypted, 0); nulPos >= 0 {
+		out = decrypted[:nulPos]
+		tlvData := decrypted[nulPos+1:]
+		for len(tlvData) > 0 {
+			var t tlv
+			var ok1, ok2, ok3 bool
+
+			t.typ, tlvData, ok1 = getU16(tlvData)
+			t.length, tlvData, ok2 = getU16(tlvData)
+			t.data, tlvData, ok3 = getNBytes(tlvData, int(t.length))
+			if !ok1 || !ok2 || !ok3 {
+				err = errors.New("otr: corrupt tlv data")
+				return
+			}
+			tlvs = append(tlvs, t)
+		}
+	} else {
+		out = decrypted
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateData(msg []byte, extra *tlv) []byte {
+	slot, err := c.calcDataKeys(c.myKeyId-1, c.theirKeyId)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("otr: failed to generate sending keys: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	var plaintext []byte
+	plaintext = append(plaintext, msg...)
+	plaintext = append(plaintext, 0)
+
+	padding := paddingGranularity - ((len(plaintext) + 4) % paddingGranularity)
+	plaintext = appendU16(plaintext, tlvTypePadding)
+	plaintext = appendU16(plaintext, uint16(padding))
+	for i := 0; i < padding; i++ {
+		plaintext = append(plaintext, 0)
+	}
+
+	if extra != nil {
+		plaintext = appendU16(plaintext, extra.typ)
+		plaintext = appendU16(plaintext, uint16(len(extra.data)))
+		plaintext = append(plaintext, extra.data...)
+	}
+
+	encrypted := make([]byte, len(plaintext))
+
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	copy(iv[:], c.myCounter[:])
+	aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(slot.sendAESKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	ctr := cipher.NewCTR(aesCipher, iv[:])
+	ctr.XORKeyStream(encrypted, plaintext)
+
+	var ret []byte
+	ret = appendU16(ret, 2)
+	ret = append(ret, msgTypeData)
+	ret = append(ret, 0 /* flags */)
+	ret = appendU32(ret, c.myKeyId-1)
+	ret = appendU32(ret, c.theirKeyId)
+	ret = appendMPI(ret, c.myCurrentDHPub)
+	ret = append(ret, c.myCounter[:]...)
+	ret = appendData(ret, encrypted)
+
+	mac := hmac.New(sha1.New, slot.sendMACKey)
+	mac.Write(ret)
+	ret = append(ret, mac.Sum(nil)[:macPrefixBytes]...)
+	ret = appendData(ret, c.oldMACs)
+	c.oldMACs = nil
+	incCounter(&c.myCounter)
+
+	return ret
+}
+
+func incCounter(counter *[8]byte) {
+	for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- {
+		counter[i]++
+		if counter[i] > 0 {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// calcDataKeys computes the keys used to encrypt a data message given the key
+// IDs.
+func (c *Conversation) calcDataKeys(myKeyId, theirKeyId uint32) (slot *keySlot, err error) {
+	// Check for a cache hit.
+	for i := range c.keySlots {
+		slot = &c.keySlots[i]
+		if slot.used && slot.theirKeyId == theirKeyId && slot.myKeyId == myKeyId {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Find an empty slot to write into.
+	slot = nil
+	for i := range c.keySlots {
+		if !c.keySlots[i].used {
+			slot = &c.keySlots[i]
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if slot == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("otr: internal error: no more key slots")
+	}
+
+	var myPriv, myPub, theirPub *big.Int
+
+	if myKeyId == c.myKeyId {
+		myPriv = c.myCurrentDHPriv
+		myPub = c.myCurrentDHPub
+	} else if myKeyId == c.myKeyId-1 {
+		myPriv = c.myLastDHPriv
+		myPub = c.myLastDHPub
+	} else {
+		err = errors.New("otr: peer requested keyid " + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(myKeyId), 10) + " when I'm on " + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(c.myKeyId), 10))
+		return
+	}
+
+	if theirKeyId == c.theirKeyId {
+		theirPub = c.theirCurrentDHPub
+	} else if theirKeyId == c.theirKeyId-1 && c.theirLastDHPub != nil {
+		theirPub = c.theirLastDHPub
+	} else {
+		err = errors.New("otr: peer requested keyid " + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(myKeyId), 10) + " when they're on " + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(c.myKeyId), 10))
+		return
+	}
+
+	var sendPrefixByte, recvPrefixByte [1]byte
+
+	if myPub.Cmp(theirPub) > 0 {
+		// we're the high end
+		sendPrefixByte[0], recvPrefixByte[0] = 1, 2
+	} else {
+		// we're the low end
+		sendPrefixByte[0], recvPrefixByte[0] = 2, 1
+	}
+
+	s := new(big.Int).Exp(theirPub, myPriv, p)
+	sBytes := appendMPI(nil, s)
+
+	h := sha1.New()
+	h.Write(sendPrefixByte[:])
+	h.Write(sBytes)
+	slot.sendAESKey = h.Sum(slot.sendAESKey[:0])[:16]
+
+	h.Reset()
+	h.Write(slot.sendAESKey)
+	slot.sendMACKey = h.Sum(slot.sendMACKey[:0])
+
+	h.Reset()
+	h.Write(recvPrefixByte[:])
+	h.Write(sBytes)
+	slot.recvAESKey = h.Sum(slot.recvAESKey[:0])[:16]
+
+	h.Reset()
+	h.Write(slot.recvAESKey)
+	slot.recvMACKey = h.Sum(slot.recvMACKey[:0])
+
+	slot.theirKeyId = theirKeyId
+	slot.myKeyId = myKeyId
+	slot.used = true
+
+	zero(slot.theirLastCtr[:])
+	return
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) calcAKEKeys(s *big.Int) {
+	mpi := appendMPI(nil, s)
+	h := sha256.New()
+
+	var cBytes [32]byte
+	hashWithPrefix(c.SSID[:], 0, mpi, h)
+
+	hashWithPrefix(cBytes[:], 1, mpi, h)
+	copy(c.revealKeys.c[:], cBytes[:16])
+	copy(c.sigKeys.c[:], cBytes[16:])
+
+	hashWithPrefix(c.revealKeys.m1[:], 2, mpi, h)
+	hashWithPrefix(c.revealKeys.m2[:], 3, mpi, h)
+	hashWithPrefix(c.sigKeys.m1[:], 4, mpi, h)
+	hashWithPrefix(c.sigKeys.m2[:], 5, mpi, h)
+}
+
+func hashWithPrefix(out []byte, prefix byte, in []byte, h hash.Hash) {
+	h.Reset()
+	var p [1]byte
+	p[0] = prefix
+	h.Write(p[:])
+	h.Write(in)
+	if len(out) == h.Size() {
+		h.Sum(out[:0])
+	} else {
+		digest := h.Sum(nil)
+		copy(out, digest)
+	}
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) encode(msg []byte) [][]byte {
+	b64 := make([]byte, base64.StdEncoding.EncodedLen(len(msg))+len(msgPrefix)+1)
+	base64.StdEncoding.Encode(b64[len(msgPrefix):], msg)
+	copy(b64, msgPrefix)
+	b64[len(b64)-1] = '.'
+
+	if c.FragmentSize < minFragmentSize || len(b64) <= c.FragmentSize {
+		// We can encode this in a single fragment.
+		return [][]byte{b64}
+	}
+
+	// We have to fragment this message.
+	var ret [][]byte
+	bytesPerFragment := c.FragmentSize - minFragmentSize
+	numFragments := (len(b64) + bytesPerFragment) / bytesPerFragment
+
+	for i := 0; i < numFragments; i++ {
+		frag := []byte("?OTR," + strconv.Itoa(i+1) + "," + strconv.Itoa(numFragments) + ",")
+		todo := bytesPerFragment
+		if todo > len(b64) {
+			todo = len(b64)
+		}
+		frag = append(frag, b64[:todo]...)
+		b64 = b64[todo:]
+		frag = append(frag, ',')
+		ret = append(ret, frag)
+	}
+
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) reset() {
+	c.myKeyId = 0
+
+	for i := range c.keySlots {
+		c.keySlots[i].used = false
+	}
+}
+
+type PublicKey struct {
+	dsa.PublicKey
+}
+
+func (pk *PublicKey) Parse(in []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
+	var ok bool
+	var pubKeyType uint16
+
+	if pubKeyType, in, ok = getU16(in); !ok || pubKeyType != 0 {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	if pk.P, in, ok = getMPI(in); !ok {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	if pk.Q, in, ok = getMPI(in); !ok {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	if pk.G, in, ok = getMPI(in); !ok {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	if pk.Y, in, ok = getMPI(in); !ok {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	return in, true
+}
+
+func (pk *PublicKey) Serialize(in []byte) []byte {
+	in = appendU16(in, 0)
+	in = appendMPI(in, pk.P)
+	in = appendMPI(in, pk.Q)
+	in = appendMPI(in, pk.G)
+	in = appendMPI(in, pk.Y)
+	return in
+}
+
+// Fingerprint returns the 20-byte, binary fingerprint of the PublicKey.
+func (pk *PublicKey) Fingerprint() []byte {
+	b := pk.Serialize(nil)
+	h := sha1.New()
+	h.Write(b[2:])
+	return h.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+func (pk *PublicKey) Verify(hashed, sig []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
+	if len(sig) != 2*dsaSubgroupBytes {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:dsaSubgroupBytes])
+	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[dsaSubgroupBytes:])
+	ok := dsa.Verify(&pk.PublicKey, hashed, r, s)
+	return sig[dsaSubgroupBytes*2:], ok
+}
+
+type PrivateKey struct {
+	PublicKey
+	dsa.PrivateKey
+}
+
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, hashed []byte) []byte {
+	r, s, err := dsa.Sign(rand, &priv.PrivateKey, hashed)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	rBytes := r.Bytes()
+	sBytes := s.Bytes()
+	if len(rBytes) > dsaSubgroupBytes || len(sBytes) > dsaSubgroupBytes {
+		panic("DSA signature too large")
+	}
+
+	out := make([]byte, 2*dsaSubgroupBytes)
+	copy(out[dsaSubgroupBytes-len(rBytes):], rBytes)
+	copy(out[len(out)-len(sBytes):], sBytes)
+	return out
+}
+
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Serialize(in []byte) []byte {
+	in = priv.PublicKey.Serialize(in)
+	in = appendMPI(in, priv.PrivateKey.X)
+	return in
+}
+
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Parse(in []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
+	in, ok := priv.PublicKey.Parse(in)
+	if !ok {
+		return in, ok
+	}
+	priv.PrivateKey.PublicKey = priv.PublicKey.PublicKey
+	priv.PrivateKey.X, in, ok = getMPI(in)
+	return in, ok
+}
+
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Generate(rand io.Reader) {
+	if err := dsa.GenerateParameters(&priv.PrivateKey.PublicKey.Parameters, rand, dsa.L1024N160); err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	if err := dsa.GenerateKey(&priv.PrivateKey, rand); err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	priv.PublicKey.PublicKey = priv.PrivateKey.PublicKey
+}
+
+func notHex(r rune) bool {
+	if r >= '0' && r <= '9' ||
+		r >= 'a' && r <= 'f' ||
+		r >= 'A' && r <= 'F' {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return true
+}
+
+// Import parses the contents of a libotr private key file.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Import(in []byte) bool {
+	mpiStart := []byte(" #")
+
+	mpis := make([]*big.Int, 5)
+
+	for i := 0; i < len(mpis); i++ {
+		start := bytes.Index(in, mpiStart)
+		if start == -1 {
+			return false
+		}
+		in = in[start+len(mpiStart):]
+		end := bytes.IndexFunc(in, notHex)
+		if end == -1 {
+			return false
+		}
+		hexBytes := in[:end]
+		in = in[end:]
+
+		if len(hexBytes)&1 != 0 {
+			return false
+		}
+
+		mpiBytes := make([]byte, len(hexBytes)/2)
+		if _, err := hex.Decode(mpiBytes, hexBytes); err != nil {
+			return false
+		}
+
+		mpis[i] = new(big.Int).SetBytes(mpiBytes)
+	}
+
+	for _, mpi := range mpis {
+		if mpi.Sign() <= 0 {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+
+	priv.PrivateKey.P = mpis[0]
+	priv.PrivateKey.Q = mpis[1]
+	priv.PrivateKey.G = mpis[2]
+	priv.PrivateKey.Y = mpis[3]
+	priv.PrivateKey.X = mpis[4]
+	priv.PublicKey.PublicKey = priv.PrivateKey.PublicKey
+
+	a := new(big.Int).Exp(priv.PrivateKey.G, priv.PrivateKey.X, priv.PrivateKey.P)
+	return a.Cmp(priv.PrivateKey.Y) == 0
+}
+
+func getU8(in []byte) (uint8, []byte, bool) {
+	if len(in) < 1 {
+		return 0, in, false
+	}
+	return in[0], in[1:], true
+}
+
+func getU16(in []byte) (uint16, []byte, bool) {
+	if len(in) < 2 {
+		return 0, in, false
+	}
+	r := uint16(in[0])<<8 | uint16(in[1])
+	return r, in[2:], true
+}
+
+func getU32(in []byte) (uint32, []byte, bool) {
+	if len(in) < 4 {
+		return 0, in, false
+	}
+	r := uint32(in[0])<<24 | uint32(in[1])<<16 | uint32(in[2])<<8 | uint32(in[3])
+	return r, in[4:], true
+}
+
+func getMPI(in []byte) (*big.Int, []byte, bool) {
+	l, in, ok := getU32(in)
+	if !ok || uint32(len(in)) < l {
+		return nil, in, false
+	}
+	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(in[:l])
+	return r, in[l:], true
+}
+
+func getData(in []byte) ([]byte, []byte, bool) {
+	l, in, ok := getU32(in)
+	if !ok || uint32(len(in)) < l {
+		return nil, in, false
+	}
+	return in[:l], in[l:], true
+}
+
+func getNBytes(in []byte, n int) ([]byte, []byte, bool) {
+	if len(in) < n {
+		return nil, in, false
+	}
+	return in[:n], in[n:], true
+}
+
+func appendU16(out []byte, v uint16) []byte {
+	out = append(out, byte(v>>8), byte(v))
+	return out
+}
+
+func appendU32(out []byte, v uint32) []byte {
+	out = append(out, byte(v>>24), byte(v>>16), byte(v>>8), byte(v))
+	return out
+}
+
+func appendData(out, v []byte) []byte {
+	out = appendU32(out, uint32(len(v)))
+	out = append(out, v...)
+	return out
+}
+
+func appendMPI(out []byte, v *big.Int) []byte {
+	vBytes := v.Bytes()
+	out = appendU32(out, uint32(len(vBytes)))
+	out = append(out, vBytes...)
+	return out
+}
+
+func appendMPIs(out []byte, mpis ...*big.Int) []byte {
+	for _, mpi := range mpis {
+		out = appendMPI(out, mpi)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func zero(b []byte) {
+	for i := range b {
+		b[i] = 0
+	}
+}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/otr/smp.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/otr/smp.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dc6de4ee0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/otr/smp.go
@@ -0,0 +1,572 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// This file implements the Socialist Millionaires Protocol as described in
+// http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/Protocol-v2-3.1.0.html. The protocol
+// specification is required in order to understand this code and, where
+// possible, the variable names in the code match up with the spec.
+
+package otr
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"math/big"
+)
+
+type smpFailure string
+
+func (s smpFailure) Error() string {
+	return string(s)
+}
+
+var smpFailureError = smpFailure("otr: SMP protocol failed")
+var smpSecretMissingError = smpFailure("otr: mutual secret needed")
+
+const smpVersion = 1
+
+const (
+	smpState1 = iota
+	smpState2
+	smpState3
+	smpState4
+)
+
+type smpState struct {
+	state                  int
+	a2, a3, b2, b3, pb, qb *big.Int
+	g2a, g3a               *big.Int
+	g2, g3                 *big.Int
+	g3b, papb, qaqb, ra    *big.Int
+	saved                  *tlv
+	secret                 *big.Int
+	question               string
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) startSMP(question string) (tlvs []tlv) {
+	if c.smp.state != smpState1 {
+		tlvs = append(tlvs, c.generateSMPAbort())
+	}
+	tlvs = append(tlvs, c.generateSMP1(question))
+	c.smp.question = ""
+	c.smp.state = smpState2
+	return
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) resetSMP() {
+	c.smp.state = smpState1
+	c.smp.secret = nil
+	c.smp.question = ""
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processSMP(in tlv) (out tlv, complete bool, err error) {
+	data := in.data
+
+	switch in.typ {
+	case tlvTypeSMPAbort:
+		if c.smp.state != smpState1 {
+			err = smpFailureError
+		}
+		c.resetSMP()
+		return
+	case tlvTypeSMP1WithQuestion:
+		// We preprocess this into a SMP1 message.
+		nulPos := bytes.IndexByte(data, 0)
+		if nulPos == -1 {
+			err = errors.New("otr: SMP message with question didn't contain a NUL byte")
+			return
+		}
+		c.smp.question = string(data[:nulPos])
+		data = data[nulPos+1:]
+	}
+
+	numMPIs, data, ok := getU32(data)
+	if !ok || numMPIs > 20 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: corrupt SMP message")
+		return
+	}
+
+	mpis := make([]*big.Int, numMPIs)
+	for i := range mpis {
+		var ok bool
+		mpis[i], data, ok = getMPI(data)
+		if !ok {
+			err = errors.New("otr: corrupt SMP message")
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	switch in.typ {
+	case tlvTypeSMP1, tlvTypeSMP1WithQuestion:
+		if c.smp.state != smpState1 {
+			c.resetSMP()
+			out = c.generateSMPAbort()
+			return
+		}
+		if c.smp.secret == nil {
+			err = smpSecretMissingError
+			return
+		}
+		if err = c.processSMP1(mpis); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		c.smp.state = smpState3
+		out = c.generateSMP2()
+	case tlvTypeSMP2:
+		if c.smp.state != smpState2 {
+			c.resetSMP()
+			out = c.generateSMPAbort()
+			return
+		}
+		if out, err = c.processSMP2(mpis); err != nil {
+			out = c.generateSMPAbort()
+			return
+		}
+		c.smp.state = smpState4
+	case tlvTypeSMP3:
+		if c.smp.state != smpState3 {
+			c.resetSMP()
+			out = c.generateSMPAbort()
+			return
+		}
+		if out, err = c.processSMP3(mpis); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		c.smp.state = smpState1
+		c.smp.secret = nil
+		complete = true
+	case tlvTypeSMP4:
+		if c.smp.state != smpState4 {
+			c.resetSMP()
+			out = c.generateSMPAbort()
+			return
+		}
+		if err = c.processSMP4(mpis); err != nil {
+			out = c.generateSMPAbort()
+			return
+		}
+		c.smp.state = smpState1
+		c.smp.secret = nil
+		complete = true
+	default:
+		panic("unknown SMP message")
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) calcSMPSecret(mutualSecret []byte, weStarted bool) {
+	h := sha256.New()
+	h.Write([]byte{smpVersion})
+	if weStarted {
+		h.Write(c.PrivateKey.PublicKey.Fingerprint())
+		h.Write(c.TheirPublicKey.Fingerprint())
+	} else {
+		h.Write(c.TheirPublicKey.Fingerprint())
+		h.Write(c.PrivateKey.PublicKey.Fingerprint())
+	}
+	h.Write(c.SSID[:])
+	h.Write(mutualSecret)
+	c.smp.secret = new(big.Int).SetBytes(h.Sum(nil))
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateSMP1(question string) tlv {
+	var randBuf [16]byte
+	c.smp.a2 = c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	c.smp.a3 = c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	g2a := new(big.Int).Exp(g, c.smp.a2, p)
+	g3a := new(big.Int).Exp(g, c.smp.a3, p)
+	h := sha256.New()
+
+	r2 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	r := new(big.Int).Exp(g, r2, p)
+	c2 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 1, r))
+	d2 := new(big.Int).Mul(c.smp.a2, c2)
+	d2.Sub(r2, d2)
+	d2.Mod(d2, q)
+	if d2.Sign() < 0 {
+		d2.Add(d2, q)
+	}
+
+	r3 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	r.Exp(g, r3, p)
+	c3 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 2, r))
+	d3 := new(big.Int).Mul(c.smp.a3, c3)
+	d3.Sub(r3, d3)
+	d3.Mod(d3, q)
+	if d3.Sign() < 0 {
+		d3.Add(d3, q)
+	}
+
+	var ret tlv
+	if len(question) > 0 {
+		ret.typ = tlvTypeSMP1WithQuestion
+		ret.data = append(ret.data, question...)
+		ret.data = append(ret.data, 0)
+	} else {
+		ret.typ = tlvTypeSMP1
+	}
+	ret.data = appendU32(ret.data, 6)
+	ret.data = appendMPIs(ret.data, g2a, c2, d2, g3a, c3, d3)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processSMP1(mpis []*big.Int) error {
+	if len(mpis) != 6 {
+		return errors.New("otr: incorrect number of arguments in SMP1 message")
+	}
+	g2a := mpis[0]
+	c2 := mpis[1]
+	d2 := mpis[2]
+	g3a := mpis[3]
+	c3 := mpis[4]
+	d3 := mpis[5]
+	h := sha256.New()
+
+	r := new(big.Int).Exp(g, d2, p)
+	s := new(big.Int).Exp(g2a, c2, p)
+	r.Mul(r, s)
+	r.Mod(r, p)
+	t := new(big.Int).SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 1, r))
+	if c2.Cmp(t) != 0 {
+		return errors.New("otr: ZKP c2 incorrect in SMP1 message")
+	}
+	r.Exp(g, d3, p)
+	s.Exp(g3a, c3, p)
+	r.Mul(r, s)
+	r.Mod(r, p)
+	t.SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 2, r))
+	if c3.Cmp(t) != 0 {
+		return errors.New("otr: ZKP c3 incorrect in SMP1 message")
+	}
+
+	c.smp.g2a = g2a
+	c.smp.g3a = g3a
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateSMP2() tlv {
+	var randBuf [16]byte
+	b2 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	c.smp.b3 = c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	r2 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	r3 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	r4 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	r5 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	r6 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+
+	g2b := new(big.Int).Exp(g, b2, p)
+	g3b := new(big.Int).Exp(g, c.smp.b3, p)
+
+	r := new(big.Int).Exp(g, r2, p)
+	h := sha256.New()
+	c2 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 3, r))
+	d2 := new(big.Int).Mul(b2, c2)
+	d2.Sub(r2, d2)
+	d2.Mod(d2, q)
+	if d2.Sign() < 0 {
+		d2.Add(d2, q)
+	}
+
+	r.Exp(g, r3, p)
+	c3 := new(big.Int).SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 4, r))
+	d3 := new(big.Int).Mul(c.smp.b3, c3)
+	d3.Sub(r3, d3)
+	d3.Mod(d3, q)
+	if d3.Sign() < 0 {
+		d3.Add(d3, q)
+	}
+
+	c.smp.g2 = new(big.Int).Exp(c.smp.g2a, b2, p)
+	c.smp.g3 = new(big.Int).Exp(c.smp.g3a, c.smp.b3, p)
+	c.smp.pb = new(big.Int).Exp(c.smp.g3, r4, p)
+	c.smp.qb = new(big.Int).Exp(g, r4, p)
+	r.Exp(c.smp.g2, c.smp.secret, p)
+	c.smp.qb.Mul(c.smp.qb, r)
+	c.smp.qb.Mod(c.smp.qb, p)
+
+	s := new(big.Int)
+	s.Exp(c.smp.g2, r6, p)
+	r.Exp(g, r5, p)
+	s.Mul(r, s)
+	s.Mod(s, p)
+	r.Exp(c.smp.g3, r5, p)
+	cp := new(big.Int).SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 5, r, s))
+
+	// D5 = r5 - r4 cP mod q and D6 = r6 - y cP mod q
+
+	s.Mul(r4, cp)
+	r.Sub(r5, s)
+	d5 := new(big.Int).Mod(r, q)
+	if d5.Sign() < 0 {
+		d5.Add(d5, q)
+	}
+
+	s.Mul(c.smp.secret, cp)
+	r.Sub(r6, s)
+	d6 := new(big.Int).Mod(r, q)
+	if d6.Sign() < 0 {
+		d6.Add(d6, q)
+	}
+
+	var ret tlv
+	ret.typ = tlvTypeSMP2
+	ret.data = appendU32(ret.data, 11)
+	ret.data = appendMPIs(ret.data, g2b, c2, d2, g3b, c3, d3, c.smp.pb, c.smp.qb, cp, d5, d6)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processSMP2(mpis []*big.Int) (out tlv, err error) {
+	if len(mpis) != 11 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: incorrect number of arguments in SMP2 message")
+		return
+	}
+	g2b := mpis[0]
+	c2 := mpis[1]
+	d2 := mpis[2]
+	g3b := mpis[3]
+	c3 := mpis[4]
+	d3 := mpis[5]
+	pb := mpis[6]
+	qb := mpis[7]
+	cp := mpis[8]
+	d5 := mpis[9]
+	d6 := mpis[10]
+	h := sha256.New()
+
+	r := new(big.Int).Exp(g, d2, p)
+	s := new(big.Int).Exp(g2b, c2, p)
+	r.Mul(r, s)
+	r.Mod(r, p)
+	s.SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 3, r))
+	if c2.Cmp(s) != 0 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: ZKP c2 failed in SMP2 message")
+		return
+	}
+
+	r.Exp(g, d3, p)
+	s.Exp(g3b, c3, p)
+	r.Mul(r, s)
+	r.Mod(r, p)
+	s.SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 4, r))
+	if c3.Cmp(s) != 0 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: ZKP c3 failed in SMP2 message")
+		return
+	}
+
+	c.smp.g2 = new(big.Int).Exp(g2b, c.smp.a2, p)
+	c.smp.g3 = new(big.Int).Exp(g3b, c.smp.a3, p)
+
+	r.Exp(g, d5, p)
+	s.Exp(c.smp.g2, d6, p)
+	r.Mul(r, s)
+	s.Exp(qb, cp, p)
+	r.Mul(r, s)
+	r.Mod(r, p)
+
+	s.Exp(c.smp.g3, d5, p)
+	t := new(big.Int).Exp(pb, cp, p)
+	s.Mul(s, t)
+	s.Mod(s, p)
+	t.SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 5, s, r))
+	if cp.Cmp(t) != 0 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: ZKP cP failed in SMP2 message")
+		return
+	}
+
+	var randBuf [16]byte
+	r4 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	r5 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	r6 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	r7 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+
+	pa := new(big.Int).Exp(c.smp.g3, r4, p)
+	r.Exp(c.smp.g2, c.smp.secret, p)
+	qa := new(big.Int).Exp(g, r4, p)
+	qa.Mul(qa, r)
+	qa.Mod(qa, p)
+
+	r.Exp(g, r5, p)
+	s.Exp(c.smp.g2, r6, p)
+	r.Mul(r, s)
+	r.Mod(r, p)
+
+	s.Exp(c.smp.g3, r5, p)
+	cp.SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 6, s, r))
+
+	r.Mul(r4, cp)
+	d5 = new(big.Int).Sub(r5, r)
+	d5.Mod(d5, q)
+	if d5.Sign() < 0 {
+		d5.Add(d5, q)
+	}
+
+	r.Mul(c.smp.secret, cp)
+	d6 = new(big.Int).Sub(r6, r)
+	d6.Mod(d6, q)
+	if d6.Sign() < 0 {
+		d6.Add(d6, q)
+	}
+
+	r.ModInverse(qb, p)
+	qaqb := new(big.Int).Mul(qa, r)
+	qaqb.Mod(qaqb, p)
+
+	ra := new(big.Int).Exp(qaqb, c.smp.a3, p)
+	r.Exp(qaqb, r7, p)
+	s.Exp(g, r7, p)
+	cr := new(big.Int).SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 7, s, r))
+
+	r.Mul(c.smp.a3, cr)
+	d7 := new(big.Int).Sub(r7, r)
+	d7.Mod(d7, q)
+	if d7.Sign() < 0 {
+		d7.Add(d7, q)
+	}
+
+	c.smp.g3b = g3b
+	c.smp.qaqb = qaqb
+
+	r.ModInverse(pb, p)
+	c.smp.papb = new(big.Int).Mul(pa, r)
+	c.smp.papb.Mod(c.smp.papb, p)
+	c.smp.ra = ra
+
+	out.typ = tlvTypeSMP3
+	out.data = appendU32(out.data, 8)
+	out.data = appendMPIs(out.data, pa, qa, cp, d5, d6, ra, cr, d7)
+	return
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processSMP3(mpis []*big.Int) (out tlv, err error) {
+	if len(mpis) != 8 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: incorrect number of arguments in SMP3 message")
+		return
+	}
+	pa := mpis[0]
+	qa := mpis[1]
+	cp := mpis[2]
+	d5 := mpis[3]
+	d6 := mpis[4]
+	ra := mpis[5]
+	cr := mpis[6]
+	d7 := mpis[7]
+	h := sha256.New()
+
+	r := new(big.Int).Exp(g, d5, p)
+	s := new(big.Int).Exp(c.smp.g2, d6, p)
+	r.Mul(r, s)
+	s.Exp(qa, cp, p)
+	r.Mul(r, s)
+	r.Mod(r, p)
+
+	s.Exp(c.smp.g3, d5, p)
+	t := new(big.Int).Exp(pa, cp, p)
+	s.Mul(s, t)
+	s.Mod(s, p)
+	t.SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 6, s, r))
+	if t.Cmp(cp) != 0 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: ZKP cP failed in SMP3 message")
+		return
+	}
+
+	r.ModInverse(c.smp.qb, p)
+	qaqb := new(big.Int).Mul(qa, r)
+	qaqb.Mod(qaqb, p)
+
+	r.Exp(qaqb, d7, p)
+	s.Exp(ra, cr, p)
+	r.Mul(r, s)
+	r.Mod(r, p)
+
+	s.Exp(g, d7, p)
+	t.Exp(c.smp.g3a, cr, p)
+	s.Mul(s, t)
+	s.Mod(s, p)
+	t.SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 7, s, r))
+	if t.Cmp(cr) != 0 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: ZKP cR failed in SMP3 message")
+		return
+	}
+
+	var randBuf [16]byte
+	r7 := c.randMPI(randBuf[:])
+	rb := new(big.Int).Exp(qaqb, c.smp.b3, p)
+
+	r.Exp(qaqb, r7, p)
+	s.Exp(g, r7, p)
+	cr = new(big.Int).SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 8, s, r))
+
+	r.Mul(c.smp.b3, cr)
+	d7 = new(big.Int).Sub(r7, r)
+	d7.Mod(d7, q)
+	if d7.Sign() < 0 {
+		d7.Add(d7, q)
+	}
+
+	out.typ = tlvTypeSMP4
+	out.data = appendU32(out.data, 3)
+	out.data = appendMPIs(out.data, rb, cr, d7)
+
+	r.ModInverse(c.smp.pb, p)
+	r.Mul(pa, r)
+	r.Mod(r, p)
+	s.Exp(ra, c.smp.b3, p)
+	if r.Cmp(s) != 0 {
+		err = smpFailureError
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processSMP4(mpis []*big.Int) error {
+	if len(mpis) != 3 {
+		return errors.New("otr: incorrect number of arguments in SMP4 message")
+	}
+	rb := mpis[0]
+	cr := mpis[1]
+	d7 := mpis[2]
+	h := sha256.New()
+
+	r := new(big.Int).Exp(c.smp.qaqb, d7, p)
+	s := new(big.Int).Exp(rb, cr, p)
+	r.Mul(r, s)
+	r.Mod(r, p)
+
+	s.Exp(g, d7, p)
+	t := new(big.Int).Exp(c.smp.g3b, cr, p)
+	s.Mul(s, t)
+	s.Mod(s, p)
+	t.SetBytes(hashMPIs(h, 8, s, r))
+	if t.Cmp(cr) != 0 {
+		return errors.New("otr: ZKP cR failed in SMP4 message")
+	}
+
+	r.Exp(rb, c.smp.a3, p)
+	if r.Cmp(c.smp.papb) != 0 {
+		return smpFailureError
+	}
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateSMPAbort() tlv {
+	return tlv{typ: tlvTypeSMPAbort}
+}
+
+func hashMPIs(h hash.Hash, magic byte, mpis ...*big.Int) []byte {
+	if h != nil {
+		h.Reset()
+	} else {
+		h = sha256.New()
+	}
+
+	h.Write([]byte{magic})
+	for _, mpi := range mpis {
+		h.Write(appendMPI(nil, mpi))
+	}
+	return h.Sum(nil)
+}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/terminal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/terminal.go
index 18379a935..9a887598f 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/terminal.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/terminal.go
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ func writeWithCRLF(w io.Writer, buf []byte) (n int, err error) {
 			if _, err = w.Write(crlf); err != nil {
 				return n, err
 			}
-			n += 1
+			n++
 			buf = buf[1:]
 		}
 	}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util.go
index e7404ff49..391104084 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util.go
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
 // license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
 
-// +build darwin dragonfly freebsd linux,!appengine netbsd openbsd
+// +build aix darwin dragonfly freebsd linux,!appengine netbsd openbsd
 
 // Package terminal provides support functions for dealing with terminals, as
 // commonly found on UNIX systems.
@@ -17,44 +17,41 @@
 package terminal // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal"
 
 import (
-	"syscall"
-	"unsafe"
-
 	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
 )
 
 // State contains the state of a terminal.
 type State struct {
-	termios syscall.Termios
+	termios unix.Termios
 }
 
-// IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal.
+// IsTerminal returns whether the given file descriptor is a terminal.
 func IsTerminal(fd int) bool {
-	var termios syscall.Termios
-	_, _, err := syscall.Syscall6(syscall.SYS_IOCTL, uintptr(fd), ioctlReadTermios, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&termios)), 0, 0, 0)
-	return err == 0
+	_, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, ioctlReadTermios)
+	return err == nil
 }
 
 // MakeRaw put the terminal connected to the given file descriptor into raw
 // mode and returns the previous state of the terminal so that it can be
 // restored.
 func MakeRaw(fd int) (*State, error) {
-	var oldState State
-	if _, _, err := syscall.Syscall6(syscall.SYS_IOCTL, uintptr(fd), ioctlReadTermios, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&oldState.termios)), 0, 0, 0); err != 0 {
+	termios, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, ioctlReadTermios)
+	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	newState := oldState.termios
+	oldState := State{termios: *termios}
+
 	// This attempts to replicate the behaviour documented for cfmakeraw in
 	// the termios(3) manpage.
-	newState.Iflag &^= syscall.IGNBRK | syscall.BRKINT | syscall.PARMRK | syscall.ISTRIP | syscall.INLCR | syscall.IGNCR | syscall.ICRNL | syscall.IXON
-	newState.Oflag &^= syscall.OPOST
-	newState.Lflag &^= syscall.ECHO | syscall.ECHONL | syscall.ICANON | syscall.ISIG | syscall.IEXTEN
-	newState.Cflag &^= syscall.CSIZE | syscall.PARENB
-	newState.Cflag |= syscall.CS8
-	newState.Cc[unix.VMIN] = 1
-	newState.Cc[unix.VTIME] = 0
-	if _, _, err := syscall.Syscall6(syscall.SYS_IOCTL, uintptr(fd), ioctlWriteTermios, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&newState)), 0, 0, 0); err != 0 {
+	termios.Iflag &^= unix.IGNBRK | unix.BRKINT | unix.PARMRK | unix.ISTRIP | unix.INLCR | unix.IGNCR | unix.ICRNL | unix.IXON
+	termios.Oflag &^= unix.OPOST
+	termios.Lflag &^= unix.ECHO | unix.ECHONL | unix.ICANON | unix.ISIG | unix.IEXTEN
+	termios.Cflag &^= unix.CSIZE | unix.PARENB
+	termios.Cflag |= unix.CS8
+	termios.Cc[unix.VMIN] = 1
+	termios.Cc[unix.VTIME] = 0
+	if err := unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, ioctlWriteTermios, termios); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
@@ -64,60 +61,54 @@ func MakeRaw(fd int) (*State, error) {
 // GetState returns the current state of a terminal which may be useful to
 // restore the terminal after a signal.
 func GetState(fd int) (*State, error) {
-	var oldState State
-	if _, _, err := syscall.Syscall6(syscall.SYS_IOCTL, uintptr(fd), ioctlReadTermios, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&oldState.termios)), 0, 0, 0); err != 0 {
+	termios, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, ioctlReadTermios)
+	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	return &oldState, nil
+	return &State{termios: *termios}, nil
 }
 
 // Restore restores the terminal connected to the given file descriptor to a
 // previous state.
 func Restore(fd int, state *State) error {
-	if _, _, err := syscall.Syscall6(syscall.SYS_IOCTL, uintptr(fd), ioctlWriteTermios, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&state.termios)), 0, 0, 0); err != 0 {
-		return err
-	}
-	return nil
+	return unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, ioctlWriteTermios, &state.termios)
 }
 
 // GetSize returns the dimensions of the given terminal.
 func GetSize(fd int) (width, height int, err error) {
-	var dimensions [4]uint16
-
-	if _, _, err := syscall.Syscall6(syscall.SYS_IOCTL, uintptr(fd), uintptr(syscall.TIOCGWINSZ), uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&dimensions)), 0, 0, 0); err != 0 {
+	ws, err := unix.IoctlGetWinsize(fd, unix.TIOCGWINSZ)
+	if err != nil {
 		return -1, -1, err
 	}
-	return int(dimensions[1]), int(dimensions[0]), nil
+	return int(ws.Col), int(ws.Row), nil
 }
 
 // passwordReader is an io.Reader that reads from a specific file descriptor.
 type passwordReader int
 
 func (r passwordReader) Read(buf []byte) (int, error) {
-	return syscall.Read(int(r), buf)
+	return unix.Read(int(r), buf)
 }
 
 // ReadPassword reads a line of input from a terminal without local echo.  This
 // is commonly used for inputting passwords and other sensitive data. The slice
 // returned does not include the \n.
 func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) {
-	var oldState syscall.Termios
-	if _, _, err := syscall.Syscall6(syscall.SYS_IOCTL, uintptr(fd), ioctlReadTermios, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&oldState)), 0, 0, 0); err != 0 {
+	termios, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, ioctlReadTermios)
+	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	newState := oldState
-	newState.Lflag &^= syscall.ECHO
-	newState.Lflag |= syscall.ICANON | syscall.ISIG
-	newState.Iflag |= syscall.ICRNL
-	if _, _, err := syscall.Syscall6(syscall.SYS_IOCTL, uintptr(fd), ioctlWriteTermios, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&newState)), 0, 0, 0); err != 0 {
+	newState := *termios
+	newState.Lflag &^= unix.ECHO
+	newState.Lflag |= unix.ICANON | unix.ISIG
+	newState.Iflag |= unix.ICRNL
+	if err := unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, ioctlWriteTermios, &newState); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	defer func() {
-		syscall.Syscall6(syscall.SYS_IOCTL, uintptr(fd), ioctlWriteTermios, uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&oldState)), 0, 0, 0)
-	}()
+	defer unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, ioctlWriteTermios, termios)
 
 	return readPasswordLine(passwordReader(fd))
 }
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_aix.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_aix.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dfcd62785
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_aix.go
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// +build aix
+
+package terminal
+
+import "golang.org/x/sys/unix"
+
+const ioctlReadTermios = unix.TCGETS
+const ioctlWriteTermios = unix.TCSETS
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_plan9.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_plan9.go
index 799f049f0..9317ac7ed 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_plan9.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_plan9.go
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ import (
 
 type State struct{}
 
-// IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal.
+// IsTerminal returns whether the given file descriptor is a terminal.
 func IsTerminal(fd int) bool {
 	return false
 }
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_solaris.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_solaris.go
index a2e1b57dc..3d5f06a9f 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_solaris.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_solaris.go
@@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ import (
 
 // State contains the state of a terminal.
 type State struct {
-	state *unix.Termios
+	termios unix.Termios
 }
 
-// IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal.
+// IsTerminal returns whether the given file descriptor is a terminal.
 func IsTerminal(fd int) bool {
 	_, err := unix.IoctlGetTermio(fd, unix.TCGETA)
 	return err == nil
@@ -75,47 +75,43 @@ func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) {
 // restored.
 // see http://cr.illumos.org/~webrev/andy_js/1060/
 func MakeRaw(fd int) (*State, error) {
-	oldTermiosPtr, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS)
+	termios, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
-	oldTermios := *oldTermiosPtr
-
-	newTermios := oldTermios
-	newTermios.Iflag &^= syscall.IGNBRK | syscall.BRKINT | syscall.PARMRK | syscall.ISTRIP | syscall.INLCR | syscall.IGNCR | syscall.ICRNL | syscall.IXON
-	newTermios.Oflag &^= syscall.OPOST
-	newTermios.Lflag &^= syscall.ECHO | syscall.ECHONL | syscall.ICANON | syscall.ISIG | syscall.IEXTEN
-	newTermios.Cflag &^= syscall.CSIZE | syscall.PARENB
-	newTermios.Cflag |= syscall.CS8
-	newTermios.Cc[unix.VMIN] = 1
-	newTermios.Cc[unix.VTIME] = 0
-
-	if err := unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, &newTermios); err != nil {
+
+	oldState := State{termios: *termios}
+
+	termios.Iflag &^= unix.IGNBRK | unix.BRKINT | unix.PARMRK | unix.ISTRIP | unix.INLCR | unix.IGNCR | unix.ICRNL | unix.IXON
+	termios.Oflag &^= unix.OPOST
+	termios.Lflag &^= unix.ECHO | unix.ECHONL | unix.ICANON | unix.ISIG | unix.IEXTEN
+	termios.Cflag &^= unix.CSIZE | unix.PARENB
+	termios.Cflag |= unix.CS8
+	termios.Cc[unix.VMIN] = 1
+	termios.Cc[unix.VTIME] = 0
+
+	if err := unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, termios); err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	return &State{
-		state: oldTermiosPtr,
-	}, nil
+	return &oldState, nil
 }
 
 // Restore restores the terminal connected to the given file descriptor to a
 // previous state.
 func Restore(fd int, oldState *State) error {
-	return unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, oldState.state)
+	return unix.IoctlSetTermios(fd, unix.TCSETS, &oldState.termios)
 }
 
 // GetState returns the current state of a terminal which may be useful to
 // restore the terminal after a signal.
 func GetState(fd int) (*State, error) {
-	oldTermiosPtr, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS)
+	termios, err := unix.IoctlGetTermios(fd, unix.TCGETS)
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	return &State{
-		state: oldTermiosPtr,
-	}, nil
+	return &State{termios: *termios}, nil
 }
 
 // GetSize returns the dimensions of the given terminal.
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_windows.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_windows.go
index 60979ccd0..6cb8a9503 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_windows.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/util_windows.go
@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
 package terminal
 
 import (
+	"os"
+
 	"golang.org/x/sys/windows"
 )
 
@@ -24,7 +26,7 @@ type State struct {
 	mode uint32
 }
 
-// IsTerminal returns true if the given file descriptor is a terminal.
+// IsTerminal returns whether the given file descriptor is a terminal.
 func IsTerminal(fd int) bool {
 	var st uint32
 	err := windows.GetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), &st)
@@ -71,13 +73,6 @@ func GetSize(fd int) (width, height int, err error) {
 	return int(info.Size.X), int(info.Size.Y), nil
 }
 
-// passwordReader is an io.Reader that reads from a specific Windows HANDLE.
-type passwordReader int
-
-func (r passwordReader) Read(buf []byte) (int, error) {
-	return windows.Read(windows.Handle(r), buf)
-}
-
 // ReadPassword reads a line of input from a terminal without local echo.  This
 // is commonly used for inputting passwords and other sensitive data. The slice
 // returned does not include the \n.
@@ -94,9 +89,15 @@ func ReadPassword(fd int) ([]byte, error) {
 		return nil, err
 	}
 
-	defer func() {
-		windows.SetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), old)
-	}()
+	defer windows.SetConsoleMode(windows.Handle(fd), old)
+
+	var h windows.Handle
+	p, _ := windows.GetCurrentProcess()
+	if err := windows.DuplicateHandle(p, windows.Handle(fd), p, &h, 0, false, windows.DUPLICATE_SAME_ACCESS); err != nil {
+		return nil, err
+	}
 
-	return readPasswordLine(passwordReader(fd))
+	f := os.NewFile(uintptr(h), "stdin")
+	defer f.Close()
+	return readPasswordLine(f)
 }
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/test/doc.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/test/doc.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..198f0ca1e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/test/doc.go
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package test contains integration tests for the
+// golang.org/x/crypto/ssh package.
+package test // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/test"
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/test/sshd_test_pw.c b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/test/sshd_test_pw.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2794a563a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/test/sshd_test_pw.c
@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
+// Copyright 2017 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// sshd_test_pw.c
+// Wrapper to inject test password data for sshd PAM authentication
+//
+// This wrapper implements custom versions of getpwnam, getpwnam_r,
+// getspnam and getspnam_r. These functions first call their real
+// libc versions, then check if the requested user matches test user
+// specified in env variable TEST_USER and if so replace the password
+// with crypted() value of TEST_PASSWD env variable.
+//
+// Compile:
+// gcc -Wall -shared -o sshd_test_pw.so -fPIC sshd_test_pw.c
+//
+// Compile with debug:
+// gcc -DVERBOSE -Wall -shared -o sshd_test_pw.so -fPIC sshd_test_pw.c
+//
+// Run sshd:
+// LD_PRELOAD="sshd_test_pw.so" TEST_USER="..." TEST_PASSWD="..." sshd ...
+
+// +build ignore
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <string.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <shadow.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#ifdef VERBOSE
+#define DEBUG(X...) fprintf(stderr, X)
+#else
+#define DEBUG(X...) while (0) { }
+#endif
+
+/* crypt() password */
+static char *
+pwhash(char *passwd) {
+  return strdup(crypt(passwd, "$6$"));
+}
+
+/* Pointers to real functions in libc */
+static struct passwd * (*real_getpwnam)(const char *) = NULL;
+static int (*real_getpwnam_r)(const char *, struct passwd *, char *, size_t, struct passwd **) = NULL;
+static struct spwd * (*real_getspnam)(const char *) = NULL;
+static int (*real_getspnam_r)(const char *, struct spwd *, char *, size_t, struct spwd **) = NULL;
+
+/* Cached test user and test password */
+static char *test_user = NULL;
+static char *test_passwd_hash = NULL;
+
+static void
+init(void) {
+  /* Fetch real libc function pointers */
+  real_getpwnam = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "getpwnam");
+  real_getpwnam_r = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "getpwnam_r");
+  real_getspnam = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "getspnam");
+  real_getspnam_r = dlsym(RTLD_NEXT, "getspnam_r");
+  
+  /* abort if env variables are not defined */
+  if (getenv("TEST_USER") == NULL || getenv("TEST_PASSWD") == NULL) {
+    fprintf(stderr, "env variables TEST_USER and TEST_PASSWD are missing\n");
+    abort();
+  }
+
+  /* Fetch test user and test password from env */
+  test_user = strdup(getenv("TEST_USER"));
+  test_passwd_hash = pwhash(getenv("TEST_PASSWD"));
+
+  DEBUG("sshd_test_pw init():\n");
+  DEBUG("\treal_getpwnam: %p\n", real_getpwnam);
+  DEBUG("\treal_getpwnam_r: %p\n", real_getpwnam_r);
+  DEBUG("\treal_getspnam: %p\n", real_getspnam);
+  DEBUG("\treal_getspnam_r: %p\n", real_getspnam_r);
+  DEBUG("\tTEST_USER: '%s'\n", test_user);
+  DEBUG("\tTEST_PASSWD: '%s'\n", getenv("TEST_PASSWD"));
+  DEBUG("\tTEST_PASSWD_HASH: '%s'\n", test_passwd_hash);
+}
+
+static int
+is_test_user(const char *name) {
+  if (test_user != NULL && strcmp(test_user, name) == 0)
+    return 1;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* getpwnam */
+
+struct passwd *
+getpwnam(const char *name) {
+  struct passwd *pw;
+
+  DEBUG("sshd_test_pw getpwnam(%s)\n", name);
+  
+  if (real_getpwnam == NULL)
+    init();
+  if ((pw = real_getpwnam(name)) == NULL)
+    return NULL;
+
+  if (is_test_user(name))
+    pw->pw_passwd = strdup(test_passwd_hash);
+      
+  return pw;
+}
+
+/* getpwnam_r */
+
+int
+getpwnam_r(const char *name,
+	   struct passwd *pwd,
+	   char *buf,
+	   size_t buflen,
+	   struct passwd **result) {
+  int r;
+
+  DEBUG("sshd_test_pw getpwnam_r(%s)\n", name);
+  
+  if (real_getpwnam_r == NULL)
+    init();
+  if ((r = real_getpwnam_r(name, pwd, buf, buflen, result)) != 0 || *result == NULL)
+    return r;
+
+  if (is_test_user(name))
+    pwd->pw_passwd = strdup(test_passwd_hash);
+  
+  return 0;
+}
+
+/* getspnam */
+
+struct spwd *
+getspnam(const char *name) {
+  struct spwd *sp;
+
+  DEBUG("sshd_test_pw getspnam(%s)\n", name);
+  
+  if (real_getspnam == NULL)
+    init();
+  if ((sp = real_getspnam(name)) == NULL)
+    return NULL;
+
+  if (is_test_user(name))
+    sp->sp_pwdp = strdup(test_passwd_hash);
+  
+  return sp;
+}
+
+/* getspnam_r */
+
+int
+getspnam_r(const char *name,
+	   struct spwd *spbuf,
+	   char *buf,
+	   size_t buflen,
+	   struct spwd **spbufp) {
+  int r;
+
+  DEBUG("sshd_test_pw getspnam_r(%s)\n", name);
+  
+  if (real_getspnam_r == NULL)
+    init();
+  if ((r = real_getspnam_r(name, spbuf, buf, buflen, spbufp)) != 0)
+    return r;
+
+  if (is_test_user(name))
+    spbuf->sp_pwdp = strdup(test_passwd_hash);
+  
+  return r;
+}