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-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go119
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go17
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/mac_noasm.go2
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go22
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go11
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go18
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go11
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go11
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go2
-rw-r--r--vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/terminal.go8
10 files changed, 114 insertions, 107 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go
index 7c498e90d..a2ecf5c32 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go
@@ -42,10 +42,14 @@ type Cipher struct {
// The last len bytes of buf are leftover key stream bytes from the previous
// XORKeyStream invocation. The size of buf depends on how many blocks are
- // computed at a time.
+ // computed at a time by xorKeyStreamBlocks.
buf [bufSize]byte
len int
+ // overflow is set when the counter overflowed, no more blocks can be
+ // generated, and the next XORKeyStream call should panic.
+ overflow bool
+
// The counter-independent results of the first round are cached after they
// are computed the first time.
precompDone bool
@@ -89,6 +93,7 @@ func newUnauthenticatedCipher(c *Cipher, key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) {
return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong nonce size")
}
+ key, nonce = key[:KeySize], nonce[:NonceSize] // bounds check elimination hint
c.key = [8]uint32{
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]),
binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]),
@@ -139,15 +144,18 @@ func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) {
// SetCounter sets the Cipher counter. The next invocation of XORKeyStream will
// behave as if (64 * counter) bytes had been encrypted so far.
//
-// To prevent accidental counter reuse, SetCounter panics if counter is
-// less than the current value.
+// To prevent accidental counter reuse, SetCounter panics if counter is less
+// than the current value.
+//
+// Note that the execution time of XORKeyStream is not independent of the
+// counter value.
func (s *Cipher) SetCounter(counter uint32) {
// Internally, s may buffer multiple blocks, which complicates this
// implementation slightly. When checking whether the counter has rolled
// back, we must use both s.counter and s.len to determine how many blocks
// we have already output.
outputCounter := s.counter - uint32(s.len)/blockSize
- if counter < outputCounter {
+ if s.overflow || counter < outputCounter {
panic("chacha20: SetCounter attempted to rollback counter")
}
@@ -196,34 +204,52 @@ func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) {
dst[i] = src[i] ^ b
}
s.len -= len(keyStream)
- src = src[len(keyStream):]
- dst = dst[len(keyStream):]
+ dst, src = dst[len(keyStream):], src[len(keyStream):]
+ }
+ if len(src) == 0 {
+ return
}
- const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize
- numBufs := (uint64(len(src)) + bufSize - 1) / bufSize
- if uint64(s.counter)+numBufs*blocksPerBuf >= 1<<32 {
+ // If we'd need to let the counter overflow and keep generating output,
+ // panic immediately. If instead we'd only reach the last block, remember
+ // not to generate any more output after the buffer is drained.
+ numBlocks := (uint64(len(src)) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize
+ if s.overflow || uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks > 1<<32 {
panic("chacha20: counter overflow")
+ } else if uint64(s.counter)+numBlocks == 1<<32 {
+ s.overflow = true
}
// xorKeyStreamBlocks implementations expect input lengths that are a
// multiple of bufSize. Platform-specific ones process multiple blocks at a
// time, so have bufSizes that are a multiple of blockSize.
- rem := len(src) % bufSize
- full := len(src) - rem
-
+ full := len(src) - len(src)%bufSize
if full > 0 {
s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst[:full], src[:full])
}
+ dst, src = dst[full:], src[full:]
+
+ // If using a multi-block xorKeyStreamBlocks would overflow, use the generic
+ // one that does one block at a time.
+ const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize
+ if uint64(s.counter)+blocksPerBuf > 1<<32 {
+ s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
+ numBlocks := (len(src) + blockSize - 1) / blockSize
+ buf := s.buf[bufSize-numBlocks*blockSize:]
+ copy(buf, src)
+ s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(buf, buf)
+ s.len = len(buf) - copy(dst, buf)
+ return
+ }
// If we have a partial (multi-)block, pad it for xorKeyStreamBlocks, and
// keep the leftover keystream for the next XORKeyStream invocation.
- if rem > 0 {
+ if len(src) > 0 {
s.buf = [bufSize]byte{}
- copy(s.buf[:], src[full:])
+ copy(s.buf[:], src)
s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(s.buf[:], s.buf[:])
- s.len = bufSize - copy(dst[full:], s.buf[:])
+ s.len = bufSize - copy(dst, s.buf[:])
}
}
@@ -260,7 +286,9 @@ func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) {
s.precompDone = true
}
- for i := 0; i < len(src); i += blockSize {
+ // A condition of len(src) > 0 would be sufficient, but this also
+ // acts as a bounds check elimination hint.
+ for len(src) >= 64 && len(dst) >= 64 {
// The remainder of the first column round.
fcr0, fcr4, fcr8, fcr12 := quarterRound(c0, c4, c8, s.counter)
@@ -285,49 +313,28 @@ func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) {
x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14)
}
- // Finally, add back the initial state to generate the key stream.
- x0 += c0
- x1 += c1
- x2 += c2
- x3 += c3
- x4 += c4
- x5 += c5
- x6 += c6
- x7 += c7
- x8 += c8
- x9 += c9
- x10 += c10
- x11 += c11
- x12 += s.counter
- x13 += c13
- x14 += c14
- x15 += c15
+ // Add back the initial state to generate the key stream, then
+ // XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result.
+ addXor(dst[0:4], src[0:4], x0, c0)
+ addXor(dst[4:8], src[4:8], x1, c1)
+ addXor(dst[8:12], src[8:12], x2, c2)
+ addXor(dst[12:16], src[12:16], x3, c3)
+ addXor(dst[16:20], src[16:20], x4, c4)
+ addXor(dst[20:24], src[20:24], x5, c5)
+ addXor(dst[24:28], src[24:28], x6, c6)
+ addXor(dst[28:32], src[28:32], x7, c7)
+ addXor(dst[32:36], src[32:36], x8, c8)
+ addXor(dst[36:40], src[36:40], x9, c9)
+ addXor(dst[40:44], src[40:44], x10, c10)
+ addXor(dst[44:48], src[44:48], x11, c11)
+ addXor(dst[48:52], src[48:52], x12, s.counter)
+ addXor(dst[52:56], src[52:56], x13, c13)
+ addXor(dst[56:60], src[56:60], x14, c14)
+ addXor(dst[60:64], src[60:64], x15, c15)
s.counter += 1
- if s.counter == 0 {
- panic("chacha20: internal error: counter overflow")
- }
- in, out := src[i:], dst[i:]
- in, out = in[:blockSize], out[:blockSize] // bounds check elimination hint
-
- // XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result.
- xor(out[0:], in[0:], x0)
- xor(out[4:], in[4:], x1)
- xor(out[8:], in[8:], x2)
- xor(out[12:], in[12:], x3)
- xor(out[16:], in[16:], x4)
- xor(out[20:], in[20:], x5)
- xor(out[24:], in[24:], x6)
- xor(out[28:], in[28:], x7)
- xor(out[32:], in[32:], x8)
- xor(out[36:], in[36:], x9)
- xor(out[40:], in[40:], x10)
- xor(out[44:], in[44:], x11)
- xor(out[48:], in[48:], x12)
- xor(out[52:], in[52:], x13)
- xor(out[56:], in[56:], x14)
- xor(out[60:], in[60:], x15)
+ src, dst = src[blockSize:], dst[blockSize:]
}
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go
index 0110c9865..c2d04851e 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ const unaligned = runtime.GOARCH == "386" ||
runtime.GOARCH == "ppc64le" ||
runtime.GOARCH == "s390x"
-// xor reads a little endian uint32 from src, XORs it with u and
+// addXor reads a little endian uint32 from src, XORs it with (a + b) and
// places the result in little endian byte order in dst.
-func xor(dst, src []byte, u uint32) {
- _, _ = src[3], dst[3] // eliminate bounds checks
+func addXor(dst, src []byte, a, b uint32) {
+ _, _ = src[3], dst[3] // bounds check elimination hint
if unaligned {
// The compiler should optimize this code into
// 32-bit unaligned little endian loads and stores.
@@ -27,15 +27,16 @@ func xor(dst, src []byte, u uint32) {
v |= uint32(src[1]) << 8
v |= uint32(src[2]) << 16
v |= uint32(src[3]) << 24
- v ^= u
+ v ^= a + b
dst[0] = byte(v)
dst[1] = byte(v >> 8)
dst[2] = byte(v >> 16)
dst[3] = byte(v >> 24)
} else {
- dst[0] = src[0] ^ byte(u)
- dst[1] = src[1] ^ byte(u>>8)
- dst[2] = src[2] ^ byte(u>>16)
- dst[3] = src[3] ^ byte(u>>24)
+ a += b
+ dst[0] = src[0] ^ byte(a)
+ dst[1] = src[1] ^ byte(a>>8)
+ dst[2] = src[2] ^ byte(a>>16)
+ dst[3] = src[3] ^ byte(a>>24)
}
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/mac_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/mac_noasm.go
index b0c2cd056..347c8b15f 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/mac_noasm.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/mac_noasm.go
@@ -7,5 +7,3 @@
package poly1305
type mac struct{ macGeneric }
-
-func newMAC(key *[32]byte) mac { return mac{newMACGeneric(key)} }
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go
index 066159b79..3c75c2a67 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go
@@ -46,10 +46,9 @@ func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool {
// two different messages with the same key allows an attacker
// to forge messages at will.
func New(key *[32]byte) *MAC {
- return &MAC{
- mac: newMAC(key),
- finalized: false,
- }
+ m := &MAC{}
+ initialize(key, &m.macState)
+ return m
}
// MAC is an io.Writer computing an authentication tag
@@ -58,7 +57,7 @@ func New(key *[32]byte) *MAC {
// MAC cannot be used like common hash.Hash implementations,
// because using a poly1305 key twice breaks its security.
// Therefore writing data to a running MAC after calling
-// Sum causes it to panic.
+// Sum or Verify causes it to panic.
type MAC struct {
mac // platform-dependent implementation
@@ -71,10 +70,10 @@ func (h *MAC) Size() int { return TagSize }
// Write adds more data to the running message authentication code.
// It never returns an error.
//
-// It must not be called after the first call of Sum.
+// It must not be called after the first call of Sum or Verify.
func (h *MAC) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) {
if h.finalized {
- panic("poly1305: write to MAC after Sum")
+ panic("poly1305: write to MAC after Sum or Verify")
}
return h.mac.Write(p)
}
@@ -87,3 +86,12 @@ func (h *MAC) Sum(b []byte) []byte {
h.finalized = true
return append(b, mac[:]...)
}
+
+// Verify returns whether the authenticator of all data written to
+// the message authentication code matches the expected value.
+func (h *MAC) Verify(expected []byte) bool {
+ var mac [TagSize]byte
+ h.mac.Sum(&mac)
+ h.finalized = true
+ return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(expected, mac[:]) == 1
+}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go
index 35b9e38c9..99e5a1d50 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go
@@ -9,17 +9,6 @@ package poly1305
//go:noescape
func update(state *macState, msg []byte)
-func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
- h := newMAC(key)
- h.Write(m)
- h.Sum(out)
-}
-
-func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) {
- initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s)
- return
-}
-
// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to
// updateGeneric to update.
//
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go
index 1187eab78..c77ff179d 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go
@@ -31,9 +31,10 @@ func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
h.Sum(out)
}
-func newMACGeneric(key *[32]byte) (h macGeneric) {
- initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s)
- return
+func newMACGeneric(key *[32]byte) macGeneric {
+ m := macGeneric{}
+ initialize(key, &m.macState)
+ return m
}
// macState holds numbers in saturated 64-bit little-endian limbs. That is,
@@ -97,11 +98,12 @@ const (
rMask1 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC
)
-func initialize(key *[32]byte, r, s *[2]uint64) {
- r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[0:8]) & rMask0
- r[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[8:16]) & rMask1
- s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[16:24])
- s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[24:32])
+// initialize loads the 256-bit key into the two 128-bit secret values r and s.
+func initialize(key *[32]byte, m *macState) {
+ m.r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[0:8]) & rMask0
+ m.r[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[8:16]) & rMask1
+ m.s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[16:24])
+ m.s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[24:32])
}
// uint128 holds a 128-bit number as two 64-bit limbs, for use with the
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go
index 2e3ae34c7..2b55a29c5 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go
@@ -2,12 +2,17 @@
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
-// +build s390x,!go1.11 !amd64,!s390x,!ppc64le gccgo purego
+// At this point only s390x has an assembly implementation of sum. All other
+// platforms have assembly implementations of mac, and just define sum as using
+// that through New. Once s390x is ported, this file can be deleted and the body
+// of sum moved into Sum.
+
+// +build !go1.11 !s390x gccgo purego
package poly1305
func sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) {
- h := newMAC(key)
+ h := New(key)
h.Write(msg)
- h.Sum(out)
+ h.Sum(out[:0])
}
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go
index 92597bb8c..2e7a120b1 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go
@@ -9,17 +9,6 @@ package poly1305
//go:noescape
func update(state *macState, msg []byte)
-func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) {
- h := newMAC(key)
- h.Write(m)
- h.Sum(out)
-}
-
-func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) {
- initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s)
- return
-}
-
// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to
// updateGeneric to update.
//
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go
index b0204ee59..8bd6b3daf 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ var cipherModes = map[string]*cipherMode{
chacha20Poly1305ID: {64, 0, newChaCha20Cipher},
// CBC mode is insecure and so is not included in the default config.
- // (See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/SandPfinal.pdf). If absolutely
+ // (See https://www.ieee-security.org/TC/SP2013/papers/4977a526.pdf). If absolutely
// needed, it's possible to specify a custom Config to enable it.
// You should expect that an active attacker can recover plaintext if
// you do.
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/terminal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/terminal.go
index d1b4fca3a..2ffb97bfb 100644
--- a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/terminal.go
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal/terminal.go
@@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ func NewTerminal(c io.ReadWriter, prompt string) *Terminal {
}
const (
+ keyCtrlC = 3
keyCtrlD = 4
keyCtrlU = 21
keyEnter = '\r'
@@ -151,8 +152,12 @@ func bytesToKey(b []byte, pasteActive bool) (rune, []byte) {
switch b[0] {
case 1: // ^A
return keyHome, b[1:]
+ case 2: // ^B
+ return keyLeft, b[1:]
case 5: // ^E
return keyEnd, b[1:]
+ case 6: // ^F
+ return keyRight, b[1:]
case 8: // ^H
return keyBackspace, b[1:]
case 11: // ^K
@@ -738,6 +743,9 @@ func (t *Terminal) readLine() (line string, err error) {
return "", io.EOF
}
}
+ if key == keyCtrlC {
+ return "", io.EOF
+ }
if key == keyPasteStart {
t.pasteActive = true
if len(t.line) == 0 {
generated by cgit v1.2.3-54-g00ecf (git 2.39.0) at 2024-11-18 02:02:45 +0000