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diff --git a/docs/tutorials/README.md b/docs/tutorials/README.md index bcd1b01d9..191d7a4b5 100644 --- a/docs/tutorials/README.md +++ b/docs/tutorials/README.md @@ -23,3 +23,7 @@ A brief how-to on using the Podman remote-client. **[How to use libpod for custom/derivative projects](podman-derivative-api.md)** How the libpod API can be used within your own project. + +**[Image Signing](image_signing.md)** + +Learn how to setup and use image signing with Podman. diff --git a/docs/tutorials/image_signing.md b/docs/tutorials/image_signing.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f0adca9af --- /dev/null +++ b/docs/tutorials/image_signing.md @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +# How to sign and distribute container images using Podman + +Signing container images originates from the motivation of trusting only +dedicated image providers to mitigate man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks or +attacks on container registries. One way to sign images is to utilize a GNU +Privacy Guard ([GPG][0]) key. This technique is generally compatible with any +OCI compliant container registry like [Quay.io][1]. It is worth mentioning that +the OpenShift integrated container registry supports this signing mechanism out +of the box, which makes separate signature storage unnecessary. + +[0]: https://gnupg.org +[1]: https://quay.io + +From a technical perspective, we can utilize Podman to sign the image before +pushing it into a remote registry. After that, all systems running Podman have +to be configured to retrieve the signatures from a remote server, which can +be any simple web server. This means that every unsigned image will be rejected +during an image pull operation. But how does this work? + +First of all, we have to create a GPG key pair or select an already locally +available one. To generate a new GPG key, just run `gpg --full-gen-key` and +follow the interactive dialog. Now we should be able to verify that the key +exists locally: + +```bash +> gpg --list-keys sgrunert@suse.com +pub rsa2048 2018-11-26 [SC] [expires: 2020-11-25] + XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX +uid [ultimate] Sascha Grunert <sgrunert@suse.com> +sub rsa2048 2018-11-26 [E] [expires: 2020-11-25] +``` + +Now let’s assume that we run a container registry. For example we could simply +start one on our local machine: + +```bash +> sudo podman run -d -p 5000:5000 docker.io/registry +``` + +The registry does not know anything about image signing, it just provides the remote +storage for the container images. This means if we want to sign an image, we +have to take care of how to distribute the signatures. + +Let’s choose a standard `alpine` image for our signing experiment: + +```bash +> sudo podman pull docker://docker.io/alpine:latest +``` + +```bash +> sudo podman images alpine +REPOSITORY TAG IMAGE ID CREATED SIZE +docker.io/library/alpine latest e7d92cdc71fe 6 weeks ago 5.86 MB +``` + +Now we can re-tag the image to point it to our local registry: + +```bash +> sudo podman tag alpine localhost:5000/alpine +``` + +```bash +> sudo podman images alpine +REPOSITORY TAG IMAGE ID CREATED SIZE +localhost:5000/alpine latest e7d92cdc71fe 6 weeks ago 5.86 MB +docker.io/library/alpine latest e7d92cdc71fe 6 weeks ago 5.86 MB +``` + +Podman would now be able to push the image and sign it in one command. But to +let this work, we have to modify our system-wide registries configuration at +`/etc/containers/registries.d/default.yaml`: + +```yaml +default-docker: + sigstore: http://localhost:8000 # Added by us + sigstore-staging: file:///var/lib/containers/sigstore +``` + +We can see that we have two signature stores configured: + +- `sigstore`: referencing a web server for signature reading +- `sigstore-staging`: referencing a file path for signature writing + +Now, let’s push and sign the image: + +```bash +> sudo -E GNUPGHOME=$HOME/.gnupg \ + podman push \ + --tls-verify=false \ + --sign-by sgrunert@suse.com \ + localhost:5000/alpine +… +Storing signatures +``` + +If we now take a look at the systems signature storage, then we see that there +is a new signature available, which was caused by the image push: + +```bash +> sudo ls /var/lib/containers/sigstore +'alpine@sha256=e9b65ef660a3ff91d28cc50eba84f21798a6c5c39b4dd165047db49e84ae1fb9' +``` + +The default signature store in our edited version of +`/etc/containers/registries.d/default.yaml` references a web server listening at +`http://localhost:8000`. For our experiment, we simply start a new server inside +the local staging signature store: + +```bash +> sudo bash -c 'cd /var/lib/containers/sigstore && python3 -m http.server' +Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8000 (http://0.0.0.0:8000/) ... +``` + +Let’s remove the local images for our verification test: + +``` +> sudo podman rmi docker.io/alpine localhost:5000/alpine +``` + +We have to write a policy to enforce that the signature has to be valid. This +can be done by adding a new rule in `/etc/containers/policy.json`. From the +below example, copy the `"docker"` entry into the `"transports"` section of your +`policy.json`. + +```json +{ + "default": [{ "type": "insecureAcceptAnything" }], + "transports": { + "docker": { + "localhost:5000": [ + { + "type": "signedBy", + "keyType": "GPGKeys", + "keyPath": "/tmp/key.gpg" + } + ] + } + } +} +``` + +The `keyPath` does not exist yet, so we have to put the GPG key there: + +```bash +> gpg --output /tmp/key.gpg --armor --export sgrunert@suse.com +``` + +If we now pull the image: + +```bash +> sudo podman pull --tls-verify=false localhost:5000/alpine +… +Storing signatures +e7d92cdc71feacf90708cb59182d0df1b911f8ae022d29e8e95d75ca6a99776a +``` + +Then we can see in the logs of the web server that the signature has been +accessed: + +``` +127.0.0.1 - - [04/Mar/2020 11:18:21] "GET /alpine@sha256=e9b65ef660a3ff91d28cc50eba84f21798a6c5c39b4dd165047db49e84ae1fb9/signature-1 HTTP/1.1" 200 - +``` + +As an counterpart example, if we specify the wrong key at `/tmp/key.gpg`: + +```bash +> gpg --output /tmp/key.gpg --armor --export mail@saschagrunert.de +File '/tmp/key.gpg' exists. Overwrite? (y/N) y +``` + +Then a pull is not possible any more: + +```bash +> sudo podman pull --tls-verify=false localhost:5000/alpine +Trying to pull localhost:5000/alpine... +Error: error pulling image "localhost:5000/alpine": unable to pull localhost:5000/alpine: unable to pull image: Source image rejected: Invalid GPG signature: … +``` + +So in general there are four main things to be taken into consideration when +signing container images with Podman and GPG: + +1. We need a valid private GPG key on the signing machine and corresponding + public keys on every system which would pull the image +2. A web server has to run somewhere which has access to the signature storage +3. The web server has to be configured in any + `/etc/containers/registries.d/*.yaml` file +4. Every image pulling system has to be configured to contain the enforcing + policy configuration via `policy.conf` + +That’s it for image signing and GPG. The cool thing is that this setup works out +of the box with [CRI-O][2] as well and can be used to sign container images in +Kubernetes environments. + +[2]: https://cri-o.io |