diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'vendor')
78 files changed, 17961 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..87f1e369c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build go1.11 +// +build !gccgo,!appengine + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = 256 + +//go:noescape +func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b3a16ef75 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_arm64.s @@ -0,0 +1,308 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build go1.11 +// +build !gccgo,!appengine + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define NUM_ROUNDS 10 + +// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + MOVD dst+0(FP), R1 + MOVD src+24(FP), R2 + MOVD src_len+32(FP), R3 + MOVD key+48(FP), R4 + MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 + MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 + + MOVD $·constants(SB), R10 + MOVD $·incRotMatrix(SB), R11 + + MOVW (R7), R20 + + AND $~255, R3, R13 + ADD R2, R13, R12 // R12 for block end + AND $255, R3, R13 +loop: + MOVD $NUM_ROUNDS, R21 + VLD1 (R11), [V30.S4, V31.S4] + + // load contants + // VLD4R (R10), [V0.S4, V1.S4, V2.S4, V3.S4] + WORD $0x4D60E940 + + // load keys + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V4.S4, V5.S4, V6.S4, V7.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE884 + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V8.S4, V9.S4, V10.S4, V11.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE888 + SUB $32, R4 + + // load counter + nonce + // VLD1R (R7), [V12.S4] + WORD $0x4D40C8EC + + // VLD3R (R6), [V13.S4, V14.S4, V15.S4] + WORD $0x4D40E8CD + + // update counter + VADD V30.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4 + +chacha: + // V0..V3 += V4..V7 + // V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 16) + VADD V0.S4, V4.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V1.S4, V5.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V2.S4, V6.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V3.S4, V7.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V12.B16, V0.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V1.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V2.B16, V14.B16 + VEOR V15.B16, V3.B16, V15.B16 + VREV32 V12.H8, V12.H8 + VREV32 V13.H8, V13.H8 + VREV32 V14.H8, V14.H8 + VREV32 V15.H8, V15.H8 + // V8..V11 += V12..V15 + // V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 12) + VADD V8.S4, V12.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V9.S4, V13.S4, V9.S4 + VADD V10.S4, V14.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V11.S4, V15.S4, V11.S4 + VEOR V8.B16, V4.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V5.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V10.B16, V6.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V7.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $12, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSHL $12, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $12, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $12, V19.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $20, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $20, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $20, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $20, V19.S4, V7.S4 + + // V0..V3 += V4..V7 + // V12..V15 <<<= ((V12..V15 XOR V0..V3), 8) + VADD V0.S4, V4.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V1.S4, V5.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V2.S4, V6.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V3.S4, V7.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V12.B16, V0.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V1.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V2.B16, V14.B16 + VEOR V15.B16, V3.B16, V15.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V12.B16], V12.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V13.B16], V13.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V14.B16], V14.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V15.B16], V15.B16 + + // V8..V11 += V12..V15 + // V4..V7 <<<= ((V4..V7 XOR V8..V11), 7) + VADD V12.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V13.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VADD V14.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V15.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VEOR V8.B16, V4.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V5.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V10.B16, V6.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V7.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $7, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSHL $7, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $7, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $7, V19.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $25, V16.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $25, V17.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $25, V18.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $25, V19.S4, V7.S4 + + // V0..V3 += V5..V7, V4 + // V15,V12-V14 <<<= ((V15,V12-V14 XOR V0..V3), 16) + VADD V0.S4, V5.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V1.S4, V6.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V2.S4, V7.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V3.S4, V4.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V15.B16, V0.B16, V15.B16 + VEOR V12.B16, V1.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V2.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V3.B16, V14.B16 + VREV32 V12.H8, V12.H8 + VREV32 V13.H8, V13.H8 + VREV32 V14.H8, V14.H8 + VREV32 V15.H8, V15.H8 + + // V10 += V15; V5 <<<= ((V10 XOR V5), 12) + // ... + VADD V15.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V12.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VADD V13.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V14.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VEOR V10.B16, V5.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V6.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V8.B16, V7.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V4.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $12, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $12, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $12, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSHL $12, V19.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $20, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $20, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $20, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $20, V19.S4, V4.S4 + + // V0 += V5; V15 <<<= ((V0 XOR V15), 8) + // ... + VADD V5.S4, V0.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V6.S4, V1.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V7.S4, V2.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V4.S4, V3.S4, V3.S4 + VEOR V0.B16, V15.B16, V15.B16 + VEOR V1.B16, V12.B16, V12.B16 + VEOR V2.B16, V13.B16, V13.B16 + VEOR V3.B16, V14.B16, V14.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V12.B16], V12.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V13.B16], V13.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V14.B16], V14.B16 + VTBL V31.B16, [V15.B16], V15.B16 + + // V10 += V15; V5 <<<= ((V10 XOR V5), 7) + // ... + VADD V15.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V12.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VADD V13.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V14.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VEOR V10.B16, V5.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V6.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V8.B16, V7.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V4.B16, V19.B16 + VSHL $7, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSHL $7, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSHL $7, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSHL $7, V19.S4, V4.S4 + VSRI $25, V16.S4, V5.S4 + VSRI $25, V17.S4, V6.S4 + VSRI $25, V18.S4, V7.S4 + VSRI $25, V19.S4, V4.S4 + + SUB $1, R21 + CBNZ R21, chacha + + // VLD4R (R10), [V16.S4, V17.S4, V18.S4, V19.S4] + WORD $0x4D60E950 + + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V20.S4, V21.S4, V22.S4, V23.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE894 + VADD V30.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4 + VADD V16.S4, V0.S4, V0.S4 + VADD V17.S4, V1.S4, V1.S4 + VADD V18.S4, V2.S4, V2.S4 + VADD V19.S4, V3.S4, V3.S4 + // VLD4R 16(R4), [V24.S4, V25.S4, V26.S4, V27.S4] + WORD $0x4DFFE898 + // restore R4 + SUB $32, R4 + + // load counter + nonce + // VLD1R (R7), [V28.S4] + WORD $0x4D40C8FC + // VLD3R (R6), [V29.S4, V30.S4, V31.S4] + WORD $0x4D40E8DD + + VADD V20.S4, V4.S4, V4.S4 + VADD V21.S4, V5.S4, V5.S4 + VADD V22.S4, V6.S4, V6.S4 + VADD V23.S4, V7.S4, V7.S4 + VADD V24.S4, V8.S4, V8.S4 + VADD V25.S4, V9.S4, V9.S4 + VADD V26.S4, V10.S4, V10.S4 + VADD V27.S4, V11.S4, V11.S4 + VADD V28.S4, V12.S4, V12.S4 + VADD V29.S4, V13.S4, V13.S4 + VADD V30.S4, V14.S4, V14.S4 + VADD V31.S4, V15.S4, V15.S4 + + VZIP1 V1.S4, V0.S4, V16.S4 + VZIP2 V1.S4, V0.S4, V17.S4 + VZIP1 V3.S4, V2.S4, V18.S4 + VZIP2 V3.S4, V2.S4, V19.S4 + VZIP1 V5.S4, V4.S4, V20.S4 + VZIP2 V5.S4, V4.S4, V21.S4 + VZIP1 V7.S4, V6.S4, V22.S4 + VZIP2 V7.S4, V6.S4, V23.S4 + VZIP1 V9.S4, V8.S4, V24.S4 + VZIP2 V9.S4, V8.S4, V25.S4 + VZIP1 V11.S4, V10.S4, V26.S4 + VZIP2 V11.S4, V10.S4, V27.S4 + VZIP1 V13.S4, V12.S4, V28.S4 + VZIP2 V13.S4, V12.S4, V29.S4 + VZIP1 V15.S4, V14.S4, V30.S4 + VZIP2 V15.S4, V14.S4, V31.S4 + VZIP1 V18.D2, V16.D2, V0.D2 + VZIP2 V18.D2, V16.D2, V4.D2 + VZIP1 V19.D2, V17.D2, V8.D2 + VZIP2 V19.D2, V17.D2, V12.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V16.B16, V17.B16, V18.B16, V19.B16] + + VZIP1 V22.D2, V20.D2, V1.D2 + VZIP2 V22.D2, V20.D2, V5.D2 + VZIP1 V23.D2, V21.D2, V9.D2 + VZIP2 V23.D2, V21.D2, V13.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V20.B16, V21.B16, V22.B16, V23.B16] + VZIP1 V26.D2, V24.D2, V2.D2 + VZIP2 V26.D2, V24.D2, V6.D2 + VZIP1 V27.D2, V25.D2, V10.D2 + VZIP2 V27.D2, V25.D2, V14.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V24.B16, V25.B16, V26.B16, V27.B16] + VZIP1 V30.D2, V28.D2, V3.D2 + VZIP2 V30.D2, V28.D2, V7.D2 + VZIP1 V31.D2, V29.D2, V11.D2 + VZIP2 V31.D2, V29.D2, V15.D2 + VLD1.P 64(R2), [V28.B16, V29.B16, V30.B16, V31.B16] + VEOR V0.B16, V16.B16, V16.B16 + VEOR V1.B16, V17.B16, V17.B16 + VEOR V2.B16, V18.B16, V18.B16 + VEOR V3.B16, V19.B16, V19.B16 + VST1.P [V16.B16, V17.B16, V18.B16, V19.B16], 64(R1) + VEOR V4.B16, V20.B16, V20.B16 + VEOR V5.B16, V21.B16, V21.B16 + VEOR V6.B16, V22.B16, V22.B16 + VEOR V7.B16, V23.B16, V23.B16 + VST1.P [V20.B16, V21.B16, V22.B16, V23.B16], 64(R1) + VEOR V8.B16, V24.B16, V24.B16 + VEOR V9.B16, V25.B16, V25.B16 + VEOR V10.B16, V26.B16, V26.B16 + VEOR V11.B16, V27.B16, V27.B16 + VST1.P [V24.B16, V25.B16, V26.B16, V27.B16], 64(R1) + VEOR V12.B16, V28.B16, V28.B16 + VEOR V13.B16, V29.B16, V29.B16 + VEOR V14.B16, V30.B16, V30.B16 + VEOR V15.B16, V31.B16, V31.B16 + VST1.P [V28.B16, V29.B16, V30.B16, V31.B16], 64(R1) + + ADD $4, R20 + MOVW R20, (R7) // update counter + + CMP R2, R12 + BGT loop + + RET + + +DATA ·constants+0x00(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA ·constants+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA ·constants+0x08(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA ·constants+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 +GLOBL ·constants(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32 + +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x00(SB)/4, $0x00000000 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x04(SB)/4, $0x00000001 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x08(SB)/4, $0x00000002 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x00000003 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x10(SB)/4, $0x02010003 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x14(SB)/4, $0x06050407 +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x18(SB)/4, $0x0A09080B +DATA ·incRotMatrix+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x0E0D0C0F +GLOBL ·incRotMatrix(SB), NOPTR|RODATA, $32 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..098ec9f6b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,364 @@ +// Copyright 2016 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package chacha20 implements the ChaCha20 and XChaCha20 encryption algorithms +// as specified in RFC 8439 and draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01. +package chacha20 + +import ( + "crypto/cipher" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "math/bits" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle" +) + +const ( + // KeySize is the size of the key used by this cipher, in bytes. + KeySize = 32 + + // NonceSize is the size of the nonce used with the standard variant of this + // cipher, in bytes. + // + // Note that this is too short to be safely generated at random if the same + // key is reused more than 2³² times. + NonceSize = 12 + + // NonceSizeX is the size of the nonce used with the XChaCha20 variant of + // this cipher, in bytes. + NonceSizeX = 24 +) + +// Cipher is a stateful instance of ChaCha20 or XChaCha20 using a particular key +// and nonce. A *Cipher implements the cipher.Stream interface. +type Cipher struct { + // The ChaCha20 state is 16 words: 4 constant, 8 of key, 1 of counter + // (incremented after each block), and 3 of nonce. + key [8]uint32 + counter uint32 + nonce [3]uint32 + + // The last len bytes of buf are leftover key stream bytes from the previous + // XORKeyStream invocation. The size of buf depends on how many blocks are + // computed at a time. + buf [bufSize]byte + len int + + // The counter-independent results of the first round are cached after they + // are computed the first time. + precompDone bool + p1, p5, p9, p13 uint32 + p2, p6, p10, p14 uint32 + p3, p7, p11, p15 uint32 +} + +var _ cipher.Stream = (*Cipher)(nil) + +// NewUnauthenticatedCipher creates a new ChaCha20 stream cipher with the given +// 32 bytes key and a 12 or 24 bytes nonce. If a nonce of 24 bytes is provided, +// the XChaCha20 construction will be used. It returns an error if key or nonce +// have any other length. +// +// Note that ChaCha20, like all stream ciphers, is not authenticated and allows +// attackers to silently tamper with the plaintext. For this reason, it is more +// appropriate as a building block than as a standalone encryption mechanism. +// Instead, consider using package golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20poly1305. +func NewUnauthenticatedCipher(key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + // This function is split into a wrapper so that the Cipher allocation will + // be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't + // escape to the heap. + c := &Cipher{} + return newUnauthenticatedCipher(c, key, nonce) +} + +func newUnauthenticatedCipher(c *Cipher, key, nonce []byte) (*Cipher, error) { + if len(key) != KeySize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong key size") + } + if len(nonce) == NonceSizeX { + // XChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to mix 16 bytes of the nonce into a + // derived key, allowing it to operate on a nonce of 24 bytes. See + // draft-irtf-cfrg-xchacha-01, Section 2.3. + key, _ = HChaCha20(key, nonce[0:16]) + cNonce := make([]byte, NonceSize) + copy(cNonce[4:12], nonce[16:24]) + nonce = cNonce + } else if len(nonce) != NonceSize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong nonce size") + } + + c.key = [8]uint32{ + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]), + } + c.nonce = [3]uint32{ + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]), + binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]), + } + return c, nil +} + +// The constant first 4 words of the ChaCha20 state. +const ( + j0 uint32 = 0x61707865 // expa + j1 uint32 = 0x3320646e // nd 3 + j2 uint32 = 0x79622d32 // 2-by + j3 uint32 = 0x6b206574 // te k +) + +const blockSize = 64 + +// quarterRound is the core of ChaCha20. It shuffles the bits of 4 state words. +// It's executed 4 times for each of the 20 ChaCha20 rounds, operating on all 16 +// words each round, in columnar or diagonal groups of 4 at a time. +func quarterRound(a, b, c, d uint32) (uint32, uint32, uint32, uint32) { + a += b + d ^= a + d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 16) + c += d + b ^= c + b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 12) + a += b + d ^= a + d = bits.RotateLeft32(d, 8) + c += d + b ^= c + b = bits.RotateLeft32(b, 7) + return a, b, c, d +} + +// XORKeyStream XORs each byte in the given slice with a byte from the +// cipher's key stream. Dst and src must overlap entirely or not at all. +// +// If len(dst) < len(src), XORKeyStream will panic. It is acceptable +// to pass a dst bigger than src, and in that case, XORKeyStream will +// only update dst[:len(src)] and will not touch the rest of dst. +// +// Multiple calls to XORKeyStream behave as if the concatenation of +// the src buffers was passed in a single run. That is, Cipher +// maintains state and does not reset at each XORKeyStream call. +func (s *Cipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) { + if len(src) == 0 { + return + } + if len(dst) < len(src) { + panic("chacha20: output smaller than input") + } + dst = dst[:len(src)] + if subtle.InexactOverlap(dst, src) { + panic("chacha20: invalid buffer overlap") + } + + // First, drain any remaining key stream from a previous XORKeyStream. + if s.len != 0 { + keyStream := s.buf[bufSize-s.len:] + if len(src) < len(keyStream) { + keyStream = keyStream[:len(src)] + } + _ = src[len(keyStream)-1] // bounds check elimination hint + for i, b := range keyStream { + dst[i] = src[i] ^ b + } + s.len -= len(keyStream) + src = src[len(keyStream):] + dst = dst[len(keyStream):] + } + + const blocksPerBuf = bufSize / blockSize + numBufs := (uint64(len(src)) + bufSize - 1) / bufSize + if uint64(s.counter)+numBufs*blocksPerBuf >= 1<<32 { + panic("chacha20: counter overflow") + } + + // xorKeyStreamBlocks implementations expect input lengths that are a + // multiple of bufSize. Platform-specific ones process multiple blocks at a + // time, so have bufSizes that are a multiple of blockSize. + + rem := len(src) % bufSize + full := len(src) - rem + + if full > 0 { + s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst[:full], src[:full]) + } + + // If we have a partial (multi-)block, pad it for xorKeyStreamBlocks, and + // keep the leftover keystream for the next XORKeyStream invocation. + if rem > 0 { + s.buf = [bufSize]byte{} + copy(s.buf[:], src[full:]) + s.xorKeyStreamBlocks(s.buf[:], s.buf[:]) + s.len = bufSize - copy(dst[full:], s.buf[:]) + } +} + +func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src []byte) { + if len(dst) != len(src) || len(dst)%blockSize != 0 { + panic("chacha20: internal error: wrong dst and/or src length") + } + + // To generate each block of key stream, the initial cipher state + // (represented below) is passed through 20 rounds of shuffling, + // alternatively applying quarterRounds by columns (like 1, 5, 9, 13) + // or by diagonals (like 1, 6, 11, 12). + // + // 0:cccccccc 1:cccccccc 2:cccccccc 3:cccccccc + // 4:kkkkkkkk 5:kkkkkkkk 6:kkkkkkkk 7:kkkkkkkk + // 8:kkkkkkkk 9:kkkkkkkk 10:kkkkkkkk 11:kkkkkkkk + // 12:bbbbbbbb 13:nnnnnnnn 14:nnnnnnnn 15:nnnnnnnn + // + // c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce + var ( + c0, c1, c2, c3 = j0, j1, j2, j3 + c4, c5, c6, c7 = s.key[0], s.key[1], s.key[2], s.key[3] + c8, c9, c10, c11 = s.key[4], s.key[5], s.key[6], s.key[7] + _, c13, c14, c15 = s.counter, s.nonce[0], s.nonce[1], s.nonce[2] + ) + + // Three quarters of the first round don't depend on the counter, so we can + // calculate them here, and reuse them for multiple blocks in the loop, and + // for future XORKeyStream invocations. + if !s.precompDone { + s.p1, s.p5, s.p9, s.p13 = quarterRound(c1, c5, c9, c13) + s.p2, s.p6, s.p10, s.p14 = quarterRound(c2, c6, c10, c14) + s.p3, s.p7, s.p11, s.p15 = quarterRound(c3, c7, c11, c15) + s.precompDone = true + } + + for i := 0; i < len(src); i += blockSize { + // The remainder of the first column round. + fcr0, fcr4, fcr8, fcr12 := quarterRound(c0, c4, c8, s.counter) + + // The second diagonal round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 := quarterRound(fcr0, s.p5, s.p10, s.p15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 := quarterRound(s.p1, s.p6, s.p11, fcr12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 := quarterRound(s.p2, s.p7, fcr8, s.p13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 := quarterRound(s.p3, fcr4, s.p9, s.p14) + + // The remaining 18 rounds. + for i := 0; i < 9; i++ { + // Column round. + x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) + x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) + x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) + x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) + + // Diagonal round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) + } + + // Finally, add back the initial state to generate the key stream. + x0 += c0 + x1 += c1 + x2 += c2 + x3 += c3 + x4 += c4 + x5 += c5 + x6 += c6 + x7 += c7 + x8 += c8 + x9 += c9 + x10 += c10 + x11 += c11 + x12 += s.counter + x13 += c13 + x14 += c14 + x15 += c15 + + s.counter += 1 + if s.counter == 0 { + panic("chacha20: internal error: counter overflow") + } + + in, out := src[i:], dst[i:] + in, out = in[:blockSize], out[:blockSize] // bounds check elimination hint + + // XOR the key stream with the source and write out the result. + xor(out[0:], in[0:], x0) + xor(out[4:], in[4:], x1) + xor(out[8:], in[8:], x2) + xor(out[12:], in[12:], x3) + xor(out[16:], in[16:], x4) + xor(out[20:], in[20:], x5) + xor(out[24:], in[24:], x6) + xor(out[28:], in[28:], x7) + xor(out[32:], in[32:], x8) + xor(out[36:], in[36:], x9) + xor(out[40:], in[40:], x10) + xor(out[44:], in[44:], x11) + xor(out[48:], in[48:], x12) + xor(out[52:], in[52:], x13) + xor(out[56:], in[56:], x14) + xor(out[60:], in[60:], x15) + } +} + +// HChaCha20 uses the ChaCha20 core to generate a derived key from a 32 bytes +// key and a 16 bytes nonce. It returns an error if key or nonce have any other +// length. It is used as part of the XChaCha20 construction. +func HChaCha20(key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) { + // This function is split into a wrapper so that the slice allocation will + // be inlined, and depending on how the caller uses the return value, won't + // escape to the heap. + out := make([]byte, 32) + return hChaCha20(out, key, nonce) +} + +func hChaCha20(out, key, nonce []byte) ([]byte, error) { + if len(key) != KeySize { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 key size") + } + if len(nonce) != 16 { + return nil, errors.New("chacha20: wrong HChaCha20 nonce size") + } + + x0, x1, x2, x3 := j0, j1, j2, j3 + x4 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[0:4]) + x5 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[4:8]) + x6 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[8:12]) + x7 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[12:16]) + x8 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[16:20]) + x9 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[20:24]) + x10 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[24:28]) + x11 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(key[28:32]) + x12 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[0:4]) + x13 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[4:8]) + x14 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[8:12]) + x15 := binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(nonce[12:16]) + + for i := 0; i < 10; i++ { + // Diagonal round. + x0, x4, x8, x12 = quarterRound(x0, x4, x8, x12) + x1, x5, x9, x13 = quarterRound(x1, x5, x9, x13) + x2, x6, x10, x14 = quarterRound(x2, x6, x10, x14) + x3, x7, x11, x15 = quarterRound(x3, x7, x11, x15) + + // Column round. + x0, x5, x10, x15 = quarterRound(x0, x5, x10, x15) + x1, x6, x11, x12 = quarterRound(x1, x6, x11, x12) + x2, x7, x8, x13 = quarterRound(x2, x7, x8, x13) + x3, x4, x9, x14 = quarterRound(x3, x4, x9, x14) + } + + _ = out[31] // bounds check elimination hint + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[0:4], x0) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[4:8], x1) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[8:12], x2) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[12:16], x3) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[16:20], x12) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[20:24], x13) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[24:28], x14) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint32(out[28:32], x15) + return out, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ec609ed86 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !arm64,!s390x,!ppc64le arm64,!go1.11 gccgo appengine + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = blockSize + +func (s *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + s.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d0ec61f08 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !gccgo,!appengine + +package chacha20 + +const bufSize = 256 + +//go:noescape +func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(&dst[0], &src[0], len(src), &c.key, &c.counter) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..533014ea3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_ppc64le.s @@ -0,0 +1,449 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Based on CRYPTOGAMS code with the following comment: +// # ==================================================================== +// # Written by Andy Polyakov <appro@openssl.org> for the OpenSSL +// # project. The module is, however, dual licensed under OpenSSL and +// # CRYPTOGAMS licenses depending on where you obtain it. For further +// # details see http://www.openssl.org/~appro/cryptogams/. +// # ==================================================================== + +// Code for the perl script that generates the ppc64 assembler +// can be found in the cryptogams repository at the link below. It is based on +// the original from openssl. + +// https://github.com/dot-asm/cryptogams/commit/a60f5b50ed908e91 + +// The differences in this and the original implementation are +// due to the calling conventions and initialization of constants. + +// +build !gccgo,!appengine + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define OUT R3 +#define INP R4 +#define LEN R5 +#define KEY R6 +#define CNT R7 +#define TMP R15 + +#define CONSTBASE R16 +#define BLOCKS R17 + +DATA consts<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x3320646e61707865 +DATA consts<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x6b20657479622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x10(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000001 +DATA consts<>+0x18(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA consts<>+0x20(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000004 +DATA consts<>+0x28(SB)/8, $0x0000000000000000 +DATA consts<>+0x30(SB)/8, $0x0a0b08090e0f0c0d +DATA consts<>+0x38(SB)/8, $0x0203000106070405 +DATA consts<>+0x40(SB)/8, $0x090a0b080d0e0f0c +DATA consts<>+0x48(SB)/8, $0x0102030005060704 +DATA consts<>+0x50(SB)/8, $0x6170786561707865 +DATA consts<>+0x58(SB)/8, $0x6170786561707865 +DATA consts<>+0x60(SB)/8, $0x3320646e3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x68(SB)/8, $0x3320646e3320646e +DATA consts<>+0x70(SB)/8, $0x79622d3279622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x78(SB)/8, $0x79622d3279622d32 +DATA consts<>+0x80(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x88(SB)/8, $0x6b2065746b206574 +DATA consts<>+0x90(SB)/8, $0x0000000100000000 +DATA consts<>+0x98(SB)/8, $0x0000000300000002 +GLOBL consts<>(SB), RODATA, $0xa0 + +//func chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(out, inp *byte, len int, key *[8]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·chaCha20_ctr32_vsx(SB),NOSPLIT,$64-40 + MOVD out+0(FP), OUT + MOVD inp+8(FP), INP + MOVD len+16(FP), LEN + MOVD key+24(FP), KEY + MOVD counter+32(FP), CNT + + // Addressing for constants + MOVD $consts<>+0x00(SB), CONSTBASE + MOVD $16, R8 + MOVD $32, R9 + MOVD $48, R10 + MOVD $64, R11 + SRD $6, LEN, BLOCKS + // V16 + LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R0), VS48 + ADD $80,CONSTBASE + + // Load key into V17,V18 + LXVW4X (KEY)(R0), VS49 + LXVW4X (KEY)(R8), VS50 + + // Load CNT, NONCE into V19 + LXVW4X (CNT)(R0), VS51 + + // Clear V27 + VXOR V27, V27, V27 + + // V28 + LXVW4X (CONSTBASE)(R11), VS60 + + // splat slot from V19 -> V26 + VSPLTW $0, V19, V26 + + VSLDOI $4, V19, V27, V19 + VSLDOI $12, V27, V19, V19 + + VADDUWM V26, V28, V26 + + MOVD $10, R14 + MOVD R14, CTR + +loop_outer_vsx: + // V0, V1, V2, V3 + LXVW4X (R0)(CONSTBASE), VS32 + LXVW4X (R8)(CONSTBASE), VS33 + LXVW4X (R9)(CONSTBASE), VS34 + LXVW4X (R10)(CONSTBASE), VS35 + + // splat values from V17, V18 into V4-V11 + VSPLTW $0, V17, V4 + VSPLTW $1, V17, V5 + VSPLTW $2, V17, V6 + VSPLTW $3, V17, V7 + VSPLTW $0, V18, V8 + VSPLTW $1, V18, V9 + VSPLTW $2, V18, V10 + VSPLTW $3, V18, V11 + + // VOR + VOR V26, V26, V12 + + // splat values from V19 -> V13, V14, V15 + VSPLTW $1, V19, V13 + VSPLTW $2, V19, V14 + VSPLTW $3, V19, V15 + + // splat const values + VSPLTISW $-16, V27 + VSPLTISW $12, V28 + VSPLTISW $8, V29 + VSPLTISW $7, V30 + +loop_vsx: + VADDUWM V0, V4, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V5, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V6, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V7, V3 + + VXOR V12, V0, V12 + VXOR V13, V1, V13 + VXOR V14, V2, V14 + VXOR V15, V3, V15 + + VRLW V12, V27, V12 + VRLW V13, V27, V13 + VRLW V14, V27, V14 + VRLW V15, V27, V15 + + VADDUWM V8, V12, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V13, V9 + VADDUWM V10, V14, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V15, V11 + + VXOR V4, V8, V4 + VXOR V5, V9, V5 + VXOR V6, V10, V6 + VXOR V7, V11, V7 + + VRLW V4, V28, V4 + VRLW V5, V28, V5 + VRLW V6, V28, V6 + VRLW V7, V28, V7 + + VADDUWM V0, V4, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V5, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V6, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V7, V3 + + VXOR V12, V0, V12 + VXOR V13, V1, V13 + VXOR V14, V2, V14 + VXOR V15, V3, V15 + + VRLW V12, V29, V12 + VRLW V13, V29, V13 + VRLW V14, V29, V14 + VRLW V15, V29, V15 + + VADDUWM V8, V12, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V13, V9 + VADDUWM V10, V14, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V15, V11 + + VXOR V4, V8, V4 + VXOR V5, V9, V5 + VXOR V6, V10, V6 + VXOR V7, V11, V7 + + VRLW V4, V30, V4 + VRLW V5, V30, V5 + VRLW V6, V30, V6 + VRLW V7, V30, V7 + + VADDUWM V0, V5, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V6, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V7, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V4, V3 + + VXOR V15, V0, V15 + VXOR V12, V1, V12 + VXOR V13, V2, V13 + VXOR V14, V3, V14 + + VRLW V15, V27, V15 + VRLW V12, V27, V12 + VRLW V13, V27, V13 + VRLW V14, V27, V14 + + VADDUWM V10, V15, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V12, V11 + VADDUWM V8, V13, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V14, V9 + + VXOR V5, V10, V5 + VXOR V6, V11, V6 + VXOR V7, V8, V7 + VXOR V4, V9, V4 + + VRLW V5, V28, V5 + VRLW V6, V28, V6 + VRLW V7, V28, V7 + VRLW V4, V28, V4 + + VADDUWM V0, V5, V0 + VADDUWM V1, V6, V1 + VADDUWM V2, V7, V2 + VADDUWM V3, V4, V3 + + VXOR V15, V0, V15 + VXOR V12, V1, V12 + VXOR V13, V2, V13 + VXOR V14, V3, V14 + + VRLW V15, V29, V15 + VRLW V12, V29, V12 + VRLW V13, V29, V13 + VRLW V14, V29, V14 + + VADDUWM V10, V15, V10 + VADDUWM V11, V12, V11 + VADDUWM V8, V13, V8 + VADDUWM V9, V14, V9 + + VXOR V5, V10, V5 + VXOR V6, V11, V6 + VXOR V7, V8, V7 + VXOR V4, V9, V4 + + VRLW V5, V30, V5 + VRLW V6, V30, V6 + VRLW V7, V30, V7 + VRLW V4, V30, V4 + BC 16, LT, loop_vsx + + VADDUWM V12, V26, V12 + + WORD $0x13600F8C // VMRGEW V0, V1, V27 + WORD $0x13821F8C // VMRGEW V2, V3, V28 + + WORD $0x10000E8C // VMRGOW V0, V1, V0 + WORD $0x10421E8C // VMRGOW V2, V3, V2 + + WORD $0x13A42F8C // VMRGEW V4, V5, V29 + WORD $0x13C63F8C // VMRGEW V6, V7, V30 + + XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $0, VS33 + XXPERMDI VS32, VS34, $3, VS35 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS32 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS34 + + WORD $0x10842E8C // VMRGOW V4, V5, V4 + WORD $0x10C63E8C // VMRGOW V6, V7, V6 + + WORD $0x13684F8C // VMRGEW V8, V9, V27 + WORD $0x138A5F8C // VMRGEW V10, V11, V28 + + XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $0, VS37 + XXPERMDI VS36, VS38, $3, VS39 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS36 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS38 + + WORD $0x11084E8C // VMRGOW V8, V9, V8 + WORD $0x114A5E8C // VMRGOW V10, V11, V10 + + WORD $0x13AC6F8C // VMRGEW V12, V13, V29 + WORD $0x13CE7F8C // VMRGEW V14, V15, V30 + + XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $0, VS41 + XXPERMDI VS40, VS42, $3, VS43 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $0, VS40 + XXPERMDI VS59, VS60, $3, VS42 + + WORD $0x118C6E8C // VMRGOW V12, V13, V12 + WORD $0x11CE7E8C // VMRGOW V14, V15, V14 + + VSPLTISW $4, V27 + VADDUWM V26, V27, V26 + + XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $0, VS45 + XXPERMDI VS44, VS46, $3, VS47 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $0, VS44 + XXPERMDI VS61, VS62, $3, VS46 + + VADDUWM V0, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V4, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V8, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V12, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + // Bottom of loop + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V1, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V5, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V9, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V13, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(V10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V2, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V6, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V10, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V14, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + BEQ done_vsx + + VADDUWM V3, V16, V0 + VADDUWM V7, V17, V4 + VADDUWM V11, V18, V8 + VADDUWM V15, V19, V12 + + CMPU LEN, $64 + BLT tail_vsx + + LXVW4X (INP)(R0), VS59 + LXVW4X (INP)(R8), VS60 + LXVW4X (INP)(R9), VS61 + LXVW4X (INP)(R10), VS62 + + VXOR V27, V0, V27 + VXOR V28, V4, V28 + VXOR V29, V8, V29 + VXOR V30, V12, V30 + + STXVW4X VS59, (OUT)(R0) + STXVW4X VS60, (OUT)(R8) + ADD $64, INP + STXVW4X VS61, (OUT)(R9) + ADD $-64, LEN + STXVW4X VS62, (OUT)(R10) + ADD $64, OUT + + MOVD $10, R14 + MOVD R14, CTR + BNE loop_outer_vsx + +done_vsx: + // Increment counter by number of 64 byte blocks + MOVD (CNT), R14 + ADD BLOCKS, R14 + MOVD R14, (CNT) + RET + +tail_vsx: + ADD $32, R1, R11 + MOVD LEN, CTR + + // Save values on stack to copy from + STXVW4X VS32, (R11)(R0) + STXVW4X VS36, (R11)(R8) + STXVW4X VS40, (R11)(R9) + STXVW4X VS44, (R11)(R10) + ADD $-1, R11, R12 + ADD $-1, INP + ADD $-1, OUT + +looptail_vsx: + // Copying the result to OUT + // in bytes. + MOVBZU 1(R12), KEY + MOVBZU 1(INP), TMP + XOR KEY, TMP, KEY + MOVBU KEY, 1(OUT) + BC 16, LT, looptail_vsx + + // Clear the stack values + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R0) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R8) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R9) + STXVW4X VS48, (R11)(R10) + BR done_vsx diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..cd55f45a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !gccgo,!appengine + +package chacha20 + +import "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" + +var haveAsm = cpu.S390X.HasVX + +const bufSize = 256 + +// xorKeyStreamVX is an assembly implementation of XORKeyStream. It must only +// be called when the vector facility is available. Implementation in asm_s390x.s. +//go:noescape +func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) + +func (c *Cipher) xorKeyStreamBlocks(dst, src []byte) { + if cpu.S390X.HasVX { + xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src, &c.key, &c.nonce, &c.counter) + } else { + c.xorKeyStreamBlocksGeneric(dst, src) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..de52a2ea8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/chacha_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !gccgo,!appengine + +#include "go_asm.h" +#include "textflag.h" + +// This is an implementation of the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm as +// specified in RFC 7539. It uses vector instructions to compute +// 4 keystream blocks in parallel (256 bytes) which are then XORed +// with the bytes in the input slice. + +GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA|NOPTR, $32 +// BSWAP: swap bytes in each 4-byte element +DATA ·constants<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x03020100 +DATA ·constants<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x07060504 +DATA ·constants<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x0b0a0908 +DATA ·constants<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x0f0e0d0c +// J0: [j0, j1, j2, j3] +DATA ·constants<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x61707865 +DATA ·constants<>+0x14(SB)/4, $0x3320646e +DATA ·constants<>+0x18(SB)/4, $0x79622d32 +DATA ·constants<>+0x1c(SB)/4, $0x6b206574 + +#define BSWAP V5 +#define J0 V6 +#define KEY0 V7 +#define KEY1 V8 +#define NONCE V9 +#define CTR V10 +#define M0 V11 +#define M1 V12 +#define M2 V13 +#define M3 V14 +#define INC V15 +#define X0 V16 +#define X1 V17 +#define X2 V18 +#define X3 V19 +#define X4 V20 +#define X5 V21 +#define X6 V22 +#define X7 V23 +#define X8 V24 +#define X9 V25 +#define X10 V26 +#define X11 V27 +#define X12 V28 +#define X13 V29 +#define X14 V30 +#define X15 V31 + +#define NUM_ROUNDS 20 + +#define ROUND4(a0, a1, a2, a3, b0, b1, b2, b3, c0, c1, c2, c3, d0, d1, d2, d3) \ + VAF a1, a0, a0 \ + VAF b1, b0, b0 \ + VAF c1, c0, c0 \ + VAF d1, d0, d0 \ + VX a0, a2, a2 \ + VX b0, b2, b2 \ + VX c0, c2, c2 \ + VX d0, d2, d2 \ + VERLLF $16, a2, a2 \ + VERLLF $16, b2, b2 \ + VERLLF $16, c2, c2 \ + VERLLF $16, d2, d2 \ + VAF a2, a3, a3 \ + VAF b2, b3, b3 \ + VAF c2, c3, c3 \ + VAF d2, d3, d3 \ + VX a3, a1, a1 \ + VX b3, b1, b1 \ + VX c3, c1, c1 \ + VX d3, d1, d1 \ + VERLLF $12, a1, a1 \ + VERLLF $12, b1, b1 \ + VERLLF $12, c1, c1 \ + VERLLF $12, d1, d1 \ + VAF a1, a0, a0 \ + VAF b1, b0, b0 \ + VAF c1, c0, c0 \ + VAF d1, d0, d0 \ + VX a0, a2, a2 \ + VX b0, b2, b2 \ + VX c0, c2, c2 \ + VX d0, d2, d2 \ + VERLLF $8, a2, a2 \ + VERLLF $8, b2, b2 \ + VERLLF $8, c2, c2 \ + VERLLF $8, d2, d2 \ + VAF a2, a3, a3 \ + VAF b2, b3, b3 \ + VAF c2, c3, c3 \ + VAF d2, d3, d3 \ + VX a3, a1, a1 \ + VX b3, b1, b1 \ + VX c3, c1, c1 \ + VX d3, d1, d1 \ + VERLLF $7, a1, a1 \ + VERLLF $7, b1, b1 \ + VERLLF $7, c1, c1 \ + VERLLF $7, d1, d1 + +#define PERMUTE(mask, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VPERM v0, v0, mask, v0 \ + VPERM v1, v1, mask, v1 \ + VPERM v2, v2, mask, v2 \ + VPERM v3, v3, mask, v3 + +#define ADDV(x, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VAF x, v0, v0 \ + VAF x, v1, v1 \ + VAF x, v2, v2 \ + VAF x, v3, v3 + +#define XORV(off, dst, src, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VLM off(src), M0, M3 \ + PERMUTE(BSWAP, v0, v1, v2, v3) \ + VX v0, M0, M0 \ + VX v1, M1, M1 \ + VX v2, M2, M2 \ + VX v3, M3, M3 \ + VSTM M0, M3, off(dst) + +#define SHUFFLE(a, b, c, d, t, u, v, w) \ + VMRHF a, c, t \ // t = {a[0], c[0], a[1], c[1]} + VMRHF b, d, u \ // u = {b[0], d[0], b[1], d[1]} + VMRLF a, c, v \ // v = {a[2], c[2], a[3], c[3]} + VMRLF b, d, w \ // w = {b[2], d[2], b[3], d[3]} + VMRHF t, u, a \ // a = {a[0], b[0], c[0], d[0]} + VMRLF t, u, b \ // b = {a[1], b[1], c[1], d[1]} + VMRHF v, w, c \ // c = {a[2], b[2], c[2], d[2]} + VMRLF v, w, d // d = {a[3], b[3], c[3], d[3]} + +// func xorKeyStreamVX(dst, src []byte, key *[8]uint32, nonce *[3]uint32, counter *uint32) +TEXT ·xorKeyStreamVX(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R1 + MOVD dst+0(FP), R2 // R2=&dst[0] + LMG src+24(FP), R3, R4 // R3=&src[0] R4=len(src) + MOVD key+48(FP), R5 // R5=key + MOVD nonce+56(FP), R6 // R6=nonce + MOVD counter+64(FP), R7 // R7=counter + + // load BSWAP and J0 + VLM (R1), BSWAP, J0 + + // setup + MOVD $95, R0 + VLM (R5), KEY0, KEY1 + VLL R0, (R6), NONCE + VZERO M0 + VLEIB $7, $32, M0 + VSRLB M0, NONCE, NONCE + + // initialize counter values + VLREPF (R7), CTR + VZERO INC + VLEIF $1, $1, INC + VLEIF $2, $2, INC + VLEIF $3, $3, INC + VAF INC, CTR, CTR + VREPIF $4, INC + +chacha: + VREPF $0, J0, X0 + VREPF $1, J0, X1 + VREPF $2, J0, X2 + VREPF $3, J0, X3 + VREPF $0, KEY0, X4 + VREPF $1, KEY0, X5 + VREPF $2, KEY0, X6 + VREPF $3, KEY0, X7 + VREPF $0, KEY1, X8 + VREPF $1, KEY1, X9 + VREPF $2, KEY1, X10 + VREPF $3, KEY1, X11 + VLR CTR, X12 + VREPF $1, NONCE, X13 + VREPF $2, NONCE, X14 + VREPF $3, NONCE, X15 + + MOVD $(NUM_ROUNDS/2), R1 + +loop: + ROUND4(X0, X4, X12, X8, X1, X5, X13, X9, X2, X6, X14, X10, X3, X7, X15, X11) + ROUND4(X0, X5, X15, X10, X1, X6, X12, X11, X2, X7, X13, X8, X3, X4, X14, X9) + + ADD $-1, R1 + BNE loop + + // decrement length + ADD $-256, R4 + + // rearrange vectors + SHUFFLE(X0, X1, X2, X3, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(J0, X0, X1, X2, X3) + SHUFFLE(X4, X5, X6, X7, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(KEY0, X4, X5, X6, X7) + SHUFFLE(X8, X9, X10, X11, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(KEY1, X8, X9, X10, X11) + VAF CTR, X12, X12 + SHUFFLE(X12, X13, X14, X15, M0, M1, M2, M3) + ADDV(NONCE, X12, X13, X14, X15) + + // increment counters + VAF INC, CTR, CTR + + // xor keystream with plaintext + XORV(0*64, R2, R3, X0, X4, X8, X12) + XORV(1*64, R2, R3, X1, X5, X9, X13) + XORV(2*64, R2, R3, X2, X6, X10, X14) + XORV(3*64, R2, R3, X3, X7, X11, X15) + + // increment pointers + MOVD $256(R2), R2 + MOVD $256(R3), R3 + + CMPBNE R4, $0, chacha + + VSTEF $0, CTR, (R7) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0110c9865 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20/xor.go @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found src the LICENSE file. + +package chacha20 + +import "runtime" + +// Platforms that have fast unaligned 32-bit little endian accesses. +const unaligned = runtime.GOARCH == "386" || + runtime.GOARCH == "amd64" || + runtime.GOARCH == "arm64" || + runtime.GOARCH == "ppc64le" || + runtime.GOARCH == "s390x" + +// xor reads a little endian uint32 from src, XORs it with u and +// places the result in little endian byte order in dst. +func xor(dst, src []byte, u uint32) { + _, _ = src[3], dst[3] // eliminate bounds checks + if unaligned { + // The compiler should optimize this code into + // 32-bit unaligned little endian loads and stores. + // TODO: delete once the compiler does a reliably + // good job with the generic code below. + // See issue #25111 for more details. + v := uint32(src[0]) + v |= uint32(src[1]) << 8 + v |= uint32(src[2]) << 16 + v |= uint32(src[3]) << 24 + v ^= u + dst[0] = byte(v) + dst[1] = byte(v >> 8) + dst[2] = byte(v >> 16) + dst[3] = byte(v >> 24) + } else { + dst[0] = src[0] ^ byte(u) + dst[1] = src[1] ^ byte(u>>8) + dst[2] = src[2] ^ byte(u>>16) + dst[3] = src[3] ^ byte(u>>24) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4b9a655d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519.go @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package curve25519 provides an implementation of the X25519 function, which +// performs scalar multiplication on the elliptic curve known as Curve25519. +// See RFC 7748. +package curve25519 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" + +import ( + "crypto/subtle" + "fmt" +) + +// ScalarMult sets dst to the product scalar * point. +// +// Deprecated: when provided a low-order point, ScalarMult will set dst to all +// zeroes, irrespective of the scalar. Instead, use the X25519 function, which +// will return an error. +func ScalarMult(dst, scalar, point *[32]byte) { + scalarMult(dst, scalar, point) +} + +// ScalarBaseMult sets dst to the product scalar * base where base is the +// standard generator. +// +// It is recommended to use the X25519 function with Basepoint instead, as +// copying into fixed size arrays can lead to unexpected bugs. +func ScalarBaseMult(dst, scalar *[32]byte) { + ScalarMult(dst, scalar, &basePoint) +} + +const ( + // ScalarSize is the size of the scalar input to X25519. + ScalarSize = 32 + // PointSize is the size of the point input to X25519. + PointSize = 32 +) + +// Basepoint is the canonical Curve25519 generator. +var Basepoint []byte + +var basePoint = [32]byte{9, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0} + +func init() { Basepoint = basePoint[:] } + +func checkBasepoint() { + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(Basepoint, []byte{ + 0x09, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + }) != 1 { + panic("curve25519: global Basepoint value was modified") + } +} + +// X25519 returns the result of the scalar multiplication (scalar * point), +// according to RFC 7748, Section 5. scalar, point and the return value are +// slices of 32 bytes. +// +// scalar can be generated at random, for example with crypto/rand. point should +// be either Basepoint or the output of another X25519 call. +// +// If point is Basepoint (but not if it's a different slice with the same +// contents) a precomputed implementation might be used for performance. +func X25519(scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) { + // Outline the body of function, to let the allocation be inlined in the + // caller, and possibly avoid escaping to the heap. + var dst [32]byte + return x25519(&dst, scalar, point) +} + +func x25519(dst *[32]byte, scalar, point []byte) ([]byte, error) { + var in [32]byte + if l := len(scalar); l != 32 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad scalar length: %d, expected %d", l, 32) + } + if l := len(point); l != 32 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad point length: %d, expected %d", l, 32) + } + copy(in[:], scalar) + if &point[0] == &Basepoint[0] { + checkBasepoint() + ScalarBaseMult(dst, &in) + } else { + var base, zero [32]byte + copy(base[:], point) + ScalarMult(dst, &in, &base) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(dst[:], zero[:]) == 1 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("bad input point: low order point") + } + } + return dst[:], nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_amd64.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..5120b779b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_amd64.go @@ -0,0 +1,240 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine,!purego + +package curve25519 + +// These functions are implemented in the .s files. The names of the functions +// in the rest of the file are also taken from the SUPERCOP sources to help +// people following along. + +//go:noescape + +func cswap(inout *[5]uint64, v uint64) + +//go:noescape + +func ladderstep(inout *[5][5]uint64) + +//go:noescape + +func freeze(inout *[5]uint64) + +//go:noescape + +func mul(dest, a, b *[5]uint64) + +//go:noescape + +func square(out, in *[5]uint64) + +// mladder uses a Montgomery ladder to calculate (xr/zr) *= s. +func mladder(xr, zr *[5]uint64, s *[32]byte) { + var work [5][5]uint64 + + work[0] = *xr + setint(&work[1], 1) + setint(&work[2], 0) + work[3] = *xr + setint(&work[4], 1) + + j := uint(6) + var prevbit byte + + for i := 31; i >= 0; i-- { + for j < 8 { + bit := ((*s)[i] >> j) & 1 + swap := bit ^ prevbit + prevbit = bit + cswap(&work[1], uint64(swap)) + ladderstep(&work) + j-- + } + j = 7 + } + + *xr = work[1] + *zr = work[2] +} + +func scalarMult(out, in, base *[32]byte) { + var e [32]byte + copy(e[:], (*in)[:]) + e[0] &= 248 + e[31] &= 127 + e[31] |= 64 + + var t, z [5]uint64 + unpack(&t, base) + mladder(&t, &z, &e) + invert(&z, &z) + mul(&t, &t, &z) + pack(out, &t) +} + +func setint(r *[5]uint64, v uint64) { + r[0] = v + r[1] = 0 + r[2] = 0 + r[3] = 0 + r[4] = 0 +} + +// unpack sets r = x where r consists of 5, 51-bit limbs in little-endian +// order. +func unpack(r *[5]uint64, x *[32]byte) { + r[0] = uint64(x[0]) | + uint64(x[1])<<8 | + uint64(x[2])<<16 | + uint64(x[3])<<24 | + uint64(x[4])<<32 | + uint64(x[5])<<40 | + uint64(x[6]&7)<<48 + + r[1] = uint64(x[6])>>3 | + uint64(x[7])<<5 | + uint64(x[8])<<13 | + uint64(x[9])<<21 | + uint64(x[10])<<29 | + uint64(x[11])<<37 | + uint64(x[12]&63)<<45 + + r[2] = uint64(x[12])>>6 | + uint64(x[13])<<2 | + uint64(x[14])<<10 | + uint64(x[15])<<18 | + uint64(x[16])<<26 | + uint64(x[17])<<34 | + uint64(x[18])<<42 | + uint64(x[19]&1)<<50 + + r[3] = uint64(x[19])>>1 | + uint64(x[20])<<7 | + uint64(x[21])<<15 | + uint64(x[22])<<23 | + uint64(x[23])<<31 | + uint64(x[24])<<39 | + uint64(x[25]&15)<<47 + + r[4] = uint64(x[25])>>4 | + uint64(x[26])<<4 | + uint64(x[27])<<12 | + uint64(x[28])<<20 | + uint64(x[29])<<28 | + uint64(x[30])<<36 | + uint64(x[31]&127)<<44 +} + +// pack sets out = x where out is the usual, little-endian form of the 5, +// 51-bit limbs in x. +func pack(out *[32]byte, x *[5]uint64) { + t := *x + freeze(&t) + + out[0] = byte(t[0]) + out[1] = byte(t[0] >> 8) + out[2] = byte(t[0] >> 16) + out[3] = byte(t[0] >> 24) + out[4] = byte(t[0] >> 32) + out[5] = byte(t[0] >> 40) + out[6] = byte(t[0] >> 48) + + out[6] ^= byte(t[1]<<3) & 0xf8 + out[7] = byte(t[1] >> 5) + out[8] = byte(t[1] >> 13) + out[9] = byte(t[1] >> 21) + out[10] = byte(t[1] >> 29) + out[11] = byte(t[1] >> 37) + out[12] = byte(t[1] >> 45) + + out[12] ^= byte(t[2]<<6) & 0xc0 + out[13] = byte(t[2] >> 2) + out[14] = byte(t[2] >> 10) + out[15] = byte(t[2] >> 18) + out[16] = byte(t[2] >> 26) + out[17] = byte(t[2] >> 34) + out[18] = byte(t[2] >> 42) + out[19] = byte(t[2] >> 50) + + out[19] ^= byte(t[3]<<1) & 0xfe + out[20] = byte(t[3] >> 7) + out[21] = byte(t[3] >> 15) + out[22] = byte(t[3] >> 23) + out[23] = byte(t[3] >> 31) + out[24] = byte(t[3] >> 39) + out[25] = byte(t[3] >> 47) + + out[25] ^= byte(t[4]<<4) & 0xf0 + out[26] = byte(t[4] >> 4) + out[27] = byte(t[4] >> 12) + out[28] = byte(t[4] >> 20) + out[29] = byte(t[4] >> 28) + out[30] = byte(t[4] >> 36) + out[31] = byte(t[4] >> 44) +} + +// invert calculates r = x^-1 mod p using Fermat's little theorem. +func invert(r *[5]uint64, x *[5]uint64) { + var z2, z9, z11, z2_5_0, z2_10_0, z2_20_0, z2_50_0, z2_100_0, t [5]uint64 + + square(&z2, x) /* 2 */ + square(&t, &z2) /* 4 */ + square(&t, &t) /* 8 */ + mul(&z9, &t, x) /* 9 */ + mul(&z11, &z9, &z2) /* 11 */ + square(&t, &z11) /* 22 */ + mul(&z2_5_0, &t, &z9) /* 2^5 - 2^0 = 31 */ + + square(&t, &z2_5_0) /* 2^6 - 2^1 */ + for i := 1; i < 5; i++ { /* 2^20 - 2^10 */ + square(&t, &t) + } + mul(&z2_10_0, &t, &z2_5_0) /* 2^10 - 2^0 */ + + square(&t, &z2_10_0) /* 2^11 - 2^1 */ + for i := 1; i < 10; i++ { /* 2^20 - 2^10 */ + square(&t, &t) + } + mul(&z2_20_0, &t, &z2_10_0) /* 2^20 - 2^0 */ + + square(&t, &z2_20_0) /* 2^21 - 2^1 */ + for i := 1; i < 20; i++ { /* 2^40 - 2^20 */ + square(&t, &t) + } + mul(&t, &t, &z2_20_0) /* 2^40 - 2^0 */ + + square(&t, &t) /* 2^41 - 2^1 */ + for i := 1; i < 10; i++ { /* 2^50 - 2^10 */ + square(&t, &t) + } + mul(&z2_50_0, &t, &z2_10_0) /* 2^50 - 2^0 */ + + square(&t, &z2_50_0) /* 2^51 - 2^1 */ + for i := 1; i < 50; i++ { /* 2^100 - 2^50 */ + square(&t, &t) + } + mul(&z2_100_0, &t, &z2_50_0) /* 2^100 - 2^0 */ + + square(&t, &z2_100_0) /* 2^101 - 2^1 */ + for i := 1; i < 100; i++ { /* 2^200 - 2^100 */ + square(&t, &t) + } + mul(&t, &t, &z2_100_0) /* 2^200 - 2^0 */ + + square(&t, &t) /* 2^201 - 2^1 */ + for i := 1; i < 50; i++ { /* 2^250 - 2^50 */ + square(&t, &t) + } + mul(&t, &t, &z2_50_0) /* 2^250 - 2^0 */ + + square(&t, &t) /* 2^251 - 2^1 */ + square(&t, &t) /* 2^252 - 2^2 */ + square(&t, &t) /* 2^253 - 2^3 */ + + square(&t, &t) /* 2^254 - 2^4 */ + + square(&t, &t) /* 2^255 - 2^5 */ + mul(r, &t, &z11) /* 2^255 - 21 */ +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0250c8885 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,1793 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// This code was translated into a form compatible with 6a from the public +// domain sources in SUPERCOP: https://bench.cr.yp.to/supercop.html + +// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine,!purego + +#define REDMASK51 0x0007FFFFFFFFFFFF + +// These constants cannot be encoded in non-MOVQ immediates. +// We access them directly from memory instead. + +DATA ·_121666_213(SB)/8, $996687872 +GLOBL ·_121666_213(SB), 8, $8 + +DATA ·_2P0(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFDA +GLOBL ·_2P0(SB), 8, $8 + +DATA ·_2P1234(SB)/8, $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFE +GLOBL ·_2P1234(SB), 8, $8 + +// func freeze(inout *[5]uint64) +TEXT ·freeze(SB),7,$0-8 + MOVQ inout+0(FP), DI + + MOVQ 0(DI),SI + MOVQ 8(DI),DX + MOVQ 16(DI),CX + MOVQ 24(DI),R8 + MOVQ 32(DI),R9 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,AX + MOVQ AX,R10 + SUBQ $18,R10 + MOVQ $3,R11 +REDUCELOOP: + MOVQ SI,R12 + SHRQ $51,R12 + ANDQ AX,SI + ADDQ R12,DX + MOVQ DX,R12 + SHRQ $51,R12 + ANDQ AX,DX + ADDQ R12,CX + MOVQ CX,R12 + SHRQ $51,R12 + ANDQ AX,CX + ADDQ R12,R8 + MOVQ R8,R12 + SHRQ $51,R12 + ANDQ AX,R8 + ADDQ R12,R9 + MOVQ R9,R12 + SHRQ $51,R12 + ANDQ AX,R9 + IMUL3Q $19,R12,R12 + ADDQ R12,SI + SUBQ $1,R11 + JA REDUCELOOP + MOVQ $1,R12 + CMPQ R10,SI + CMOVQLT R11,R12 + CMPQ AX,DX + CMOVQNE R11,R12 + CMPQ AX,CX + CMOVQNE R11,R12 + CMPQ AX,R8 + CMOVQNE R11,R12 + CMPQ AX,R9 + CMOVQNE R11,R12 + NEGQ R12 + ANDQ R12,AX + ANDQ R12,R10 + SUBQ R10,SI + SUBQ AX,DX + SUBQ AX,CX + SUBQ AX,R8 + SUBQ AX,R9 + MOVQ SI,0(DI) + MOVQ DX,8(DI) + MOVQ CX,16(DI) + MOVQ R8,24(DI) + MOVQ R9,32(DI) + RET + +// func ladderstep(inout *[5][5]uint64) +TEXT ·ladderstep(SB),0,$296-8 + MOVQ inout+0(FP),DI + + MOVQ 40(DI),SI + MOVQ 48(DI),DX + MOVQ 56(DI),CX + MOVQ 64(DI),R8 + MOVQ 72(DI),R9 + MOVQ SI,AX + MOVQ DX,R10 + MOVQ CX,R11 + MOVQ R8,R12 + MOVQ R9,R13 + ADDQ ·_2P0(SB),AX + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R10 + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R11 + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R12 + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R13 + ADDQ 80(DI),SI + ADDQ 88(DI),DX + ADDQ 96(DI),CX + ADDQ 104(DI),R8 + ADDQ 112(DI),R9 + SUBQ 80(DI),AX + SUBQ 88(DI),R10 + SUBQ 96(DI),R11 + SUBQ 104(DI),R12 + SUBQ 112(DI),R13 + MOVQ SI,0(SP) + MOVQ DX,8(SP) + MOVQ CX,16(SP) + MOVQ R8,24(SP) + MOVQ R9,32(SP) + MOVQ AX,40(SP) + MOVQ R10,48(SP) + MOVQ R11,56(SP) + MOVQ R12,64(SP) + MOVQ R13,72(SP) + MOVQ 40(SP),AX + MULQ 40(SP) + MOVQ AX,SI + MOVQ DX,CX + MOVQ 40(SP),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 48(SP) + MOVQ AX,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 40(SP),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 56(SP) + MOVQ AX,R10 + MOVQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 40(SP),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 64(SP) + MOVQ AX,R12 + MOVQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 40(SP),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 72(SP) + MOVQ AX,R14 + MOVQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 48(SP),AX + MULQ 48(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 48(SP),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 56(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 48(SP),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 64(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 48(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 72(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 56(SP),AX + MULQ 56(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 56(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 64(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 56(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 72(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 64(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 64(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 64(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 72(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 72(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 72(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX + SHLQ $13,SI,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + SHLQ $13,R8,R9 + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ CX,R8 + SHLQ $13,R10,R11 + ANDQ DX,R10 + ADDQ R9,R10 + SHLQ $13,R12,R13 + ANDQ DX,R12 + ADDQ R11,R12 + SHLQ $13,R14,R15 + ANDQ DX,R14 + ADDQ R13,R14 + IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + MOVQ SI,CX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R8,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + MOVQ CX,R8 + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R10,CX + ANDQ DX,R8 + MOVQ CX,R9 + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R12,CX + ANDQ DX,R9 + MOVQ CX,AX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R14,CX + ANDQ DX,AX + MOVQ CX,R10 + SHRQ $51,CX + IMUL3Q $19,CX,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + ANDQ DX,R10 + MOVQ SI,80(SP) + MOVQ R8,88(SP) + MOVQ R9,96(SP) + MOVQ AX,104(SP) + MOVQ R10,112(SP) + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + MULQ 0(SP) + MOVQ AX,SI + MOVQ DX,CX + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 8(SP) + MOVQ AX,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 16(SP) + MOVQ AX,R10 + MOVQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 24(SP) + MOVQ AX,R12 + MOVQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 32(SP) + MOVQ AX,R14 + MOVQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 8(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 16(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 24(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 8(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 16(SP),AX + MULQ 16(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 16(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 24(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 16(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 24(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 24(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 24(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 32(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX + SHLQ $13,SI,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + SHLQ $13,R8,R9 + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ CX,R8 + SHLQ $13,R10,R11 + ANDQ DX,R10 + ADDQ R9,R10 + SHLQ $13,R12,R13 + ANDQ DX,R12 + ADDQ R11,R12 + SHLQ $13,R14,R15 + ANDQ DX,R14 + ADDQ R13,R14 + IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + MOVQ SI,CX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R8,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + MOVQ CX,R8 + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R10,CX + ANDQ DX,R8 + MOVQ CX,R9 + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R12,CX + ANDQ DX,R9 + MOVQ CX,AX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R14,CX + ANDQ DX,AX + MOVQ CX,R10 + SHRQ $51,CX + IMUL3Q $19,CX,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + ANDQ DX,R10 + MOVQ SI,120(SP) + MOVQ R8,128(SP) + MOVQ R9,136(SP) + MOVQ AX,144(SP) + MOVQ R10,152(SP) + MOVQ SI,SI + MOVQ R8,DX + MOVQ R9,CX + MOVQ AX,R8 + MOVQ R10,R9 + ADDQ ·_2P0(SB),SI + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),DX + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),CX + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R8 + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R9 + SUBQ 80(SP),SI + SUBQ 88(SP),DX + SUBQ 96(SP),CX + SUBQ 104(SP),R8 + SUBQ 112(SP),R9 + MOVQ SI,160(SP) + MOVQ DX,168(SP) + MOVQ CX,176(SP) + MOVQ R8,184(SP) + MOVQ R9,192(SP) + MOVQ 120(DI),SI + MOVQ 128(DI),DX + MOVQ 136(DI),CX + MOVQ 144(DI),R8 + MOVQ 152(DI),R9 + MOVQ SI,AX + MOVQ DX,R10 + MOVQ CX,R11 + MOVQ R8,R12 + MOVQ R9,R13 + ADDQ ·_2P0(SB),AX + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R10 + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R11 + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R12 + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R13 + ADDQ 160(DI),SI + ADDQ 168(DI),DX + ADDQ 176(DI),CX + ADDQ 184(DI),R8 + ADDQ 192(DI),R9 + SUBQ 160(DI),AX + SUBQ 168(DI),R10 + SUBQ 176(DI),R11 + SUBQ 184(DI),R12 + SUBQ 192(DI),R13 + MOVQ SI,200(SP) + MOVQ DX,208(SP) + MOVQ CX,216(SP) + MOVQ R8,224(SP) + MOVQ R9,232(SP) + MOVQ AX,240(SP) + MOVQ R10,248(SP) + MOVQ R11,256(SP) + MOVQ R12,264(SP) + MOVQ R13,272(SP) + MOVQ 224(SP),SI + IMUL3Q $19,SI,AX + MOVQ AX,280(SP) + MULQ 56(SP) + MOVQ AX,SI + MOVQ DX,CX + MOVQ 232(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MOVQ AX,288(SP) + MULQ 48(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 200(SP),AX + MULQ 40(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 200(SP),AX + MULQ 48(SP) + MOVQ AX,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 200(SP),AX + MULQ 56(SP) + MOVQ AX,R10 + MOVQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 200(SP),AX + MULQ 64(SP) + MOVQ AX,R12 + MOVQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 200(SP),AX + MULQ 72(SP) + MOVQ AX,R14 + MOVQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 208(SP),AX + MULQ 40(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 208(SP),AX + MULQ 48(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 208(SP),AX + MULQ 56(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 208(SP),AX + MULQ 64(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 208(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 72(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 216(SP),AX + MULQ 40(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 216(SP),AX + MULQ 48(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 216(SP),AX + MULQ 56(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 216(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 64(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 216(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 72(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 224(SP),AX + MULQ 40(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 224(SP),AX + MULQ 48(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 280(SP),AX + MULQ 64(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 280(SP),AX + MULQ 72(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 232(SP),AX + MULQ 40(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 288(SP),AX + MULQ 56(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 288(SP),AX + MULQ 64(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 288(SP),AX + MULQ 72(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX + SHLQ $13,SI,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + SHLQ $13,R8,R9 + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ CX,R8 + SHLQ $13,R10,R11 + ANDQ DX,R10 + ADDQ R9,R10 + SHLQ $13,R12,R13 + ANDQ DX,R12 + ADDQ R11,R12 + SHLQ $13,R14,R15 + ANDQ DX,R14 + ADDQ R13,R14 + IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + MOVQ SI,CX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R8,CX + MOVQ CX,R8 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + ADDQ R10,CX + MOVQ CX,R9 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ R12,CX + MOVQ CX,AX + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,R9 + ADDQ R14,CX + MOVQ CX,R10 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,AX + IMUL3Q $19,CX,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + ANDQ DX,R10 + MOVQ SI,40(SP) + MOVQ R8,48(SP) + MOVQ R9,56(SP) + MOVQ AX,64(SP) + MOVQ R10,72(SP) + MOVQ 264(SP),SI + IMUL3Q $19,SI,AX + MOVQ AX,200(SP) + MULQ 16(SP) + MOVQ AX,SI + MOVQ DX,CX + MOVQ 272(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MOVQ AX,208(SP) + MULQ 8(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 240(SP),AX + MULQ 0(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 240(SP),AX + MULQ 8(SP) + MOVQ AX,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 240(SP),AX + MULQ 16(SP) + MOVQ AX,R10 + MOVQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 240(SP),AX + MULQ 24(SP) + MOVQ AX,R12 + MOVQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 240(SP),AX + MULQ 32(SP) + MOVQ AX,R14 + MOVQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 248(SP),AX + MULQ 0(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 248(SP),AX + MULQ 8(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 248(SP),AX + MULQ 16(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 248(SP),AX + MULQ 24(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 248(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 256(SP),AX + MULQ 0(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 256(SP),AX + MULQ 8(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 256(SP),AX + MULQ 16(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 256(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 24(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 256(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 264(SP),AX + MULQ 0(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 264(SP),AX + MULQ 8(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 200(SP),AX + MULQ 24(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 200(SP),AX + MULQ 32(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 272(SP),AX + MULQ 0(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 208(SP),AX + MULQ 16(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 208(SP),AX + MULQ 24(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 208(SP),AX + MULQ 32(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX + SHLQ $13,SI,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + SHLQ $13,R8,R9 + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ CX,R8 + SHLQ $13,R10,R11 + ANDQ DX,R10 + ADDQ R9,R10 + SHLQ $13,R12,R13 + ANDQ DX,R12 + ADDQ R11,R12 + SHLQ $13,R14,R15 + ANDQ DX,R14 + ADDQ R13,R14 + IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + MOVQ SI,CX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R8,CX + MOVQ CX,R8 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + ADDQ R10,CX + MOVQ CX,R9 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ R12,CX + MOVQ CX,AX + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,R9 + ADDQ R14,CX + MOVQ CX,R10 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,AX + IMUL3Q $19,CX,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + ANDQ DX,R10 + MOVQ SI,DX + MOVQ R8,CX + MOVQ R9,R11 + MOVQ AX,R12 + MOVQ R10,R13 + ADDQ ·_2P0(SB),DX + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),CX + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R11 + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R12 + ADDQ ·_2P1234(SB),R13 + ADDQ 40(SP),SI + ADDQ 48(SP),R8 + ADDQ 56(SP),R9 + ADDQ 64(SP),AX + ADDQ 72(SP),R10 + SUBQ 40(SP),DX + SUBQ 48(SP),CX + SUBQ 56(SP),R11 + SUBQ 64(SP),R12 + SUBQ 72(SP),R13 + MOVQ SI,120(DI) + MOVQ R8,128(DI) + MOVQ R9,136(DI) + MOVQ AX,144(DI) + MOVQ R10,152(DI) + MOVQ DX,160(DI) + MOVQ CX,168(DI) + MOVQ R11,176(DI) + MOVQ R12,184(DI) + MOVQ R13,192(DI) + MOVQ 120(DI),AX + MULQ 120(DI) + MOVQ AX,SI + MOVQ DX,CX + MOVQ 120(DI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 128(DI) + MOVQ AX,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 120(DI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 136(DI) + MOVQ AX,R10 + MOVQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 120(DI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 144(DI) + MOVQ AX,R12 + MOVQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 120(DI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 152(DI) + MOVQ AX,R14 + MOVQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 128(DI),AX + MULQ 128(DI) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 128(DI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 136(DI) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 128(DI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 144(DI) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 128(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 152(DI) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 136(DI),AX + MULQ 136(DI) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 136(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 144(DI) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 136(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 152(DI) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 144(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 144(DI) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 144(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 152(DI) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 152(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 152(DI) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX + SHLQ $13,SI,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + SHLQ $13,R8,R9 + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ CX,R8 + SHLQ $13,R10,R11 + ANDQ DX,R10 + ADDQ R9,R10 + SHLQ $13,R12,R13 + ANDQ DX,R12 + ADDQ R11,R12 + SHLQ $13,R14,R15 + ANDQ DX,R14 + ADDQ R13,R14 + IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + MOVQ SI,CX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R8,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + MOVQ CX,R8 + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R10,CX + ANDQ DX,R8 + MOVQ CX,R9 + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R12,CX + ANDQ DX,R9 + MOVQ CX,AX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R14,CX + ANDQ DX,AX + MOVQ CX,R10 + SHRQ $51,CX + IMUL3Q $19,CX,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + ANDQ DX,R10 + MOVQ SI,120(DI) + MOVQ R8,128(DI) + MOVQ R9,136(DI) + MOVQ AX,144(DI) + MOVQ R10,152(DI) + MOVQ 160(DI),AX + MULQ 160(DI) + MOVQ AX,SI + MOVQ DX,CX + MOVQ 160(DI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 168(DI) + MOVQ AX,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 160(DI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 176(DI) + MOVQ AX,R10 + MOVQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 160(DI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 184(DI) + MOVQ AX,R12 + MOVQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 160(DI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 192(DI) + MOVQ AX,R14 + MOVQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 168(DI),AX + MULQ 168(DI) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 168(DI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 176(DI) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 168(DI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 184(DI) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 168(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 192(DI) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 176(DI),AX + MULQ 176(DI) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 176(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 184(DI) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 176(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 192(DI) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 184(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 184(DI) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 184(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 192(DI) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 192(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 192(DI) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX + SHLQ $13,SI,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + SHLQ $13,R8,R9 + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ CX,R8 + SHLQ $13,R10,R11 + ANDQ DX,R10 + ADDQ R9,R10 + SHLQ $13,R12,R13 + ANDQ DX,R12 + ADDQ R11,R12 + SHLQ $13,R14,R15 + ANDQ DX,R14 + ADDQ R13,R14 + IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + MOVQ SI,CX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R8,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + MOVQ CX,R8 + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R10,CX + ANDQ DX,R8 + MOVQ CX,R9 + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R12,CX + ANDQ DX,R9 + MOVQ CX,AX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R14,CX + ANDQ DX,AX + MOVQ CX,R10 + SHRQ $51,CX + IMUL3Q $19,CX,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + ANDQ DX,R10 + MOVQ SI,160(DI) + MOVQ R8,168(DI) + MOVQ R9,176(DI) + MOVQ AX,184(DI) + MOVQ R10,192(DI) + MOVQ 184(DI),SI + IMUL3Q $19,SI,AX + MOVQ AX,0(SP) + MULQ 16(DI) + MOVQ AX,SI + MOVQ DX,CX + MOVQ 192(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MOVQ AX,8(SP) + MULQ 8(DI) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 160(DI),AX + MULQ 0(DI) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 160(DI),AX + MULQ 8(DI) + MOVQ AX,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 160(DI),AX + MULQ 16(DI) + MOVQ AX,R10 + MOVQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 160(DI),AX + MULQ 24(DI) + MOVQ AX,R12 + MOVQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 160(DI),AX + MULQ 32(DI) + MOVQ AX,R14 + MOVQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 168(DI),AX + MULQ 0(DI) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 168(DI),AX + MULQ 8(DI) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 168(DI),AX + MULQ 16(DI) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 168(DI),AX + MULQ 24(DI) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 168(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 32(DI) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 176(DI),AX + MULQ 0(DI) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 176(DI),AX + MULQ 8(DI) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 176(DI),AX + MULQ 16(DI) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 176(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 24(DI) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 176(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 32(DI) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 184(DI),AX + MULQ 0(DI) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 184(DI),AX + MULQ 8(DI) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + MULQ 24(DI) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + MULQ 32(DI) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 192(DI),AX + MULQ 0(DI) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 16(DI) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 24(DI) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 32(DI) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX + SHLQ $13,SI,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + SHLQ $13,R8,R9 + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ CX,R8 + SHLQ $13,R10,R11 + ANDQ DX,R10 + ADDQ R9,R10 + SHLQ $13,R12,R13 + ANDQ DX,R12 + ADDQ R11,R12 + SHLQ $13,R14,R15 + ANDQ DX,R14 + ADDQ R13,R14 + IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + MOVQ SI,CX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R8,CX + MOVQ CX,R8 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + ADDQ R10,CX + MOVQ CX,R9 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ R12,CX + MOVQ CX,AX + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,R9 + ADDQ R14,CX + MOVQ CX,R10 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,AX + IMUL3Q $19,CX,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + ANDQ DX,R10 + MOVQ SI,160(DI) + MOVQ R8,168(DI) + MOVQ R9,176(DI) + MOVQ AX,184(DI) + MOVQ R10,192(DI) + MOVQ 144(SP),SI + IMUL3Q $19,SI,AX + MOVQ AX,0(SP) + MULQ 96(SP) + MOVQ AX,SI + MOVQ DX,CX + MOVQ 152(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MOVQ AX,8(SP) + MULQ 88(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 120(SP),AX + MULQ 80(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 120(SP),AX + MULQ 88(SP) + MOVQ AX,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 120(SP),AX + MULQ 96(SP) + MOVQ AX,R10 + MOVQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 120(SP),AX + MULQ 104(SP) + MOVQ AX,R12 + MOVQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 120(SP),AX + MULQ 112(SP) + MOVQ AX,R14 + MOVQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 128(SP),AX + MULQ 80(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 128(SP),AX + MULQ 88(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 128(SP),AX + MULQ 96(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 128(SP),AX + MULQ 104(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 128(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 112(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 136(SP),AX + MULQ 80(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 136(SP),AX + MULQ 88(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 136(SP),AX + MULQ 96(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 136(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 104(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 136(SP),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 112(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 144(SP),AX + MULQ 80(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 144(SP),AX + MULQ 88(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + MULQ 104(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + MULQ 112(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 152(SP),AX + MULQ 80(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 96(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 104(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 112(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX + SHLQ $13,SI,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + SHLQ $13,R8,R9 + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ CX,R8 + SHLQ $13,R10,R11 + ANDQ DX,R10 + ADDQ R9,R10 + SHLQ $13,R12,R13 + ANDQ DX,R12 + ADDQ R11,R12 + SHLQ $13,R14,R15 + ANDQ DX,R14 + ADDQ R13,R14 + IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + MOVQ SI,CX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R8,CX + MOVQ CX,R8 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + ADDQ R10,CX + MOVQ CX,R9 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ R12,CX + MOVQ CX,AX + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,R9 + ADDQ R14,CX + MOVQ CX,R10 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,AX + IMUL3Q $19,CX,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + ANDQ DX,R10 + MOVQ SI,40(DI) + MOVQ R8,48(DI) + MOVQ R9,56(DI) + MOVQ AX,64(DI) + MOVQ R10,72(DI) + MOVQ 160(SP),AX + MULQ ·_121666_213(SB) + SHRQ $13,AX + MOVQ AX,SI + MOVQ DX,CX + MOVQ 168(SP),AX + MULQ ·_121666_213(SB) + SHRQ $13,AX + ADDQ AX,CX + MOVQ DX,R8 + MOVQ 176(SP),AX + MULQ ·_121666_213(SB) + SHRQ $13,AX + ADDQ AX,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 184(SP),AX + MULQ ·_121666_213(SB) + SHRQ $13,AX + ADDQ AX,R9 + MOVQ DX,R10 + MOVQ 192(SP),AX + MULQ ·_121666_213(SB) + SHRQ $13,AX + ADDQ AX,R10 + IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX + ADDQ DX,SI + ADDQ 80(SP),SI + ADDQ 88(SP),CX + ADDQ 96(SP),R8 + ADDQ 104(SP),R9 + ADDQ 112(SP),R10 + MOVQ SI,80(DI) + MOVQ CX,88(DI) + MOVQ R8,96(DI) + MOVQ R9,104(DI) + MOVQ R10,112(DI) + MOVQ 104(DI),SI + IMUL3Q $19,SI,AX + MOVQ AX,0(SP) + MULQ 176(SP) + MOVQ AX,SI + MOVQ DX,CX + MOVQ 112(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MOVQ AX,8(SP) + MULQ 168(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 80(DI),AX + MULQ 160(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 80(DI),AX + MULQ 168(SP) + MOVQ AX,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 80(DI),AX + MULQ 176(SP) + MOVQ AX,R10 + MOVQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 80(DI),AX + MULQ 184(SP) + MOVQ AX,R12 + MOVQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 80(DI),AX + MULQ 192(SP) + MOVQ AX,R14 + MOVQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 88(DI),AX + MULQ 160(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 88(DI),AX + MULQ 168(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 88(DI),AX + MULQ 176(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 88(DI),AX + MULQ 184(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 88(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 192(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 96(DI),AX + MULQ 160(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 96(DI),AX + MULQ 168(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 96(DI),AX + MULQ 176(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 96(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 184(SP) + ADDQ AX,SI + ADCQ DX,CX + MOVQ 96(DI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 192(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 104(DI),AX + MULQ 160(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 104(DI),AX + MULQ 168(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + MULQ 184(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + MULQ 192(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 112(DI),AX + MULQ 160(SP) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 176(SP) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 184(SP) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 192(SP) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,DX + SHLQ $13,SI,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + SHLQ $13,R8,R9 + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ CX,R8 + SHLQ $13,R10,R11 + ANDQ DX,R10 + ADDQ R9,R10 + SHLQ $13,R12,R13 + ANDQ DX,R12 + ADDQ R11,R12 + SHLQ $13,R14,R15 + ANDQ DX,R14 + ADDQ R13,R14 + IMUL3Q $19,R15,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + MOVQ SI,CX + SHRQ $51,CX + ADDQ R8,CX + MOVQ CX,R8 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,SI + ADDQ R10,CX + MOVQ CX,R9 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,R8 + ADDQ R12,CX + MOVQ CX,AX + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,R9 + ADDQ R14,CX + MOVQ CX,R10 + SHRQ $51,CX + ANDQ DX,AX + IMUL3Q $19,CX,CX + ADDQ CX,SI + ANDQ DX,R10 + MOVQ SI,80(DI) + MOVQ R8,88(DI) + MOVQ R9,96(DI) + MOVQ AX,104(DI) + MOVQ R10,112(DI) + RET + +// func cswap(inout *[4][5]uint64, v uint64) +TEXT ·cswap(SB),7,$0 + MOVQ inout+0(FP),DI + MOVQ v+8(FP),SI + + SUBQ $1, SI + NOTQ SI + MOVQ SI, X15 + PSHUFD $0x44, X15, X15 + + MOVOU 0(DI), X0 + MOVOU 16(DI), X2 + MOVOU 32(DI), X4 + MOVOU 48(DI), X6 + MOVOU 64(DI), X8 + MOVOU 80(DI), X1 + MOVOU 96(DI), X3 + MOVOU 112(DI), X5 + MOVOU 128(DI), X7 + MOVOU 144(DI), X9 + + MOVO X1, X10 + MOVO X3, X11 + MOVO X5, X12 + MOVO X7, X13 + MOVO X9, X14 + + PXOR X0, X10 + PXOR X2, X11 + PXOR X4, X12 + PXOR X6, X13 + PXOR X8, X14 + PAND X15, X10 + PAND X15, X11 + PAND X15, X12 + PAND X15, X13 + PAND X15, X14 + PXOR X10, X0 + PXOR X10, X1 + PXOR X11, X2 + PXOR X11, X3 + PXOR X12, X4 + PXOR X12, X5 + PXOR X13, X6 + PXOR X13, X7 + PXOR X14, X8 + PXOR X14, X9 + + MOVOU X0, 0(DI) + MOVOU X2, 16(DI) + MOVOU X4, 32(DI) + MOVOU X6, 48(DI) + MOVOU X8, 64(DI) + MOVOU X1, 80(DI) + MOVOU X3, 96(DI) + MOVOU X5, 112(DI) + MOVOU X7, 128(DI) + MOVOU X9, 144(DI) + RET + +// func mul(dest, a, b *[5]uint64) +TEXT ·mul(SB),0,$16-24 + MOVQ dest+0(FP), DI + MOVQ a+8(FP), SI + MOVQ b+16(FP), DX + + MOVQ DX,CX + MOVQ 24(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MOVQ AX,0(SP) + MULQ 16(CX) + MOVQ AX,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 32(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MOVQ AX,8(SP) + MULQ 8(CX) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + MULQ 0(CX) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + MULQ 8(CX) + MOVQ AX,R10 + MOVQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + MULQ 16(CX) + MOVQ AX,R12 + MOVQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + MULQ 24(CX) + MOVQ AX,R14 + MOVQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + MULQ 32(CX) + MOVQ AX,BX + MOVQ DX,BP + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + MULQ 0(CX) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + MULQ 8(CX) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + MULQ 16(CX) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX,BX + ADCQ DX,BP + MOVQ 8(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 16(SI),AX + MULQ 0(CX) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 16(SI),AX + MULQ 8(CX) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 16(SI),AX + MULQ 16(CX) + ADDQ AX,BX + ADCQ DX,BP + MOVQ 16(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX,R8 + ADCQ DX,R9 + MOVQ 16(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 24(SI),AX + MULQ 0(CX) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ 24(SI),AX + MULQ 8(CX) + ADDQ AX,BX + ADCQ DX,BP + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 0(SP),AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 32(SI),AX + MULQ 0(CX) + ADDQ AX,BX + ADCQ DX,BP + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 16(CX) + ADDQ AX,R10 + ADCQ DX,R11 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 24(CX) + ADDQ AX,R12 + ADCQ DX,R13 + MOVQ 8(SP),AX + MULQ 32(CX) + ADDQ AX,R14 + ADCQ DX,R15 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,SI + SHLQ $13,R8,R9 + ANDQ SI,R8 + SHLQ $13,R10,R11 + ANDQ SI,R10 + ADDQ R9,R10 + SHLQ $13,R12,R13 + ANDQ SI,R12 + ADDQ R11,R12 + SHLQ $13,R14,R15 + ANDQ SI,R14 + ADDQ R13,R14 + SHLQ $13,BX,BP + ANDQ SI,BX + ADDQ R15,BX + IMUL3Q $19,BP,DX + ADDQ DX,R8 + MOVQ R8,DX + SHRQ $51,DX + ADDQ R10,DX + MOVQ DX,CX + SHRQ $51,DX + ANDQ SI,R8 + ADDQ R12,DX + MOVQ DX,R9 + SHRQ $51,DX + ANDQ SI,CX + ADDQ R14,DX + MOVQ DX,AX + SHRQ $51,DX + ANDQ SI,R9 + ADDQ BX,DX + MOVQ DX,R10 + SHRQ $51,DX + ANDQ SI,AX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX + ADDQ DX,R8 + ANDQ SI,R10 + MOVQ R8,0(DI) + MOVQ CX,8(DI) + MOVQ R9,16(DI) + MOVQ AX,24(DI) + MOVQ R10,32(DI) + RET + +// func square(out, in *[5]uint64) +TEXT ·square(SB),7,$0-16 + MOVQ out+0(FP), DI + MOVQ in+8(FP), SI + + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + MULQ 0(SI) + MOVQ AX,CX + MOVQ DX,R8 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 8(SI) + MOVQ AX,R9 + MOVQ DX,R10 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 16(SI) + MOVQ AX,R11 + MOVQ DX,R12 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 24(SI) + MOVQ AX,R13 + MOVQ DX,R14 + MOVQ 0(SI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 32(SI) + MOVQ AX,R15 + MOVQ DX,BX + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + MULQ 8(SI) + ADDQ AX,R11 + ADCQ DX,R12 + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 16(SI) + ADDQ AX,R13 + ADCQ DX,R14 + MOVQ 8(SI),AX + SHLQ $1,AX + MULQ 24(SI) + ADDQ AX,R15 + ADCQ DX,BX + MOVQ 8(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SI) + ADDQ AX,CX + ADCQ DX,R8 + MOVQ 16(SI),AX + MULQ 16(SI) + ADDQ AX,R15 + ADCQ DX,BX + MOVQ 16(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 24(SI) + ADDQ AX,CX + ADCQ DX,R8 + MOVQ 16(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SI) + ADDQ AX,R9 + ADCQ DX,R10 + MOVQ 24(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 24(SI) + ADDQ AX,R9 + ADCQ DX,R10 + MOVQ 24(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $38,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SI) + ADDQ AX,R11 + ADCQ DX,R12 + MOVQ 32(SI),DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,AX + MULQ 32(SI) + ADDQ AX,R13 + ADCQ DX,R14 + MOVQ $REDMASK51,SI + SHLQ $13,CX,R8 + ANDQ SI,CX + SHLQ $13,R9,R10 + ANDQ SI,R9 + ADDQ R8,R9 + SHLQ $13,R11,R12 + ANDQ SI,R11 + ADDQ R10,R11 + SHLQ $13,R13,R14 + ANDQ SI,R13 + ADDQ R12,R13 + SHLQ $13,R15,BX + ANDQ SI,R15 + ADDQ R14,R15 + IMUL3Q $19,BX,DX + ADDQ DX,CX + MOVQ CX,DX + SHRQ $51,DX + ADDQ R9,DX + ANDQ SI,CX + MOVQ DX,R8 + SHRQ $51,DX + ADDQ R11,DX + ANDQ SI,R8 + MOVQ DX,R9 + SHRQ $51,DX + ADDQ R13,DX + ANDQ SI,R9 + MOVQ DX,AX + SHRQ $51,DX + ADDQ R15,DX + ANDQ SI,AX + MOVQ DX,R10 + SHRQ $51,DX + IMUL3Q $19,DX,DX + ADDQ DX,CX + ANDQ SI,R10 + MOVQ CX,0(DI) + MOVQ R8,8(DI) + MOVQ R9,16(DI) + MOVQ AX,24(DI) + MOVQ R10,32(DI) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c43b13fc8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,828 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package curve25519 + +import "encoding/binary" + +// This code is a port of the public domain, "ref10" implementation of +// curve25519 from SUPERCOP 20130419 by D. J. Bernstein. + +// fieldElement represents an element of the field GF(2^255 - 19). An element +// t, entries t[0]...t[9], represents the integer t[0]+2^26 t[1]+2^51 t[2]+2^77 +// t[3]+2^102 t[4]+...+2^230 t[9]. Bounds on each t[i] vary depending on +// context. +type fieldElement [10]int32 + +func feZero(fe *fieldElement) { + for i := range fe { + fe[i] = 0 + } +} + +func feOne(fe *fieldElement) { + feZero(fe) + fe[0] = 1 +} + +func feAdd(dst, a, b *fieldElement) { + for i := range dst { + dst[i] = a[i] + b[i] + } +} + +func feSub(dst, a, b *fieldElement) { + for i := range dst { + dst[i] = a[i] - b[i] + } +} + +func feCopy(dst, src *fieldElement) { + for i := range dst { + dst[i] = src[i] + } +} + +// feCSwap replaces (f,g) with (g,f) if b == 1; replaces (f,g) with (f,g) if b == 0. +// +// Preconditions: b in {0,1}. +func feCSwap(f, g *fieldElement, b int32) { + b = -b + for i := range f { + t := b & (f[i] ^ g[i]) + f[i] ^= t + g[i] ^= t + } +} + +// load3 reads a 24-bit, little-endian value from in. +func load3(in []byte) int64 { + var r int64 + r = int64(in[0]) + r |= int64(in[1]) << 8 + r |= int64(in[2]) << 16 + return r +} + +// load4 reads a 32-bit, little-endian value from in. +func load4(in []byte) int64 { + return int64(binary.LittleEndian.Uint32(in)) +} + +func feFromBytes(dst *fieldElement, src *[32]byte) { + h0 := load4(src[:]) + h1 := load3(src[4:]) << 6 + h2 := load3(src[7:]) << 5 + h3 := load3(src[10:]) << 3 + h4 := load3(src[13:]) << 2 + h5 := load4(src[16:]) + h6 := load3(src[20:]) << 7 + h7 := load3(src[23:]) << 5 + h8 := load3(src[26:]) << 4 + h9 := (load3(src[29:]) & 0x7fffff) << 2 + + var carry [10]int64 + carry[9] = (h9 + 1<<24) >> 25 + h0 += carry[9] * 19 + h9 -= carry[9] << 25 + carry[1] = (h1 + 1<<24) >> 25 + h2 += carry[1] + h1 -= carry[1] << 25 + carry[3] = (h3 + 1<<24) >> 25 + h4 += carry[3] + h3 -= carry[3] << 25 + carry[5] = (h5 + 1<<24) >> 25 + h6 += carry[5] + h5 -= carry[5] << 25 + carry[7] = (h7 + 1<<24) >> 25 + h8 += carry[7] + h7 -= carry[7] << 25 + + carry[0] = (h0 + 1<<25) >> 26 + h1 += carry[0] + h0 -= carry[0] << 26 + carry[2] = (h2 + 1<<25) >> 26 + h3 += carry[2] + h2 -= carry[2] << 26 + carry[4] = (h4 + 1<<25) >> 26 + h5 += carry[4] + h4 -= carry[4] << 26 + carry[6] = (h6 + 1<<25) >> 26 + h7 += carry[6] + h6 -= carry[6] << 26 + carry[8] = (h8 + 1<<25) >> 26 + h9 += carry[8] + h8 -= carry[8] << 26 + + dst[0] = int32(h0) + dst[1] = int32(h1) + dst[2] = int32(h2) + dst[3] = int32(h3) + dst[4] = int32(h4) + dst[5] = int32(h5) + dst[6] = int32(h6) + dst[7] = int32(h7) + dst[8] = int32(h8) + dst[9] = int32(h9) +} + +// feToBytes marshals h to s. +// Preconditions: +// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. +// +// Write p=2^255-19; q=floor(h/p). +// Basic claim: q = floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25)h9 + 2^(-1))). +// +// Proof: +// Have |h|<=p so |q|<=1 so |19^2 2^(-255) q|<1/4. +// Also have |h-2^230 h9|<2^230 so |19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9)|<1/4. +// +// Write y=2^(-1)-19^2 2^(-255)q-19 2^(-255)(h-2^230 h9). +// Then 0<y<1. +// +// Write r=h-pq. +// Have 0<=r<=p-1=2^255-20. +// Thus 0<=r+19(2^-255)r<r+19(2^-255)2^255<=2^255-1. +// +// Write x=r+19(2^-255)r+y. +// Then 0<x<2^255 so floor(2^(-255)x) = 0 so floor(q+2^(-255)x) = q. +// +// Have q+2^(-255)x = 2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1)) +// so floor(2^(-255)(h + 19 2^(-25) h9 + 2^(-1))) = q. +func feToBytes(s *[32]byte, h *fieldElement) { + var carry [10]int32 + + q := (19*h[9] + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + q = (h[0] + q) >> 26 + q = (h[1] + q) >> 25 + q = (h[2] + q) >> 26 + q = (h[3] + q) >> 25 + q = (h[4] + q) >> 26 + q = (h[5] + q) >> 25 + q = (h[6] + q) >> 26 + q = (h[7] + q) >> 25 + q = (h[8] + q) >> 26 + q = (h[9] + q) >> 25 + + // Goal: Output h-(2^255-19)q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. + h[0] += 19 * q + // Goal: Output h-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. + + carry[0] = h[0] >> 26 + h[1] += carry[0] + h[0] -= carry[0] << 26 + carry[1] = h[1] >> 25 + h[2] += carry[1] + h[1] -= carry[1] << 25 + carry[2] = h[2] >> 26 + h[3] += carry[2] + h[2] -= carry[2] << 26 + carry[3] = h[3] >> 25 + h[4] += carry[3] + h[3] -= carry[3] << 25 + carry[4] = h[4] >> 26 + h[5] += carry[4] + h[4] -= carry[4] << 26 + carry[5] = h[5] >> 25 + h[6] += carry[5] + h[5] -= carry[5] << 25 + carry[6] = h[6] >> 26 + h[7] += carry[6] + h[6] -= carry[6] << 26 + carry[7] = h[7] >> 25 + h[8] += carry[7] + h[7] -= carry[7] << 25 + carry[8] = h[8] >> 26 + h[9] += carry[8] + h[8] -= carry[8] << 26 + carry[9] = h[9] >> 25 + h[9] -= carry[9] << 25 + // h10 = carry9 + + // Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^255 h10-2^255 q, which is between 0 and 2^255-20. + // Have h[0]+...+2^230 h[9] between 0 and 2^255-1; + // evidently 2^255 h10-2^255 q = 0. + // Goal: Output h[0]+...+2^230 h[9]. + + s[0] = byte(h[0] >> 0) + s[1] = byte(h[0] >> 8) + s[2] = byte(h[0] >> 16) + s[3] = byte((h[0] >> 24) | (h[1] << 2)) + s[4] = byte(h[1] >> 6) + s[5] = byte(h[1] >> 14) + s[6] = byte((h[1] >> 22) | (h[2] << 3)) + s[7] = byte(h[2] >> 5) + s[8] = byte(h[2] >> 13) + s[9] = byte((h[2] >> 21) | (h[3] << 5)) + s[10] = byte(h[3] >> 3) + s[11] = byte(h[3] >> 11) + s[12] = byte((h[3] >> 19) | (h[4] << 6)) + s[13] = byte(h[4] >> 2) + s[14] = byte(h[4] >> 10) + s[15] = byte(h[4] >> 18) + s[16] = byte(h[5] >> 0) + s[17] = byte(h[5] >> 8) + s[18] = byte(h[5] >> 16) + s[19] = byte((h[5] >> 24) | (h[6] << 1)) + s[20] = byte(h[6] >> 7) + s[21] = byte(h[6] >> 15) + s[22] = byte((h[6] >> 23) | (h[7] << 3)) + s[23] = byte(h[7] >> 5) + s[24] = byte(h[7] >> 13) + s[25] = byte((h[7] >> 21) | (h[8] << 4)) + s[26] = byte(h[8] >> 4) + s[27] = byte(h[8] >> 12) + s[28] = byte((h[8] >> 20) | (h[9] << 6)) + s[29] = byte(h[9] >> 2) + s[30] = byte(h[9] >> 10) + s[31] = byte(h[9] >> 18) +} + +// feMul calculates h = f * g +// Can overlap h with f or g. +// +// Preconditions: +// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. +// |g| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. +// +// Postconditions: +// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. +// +// Notes on implementation strategy: +// +// Using schoolbook multiplication. +// Karatsuba would save a little in some cost models. +// +// Most multiplications by 2 and 19 are 32-bit precomputations; +// cheaper than 64-bit postcomputations. +// +// There is one remaining multiplication by 19 in the carry chain; +// one *19 precomputation can be merged into this, +// but the resulting data flow is considerably less clean. +// +// There are 12 carries below. +// 10 of them are 2-way parallelizable and vectorizable. +// Can get away with 11 carries, but then data flow is much deeper. +// +// With tighter constraints on inputs can squeeze carries into int32. +func feMul(h, f, g *fieldElement) { + f0 := f[0] + f1 := f[1] + f2 := f[2] + f3 := f[3] + f4 := f[4] + f5 := f[5] + f6 := f[6] + f7 := f[7] + f8 := f[8] + f9 := f[9] + g0 := g[0] + g1 := g[1] + g2 := g[2] + g3 := g[3] + g4 := g[4] + g5 := g[5] + g6 := g[6] + g7 := g[7] + g8 := g[8] + g9 := g[9] + g1_19 := 19 * g1 // 1.4*2^29 + g2_19 := 19 * g2 // 1.4*2^30; still ok + g3_19 := 19 * g3 + g4_19 := 19 * g4 + g5_19 := 19 * g5 + g6_19 := 19 * g6 + g7_19 := 19 * g7 + g8_19 := 19 * g8 + g9_19 := 19 * g9 + f1_2 := 2 * f1 + f3_2 := 2 * f3 + f5_2 := 2 * f5 + f7_2 := 2 * f7 + f9_2 := 2 * f9 + f0g0 := int64(f0) * int64(g0) + f0g1 := int64(f0) * int64(g1) + f0g2 := int64(f0) * int64(g2) + f0g3 := int64(f0) * int64(g3) + f0g4 := int64(f0) * int64(g4) + f0g5 := int64(f0) * int64(g5) + f0g6 := int64(f0) * int64(g6) + f0g7 := int64(f0) * int64(g7) + f0g8 := int64(f0) * int64(g8) + f0g9 := int64(f0) * int64(g9) + f1g0 := int64(f1) * int64(g0) + f1g1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g1) + f1g2 := int64(f1) * int64(g2) + f1g3_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g3) + f1g4 := int64(f1) * int64(g4) + f1g5_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g5) + f1g6 := int64(f1) * int64(g6) + f1g7_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g7) + f1g8 := int64(f1) * int64(g8) + f1g9_38 := int64(f1_2) * int64(g9_19) + f2g0 := int64(f2) * int64(g0) + f2g1 := int64(f2) * int64(g1) + f2g2 := int64(f2) * int64(g2) + f2g3 := int64(f2) * int64(g3) + f2g4 := int64(f2) * int64(g4) + f2g5 := int64(f2) * int64(g5) + f2g6 := int64(f2) * int64(g6) + f2g7 := int64(f2) * int64(g7) + f2g8_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g8_19) + f2g9_19 := int64(f2) * int64(g9_19) + f3g0 := int64(f3) * int64(g0) + f3g1_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g1) + f3g2 := int64(f3) * int64(g2) + f3g3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g3) + f3g4 := int64(f3) * int64(g4) + f3g5_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g5) + f3g6 := int64(f3) * int64(g6) + f3g7_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g7_19) + f3g8_19 := int64(f3) * int64(g8_19) + f3g9_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(g9_19) + f4g0 := int64(f4) * int64(g0) + f4g1 := int64(f4) * int64(g1) + f4g2 := int64(f4) * int64(g2) + f4g3 := int64(f4) * int64(g3) + f4g4 := int64(f4) * int64(g4) + f4g5 := int64(f4) * int64(g5) + f4g6_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g6_19) + f4g7_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g7_19) + f4g8_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g8_19) + f4g9_19 := int64(f4) * int64(g9_19) + f5g0 := int64(f5) * int64(g0) + f5g1_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g1) + f5g2 := int64(f5) * int64(g2) + f5g3_2 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g3) + f5g4 := int64(f5) * int64(g4) + f5g5_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g5_19) + f5g6_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g6_19) + f5g7_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g7_19) + f5g8_19 := int64(f5) * int64(g8_19) + f5g9_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(g9_19) + f6g0 := int64(f6) * int64(g0) + f6g1 := int64(f6) * int64(g1) + f6g2 := int64(f6) * int64(g2) + f6g3 := int64(f6) * int64(g3) + f6g4_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g4_19) + f6g5_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g5_19) + f6g6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g6_19) + f6g7_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g7_19) + f6g8_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g8_19) + f6g9_19 := int64(f6) * int64(g9_19) + f7g0 := int64(f7) * int64(g0) + f7g1_2 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g1) + f7g2 := int64(f7) * int64(g2) + f7g3_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g3_19) + f7g4_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g4_19) + f7g5_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g5_19) + f7g6_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g6_19) + f7g7_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g7_19) + f7g8_19 := int64(f7) * int64(g8_19) + f7g9_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(g9_19) + f8g0 := int64(f8) * int64(g0) + f8g1 := int64(f8) * int64(g1) + f8g2_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g2_19) + f8g3_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g3_19) + f8g4_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g4_19) + f8g5_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g5_19) + f8g6_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g6_19) + f8g7_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g7_19) + f8g8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g8_19) + f8g9_19 := int64(f8) * int64(g9_19) + f9g0 := int64(f9) * int64(g0) + f9g1_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g1_19) + f9g2_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g2_19) + f9g3_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g3_19) + f9g4_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g4_19) + f9g5_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g5_19) + f9g6_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g6_19) + f9g7_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g7_19) + f9g8_19 := int64(f9) * int64(g8_19) + f9g9_38 := int64(f9_2) * int64(g9_19) + h0 := f0g0 + f1g9_38 + f2g8_19 + f3g7_38 + f4g6_19 + f5g5_38 + f6g4_19 + f7g3_38 + f8g2_19 + f9g1_38 + h1 := f0g1 + f1g0 + f2g9_19 + f3g8_19 + f4g7_19 + f5g6_19 + f6g5_19 + f7g4_19 + f8g3_19 + f9g2_19 + h2 := f0g2 + f1g1_2 + f2g0 + f3g9_38 + f4g8_19 + f5g7_38 + f6g6_19 + f7g5_38 + f8g4_19 + f9g3_38 + h3 := f0g3 + f1g2 + f2g1 + f3g0 + f4g9_19 + f5g8_19 + f6g7_19 + f7g6_19 + f8g5_19 + f9g4_19 + h4 := f0g4 + f1g3_2 + f2g2 + f3g1_2 + f4g0 + f5g9_38 + f6g8_19 + f7g7_38 + f8g6_19 + f9g5_38 + h5 := f0g5 + f1g4 + f2g3 + f3g2 + f4g1 + f5g0 + f6g9_19 + f7g8_19 + f8g7_19 + f9g6_19 + h6 := f0g6 + f1g5_2 + f2g4 + f3g3_2 + f4g2 + f5g1_2 + f6g0 + f7g9_38 + f8g8_19 + f9g7_38 + h7 := f0g7 + f1g6 + f2g5 + f3g4 + f4g3 + f5g2 + f6g1 + f7g0 + f8g9_19 + f9g8_19 + h8 := f0g8 + f1g7_2 + f2g6 + f3g5_2 + f4g4 + f5g3_2 + f6g2 + f7g1_2 + f8g0 + f9g9_38 + h9 := f0g9 + f1g8 + f2g7 + f3g6 + f4g5 + f5g4 + f6g3 + f7g2 + f8g1 + f9g0 + var carry [10]int64 + + // |h0| <= (1.1*1.1*2^52*(1+19+19+19+19)+1.1*1.1*2^50*(38+38+38+38+38)) + // i.e. |h0| <= 1.2*2^59; narrower ranges for h2, h4, h6, h8 + // |h1| <= (1.1*1.1*2^51*(1+1+19+19+19+19+19+19+19+19)) + // i.e. |h1| <= 1.5*2^58; narrower ranges for h3, h5, h7, h9 + + carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h1 += carry[0] + h0 -= carry[0] << 26 + carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h5 += carry[4] + h4 -= carry[4] << 26 + // |h0| <= 2^25 + // |h4| <= 2^25 + // |h1| <= 1.51*2^58 + // |h5| <= 1.51*2^58 + + carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h2 += carry[1] + h1 -= carry[1] << 25 + carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h6 += carry[5] + h5 -= carry[5] << 25 + // |h1| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 + // |h5| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 + // |h2| <= 1.21*2^59 + // |h6| <= 1.21*2^59 + + carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h3 += carry[2] + h2 -= carry[2] << 26 + carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h7 += carry[6] + h6 -= carry[6] << 26 + // |h2| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h6| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h3| <= 1.51*2^58 + // |h7| <= 1.51*2^58 + + carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h4 += carry[3] + h3 -= carry[3] << 25 + carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h8 += carry[7] + h7 -= carry[7] << 25 + // |h3| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h7| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h4| <= 1.52*2^33 + // |h8| <= 1.52*2^33 + + carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h5 += carry[4] + h4 -= carry[4] << 26 + carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h9 += carry[8] + h8 -= carry[8] << 26 + // |h4| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h8| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h5| <= 1.01*2^24 + // |h9| <= 1.51*2^58 + + carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h0 += carry[9] * 19 + h9 -= carry[9] << 25 + // |h9| <= 2^24; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h0| <= 1.8*2^37 + + carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h1 += carry[0] + h0 -= carry[0] << 26 + // |h0| <= 2^25; from now on fits into int32 unchanged + // |h1| <= 1.01*2^24 + + h[0] = int32(h0) + h[1] = int32(h1) + h[2] = int32(h2) + h[3] = int32(h3) + h[4] = int32(h4) + h[5] = int32(h5) + h[6] = int32(h6) + h[7] = int32(h7) + h[8] = int32(h8) + h[9] = int32(h9) +} + +// feSquare calculates h = f*f. Can overlap h with f. +// +// Preconditions: +// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. +// +// Postconditions: +// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. +func feSquare(h, f *fieldElement) { + f0 := f[0] + f1 := f[1] + f2 := f[2] + f3 := f[3] + f4 := f[4] + f5 := f[5] + f6 := f[6] + f7 := f[7] + f8 := f[8] + f9 := f[9] + f0_2 := 2 * f0 + f1_2 := 2 * f1 + f2_2 := 2 * f2 + f3_2 := 2 * f3 + f4_2 := 2 * f4 + f5_2 := 2 * f5 + f6_2 := 2 * f6 + f7_2 := 2 * f7 + f5_38 := 38 * f5 // 1.31*2^30 + f6_19 := 19 * f6 // 1.31*2^30 + f7_38 := 38 * f7 // 1.31*2^30 + f8_19 := 19 * f8 // 1.31*2^30 + f9_38 := 38 * f9 // 1.31*2^30 + f0f0 := int64(f0) * int64(f0) + f0f1_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f1) + f0f2_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f2) + f0f3_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f3) + f0f4_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f4) + f0f5_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f5) + f0f6_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f6) + f0f7_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f7) + f0f8_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f8) + f0f9_2 := int64(f0_2) * int64(f9) + f1f1_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f1) + f1f2_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f2) + f1f3_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f3_2) + f1f4_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f4) + f1f5_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f5_2) + f1f6_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f6) + f1f7_4 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f7_2) + f1f8_2 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f8) + f1f9_76 := int64(f1_2) * int64(f9_38) + f2f2 := int64(f2) * int64(f2) + f2f3_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f3) + f2f4_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f4) + f2f5_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f5) + f2f6_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f6) + f2f7_2 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f7) + f2f8_38 := int64(f2_2) * int64(f8_19) + f2f9_38 := int64(f2) * int64(f9_38) + f3f3_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f3) + f3f4_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f4) + f3f5_4 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f5_2) + f3f6_2 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f6) + f3f7_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f7_38) + f3f8_38 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f8_19) + f3f9_76 := int64(f3_2) * int64(f9_38) + f4f4 := int64(f4) * int64(f4) + f4f5_2 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f5) + f4f6_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f6_19) + f4f7_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f7_38) + f4f8_38 := int64(f4_2) * int64(f8_19) + f4f9_38 := int64(f4) * int64(f9_38) + f5f5_38 := int64(f5) * int64(f5_38) + f5f6_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f6_19) + f5f7_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f7_38) + f5f8_38 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f8_19) + f5f9_76 := int64(f5_2) * int64(f9_38) + f6f6_19 := int64(f6) * int64(f6_19) + f6f7_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f7_38) + f6f8_38 := int64(f6_2) * int64(f8_19) + f6f9_38 := int64(f6) * int64(f9_38) + f7f7_38 := int64(f7) * int64(f7_38) + f7f8_38 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f8_19) + f7f9_76 := int64(f7_2) * int64(f9_38) + f8f8_19 := int64(f8) * int64(f8_19) + f8f9_38 := int64(f8) * int64(f9_38) + f9f9_38 := int64(f9) * int64(f9_38) + h0 := f0f0 + f1f9_76 + f2f8_38 + f3f7_76 + f4f6_38 + f5f5_38 + h1 := f0f1_2 + f2f9_38 + f3f8_38 + f4f7_38 + f5f6_38 + h2 := f0f2_2 + f1f1_2 + f3f9_76 + f4f8_38 + f5f7_76 + f6f6_19 + h3 := f0f3_2 + f1f2_2 + f4f9_38 + f5f8_38 + f6f7_38 + h4 := f0f4_2 + f1f3_4 + f2f2 + f5f9_76 + f6f8_38 + f7f7_38 + h5 := f0f5_2 + f1f4_2 + f2f3_2 + f6f9_38 + f7f8_38 + h6 := f0f6_2 + f1f5_4 + f2f4_2 + f3f3_2 + f7f9_76 + f8f8_19 + h7 := f0f7_2 + f1f6_2 + f2f5_2 + f3f4_2 + f8f9_38 + h8 := f0f8_2 + f1f7_4 + f2f6_2 + f3f5_4 + f4f4 + f9f9_38 + h9 := f0f9_2 + f1f8_2 + f2f7_2 + f3f6_2 + f4f5_2 + var carry [10]int64 + + carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h1 += carry[0] + h0 -= carry[0] << 26 + carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h5 += carry[4] + h4 -= carry[4] << 26 + + carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h2 += carry[1] + h1 -= carry[1] << 25 + carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h6 += carry[5] + h5 -= carry[5] << 25 + + carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h3 += carry[2] + h2 -= carry[2] << 26 + carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h7 += carry[6] + h6 -= carry[6] << 26 + + carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h4 += carry[3] + h3 -= carry[3] << 25 + carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h8 += carry[7] + h7 -= carry[7] << 25 + + carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h5 += carry[4] + h4 -= carry[4] << 26 + carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h9 += carry[8] + h8 -= carry[8] << 26 + + carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h0 += carry[9] * 19 + h9 -= carry[9] << 25 + + carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h1 += carry[0] + h0 -= carry[0] << 26 + + h[0] = int32(h0) + h[1] = int32(h1) + h[2] = int32(h2) + h[3] = int32(h3) + h[4] = int32(h4) + h[5] = int32(h5) + h[6] = int32(h6) + h[7] = int32(h7) + h[8] = int32(h8) + h[9] = int32(h9) +} + +// feMul121666 calculates h = f * 121666. Can overlap h with f. +// +// Preconditions: +// |f| bounded by 1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^26,1.1*2^25,etc. +// +// Postconditions: +// |h| bounded by 1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,1.1*2^25,1.1*2^24,etc. +func feMul121666(h, f *fieldElement) { + h0 := int64(f[0]) * 121666 + h1 := int64(f[1]) * 121666 + h2 := int64(f[2]) * 121666 + h3 := int64(f[3]) * 121666 + h4 := int64(f[4]) * 121666 + h5 := int64(f[5]) * 121666 + h6 := int64(f[6]) * 121666 + h7 := int64(f[7]) * 121666 + h8 := int64(f[8]) * 121666 + h9 := int64(f[9]) * 121666 + var carry [10]int64 + + carry[9] = (h9 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h0 += carry[9] * 19 + h9 -= carry[9] << 25 + carry[1] = (h1 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h2 += carry[1] + h1 -= carry[1] << 25 + carry[3] = (h3 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h4 += carry[3] + h3 -= carry[3] << 25 + carry[5] = (h5 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h6 += carry[5] + h5 -= carry[5] << 25 + carry[7] = (h7 + (1 << 24)) >> 25 + h8 += carry[7] + h7 -= carry[7] << 25 + + carry[0] = (h0 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h1 += carry[0] + h0 -= carry[0] << 26 + carry[2] = (h2 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h3 += carry[2] + h2 -= carry[2] << 26 + carry[4] = (h4 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h5 += carry[4] + h4 -= carry[4] << 26 + carry[6] = (h6 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h7 += carry[6] + h6 -= carry[6] << 26 + carry[8] = (h8 + (1 << 25)) >> 26 + h9 += carry[8] + h8 -= carry[8] << 26 + + h[0] = int32(h0) + h[1] = int32(h1) + h[2] = int32(h2) + h[3] = int32(h3) + h[4] = int32(h4) + h[5] = int32(h5) + h[6] = int32(h6) + h[7] = int32(h7) + h[8] = int32(h8) + h[9] = int32(h9) +} + +// feInvert sets out = z^-1. +func feInvert(out, z *fieldElement) { + var t0, t1, t2, t3 fieldElement + var i int + + feSquare(&t0, z) + for i = 1; i < 1; i++ { + feSquare(&t0, &t0) + } + feSquare(&t1, &t0) + for i = 1; i < 2; i++ { + feSquare(&t1, &t1) + } + feMul(&t1, z, &t1) + feMul(&t0, &t0, &t1) + feSquare(&t2, &t0) + for i = 1; i < 1; i++ { + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + } + feMul(&t1, &t1, &t2) + feSquare(&t2, &t1) + for i = 1; i < 5; i++ { + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + } + feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1) + feSquare(&t2, &t1) + for i = 1; i < 10; i++ { + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + } + feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1) + feSquare(&t3, &t2) + for i = 1; i < 20; i++ { + feSquare(&t3, &t3) + } + feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2) + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + for i = 1; i < 10; i++ { + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + } + feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1) + feSquare(&t2, &t1) + for i = 1; i < 50; i++ { + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + } + feMul(&t2, &t2, &t1) + feSquare(&t3, &t2) + for i = 1; i < 100; i++ { + feSquare(&t3, &t3) + } + feMul(&t2, &t3, &t2) + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + for i = 1; i < 50; i++ { + feSquare(&t2, &t2) + } + feMul(&t1, &t2, &t1) + feSquare(&t1, &t1) + for i = 1; i < 5; i++ { + feSquare(&t1, &t1) + } + feMul(out, &t1, &t0) +} + +func scalarMultGeneric(out, in, base *[32]byte) { + var e [32]byte + + copy(e[:], in[:]) + e[0] &= 248 + e[31] &= 127 + e[31] |= 64 + + var x1, x2, z2, x3, z3, tmp0, tmp1 fieldElement + feFromBytes(&x1, base) + feOne(&x2) + feCopy(&x3, &x1) + feOne(&z3) + + swap := int32(0) + for pos := 254; pos >= 0; pos-- { + b := e[pos/8] >> uint(pos&7) + b &= 1 + swap ^= int32(b) + feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap) + feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap) + swap = int32(b) + + feSub(&tmp0, &x3, &z3) + feSub(&tmp1, &x2, &z2) + feAdd(&x2, &x2, &z2) + feAdd(&z2, &x3, &z3) + feMul(&z3, &tmp0, &x2) + feMul(&z2, &z2, &tmp1) + feSquare(&tmp0, &tmp1) + feSquare(&tmp1, &x2) + feAdd(&x3, &z3, &z2) + feSub(&z2, &z3, &z2) + feMul(&x2, &tmp1, &tmp0) + feSub(&tmp1, &tmp1, &tmp0) + feSquare(&z2, &z2) + feMul121666(&z3, &tmp1) + feSquare(&x3, &x3) + feAdd(&tmp0, &tmp0, &z3) + feMul(&z3, &x1, &z2) + feMul(&z2, &tmp1, &tmp0) + } + + feCSwap(&x2, &x3, swap) + feCSwap(&z2, &z3, swap) + + feInvert(&z2, &z2) + feMul(&x2, &x2, &z2) + feToBytes(out, &x2) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..047d49afc --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519/curve25519_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !amd64 gccgo appengine purego + +package curve25519 + +func scalarMult(out, in, base *[32]byte) { + scalarMultGeneric(out, in, base) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f38797bfa --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing.go @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !appengine + +// Package subtle implements functions that are often useful in cryptographic +// code but require careful thought to use correctly. +package subtle // import "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle" + +import "unsafe" + +// AnyOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any (not necessarily +// corresponding) index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. +func AnyOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + return len(x) > 0 && len(y) > 0 && + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&x[0])) <= uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&y[len(y)-1])) && + uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&y[0])) <= uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&x[len(x)-1])) +} + +// InexactOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any non-corresponding +// index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. Note that x and y can +// have different lengths and still not have any inexact overlap. +// +// InexactOverlap can be used to implement the requirements of the crypto/cipher +// AEAD, Block, BlockMode and Stream interfaces. +func InexactOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + if len(x) == 0 || len(y) == 0 || &x[0] == &y[0] { + return false + } + return AnyOverlap(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing_appengine.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing_appengine.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0cc4a8a64 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle/aliasing_appengine.go @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build appengine + +// Package subtle implements functions that are often useful in cryptographic +// code but require careful thought to use correctly. +package subtle // import "golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle" + +// This is the Google App Engine standard variant based on reflect +// because the unsafe package and cgo are disallowed. + +import "reflect" + +// AnyOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any (not necessarily +// corresponding) index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. +func AnyOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + return len(x) > 0 && len(y) > 0 && + reflect.ValueOf(&x[0]).Pointer() <= reflect.ValueOf(&y[len(y)-1]).Pointer() && + reflect.ValueOf(&y[0]).Pointer() <= reflect.ValueOf(&x[len(x)-1]).Pointer() +} + +// InexactOverlap reports whether x and y share memory at any non-corresponding +// index. The memory beyond the slice length is ignored. Note that x and y can +// have different lengths and still not have any inexact overlap. +// +// InexactOverlap can be used to implement the requirements of the crypto/cipher +// AEAD, Block, BlockMode and Stream interfaces. +func InexactOverlap(x, y []byte) bool { + if len(x) == 0 || len(y) == 0 || &x[0] == &y[0] { + return false + } + return AnyOverlap(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_compat.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_compat.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..157a69f61 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_compat.go @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !go1.13 + +package poly1305 + +// Generic fallbacks for the math/bits intrinsics, copied from +// src/math/bits/bits.go. They were added in Go 1.12, but Add64 and Sum64 had +// variable time fallbacks until Go 1.13. + +func bitsAdd64(x, y, carry uint64) (sum, carryOut uint64) { + sum = x + y + carry + carryOut = ((x & y) | ((x | y) &^ sum)) >> 63 + return +} + +func bitsSub64(x, y, borrow uint64) (diff, borrowOut uint64) { + diff = x - y - borrow + borrowOut = ((^x & y) | (^(x ^ y) & diff)) >> 63 + return +} + +func bitsMul64(x, y uint64) (hi, lo uint64) { + const mask32 = 1<<32 - 1 + x0 := x & mask32 + x1 := x >> 32 + y0 := y & mask32 + y1 := y >> 32 + w0 := x0 * y0 + t := x1*y0 + w0>>32 + w1 := t & mask32 + w2 := t >> 32 + w1 += x0 * y1 + hi = x1*y1 + w2 + w1>>32 + lo = x * y + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a0a185f0f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/bits_go1.13.go @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build go1.13 + +package poly1305 + +import "math/bits" + +func bitsAdd64(x, y, carry uint64) (sum, carryOut uint64) { + return bits.Add64(x, y, carry) +} + +func bitsSub64(x, y, borrow uint64) (diff, borrowOut uint64) { + return bits.Sub64(x, y, borrow) +} + +func bitsMul64(x, y uint64) (hi, lo uint64) { + return bits.Mul64(x, y) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/mac_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/mac_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a8dd589ae --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/mac_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !amd64,!ppc64le gccgo appengine + +package poly1305 + +type mac struct{ macGeneric } + +func newMAC(key *[32]byte) mac { return mac{newMACGeneric(key)} } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..066159b79 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/poly1305.go @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package poly1305 implements Poly1305 one-time message authentication code as +// specified in https://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf. +// +// Poly1305 is a fast, one-time authentication function. It is infeasible for an +// attacker to generate an authenticator for a message without the key. However, a +// key must only be used for a single message. Authenticating two different +// messages with the same key allows an attacker to forge authenticators for other +// messages with the same key. +// +// Poly1305 was originally coupled with AES in order to make Poly1305-AES. AES was +// used with a fixed key in order to generate one-time keys from an nonce. +// However, in this package AES isn't used and the one-time key is specified +// directly. +package poly1305 // import "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305" + +import "crypto/subtle" + +// TagSize is the size, in bytes, of a poly1305 authenticator. +const TagSize = 16 + +// Sum generates an authenticator for msg using a one-time key and puts the +// 16-byte result into out. Authenticating two different messages with the same +// key allows an attacker to forge messages at will. +func Sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { + sum(out, m, key) +} + +// Verify returns true if mac is a valid authenticator for m with the given key. +func Verify(mac *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) bool { + var tmp [16]byte + Sum(&tmp, m, key) + return subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(tmp[:], mac[:]) == 1 +} + +// New returns a new MAC computing an authentication +// tag of all data written to it with the given key. +// This allows writing the message progressively instead +// of passing it as a single slice. Common users should use +// the Sum function instead. +// +// The key must be unique for each message, as authenticating +// two different messages with the same key allows an attacker +// to forge messages at will. +func New(key *[32]byte) *MAC { + return &MAC{ + mac: newMAC(key), + finalized: false, + } +} + +// MAC is an io.Writer computing an authentication tag +// of the data written to it. +// +// MAC cannot be used like common hash.Hash implementations, +// because using a poly1305 key twice breaks its security. +// Therefore writing data to a running MAC after calling +// Sum causes it to panic. +type MAC struct { + mac // platform-dependent implementation + + finalized bool +} + +// Size returns the number of bytes Sum will return. +func (h *MAC) Size() int { return TagSize } + +// Write adds more data to the running message authentication code. +// It never returns an error. +// +// It must not be called after the first call of Sum. +func (h *MAC) Write(p []byte) (n int, err error) { + if h.finalized { + panic("poly1305: write to MAC after Sum") + } + return h.mac.Write(p) +} + +// Sum computes the authenticator of all data written to the +// message authentication code. +func (h *MAC) Sum(b []byte) []byte { + var mac [TagSize]byte + h.mac.Sum(&mac) + h.finalized = true + return append(b, mac[:]...) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..df56a652f --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.go @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine + +package poly1305 + +//go:noescape +func update(state *macState, msg []byte) + +func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { + h := newMAC(key) + h.Write(m) + h.Sum(out) +} + +func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) { + initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s) + return +} + +// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to +// updateGeneric to update. +// +// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but +// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost. +type mac struct{ macGeneric } + +func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + update(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] + } + if len(p) > 0 { + h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + } + return nn, nil +} + +func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) { + state := h.macState + if h.offset > 0 { + update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8c0cefbb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_amd64.s @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build amd64,!gccgo,!appengine + +#include "textflag.h" + +#define POLY1305_ADD(msg, h0, h1, h2) \ + ADDQ 0(msg), h0; \ + ADCQ 8(msg), h1; \ + ADCQ $1, h2; \ + LEAQ 16(msg), msg + +#define POLY1305_MUL(h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, t0, t1, t2, t3) \ + MOVQ r0, AX; \ + MULQ h0; \ + MOVQ AX, t0; \ + MOVQ DX, t1; \ + MOVQ r0, AX; \ + MULQ h1; \ + ADDQ AX, t1; \ + ADCQ $0, DX; \ + MOVQ r0, t2; \ + IMULQ h2, t2; \ + ADDQ DX, t2; \ + \ + MOVQ r1, AX; \ + MULQ h0; \ + ADDQ AX, t1; \ + ADCQ $0, DX; \ + MOVQ DX, h0; \ + MOVQ r1, t3; \ + IMULQ h2, t3; \ + MOVQ r1, AX; \ + MULQ h1; \ + ADDQ AX, t2; \ + ADCQ DX, t3; \ + ADDQ h0, t2; \ + ADCQ $0, t3; \ + \ + MOVQ t0, h0; \ + MOVQ t1, h1; \ + MOVQ t2, h2; \ + ANDQ $3, h2; \ + MOVQ t2, t0; \ + ANDQ $0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC, t0; \ + ADDQ t0, h0; \ + ADCQ t3, h1; \ + ADCQ $0, h2; \ + SHRQ $2, t3, t2; \ + SHRQ $2, t3; \ + ADDQ t2, h0; \ + ADCQ t3, h1; \ + ADCQ $0, h2 + +// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte) +TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32 + MOVQ state+0(FP), DI + MOVQ msg_base+8(FP), SI + MOVQ msg_len+16(FP), R15 + + MOVQ 0(DI), R8 // h0 + MOVQ 8(DI), R9 // h1 + MOVQ 16(DI), R10 // h2 + MOVQ 24(DI), R11 // r0 + MOVQ 32(DI), R12 // r1 + + CMPQ R15, $16 + JB bytes_between_0_and_15 + +loop: + POLY1305_ADD(SI, R8, R9, R10) + +multiply: + POLY1305_MUL(R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, BX, CX, R13, R14) + SUBQ $16, R15 + CMPQ R15, $16 + JAE loop + +bytes_between_0_and_15: + TESTQ R15, R15 + JZ done + MOVQ $1, BX + XORQ CX, CX + XORQ R13, R13 + ADDQ R15, SI + +flush_buffer: + SHLQ $8, BX, CX + SHLQ $8, BX + MOVB -1(SI), R13 + XORQ R13, BX + DECQ SI + DECQ R15 + JNZ flush_buffer + + ADDQ BX, R8 + ADCQ CX, R9 + ADCQ $0, R10 + MOVQ $16, R15 + JMP multiply + +done: + MOVQ R8, 0(DI) + MOVQ R9, 8(DI) + MOVQ R10, 16(DI) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6e695e427 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.go @@ -0,0 +1,19 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build arm,!gccgo,!appengine,!nacl + +package poly1305 + +// poly1305_auth_armv6 is implemented in sum_arm.s +//go:noescape +func poly1305_auth_armv6(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint32, key *[32]byte) + +func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { + var mPtr *byte + if len(m) > 0 { + mPtr = &m[0] + } + poly1305_auth_armv6(out, mPtr, uint32(len(m)), key) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f70b4ac48 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_arm.s @@ -0,0 +1,427 @@ +// Copyright 2015 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build arm,!gccgo,!appengine,!nacl + +#include "textflag.h" + +// This code was translated into a form compatible with 5a from the public +// domain source by Andrew Moon: github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-opt/blob/master/app/extensions/poly1305. + +DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x00(SB)/4, $0x3ffffff +DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x04(SB)/4, $0x3ffff03 +DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x08(SB)/4, $0x3ffc0ff +DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x0c(SB)/4, $0x3f03fff +DATA ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>+0x10(SB)/4, $0x00fffff +GLOBL ·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>(SB), 8, $20 + +// Warning: the linker may use R11 to synthesize certain instructions. Please +// take care and verify that no synthetic instructions use it. + +TEXT poly1305_init_ext_armv6<>(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + // Needs 16 bytes of stack and 64 bytes of space pointed to by R0. (It + // might look like it's only 60 bytes of space but the final four bytes + // will be written by another function.) We need to skip over four + // bytes of stack because that's saving the value of 'g'. + ADD $4, R13, R8 + MOVM.IB [R4-R7], (R8) + MOVM.IA.W (R1), [R2-R5] + MOVW $·poly1305_init_constants_armv6<>(SB), R7 + MOVW R2, R8 + MOVW R2>>26, R9 + MOVW R3>>20, g + MOVW R4>>14, R11 + MOVW R5>>8, R12 + ORR R3<<6, R9, R9 + ORR R4<<12, g, g + ORR R5<<18, R11, R11 + MOVM.IA (R7), [R2-R6] + AND R8, R2, R2 + AND R9, R3, R3 + AND g, R4, R4 + AND R11, R5, R5 + AND R12, R6, R6 + MOVM.IA.W [R2-R6], (R0) + EOR R2, R2, R2 + EOR R3, R3, R3 + EOR R4, R4, R4 + EOR R5, R5, R5 + EOR R6, R6, R6 + MOVM.IA.W [R2-R6], (R0) + MOVM.IA.W (R1), [R2-R5] + MOVM.IA [R2-R6], (R0) + ADD $20, R13, R0 + MOVM.DA (R0), [R4-R7] + RET + +#define MOVW_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp, offset) \ + MOVBU (offset+0)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \ + MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+0)(Rdst); \ + MOVBU (offset+1)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \ + MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+1)(Rdst); \ + MOVBU (offset+2)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \ + MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+2)(Rdst); \ + MOVBU (offset+3)(Rsrc), Rtmp; \ + MOVBU Rtmp, (offset+3)(Rdst) + +TEXT poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB), NOSPLIT, $0 + // Needs 24 bytes of stack for saved registers and then 88 bytes of + // scratch space after that. We assume that 24 bytes at (R13) have + // already been used: four bytes for the link register saved in the + // prelude of poly1305_auth_armv6, four bytes for saving the value of g + // in that function and 16 bytes of scratch space used around + // poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1. + ADD $24, R13, R12 + MOVM.IB [R4-R8, R14], (R12) + MOVW R0, 88(R13) + MOVW R1, 92(R13) + MOVW R2, 96(R13) + MOVW R1, R14 + MOVW R2, R12 + MOVW 56(R0), R8 + WORD $0xe1180008 // TST R8, R8 not working see issue 5921 + EOR R6, R6, R6 + MOVW.EQ $(1<<24), R6 + MOVW R6, 84(R13) + ADD $116, R13, g + MOVM.IA (R0), [R0-R9] + MOVM.IA [R0-R4], (g) + CMP $16, R12 + BLO poly1305_blocks_armv6_done + +poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop: + WORD $0xe31e0003 // TST R14, #3 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_aligned + ADD $100, R13, g + MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 0) + MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 4) + MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 8) + MOVW_UNALIGNED(R14, g, R0, 12) + MOVM.IA (g), [R0-R3] + ADD $16, R14 + B poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_loaded + +poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_aligned: + MOVM.IA.W (R14), [R0-R3] + +poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop_loaded: + MOVW R0>>26, g + MOVW R1>>20, R11 + MOVW R2>>14, R12 + MOVW R14, 92(R13) + MOVW R3>>8, R4 + ORR R1<<6, g, g + ORR R2<<12, R11, R11 + ORR R3<<18, R12, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0 + BIC $0xfc000000, g, g + MOVW 84(R13), R3 + BIC $0xfc000000, R11, R11 + BIC $0xfc000000, R12, R12 + ADD R0, R5, R5 + ADD g, R6, R6 + ORR R3, R4, R4 + ADD R11, R7, R7 + ADD $116, R13, R14 + ADD R12, R8, R8 + ADD R4, R9, R9 + MOVM.IA (R14), [R0-R4] + MULLU R4, R5, (R11, g) + MULLU R3, R5, (R14, R12) + MULALU R3, R6, (R11, g) + MULALU R2, R6, (R14, R12) + MULALU R2, R7, (R11, g) + MULALU R1, R7, (R14, R12) + ADD R4<<2, R4, R4 + ADD R3<<2, R3, R3 + MULALU R1, R8, (R11, g) + MULALU R0, R8, (R14, R12) + MULALU R0, R9, (R11, g) + MULALU R4, R9, (R14, R12) + MOVW g, 76(R13) + MOVW R11, 80(R13) + MOVW R12, 68(R13) + MOVW R14, 72(R13) + MULLU R2, R5, (R11, g) + MULLU R1, R5, (R14, R12) + MULALU R1, R6, (R11, g) + MULALU R0, R6, (R14, R12) + MULALU R0, R7, (R11, g) + MULALU R4, R7, (R14, R12) + ADD R2<<2, R2, R2 + ADD R1<<2, R1, R1 + MULALU R4, R8, (R11, g) + MULALU R3, R8, (R14, R12) + MULALU R3, R9, (R11, g) + MULALU R2, R9, (R14, R12) + MOVW g, 60(R13) + MOVW R11, 64(R13) + MOVW R12, 52(R13) + MOVW R14, 56(R13) + MULLU R0, R5, (R11, g) + MULALU R4, R6, (R11, g) + MULALU R3, R7, (R11, g) + MULALU R2, R8, (R11, g) + MULALU R1, R9, (R11, g) + ADD $52, R13, R0 + MOVM.IA (R0), [R0-R7] + MOVW g>>26, R12 + MOVW R4>>26, R14 + ORR R11<<6, R12, R12 + ORR R5<<6, R14, R14 + BIC $0xfc000000, g, g + BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R4 + ADD.S R12, R0, R0 + ADC $0, R1, R1 + ADD.S R14, R6, R6 + ADC $0, R7, R7 + MOVW R0>>26, R12 + MOVW R6>>26, R14 + ORR R1<<6, R12, R12 + ORR R7<<6, R14, R14 + BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0 + BIC $0xfc000000, R6, R6 + ADD R14<<2, R14, R14 + ADD.S R12, R2, R2 + ADC $0, R3, R3 + ADD R14, g, g + MOVW R2>>26, R12 + MOVW g>>26, R14 + ORR R3<<6, R12, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, g, R5 + BIC $0xfc000000, R2, R7 + ADD R12, R4, R4 + ADD R14, R0, R0 + MOVW R4>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R8 + ADD R12, R6, R9 + MOVW 96(R13), R12 + MOVW 92(R13), R14 + MOVW R0, R6 + CMP $32, R12 + SUB $16, R12, R12 + MOVW R12, 96(R13) + BHS poly1305_blocks_armv6_mainloop + +poly1305_blocks_armv6_done: + MOVW 88(R13), R12 + MOVW R5, 20(R12) + MOVW R6, 24(R12) + MOVW R7, 28(R12) + MOVW R8, 32(R12) + MOVW R9, 36(R12) + ADD $48, R13, R0 + MOVM.DA (R0), [R4-R8, R14] + RET + +#define MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp) \ + MOVBU.P 1(Rsrc), Rtmp; \ + MOVBU.P Rtmp, 1(Rdst); \ + MOVBU.P 1(Rsrc), Rtmp; \ + MOVBU.P Rtmp, 1(Rdst) + +#define MOVWP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp) \ + MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp); \ + MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(Rsrc, Rdst, Rtmp) + +// func poly1305_auth_armv6(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint32, key *[32]key) +TEXT ·poly1305_auth_armv6(SB), $196-16 + // The value 196, just above, is the sum of 64 (the size of the context + // structure) and 132 (the amount of stack needed). + // + // At this point, the stack pointer (R13) has been moved down. It + // points to the saved link register and there's 196 bytes of free + // space above it. + // + // The stack for this function looks like: + // + // +--------------------- + // | + // | 64 bytes of context structure + // | + // +--------------------- + // | + // | 112 bytes for poly1305_blocks_armv6 + // | + // +--------------------- + // | 16 bytes of final block, constructed at + // | poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8 + // +--------------------- + // | four bytes of saved 'g' + // +--------------------- + // | lr, saved by prelude <- R13 points here + // +--------------------- + MOVW g, 4(R13) + + MOVW out+0(FP), R4 + MOVW m+4(FP), R5 + MOVW mlen+8(FP), R6 + MOVW key+12(FP), R7 + + ADD $136, R13, R0 // 136 = 4 + 4 + 16 + 112 + MOVW R7, R1 + + // poly1305_init_ext_armv6 will write to the stack from R13+4, but + // that's ok because none of the other values have been written yet. + BL poly1305_init_ext_armv6<>(SB) + BIC.S $15, R6, R2 + BEQ poly1305_auth_armv6_noblocks + ADD $136, R13, R0 + MOVW R5, R1 + ADD R2, R5, R5 + SUB R2, R6, R6 + BL poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB) + +poly1305_auth_armv6_noblocks: + ADD $136, R13, R0 + MOVW R5, R1 + MOVW R6, R2 + MOVW R4, R3 + + MOVW R0, R5 + MOVW R1, R6 + MOVW R2, R7 + MOVW R3, R8 + AND.S R2, R2, R2 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_noremaining + EOR R0, R0 + ADD $8, R13, R9 // 8 = offset to 16 byte scratch space + MOVW R0, (R9) + MOVW R0, 4(R9) + MOVW R0, 8(R9) + MOVW R0, 12(R9) + WORD $0xe3110003 // TST R1, #3 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_aligned + WORD $0xe3120008 // TST R2, #8 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8 + MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g) + MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8: + WORD $0xe3120004 // TST $4, R2 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4 + MOVWP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4: + WORD $0xe3120002 // TST $2, R2 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2 + MOVHUP_UNALIGNED(R1, R9, g) + B poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2 + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_aligned: + WORD $0xe3120008 // TST R2, #8 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8_aligned + MOVM.IA.W (R1), [g-R11] + MOVM.IA.W [g-R11], (R9) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip8_aligned: + WORD $0xe3120004 // TST $4, R2 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4_aligned + MOVW.P 4(R1), g + MOVW.P g, 4(R9) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip4_aligned: + WORD $0xe3120002 // TST $2, R2 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2 + MOVHU.P 2(R1), g + MOVH.P g, 2(R9) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip2: + WORD $0xe3120001 // TST $1, R2 not working see issue 5921 + BEQ poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1 + MOVBU.P 1(R1), g + MOVBU.P g, 1(R9) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_skip1: + MOVW $1, R11 + MOVBU R11, 0(R9) + MOVW R11, 56(R5) + MOVW R5, R0 + ADD $8, R13, R1 + MOVW $16, R2 + BL poly1305_blocks_armv6<>(SB) + +poly1305_finish_ext_armv6_noremaining: + MOVW 20(R5), R0 + MOVW 24(R5), R1 + MOVW 28(R5), R2 + MOVW 32(R5), R3 + MOVW 36(R5), R4 + MOVW R4>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R4, R4 + ADD R12<<2, R12, R12 + ADD R12, R0, R0 + MOVW R0>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R0, R0 + ADD R12, R1, R1 + MOVW R1>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R1, R1 + ADD R12, R2, R2 + MOVW R2>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R2, R2 + ADD R12, R3, R3 + MOVW R3>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R3, R3 + ADD R12, R4, R4 + ADD $5, R0, R6 + MOVW R6>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R6, R6 + ADD R12, R1, R7 + MOVW R7>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R7, R7 + ADD R12, R2, g + MOVW g>>26, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, g, g + ADD R12, R3, R11 + MOVW $-(1<<26), R12 + ADD R11>>26, R12, R12 + BIC $0xfc000000, R11, R11 + ADD R12, R4, R9 + MOVW R9>>31, R12 + SUB $1, R12 + AND R12, R6, R6 + AND R12, R7, R7 + AND R12, g, g + AND R12, R11, R11 + AND R12, R9, R9 + MVN R12, R12 + AND R12, R0, R0 + AND R12, R1, R1 + AND R12, R2, R2 + AND R12, R3, R3 + AND R12, R4, R4 + ORR R6, R0, R0 + ORR R7, R1, R1 + ORR g, R2, R2 + ORR R11, R3, R3 + ORR R9, R4, R4 + ORR R1<<26, R0, R0 + MOVW R1>>6, R1 + ORR R2<<20, R1, R1 + MOVW R2>>12, R2 + ORR R3<<14, R2, R2 + MOVW R3>>18, R3 + ORR R4<<8, R3, R3 + MOVW 40(R5), R6 + MOVW 44(R5), R7 + MOVW 48(R5), g + MOVW 52(R5), R11 + ADD.S R6, R0, R0 + ADC.S R7, R1, R1 + ADC.S g, R2, R2 + ADC.S R11, R3, R3 + MOVM.IA [R0-R3], (R8) + MOVW R5, R12 + EOR R0, R0, R0 + EOR R1, R1, R1 + EOR R2, R2, R2 + EOR R3, R3, R3 + EOR R4, R4, R4 + EOR R5, R5, R5 + EOR R6, R6, R6 + EOR R7, R7, R7 + MOVM.IA.W [R0-R7], (R12) + MOVM.IA [R0-R7], (R12) + MOVW 4(R13), g + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1187eab78 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_generic.go @@ -0,0 +1,307 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// This file provides the generic implementation of Sum and MAC. Other files +// might provide optimized assembly implementations of some of this code. + +package poly1305 + +import "encoding/binary" + +// Poly1305 [RFC 7539] is a relatively simple algorithm: the authentication tag +// for a 64 bytes message is approximately +// +// s + m[0:16] * r⁴ + m[16:32] * r³ + m[32:48] * r² + m[48:64] * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// +// for some secret r and s. It can be computed sequentially like +// +// for len(msg) > 0: +// h += read(msg, 16) +// h *= r +// h %= 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// return h + s +// +// All the complexity is about doing performant constant-time math on numbers +// larger than any available numeric type. + +func sumGeneric(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { + h := newMACGeneric(key) + h.Write(msg) + h.Sum(out) +} + +func newMACGeneric(key *[32]byte) (h macGeneric) { + initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s) + return +} + +// macState holds numbers in saturated 64-bit little-endian limbs. That is, +// the value of [x0, x1, x2] is x[0] + x[1] * 2⁶⁴ + x[2] * 2¹²⁸. +type macState struct { + // h is the main accumulator. It is to be interpreted modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5, but + // can grow larger during and after rounds. + h [3]uint64 + // r and s are the private key components. + r [2]uint64 + s [2]uint64 +} + +type macGeneric struct { + macState + + buffer [TagSize]byte + offset int +} + +// Write splits the incoming message into TagSize chunks, and passes them to +// update. It buffers incomplete chunks. +func (h *macGeneric) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + updateGeneric(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + updateGeneric(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] + } + if len(p) > 0 { + h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + } + return nn, nil +} + +// Sum flushes the last incomplete chunk from the buffer, if any, and generates +// the MAC output. It does not modify its state, in order to allow for multiple +// calls to Sum, even if no Write is allowed after Sum. +func (h *macGeneric) Sum(out *[TagSize]byte) { + state := h.macState + if h.offset > 0 { + updateGeneric(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} + +// [rMask0, rMask1] is the specified Poly1305 clamping mask in little-endian. It +// clears some bits of the secret coefficient to make it possible to implement +// multiplication more efficiently. +const ( + rMask0 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF + rMask1 = 0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC +) + +func initialize(key *[32]byte, r, s *[2]uint64) { + r[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[0:8]) & rMask0 + r[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[8:16]) & rMask1 + s[0] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[16:24]) + s[1] = binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(key[24:32]) +} + +// uint128 holds a 128-bit number as two 64-bit limbs, for use with the +// bits.Mul64 and bits.Add64 intrinsics. +type uint128 struct { + lo, hi uint64 +} + +func mul64(a, b uint64) uint128 { + hi, lo := bitsMul64(a, b) + return uint128{lo, hi} +} + +func add128(a, b uint128) uint128 { + lo, c := bitsAdd64(a.lo, b.lo, 0) + hi, c := bitsAdd64(a.hi, b.hi, c) + if c != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + return uint128{lo, hi} +} + +func shiftRightBy2(a uint128) uint128 { + a.lo = a.lo>>2 | (a.hi&3)<<62 + a.hi = a.hi >> 2 + return a +} + +// updateGeneric absorbs msg into the state.h accumulator. For each chunk m of +// 128 bits of message, it computes +// +// h₊ = (h + m) * r mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 +// +// If the msg length is not a multiple of TagSize, it assumes the last +// incomplete chunk is the final one. +func updateGeneric(state *macState, msg []byte) { + h0, h1, h2 := state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2] + r0, r1 := state.r[0], state.r[1] + + for len(msg) > 0 { + var c uint64 + + // For the first step, h + m, we use a chain of bits.Add64 intrinsics. + // The resulting value of h might exceed 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be partially + // reduced at the end of the multiplication below. + // + // The spec requires us to set a bit just above the message size, not to + // hide leading zeroes. For full chunks, that's 1 << 128, so we can just + // add 1 to the most significant (2¹²⁸) limb, h2. + if len(msg) >= TagSize { + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[0:8]), 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(msg[8:16]), c) + h2 += c + 1 + + msg = msg[TagSize:] + } else { + var buf [TagSize]byte + copy(buf[:], msg) + buf[len(msg)] = 1 + + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[0:8]), 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, binary.LittleEndian.Uint64(buf[8:16]), c) + h2 += c + + msg = nil + } + + // Multiplication of big number limbs is similar to elementary school + // columnar multiplication. Instead of digits, there are 64-bit limbs. + // + // We are multiplying a 3 limbs number, h, by a 2 limbs number, r. + // + // h2 h1 h0 x + // r1 r0 = + // ---------------- + // h2r0 h1r0 h0r0 <-- individual 128-bit products + // + h2r1 h1r1 h0r1 + // ------------------------ + // m3 m2 m1 m0 <-- result in 128-bit overlapping limbs + // ------------------------ + // m3.hi m2.hi m1.hi m0.hi <-- carry propagation + // + m3.lo m2.lo m1.lo m0.lo + // ------------------------------- + // t4 t3 t2 t1 t0 <-- final result in 64-bit limbs + // + // The main difference from pen-and-paper multiplication is that we do + // carry propagation in a separate step, as if we wrote two digit sums + // at first (the 128-bit limbs), and then carried the tens all at once. + + h0r0 := mul64(h0, r0) + h1r0 := mul64(h1, r0) + h2r0 := mul64(h2, r0) + h0r1 := mul64(h0, r1) + h1r1 := mul64(h1, r1) + h2r1 := mul64(h2, r1) + + // Since h2 is known to be at most 7 (5 + 1 + 1), and r0 and r1 have their + // top 4 bits cleared by rMask{0,1}, we know that their product is not going + // to overflow 64 bits, so we can ignore the high part of the products. + // + // This also means that the product doesn't have a fifth limb (t4). + if h2r0.hi != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + if h2r1.hi != 0 { + panic("poly1305: unexpected overflow") + } + + m0 := h0r0 + m1 := add128(h1r0, h0r1) // These two additions don't overflow thanks again + m2 := add128(h2r0, h1r1) // to the 4 masked bits at the top of r0 and r1. + m3 := h2r1 + + t0 := m0.lo + t1, c := bitsAdd64(m1.lo, m0.hi, 0) + t2, c := bitsAdd64(m2.lo, m1.hi, c) + t3, _ := bitsAdd64(m3.lo, m2.hi, c) + + // Now we have the result as 4 64-bit limbs, and we need to reduce it + // modulo 2¹³⁰ - 5. The special shape of this Crandall prime lets us do + // a cheap partial reduction according to the reduction identity + // + // c * 2¹³⁰ + n = c * 5 + n mod 2¹³⁰ - 5 + // + // because 2¹³⁰ = 5 mod 2¹³⁰ - 5. Partial reduction since the result is + // likely to be larger than 2¹³⁰ - 5, but still small enough to fit the + // assumptions we make about h in the rest of the code. + // + // See also https://speakerdeck.com/gtank/engineering-prime-numbers?slide=23 + + // We split the final result at the 2¹³⁰ mark into h and cc, the carry. + // Note that the carry bits are effectively shifted left by 2, in other + // words, cc = c * 4 for the c in the reduction identity. + h0, h1, h2 = t0, t1, t2&maskLow2Bits + cc := uint128{t2 & maskNotLow2Bits, t3} + + // To add c * 5 to h, we first add cc = c * 4, and then add (cc >> 2) = c. + + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, cc.lo, 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, cc.hi, c) + h2 += c + + cc = shiftRightBy2(cc) + + h0, c = bitsAdd64(h0, cc.lo, 0) + h1, c = bitsAdd64(h1, cc.hi, c) + h2 += c + + // h2 is at most 3 + 1 + 1 = 5, making the whole of h at most + // + // 5 * 2¹²⁸ + (2¹²⁸ - 1) = 6 * 2¹²⁸ - 1 + } + + state.h[0], state.h[1], state.h[2] = h0, h1, h2 +} + +const ( + maskLow2Bits uint64 = 0x0000000000000003 + maskNotLow2Bits uint64 = ^maskLow2Bits +) + +// select64 returns x if v == 1 and y if v == 0, in constant time. +func select64(v, x, y uint64) uint64 { return ^(v-1)&x | (v-1)&y } + +// [p0, p1, p2] is 2¹³⁰ - 5 in little endian order. +const ( + p0 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFB + p1 = 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF + p2 = 0x0000000000000003 +) + +// finalize completes the modular reduction of h and computes +// +// out = h + s mod 2¹²⁸ +// +func finalize(out *[TagSize]byte, h *[3]uint64, s *[2]uint64) { + h0, h1, h2 := h[0], h[1], h[2] + + // After the partial reduction in updateGeneric, h might be more than + // 2¹³⁰ - 5, but will be less than 2 * (2¹³⁰ - 5). To complete the reduction + // in constant time, we compute t = h - (2¹³⁰ - 5), and select h as the + // result if the subtraction underflows, and t otherwise. + + hMinusP0, b := bitsSub64(h0, p0, 0) + hMinusP1, b := bitsSub64(h1, p1, b) + _, b = bitsSub64(h2, p2, b) + + // h = h if h < p else h - p + h0 = select64(b, h0, hMinusP0) + h1 = select64(b, h1, hMinusP1) + + // Finally, we compute the last Poly1305 step + // + // tag = h + s mod 2¹²⁸ + // + // by just doing a wide addition with the 128 low bits of h and discarding + // the overflow. + h0, c := bitsAdd64(h0, s[0], 0) + h1, _ = bitsAdd64(h1, s[1], c) + + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[0:8], h0) + binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(out[8:16], h1) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1682eda45 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_noasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build s390x,!go1.11 !arm,!amd64,!s390x,!ppc64le gccgo appengine nacl + +package poly1305 + +func sum(out *[TagSize]byte, msg []byte, key *[32]byte) { + h := newMAC(key) + h.Write(msg) + h.Sum(out) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..323361693 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.go @@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine + +package poly1305 + +//go:noescape +func update(state *macState, msg []byte) + +func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { + h := newMAC(key) + h.Write(m) + h.Sum(out) +} + +func newMAC(key *[32]byte) (h mac) { + initialize(key, &h.r, &h.s) + return +} + +// mac is a wrapper for macGeneric that redirects calls that would have gone to +// updateGeneric to update. +// +// Its Write and Sum methods are otherwise identical to the macGeneric ones, but +// using function pointers would carry a major performance cost. +type mac struct{ macGeneric } + +func (h *mac) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + nn := len(p) + if h.offset > 0 { + n := copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + if h.offset+n < TagSize { + h.offset += n + return nn, nil + } + p = p[n:] + h.offset = 0 + update(&h.macState, h.buffer[:]) + } + if n := len(p) - (len(p) % TagSize); n > 0 { + update(&h.macState, p[:n]) + p = p[n:] + } + if len(p) > 0 { + h.offset += copy(h.buffer[h.offset:], p) + } + return nn, nil +} + +func (h *mac) Sum(out *[16]byte) { + state := h.macState + if h.offset > 0 { + update(&state, h.buffer[:h.offset]) + } + finalize(out, &state.h, &state.s) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..4e20bf299 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_ppc64le.s @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build ppc64le,!gccgo,!appengine + +#include "textflag.h" + +// This was ported from the amd64 implementation. + +#define POLY1305_ADD(msg, h0, h1, h2, t0, t1, t2) \ + MOVD (msg), t0; \ + MOVD 8(msg), t1; \ + MOVD $1, t2; \ + ADDC t0, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t1, h1, h1; \ + ADDE t2, h2; \ + ADD $16, msg + +#define POLY1305_MUL(h0, h1, h2, r0, r1, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5) \ + MULLD r0, h0, t0; \ + MULLD r0, h1, t4; \ + MULHDU r0, h0, t1; \ + MULHDU r0, h1, t5; \ + ADDC t4, t1, t1; \ + MULLD r0, h2, t2; \ + ADDZE t5; \ + MULHDU r1, h0, t4; \ + MULLD r1, h0, h0; \ + ADD t5, t2, t2; \ + ADDC h0, t1, t1; \ + MULLD h2, r1, t3; \ + ADDZE t4, h0; \ + MULHDU r1, h1, t5; \ + MULLD r1, h1, t4; \ + ADDC t4, t2, t2; \ + ADDE t5, t3, t3; \ + ADDC h0, t2, t2; \ + MOVD $-4, t4; \ + MOVD t0, h0; \ + MOVD t1, h1; \ + ADDZE t3; \ + ANDCC $3, t2, h2; \ + AND t2, t4, t0; \ + ADDC t0, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t3, h1, h1; \ + SLD $62, t3, t4; \ + SRD $2, t2; \ + ADDZE h2; \ + OR t4, t2, t2; \ + SRD $2, t3; \ + ADDC t2, h0, h0; \ + ADDE t3, h1, h1; \ + ADDZE h2 + +DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x00(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFF +DATA ·poly1305Mask<>+0x08(SB)/8, $0x0FFFFFFC0FFFFFFC +GLOBL ·poly1305Mask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 + +// func update(state *[7]uint64, msg []byte) +TEXT ·update(SB), $0-32 + MOVD state+0(FP), R3 + MOVD msg_base+8(FP), R4 + MOVD msg_len+16(FP), R5 + + MOVD 0(R3), R8 // h0 + MOVD 8(R3), R9 // h1 + MOVD 16(R3), R10 // h2 + MOVD 24(R3), R11 // r0 + MOVD 32(R3), R12 // r1 + + CMP R5, $16 + BLT bytes_between_0_and_15 + +loop: + POLY1305_ADD(R4, R8, R9, R10, R20, R21, R22) + +multiply: + POLY1305_MUL(R8, R9, R10, R11, R12, R16, R17, R18, R14, R20, R21) + ADD $-16, R5 + CMP R5, $16 + BGE loop + +bytes_between_0_and_15: + CMP $0, R5 + BEQ done + MOVD $0, R16 // h0 + MOVD $0, R17 // h1 + +flush_buffer: + CMP R5, $8 + BLE just1 + + MOVD $8, R21 + SUB R21, R5, R21 + + // Greater than 8 -- load the rightmost remaining bytes in msg + // and put into R17 (h1) + MOVD (R4)(R21), R17 + MOVD $16, R22 + + // Find the offset to those bytes + SUB R5, R22, R22 + SLD $3, R22 + + // Shift to get only the bytes in msg + SRD R22, R17, R17 + + // Put 1 at high end + MOVD $1, R23 + SLD $3, R21 + SLD R21, R23, R23 + OR R23, R17, R17 + + // Remainder is 8 + MOVD $8, R5 + +just1: + CMP R5, $8 + BLT less8 + + // Exactly 8 + MOVD (R4), R16 + + CMP $0, R17 + + // Check if we've already set R17; if not + // set 1 to indicate end of msg. + BNE carry + MOVD $1, R17 + BR carry + +less8: + MOVD $0, R16 // h0 + MOVD $0, R22 // shift count + CMP R5, $4 + BLT less4 + MOVWZ (R4), R16 + ADD $4, R4 + ADD $-4, R5 + MOVD $32, R22 + +less4: + CMP R5, $2 + BLT less2 + MOVHZ (R4), R21 + SLD R22, R21, R21 + OR R16, R21, R16 + ADD $16, R22 + ADD $-2, R5 + ADD $2, R4 + +less2: + CMP $0, R5 + BEQ insert1 + MOVBZ (R4), R21 + SLD R22, R21, R21 + OR R16, R21, R16 + ADD $8, R22 + +insert1: + // Insert 1 at end of msg + MOVD $1, R21 + SLD R22, R21, R21 + OR R16, R21, R16 + +carry: + // Add new values to h0, h1, h2 + ADDC R16, R8 + ADDE R17, R9 + ADDE $0, R10 + MOVD $16, R5 + ADD R5, R4 + BR multiply + +done: + // Save h0, h1, h2 in state + MOVD R8, 0(R3) + MOVD R9, 8(R3) + MOVD R10, 16(R3) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..a8920ee9d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build s390x,go1.11,!gccgo,!appengine + +package poly1305 + +import ( + "golang.org/x/sys/cpu" +) + +// poly1305vx is an assembly implementation of Poly1305 that uses vector +// instructions. It must only be called if the vector facility (vx) is +// available. +//go:noescape +func poly1305vx(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte) + +// poly1305vmsl is an assembly implementation of Poly1305 that uses vector +// instructions, including VMSL. It must only be called if the vector facility (vx) is +// available and if VMSL is supported. +//go:noescape +func poly1305vmsl(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]byte) + +func sum(out *[16]byte, m []byte, key *[32]byte) { + if cpu.S390X.HasVX { + var mPtr *byte + if len(m) > 0 { + mPtr = &m[0] + } + if cpu.S390X.HasVXE && len(m) > 256 { + poly1305vmsl(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key) + } else { + poly1305vx(out, mPtr, uint64(len(m)), key) + } + } else { + sumGeneric(out, m, key) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ca5a309d8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,378 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build s390x,go1.11,!gccgo,!appengine + +#include "textflag.h" + +// Implementation of Poly1305 using the vector facility (vx). + +// constants +#define MOD26 V0 +#define EX0 V1 +#define EX1 V2 +#define EX2 V3 + +// temporaries +#define T_0 V4 +#define T_1 V5 +#define T_2 V6 +#define T_3 V7 +#define T_4 V8 + +// key (r) +#define R_0 V9 +#define R_1 V10 +#define R_2 V11 +#define R_3 V12 +#define R_4 V13 +#define R5_1 V14 +#define R5_2 V15 +#define R5_3 V16 +#define R5_4 V17 +#define RSAVE_0 R5 +#define RSAVE_1 R6 +#define RSAVE_2 R7 +#define RSAVE_3 R8 +#define RSAVE_4 R9 +#define R5SAVE_1 V28 +#define R5SAVE_2 V29 +#define R5SAVE_3 V30 +#define R5SAVE_4 V31 + +// message block +#define F_0 V18 +#define F_1 V19 +#define F_2 V20 +#define F_3 V21 +#define F_4 V22 + +// accumulator +#define H_0 V23 +#define H_1 V24 +#define H_2 V25 +#define H_3 V26 +#define H_4 V27 + +GLOBL ·keyMask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 +DATA ·keyMask<>+0(SB)/8, $0xffffff0ffcffff0f +DATA ·keyMask<>+8(SB)/8, $0xfcffff0ffcffff0f + +GLOBL ·bswapMask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 +DATA ·bswapMask<>+0(SB)/8, $0x0f0e0d0c0b0a0908 +DATA ·bswapMask<>+8(SB)/8, $0x0706050403020100 + +GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA, $64 +// MOD26 +DATA ·constants<>+0(SB)/8, $0x3ffffff +DATA ·constants<>+8(SB)/8, $0x3ffffff +// EX0 +DATA ·constants<>+16(SB)/8, $0x0006050403020100 +DATA ·constants<>+24(SB)/8, $0x1016151413121110 +// EX1 +DATA ·constants<>+32(SB)/8, $0x060c0b0a09080706 +DATA ·constants<>+40(SB)/8, $0x161c1b1a19181716 +// EX2 +DATA ·constants<>+48(SB)/8, $0x0d0d0d0d0d0f0e0d +DATA ·constants<>+56(SB)/8, $0x1d1d1d1d1d1f1e1d + +// h = (f*g) % (2**130-5) [partial reduction] +#define MULTIPLY(f0, f1, f2, f3, f4, g0, g1, g2, g3, g4, g51, g52, g53, g54, h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \ + VMLOF f0, g0, h0 \ + VMLOF f0, g1, h1 \ + VMLOF f0, g2, h2 \ + VMLOF f0, g3, h3 \ + VMLOF f0, g4, h4 \ + VMLOF f1, g54, T_0 \ + VMLOF f1, g0, T_1 \ + VMLOF f1, g1, T_2 \ + VMLOF f1, g2, T_3 \ + VMLOF f1, g3, T_4 \ + VMALOF f2, g53, h0, h0 \ + VMALOF f2, g54, h1, h1 \ + VMALOF f2, g0, h2, h2 \ + VMALOF f2, g1, h3, h3 \ + VMALOF f2, g2, h4, h4 \ + VMALOF f3, g52, T_0, T_0 \ + VMALOF f3, g53, T_1, T_1 \ + VMALOF f3, g54, T_2, T_2 \ + VMALOF f3, g0, T_3, T_3 \ + VMALOF f3, g1, T_4, T_4 \ + VMALOF f4, g51, h0, h0 \ + VMALOF f4, g52, h1, h1 \ + VMALOF f4, g53, h2, h2 \ + VMALOF f4, g54, h3, h3 \ + VMALOF f4, g0, h4, h4 \ + VAG T_0, h0, h0 \ + VAG T_1, h1, h1 \ + VAG T_2, h2, h2 \ + VAG T_3, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_4, h4, h4 + +// carry h0->h1 h3->h4, h1->h2 h4->h0, h0->h1 h2->h3, h3->h4 +#define REDUCE(h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \ + VESRLG $26, h0, T_0 \ + VESRLG $26, h3, T_1 \ + VN MOD26, h0, h0 \ + VN MOD26, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_0, h1, h1 \ + VAG T_1, h4, h4 \ + VESRLG $26, h1, T_2 \ + VESRLG $26, h4, T_3 \ + VN MOD26, h1, h1 \ + VN MOD26, h4, h4 \ + VESLG $2, T_3, T_4 \ + VAG T_3, T_4, T_4 \ + VAG T_2, h2, h2 \ + VAG T_4, h0, h0 \ + VESRLG $26, h2, T_0 \ + VESRLG $26, h0, T_1 \ + VN MOD26, h2, h2 \ + VN MOD26, h0, h0 \ + VAG T_0, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_1, h1, h1 \ + VESRLG $26, h3, T_2 \ + VN MOD26, h3, h3 \ + VAG T_2, h4, h4 + +// expand in0 into d[0] and in1 into d[1] +#define EXPAND(in0, in1, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4) \ + VGBM $0x0707, d1 \ // d1=tmp + VPERM in0, in1, EX2, d4 \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX0, d0 \ + VPERM in0, in1, EX1, d2 \ + VN d1, d4, d4 \ + VESRLG $26, d0, d1 \ + VESRLG $30, d2, d3 \ + VESRLG $4, d2, d2 \ + VN MOD26, d0, d0 \ + VN MOD26, d1, d1 \ + VN MOD26, d2, d2 \ + VN MOD26, d3, d3 + +// pack h4:h0 into h1:h0 (no carry) +#define PACK(h0, h1, h2, h3, h4) \ + VESLG $26, h1, h1 \ + VESLG $26, h3, h3 \ + VO h0, h1, h0 \ + VO h2, h3, h2 \ + VESLG $4, h2, h2 \ + VLEIB $7, $48, h1 \ + VSLB h1, h2, h2 \ + VO h0, h2, h0 \ + VLEIB $7, $104, h1 \ + VSLB h1, h4, h3 \ + VO h3, h0, h0 \ + VLEIB $7, $24, h1 \ + VSRLB h1, h4, h1 + +// if h > 2**130-5 then h -= 2**130-5 +#define MOD(h0, h1, t0, t1, t2) \ + VZERO t0 \ + VLEIG $1, $5, t0 \ + VACCQ h0, t0, t1 \ + VAQ h0, t0, t0 \ + VONE t2 \ + VLEIG $1, $-4, t2 \ + VAQ t2, t1, t1 \ + VACCQ h1, t1, t1 \ + VONE t2 \ + VAQ t2, t1, t1 \ + VN h0, t1, t2 \ + VNC t0, t1, t1 \ + VO t1, t2, h0 + +// func poly1305vx(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]key) +TEXT ·poly1305vx(SB), $0-32 + // This code processes up to 2 blocks (32 bytes) per iteration + // using the algorithm described in: + // NEON crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein & Peter Schwabe + // https://cryptojedi.org/papers/neoncrypto-20120320.pdf + LMG out+0(FP), R1, R4 // R1=out, R2=m, R3=mlen, R4=key + + // load MOD26, EX0, EX1 and EX2 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), MOD26, EX2 + + // setup r + VL (R4), T_0 + MOVD $·keyMask<>(SB), R6 + VL (R6), T_1 + VN T_0, T_1, T_0 + EXPAND(T_0, T_0, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4) + + // setup r*5 + VLEIG $0, $5, T_0 + VLEIG $1, $5, T_0 + + // store r (for final block) + VMLOF T_0, R_1, R5SAVE_1 + VMLOF T_0, R_2, R5SAVE_2 + VMLOF T_0, R_3, R5SAVE_3 + VMLOF T_0, R_4, R5SAVE_4 + VLGVG $0, R_0, RSAVE_0 + VLGVG $0, R_1, RSAVE_1 + VLGVG $0, R_2, RSAVE_2 + VLGVG $0, R_3, RSAVE_3 + VLGVG $0, R_4, RSAVE_4 + + // skip r**2 calculation + CMPBLE R3, $16, skip + + // calculate r**2 + MULTIPLY(R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R5SAVE_1, R5SAVE_2, R5SAVE_3, R5SAVE_4, H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + VLEIG $0, $5, T_0 + VLEIG $1, $5, T_0 + VMLOF T_0, H_1, R5_1 + VMLOF T_0, H_2, R5_2 + VMLOF T_0, H_3, R5_3 + VMLOF T_0, H_4, R5_4 + VLR H_0, R_0 + VLR H_1, R_1 + VLR H_2, R_2 + VLR H_3, R_3 + VLR H_4, R_4 + + // initialize h + VZERO H_0 + VZERO H_1 + VZERO H_2 + VZERO H_3 + VZERO H_4 + +loop: + CMPBLE R3, $32, b2 + VLM (R2), T_0, T_1 + SUB $32, R3 + MOVD $32(R2), R2 + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, F_0, F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4) + VLEIB $4, $1, F_4 + VLEIB $12, $1, F_4 + +multiply: + VAG H_0, F_0, F_0 + VAG H_1, F_1, F_1 + VAG H_2, F_2, F_2 + VAG H_3, F_3, F_3 + VAG H_4, F_4, F_4 + MULTIPLY(F_0, F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4, R_0, R_1, R_2, R_3, R_4, R5_1, R5_2, R5_3, R5_4, H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + CMPBNE R3, $0, loop + +finish: + // sum vectors + VZERO T_0 + VSUMQG H_0, T_0, H_0 + VSUMQG H_1, T_0, H_1 + VSUMQG H_2, T_0, H_2 + VSUMQG H_3, T_0, H_3 + VSUMQG H_4, T_0, H_4 + + // h may be >= 2*(2**130-5) so we need to reduce it again + REDUCE(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + // carry h1->h4 + VESRLG $26, H_1, T_1 + VN MOD26, H_1, H_1 + VAQ T_1, H_2, H_2 + VESRLG $26, H_2, T_2 + VN MOD26, H_2, H_2 + VAQ T_2, H_3, H_3 + VESRLG $26, H_3, T_3 + VN MOD26, H_3, H_3 + VAQ T_3, H_4, H_4 + + // h is now < 2*(2**130-5) + // pack h into h1 (hi) and h0 (lo) + PACK(H_0, H_1, H_2, H_3, H_4) + + // if h > 2**130-5 then h -= 2**130-5 + MOD(H_0, H_1, T_0, T_1, T_2) + + // h += s + MOVD $·bswapMask<>(SB), R5 + VL (R5), T_1 + VL 16(R4), T_0 + VPERM T_0, T_0, T_1, T_0 // reverse bytes (to big) + VAQ T_0, H_0, H_0 + VPERM H_0, H_0, T_1, H_0 // reverse bytes (to little) + VST H_0, (R1) + + RET + +b2: + CMPBLE R3, $16, b1 + + // 2 blocks remaining + SUB $17, R3 + VL (R2), T_0 + VLL R3, 16(R2), T_1 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, T_1 + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, F_0, F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4) + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $12, $1, F_4 + VLEIB $4, $1, F_4 + + // setup [r²,r] + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_3, R_3 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_4, R_4 + VPDI $0, R5_1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1 + VPDI $0, R5_2, R5SAVE_2, R5_2 + VPDI $0, R5_3, R5SAVE_3, R5_3 + VPDI $0, R5_4, R5SAVE_4, R5_4 + + MOVD $0, R3 + BR multiply + +skip: + VZERO H_0 + VZERO H_1 + VZERO H_2 + VZERO H_3 + VZERO H_4 + + CMPBEQ R3, $0, finish + +b1: + // 1 block remaining + SUB $1, R3 + VLL R3, (R2), T_0 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, T_0 + VZERO T_1 + EXPAND(T_0, T_1, F_0, F_1, F_2, F_3, F_4) + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $4, $1, F_4 + VLEIG $1, $1, R_0 + VZERO R_1 + VZERO R_2 + VZERO R_3 + VZERO R_4 + VZERO R5_1 + VZERO R5_2 + VZERO R5_3 + VZERO R5_4 + + // setup [r, 1] + VLVGG $0, RSAVE_0, R_0 + VLVGG $0, RSAVE_1, R_1 + VLVGG $0, RSAVE_2, R_2 + VLVGG $0, RSAVE_3, R_3 + VLVGG $0, RSAVE_4, R_4 + VPDI $0, R5SAVE_1, R5_1, R5_1 + VPDI $0, R5SAVE_2, R5_2, R5_2 + VPDI $0, R5SAVE_3, R5_3, R5_3 + VPDI $0, R5SAVE_4, R5_4, R5_4 + + MOVD $0, R3 + BR multiply diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_vmsl_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_vmsl_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e60bbc1d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305/sum_vmsl_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,909 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build s390x,go1.11,!gccgo,!appengine + +#include "textflag.h" + +// Implementation of Poly1305 using the vector facility (vx) and the VMSL instruction. + +// constants +#define EX0 V1 +#define EX1 V2 +#define EX2 V3 + +// temporaries +#define T_0 V4 +#define T_1 V5 +#define T_2 V6 +#define T_3 V7 +#define T_4 V8 +#define T_5 V9 +#define T_6 V10 +#define T_7 V11 +#define T_8 V12 +#define T_9 V13 +#define T_10 V14 + +// r**2 & r**4 +#define R_0 V15 +#define R_1 V16 +#define R_2 V17 +#define R5_1 V18 +#define R5_2 V19 +// key (r) +#define RSAVE_0 R7 +#define RSAVE_1 R8 +#define RSAVE_2 R9 +#define R5SAVE_1 R10 +#define R5SAVE_2 R11 + +// message block +#define M0 V20 +#define M1 V21 +#define M2 V22 +#define M3 V23 +#define M4 V24 +#define M5 V25 + +// accumulator +#define H0_0 V26 +#define H1_0 V27 +#define H2_0 V28 +#define H0_1 V29 +#define H1_1 V30 +#define H2_1 V31 + +GLOBL ·keyMask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 +DATA ·keyMask<>+0(SB)/8, $0xffffff0ffcffff0f +DATA ·keyMask<>+8(SB)/8, $0xfcffff0ffcffff0f + +GLOBL ·bswapMask<>(SB), RODATA, $16 +DATA ·bswapMask<>+0(SB)/8, $0x0f0e0d0c0b0a0908 +DATA ·bswapMask<>+8(SB)/8, $0x0706050403020100 + +GLOBL ·constants<>(SB), RODATA, $48 +// EX0 +DATA ·constants<>+0(SB)/8, $0x18191a1b1c1d1e1f +DATA ·constants<>+8(SB)/8, $0x0000050403020100 +// EX1 +DATA ·constants<>+16(SB)/8, $0x18191a1b1c1d1e1f +DATA ·constants<>+24(SB)/8, $0x00000a0908070605 +// EX2 +DATA ·constants<>+32(SB)/8, $0x18191a1b1c1d1e1f +DATA ·constants<>+40(SB)/8, $0x0000000f0e0d0c0b + +GLOBL ·c<>(SB), RODATA, $48 +// EX0 +DATA ·c<>+0(SB)/8, $0x0000050403020100 +DATA ·c<>+8(SB)/8, $0x0000151413121110 +// EX1 +DATA ·c<>+16(SB)/8, $0x00000a0908070605 +DATA ·c<>+24(SB)/8, $0x00001a1918171615 +// EX2 +DATA ·c<>+32(SB)/8, $0x0000000f0e0d0c0b +DATA ·c<>+40(SB)/8, $0x0000001f1e1d1c1b + +GLOBL ·reduce<>(SB), RODATA, $32 +// 44 bit +DATA ·reduce<>+0(SB)/8, $0x0 +DATA ·reduce<>+8(SB)/8, $0xfffffffffff +// 42 bit +DATA ·reduce<>+16(SB)/8, $0x0 +DATA ·reduce<>+24(SB)/8, $0x3ffffffffff + +// h = (f*g) % (2**130-5) [partial reduction] +// uses T_0...T_9 temporary registers +// input: m02_0, m02_1, m02_2, m13_0, m13_1, m13_2, r_0, r_1, r_2, r5_1, r5_2, m4_0, m4_1, m4_2, m5_0, m5_1, m5_2 +// temp: t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9 +// output: m02_0, m02_1, m02_2, m13_0, m13_1, m13_2 +#define MULTIPLY(m02_0, m02_1, m02_2, m13_0, m13_1, m13_2, r_0, r_1, r_2, r5_1, r5_2, m4_0, m4_1, m4_2, m5_0, m5_1, m5_2, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9) \ + \ // Eliminate the dependency for the last 2 VMSLs + VMSLG m02_0, r_2, m4_2, m4_2 \ + VMSLG m13_0, r_2, m5_2, m5_2 \ // 8 VMSLs pipelined + VMSLG m02_0, r_0, m4_0, m4_0 \ + VMSLG m02_1, r5_2, V0, T_0 \ + VMSLG m02_0, r_1, m4_1, m4_1 \ + VMSLG m02_1, r_0, V0, T_1 \ + VMSLG m02_1, r_1, V0, T_2 \ + VMSLG m02_2, r5_1, V0, T_3 \ + VMSLG m02_2, r5_2, V0, T_4 \ + VMSLG m13_0, r_0, m5_0, m5_0 \ + VMSLG m13_1, r5_2, V0, T_5 \ + VMSLG m13_0, r_1, m5_1, m5_1 \ + VMSLG m13_1, r_0, V0, T_6 \ + VMSLG m13_1, r_1, V0, T_7 \ + VMSLG m13_2, r5_1, V0, T_8 \ + VMSLG m13_2, r5_2, V0, T_9 \ + VMSLG m02_2, r_0, m4_2, m4_2 \ + VMSLG m13_2, r_0, m5_2, m5_2 \ + VAQ m4_0, T_0, m02_0 \ + VAQ m4_1, T_1, m02_1 \ + VAQ m5_0, T_5, m13_0 \ + VAQ m5_1, T_6, m13_1 \ + VAQ m02_0, T_3, m02_0 \ + VAQ m02_1, T_4, m02_1 \ + VAQ m13_0, T_8, m13_0 \ + VAQ m13_1, T_9, m13_1 \ + VAQ m4_2, T_2, m02_2 \ + VAQ m5_2, T_7, m13_2 \ + +// SQUARE uses three limbs of r and r_2*5 to output square of r +// uses T_1, T_5 and T_7 temporary registers +// input: r_0, r_1, r_2, r5_2 +// temp: TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2 +// output: p0, p1, p2 +#define SQUARE(r_0, r_1, r_2, r5_2, p0, p1, p2, TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2) \ + VMSLG r_0, r_0, p0, p0 \ + VMSLG r_1, r5_2, V0, TEMP0 \ + VMSLG r_2, r5_2, p1, p1 \ + VMSLG r_0, r_1, V0, TEMP1 \ + VMSLG r_1, r_1, p2, p2 \ + VMSLG r_0, r_2, V0, TEMP2 \ + VAQ TEMP0, p0, p0 \ + VAQ TEMP1, p1, p1 \ + VAQ TEMP2, p2, p2 \ + VAQ TEMP0, p0, p0 \ + VAQ TEMP1, p1, p1 \ + VAQ TEMP2, p2, p2 \ + +// carry h0->h1->h2->h0 || h3->h4->h5->h3 +// uses T_2, T_4, T_5, T_7, T_8, T_9 +// t6, t7, t8, t9, t10, t11 +// input: h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 +// temp: t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9, t10, t11 +// output: h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5 +#define REDUCE(h0, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8, t9, t10, t11) \ + VLM (R12), t6, t7 \ // 44 and 42 bit clear mask + VLEIB $7, $0x28, t10 \ // 5 byte shift mask + VREPIB $4, t8 \ // 4 bit shift mask + VREPIB $2, t11 \ // 2 bit shift mask + VSRLB t10, h0, t0 \ // h0 byte shift + VSRLB t10, h1, t1 \ // h1 byte shift + VSRLB t10, h2, t2 \ // h2 byte shift + VSRLB t10, h3, t3 \ // h3 byte shift + VSRLB t10, h4, t4 \ // h4 byte shift + VSRLB t10, h5, t5 \ // h5 byte shift + VSRL t8, t0, t0 \ // h0 bit shift + VSRL t8, t1, t1 \ // h2 bit shift + VSRL t11, t2, t2 \ // h2 bit shift + VSRL t8, t3, t3 \ // h3 bit shift + VSRL t8, t4, t4 \ // h4 bit shift + VESLG $2, t2, t9 \ // h2 carry x5 + VSRL t11, t5, t5 \ // h5 bit shift + VN t6, h0, h0 \ // h0 clear carry + VAQ t2, t9, t2 \ // h2 carry x5 + VESLG $2, t5, t9 \ // h5 carry x5 + VN t6, h1, h1 \ // h1 clear carry + VN t7, h2, h2 \ // h2 clear carry + VAQ t5, t9, t5 \ // h5 carry x5 + VN t6, h3, h3 \ // h3 clear carry + VN t6, h4, h4 \ // h4 clear carry + VN t7, h5, h5 \ // h5 clear carry + VAQ t0, h1, h1 \ // h0->h1 + VAQ t3, h4, h4 \ // h3->h4 + VAQ t1, h2, h2 \ // h1->h2 + VAQ t4, h5, h5 \ // h4->h5 + VAQ t2, h0, h0 \ // h2->h0 + VAQ t5, h3, h3 \ // h5->h3 + VREPG $1, t6, t6 \ // 44 and 42 bit masks across both halves + VREPG $1, t7, t7 \ + VSLDB $8, h0, h0, h0 \ // set up [h0/1/2, h3/4/5] + VSLDB $8, h1, h1, h1 \ + VSLDB $8, h2, h2, h2 \ + VO h0, h3, h3 \ + VO h1, h4, h4 \ + VO h2, h5, h5 \ + VESRLG $44, h3, t0 \ // 44 bit shift right + VESRLG $44, h4, t1 \ + VESRLG $42, h5, t2 \ + VN t6, h3, h3 \ // clear carry bits + VN t6, h4, h4 \ + VN t7, h5, h5 \ + VESLG $2, t2, t9 \ // multiply carry by 5 + VAQ t9, t2, t2 \ + VAQ t0, h4, h4 \ + VAQ t1, h5, h5 \ + VAQ t2, h3, h3 \ + +// carry h0->h1->h2->h0 +// input: h0, h1, h2 +// temp: t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8 +// output: h0, h1, h2 +#define REDUCE2(h0, h1, h2, t0, t1, t2, t3, t4, t5, t6, t7, t8) \ + VLEIB $7, $0x28, t3 \ // 5 byte shift mask + VREPIB $4, t4 \ // 4 bit shift mask + VREPIB $2, t7 \ // 2 bit shift mask + VGBM $0x003F, t5 \ // mask to clear carry bits + VSRLB t3, h0, t0 \ + VSRLB t3, h1, t1 \ + VSRLB t3, h2, t2 \ + VESRLG $4, t5, t5 \ // 44 bit clear mask + VSRL t4, t0, t0 \ + VSRL t4, t1, t1 \ + VSRL t7, t2, t2 \ + VESRLG $2, t5, t6 \ // 42 bit clear mask + VESLG $2, t2, t8 \ + VAQ t8, t2, t2 \ + VN t5, h0, h0 \ + VN t5, h1, h1 \ + VN t6, h2, h2 \ + VAQ t0, h1, h1 \ + VAQ t1, h2, h2 \ + VAQ t2, h0, h0 \ + VSRLB t3, h0, t0 \ + VSRLB t3, h1, t1 \ + VSRLB t3, h2, t2 \ + VSRL t4, t0, t0 \ + VSRL t4, t1, t1 \ + VSRL t7, t2, t2 \ + VN t5, h0, h0 \ + VN t5, h1, h1 \ + VESLG $2, t2, t8 \ + VN t6, h2, h2 \ + VAQ t0, h1, h1 \ + VAQ t8, t2, t2 \ + VAQ t1, h2, h2 \ + VAQ t2, h0, h0 \ + +// expands two message blocks into the lower halfs of the d registers +// moves the contents of the d registers into upper halfs +// input: in1, in2, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5 +// temp: TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2, TEMP3 +// output: d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5 +#define EXPACC(in1, in2, d0, d1, d2, d3, d4, d5, TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2, TEMP3) \ + VGBM $0xff3f, TEMP0 \ + VGBM $0xff1f, TEMP1 \ + VESLG $4, d1, TEMP2 \ + VESLG $4, d4, TEMP3 \ + VESRLG $4, TEMP0, TEMP0 \ + VPERM in1, d0, EX0, d0 \ + VPERM in2, d3, EX0, d3 \ + VPERM in1, d2, EX2, d2 \ + VPERM in2, d5, EX2, d5 \ + VPERM in1, TEMP2, EX1, d1 \ + VPERM in2, TEMP3, EX1, d4 \ + VN TEMP0, d0, d0 \ + VN TEMP0, d3, d3 \ + VESRLG $4, d1, d1 \ + VESRLG $4, d4, d4 \ + VN TEMP1, d2, d2 \ + VN TEMP1, d5, d5 \ + VN TEMP0, d1, d1 \ + VN TEMP0, d4, d4 \ + +// expands one message block into the lower halfs of the d registers +// moves the contents of the d registers into upper halfs +// input: in, d0, d1, d2 +// temp: TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2 +// output: d0, d1, d2 +#define EXPACC2(in, d0, d1, d2, TEMP0, TEMP1, TEMP2) \ + VGBM $0xff3f, TEMP0 \ + VESLG $4, d1, TEMP2 \ + VGBM $0xff1f, TEMP1 \ + VPERM in, d0, EX0, d0 \ + VESRLG $4, TEMP0, TEMP0 \ + VPERM in, d2, EX2, d2 \ + VPERM in, TEMP2, EX1, d1 \ + VN TEMP0, d0, d0 \ + VN TEMP1, d2, d2 \ + VESRLG $4, d1, d1 \ + VN TEMP0, d1, d1 \ + +// pack h2:h0 into h1:h0 (no carry) +// input: h0, h1, h2 +// output: h0, h1, h2 +#define PACK(h0, h1, h2) \ + VMRLG h1, h2, h2 \ // copy h1 to upper half h2 + VESLG $44, h1, h1 \ // shift limb 1 44 bits, leaving 20 + VO h0, h1, h0 \ // combine h0 with 20 bits from limb 1 + VESRLG $20, h2, h1 \ // put top 24 bits of limb 1 into h1 + VLEIG $1, $0, h1 \ // clear h2 stuff from lower half of h1 + VO h0, h1, h0 \ // h0 now has 88 bits (limb 0 and 1) + VLEIG $0, $0, h2 \ // clear upper half of h2 + VESRLG $40, h2, h1 \ // h1 now has upper two bits of result + VLEIB $7, $88, h1 \ // for byte shift (11 bytes) + VSLB h1, h2, h2 \ // shift h2 11 bytes to the left + VO h0, h2, h0 \ // combine h0 with 20 bits from limb 1 + VLEIG $0, $0, h1 \ // clear upper half of h1 + +// if h > 2**130-5 then h -= 2**130-5 +// input: h0, h1 +// temp: t0, t1, t2 +// output: h0 +#define MOD(h0, h1, t0, t1, t2) \ + VZERO t0 \ + VLEIG $1, $5, t0 \ + VACCQ h0, t0, t1 \ + VAQ h0, t0, t0 \ + VONE t2 \ + VLEIG $1, $-4, t2 \ + VAQ t2, t1, t1 \ + VACCQ h1, t1, t1 \ + VONE t2 \ + VAQ t2, t1, t1 \ + VN h0, t1, t2 \ + VNC t0, t1, t1 \ + VO t1, t2, h0 \ + +// func poly1305vmsl(out *[16]byte, m *byte, mlen uint64, key *[32]key) +TEXT ·poly1305vmsl(SB), $0-32 + // This code processes 6 + up to 4 blocks (32 bytes) per iteration + // using the algorithm described in: + // NEON crypto, Daniel J. Bernstein & Peter Schwabe + // https://cryptojedi.org/papers/neoncrypto-20120320.pdf + // And as moddified for VMSL as described in + // Accelerating Poly1305 Cryptographic Message Authentication on the z14 + // O'Farrell et al, CASCON 2017, p48-55 + // https://ibm.ent.box.com/s/jf9gedj0e9d2vjctfyh186shaztavnht + + LMG out+0(FP), R1, R4 // R1=out, R2=m, R3=mlen, R4=key + VZERO V0 // c + + // load EX0, EX1 and EX2 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), EX0, EX2 // c + + // setup r + VL (R4), T_0 + MOVD $·keyMask<>(SB), R6 + VL (R6), T_1 + VN T_0, T_1, T_0 + VZERO T_2 // limbs for r + VZERO T_3 + VZERO T_4 + EXPACC2(T_0, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_1, T_5, T_7) + + // T_2, T_3, T_4: [0, r] + + // setup r*20 + VLEIG $0, $0, T_0 + VLEIG $1, $20, T_0 // T_0: [0, 20] + VZERO T_5 + VZERO T_6 + VMSLG T_0, T_3, T_5, T_5 + VMSLG T_0, T_4, T_6, T_6 + + // store r for final block in GR + VLGVG $1, T_2, RSAVE_0 // c + VLGVG $1, T_3, RSAVE_1 // c + VLGVG $1, T_4, RSAVE_2 // c + VLGVG $1, T_5, R5SAVE_1 // c + VLGVG $1, T_6, R5SAVE_2 // c + + // initialize h + VZERO H0_0 + VZERO H1_0 + VZERO H2_0 + VZERO H0_1 + VZERO H1_1 + VZERO H2_1 + + // initialize pointer for reduce constants + MOVD $·reduce<>(SB), R12 + + // calculate r**2 and 20*(r**2) + VZERO R_0 + VZERO R_1 + VZERO R_2 + SQUARE(T_2, T_3, T_4, T_6, R_0, R_1, R_2, T_1, T_5, T_7) + REDUCE2(R_0, R_1, R_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, R5_1, R5_2, M5, T_1) + VZERO R5_1 + VZERO R5_2 + VMSLG T_0, R_1, R5_1, R5_1 + VMSLG T_0, R_2, R5_2, R5_2 + + // skip r**4 calculation if 3 blocks or less + CMPBLE R3, $48, b4 + + // calculate r**4 and 20*(r**4) + VZERO T_8 + VZERO T_9 + VZERO T_10 + SQUARE(R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_2, T_8, T_9, T_10, T_1, T_5, T_7) + REDUCE2(T_8, T_9, T_10, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_2, T_3, M5, T_1) + VZERO T_2 + VZERO T_3 + VMSLG T_0, T_9, T_2, T_2 + VMSLG T_0, T_10, T_3, T_3 + + // put r**2 to the right and r**4 to the left of R_0, R_1, R_2 + VSLDB $8, T_8, T_8, T_8 + VSLDB $8, T_9, T_9, T_9 + VSLDB $8, T_10, T_10, T_10 + VSLDB $8, T_2, T_2, T_2 + VSLDB $8, T_3, T_3, T_3 + + VO T_8, R_0, R_0 + VO T_9, R_1, R_1 + VO T_10, R_2, R_2 + VO T_2, R5_1, R5_1 + VO T_3, R5_2, R5_2 + + CMPBLE R3, $80, load // less than or equal to 5 blocks in message + + // 6(or 5+1) blocks + SUB $81, R3 + VLM (R2), M0, M4 + VLL R3, 80(R2), M5 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBGE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, M5 + MOVD $96(R2), R2 + EXPACC(M0, M1, H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3) + EXPACC(M2, M3, H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3) + VLEIB $2, $1, H2_0 + VLEIB $2, $1, H2_1 + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_0 + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_1 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO T_4 + VZERO T_10 + EXPACC(M4, M5, M0, M1, M2, M3, T_4, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3) + VLR T_4, M4 + VLEIB $10, $1, M2 + CMPBLT R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $10, $1, T_10 + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9) + VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0 + VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0 + VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0 + VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1 + VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1 + VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1 + + SUB $16, R3 + CMPBLE R3, $0, square + +load: + // load EX0, EX1 and EX2 + MOVD $·c<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), EX0, EX2 + +loop: + CMPBLE R3, $64, add // b4 // last 4 or less blocks left + + // next 4 full blocks + VLM (R2), M2, M5 + SUB $64, R3 + MOVD $64(R2), R2 + REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, T_0, T_1, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9) + + // expacc in-lined to create [m2, m3] limbs + VGBM $0x3f3f, T_0 // 44 bit clear mask + VGBM $0x1f1f, T_1 // 40 bit clear mask + VPERM M2, M3, EX0, T_3 + VESRLG $4, T_0, T_0 // 44 bit clear mask ready + VPERM M2, M3, EX1, T_4 + VPERM M2, M3, EX2, T_5 + VN T_0, T_3, T_3 + VESRLG $4, T_4, T_4 + VN T_1, T_5, T_5 + VN T_0, T_4, T_4 + VMRHG H0_1, T_3, H0_0 + VMRHG H1_1, T_4, H1_0 + VMRHG H2_1, T_5, H2_0 + VMRLG H0_1, T_3, H0_1 + VMRLG H1_1, T_4, H1_1 + VMRLG H2_1, T_5, H2_1 + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_0 + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_1 + VPERM M4, M5, EX0, T_3 + VPERM M4, M5, EX1, T_4 + VPERM M4, M5, EX2, T_5 + VN T_0, T_3, T_3 + VESRLG $4, T_4, T_4 + VN T_1, T_5, T_5 + VN T_0, T_4, T_4 + VMRHG V0, T_3, M0 + VMRHG V0, T_4, M1 + VMRHG V0, T_5, M2 + VMRLG V0, T_3, M3 + VMRLG V0, T_4, M4 + VMRLG V0, T_5, M5 + VLEIB $10, $1, M2 + VLEIB $10, $1, M5 + + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + CMPBNE R3, $0, loop + REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M3, M4, M5, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9) + VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0 + VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0 + VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0 + VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1 + VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1 + VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1 + + // load EX0, EX1, EX2 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), EX0, EX2 + + // sum vectors + VAQ H0_0, H0_1, H0_0 + VAQ H1_0, H1_1, H1_0 + VAQ H2_0, H2_1, H2_0 + + // h may be >= 2*(2**130-5) so we need to reduce it again + // M0...M4 are used as temps here + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5) + +next: // carry h1->h2 + VLEIB $7, $0x28, T_1 + VREPIB $4, T_2 + VGBM $0x003F, T_3 + VESRLG $4, T_3 + + // byte shift + VSRLB T_1, H1_0, T_4 + + // bit shift + VSRL T_2, T_4, T_4 + + // clear h1 carry bits + VN T_3, H1_0, H1_0 + + // add carry + VAQ T_4, H2_0, H2_0 + + // h is now < 2*(2**130-5) + // pack h into h1 (hi) and h0 (lo) + PACK(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0) + + // if h > 2**130-5 then h -= 2**130-5 + MOD(H0_0, H1_0, T_0, T_1, T_2) + + // h += s + MOVD $·bswapMask<>(SB), R5 + VL (R5), T_1 + VL 16(R4), T_0 + VPERM T_0, T_0, T_1, T_0 // reverse bytes (to big) + VAQ T_0, H0_0, H0_0 + VPERM H0_0, H0_0, T_1, H0_0 // reverse bytes (to little) + VST H0_0, (R1) + RET + +add: + // load EX0, EX1, EX2 + MOVD $·constants<>(SB), R5 + VLM (R5), EX0, EX2 + + REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M3, M4, M5, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9) + VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0 + VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0 + VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0 + VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1 + VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1 + VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1 + CMPBLE R3, $64, b4 + +b4: + CMPBLE R3, $48, b3 // 3 blocks or less + + // 4(3+1) blocks remaining + SUB $49, R3 + VLM (R2), M0, M2 + VLL R3, 48(R2), M3 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, M3 + MOVD $64(R2), R2 + EXPACC(M0, M1, H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3) + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_0 + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_1 + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + VZERO T_4 + VZERO T_10 + EXPACC(M2, M3, M0, M1, M4, M5, T_4, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3) + VLR T_4, M2 + VLEIB $10, $1, M4 + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $10, $1, T_10 + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M4, M5, M2, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M3, M4, M5, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9) + VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0 + VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0 + VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0 + VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1 + VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1 + VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1 + SUB $16, R3 + CMPBLE R3, $0, square // this condition must always hold true! + +b3: + CMPBLE R3, $32, b2 + + // 3 blocks remaining + + // setup [r²,r] + VSLDB $8, R_0, R_0, R_0 + VSLDB $8, R_1, R_1, R_1 + VSLDB $8, R_2, R_2, R_2 + VSLDB $8, R5_1, R5_1, R5_1 + VSLDB $8, R5_2, R5_2, R5_2 + + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_2, R5_2 + + // setup [h0, h1] + VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0 + VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0 + VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0 + VO H0_1, H0_0, H0_0 + VO H1_1, H1_0, H1_0 + VO H2_1, H2_0, H2_0 + VZERO H0_1 + VZERO H1_1 + VZERO H2_1 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + + // H*[r**2, r] + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, H0_1, H1_1, T_10, M5) + + SUB $33, R3 + VLM (R2), M0, M1 + VLL R3, 32(R2), M2 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, M2 + + // H += m0 + VZERO T_1 + VZERO T_2 + VZERO T_3 + EXPACC2(M0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6) + VLEIB $10, $1, T_3 + VAG H0_0, T_1, H0_0 + VAG H1_0, T_2, H1_0 + VAG H2_0, T_3, H2_0 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + VZERO T_10 + + // (H+m0)*r + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M3, M4, M5, V0, T_10, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M3, M4, M5, T_10, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_9) + + // H += m1 + VZERO V0 + VZERO T_1 + VZERO T_2 + VZERO T_3 + EXPACC2(M1, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6) + VLEIB $10, $1, T_3 + VAQ H0_0, T_1, H0_0 + VAQ H1_0, T_2, H1_0 + VAQ H2_0, T_3, H2_0 + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M3, M4, M5, T_9, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10) + + // [H, m2] * [r**2, r] + EXPACC2(M2, H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, T_1, T_2, T_3) + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $10, $1, H2_0 + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, H0_1, H1_1, M5, T_10) + SUB $16, R3 + CMPBLE R3, $0, next // this condition must always hold true! + +b2: + CMPBLE R3, $16, b1 + + // 2 blocks remaining + + // setup [r²,r] + VSLDB $8, R_0, R_0, R_0 + VSLDB $8, R_1, R_1, R_1 + VSLDB $8, R_2, R_2, R_2 + VSLDB $8, R5_1, R5_1, R5_1 + VSLDB $8, R5_2, R5_2, R5_2 + + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_2, R5_2 + + // setup [h0, h1] + VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0 + VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0 + VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0 + VO H0_1, H0_0, H0_0 + VO H1_1, H1_0, H1_0 + VO H2_1, H2_0, H2_0 + VZERO H0_1 + VZERO H1_1 + VZERO H2_1 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + + // H*[r**2, r] + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_4, T_5, T_2, T_7, T_8, T_9) + VMRHG V0, H0_1, H0_0 + VMRHG V0, H1_1, H1_0 + VMRHG V0, H2_1, H2_0 + VMRLG V0, H0_1, H0_1 + VMRLG V0, H1_1, H1_1 + VMRLG V0, H2_1, H2_1 + + // move h to the left and 0s at the right + VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0 + VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0 + VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0 + + // get message blocks and append 1 to start + SUB $17, R3 + VL (R2), M0 + VLL R3, 16(R2), M1 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, M1 + VZERO T_6 + VZERO T_7 + VZERO T_8 + EXPACC2(M0, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_1, T_2, T_3) + EXPACC2(M1, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_1, T_2, T_3) + VLEIB $2, $1, T_8 + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $10, $1, T_8 + + // add [m0, m1] to h + VAG H0_0, T_6, H0_0 + VAG H1_0, T_7, H1_0 + VAG H2_0, T_8, H2_0 + + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + VZERO T_10 + VZERO M0 + + // at this point R_0 .. R5_2 look like [r**2, r] + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_10, M0, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_9, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, T_10) + SUB $16, R3, R3 + CMPBLE R3, $0, next + +b1: + CMPBLE R3, $0, next + + // 1 block remaining + + // setup [r²,r] + VSLDB $8, R_0, R_0, R_0 + VSLDB $8, R_1, R_1, R_1 + VSLDB $8, R_2, R_2, R_2 + VSLDB $8, R5_1, R5_1, R5_1 + VSLDB $8, R5_2, R5_2, R5_2 + + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_2, R5_2 + + // setup [h0, h1] + VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0 + VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0 + VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0 + VO H0_1, H0_0, H0_0 + VO H1_1, H1_0, H1_0 + VO H2_1, H2_0, H2_0 + VZERO H0_1 + VZERO H1_1 + VZERO H2_1 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + + // H*[r**2, r] + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5) + + // set up [0, m0] limbs + SUB $1, R3 + VLL R3, (R2), M0 + ADD $1, R3 + MOVBZ $1, R0 + CMPBEQ R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLVGB R3, R0, M0 + VZERO T_1 + VZERO T_2 + VZERO T_3 + EXPACC2(M0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6)// limbs: [0, m] + CMPBNE R3, $16, 2(PC) + VLEIB $10, $1, T_3 + + // h+m0 + VAQ H0_0, T_1, H0_0 + VAQ H1_0, T_2, H1_0 + VAQ H2_0, T_3, H2_0 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5) + + BR next + +square: + // setup [r²,r] + VSLDB $8, R_0, R_0, R_0 + VSLDB $8, R_1, R_1, R_1 + VSLDB $8, R_2, R_2, R_2 + VSLDB $8, R5_1, R5_1, R5_1 + VSLDB $8, R5_2, R5_2, R5_2 + + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_0, R_0 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_1, R_1 + VLVGG $1, RSAVE_2, R_2 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_1, R5_1 + VLVGG $1, R5SAVE_2, R5_2 + + // setup [h0, h1] + VSLDB $8, H0_0, H0_0, H0_0 + VSLDB $8, H1_0, H1_0, H1_0 + VSLDB $8, H2_0, H2_0, H2_0 + VO H0_1, H0_0, H0_0 + VO H1_1, H1_0, H1_0 + VO H2_1, H2_0, H2_0 + VZERO H0_1 + VZERO H1_1 + VZERO H2_1 + + VZERO M0 + VZERO M1 + VZERO M2 + VZERO M3 + VZERO M4 + VZERO M5 + + // (h0*r**2) + (h1*r) + MULTIPLY(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, H0_1, H1_1, H2_1, R_0, R_1, R_2, R5_1, R5_2, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, T_0, T_1, T_2, T_3, T_4, T_5, T_6, T_7, T_8, T_9) + REDUCE2(H0_0, H1_0, H2_0, M0, M1, M2, M3, M4, T_9, T_10, H0_1, M5) + BR next diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1ab07d078 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/buffer.go @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "io" + "sync" +) + +// buffer provides a linked list buffer for data exchange +// between producer and consumer. Theoretically the buffer is +// of unlimited capacity as it does no allocation of its own. +type buffer struct { + // protects concurrent access to head, tail and closed + *sync.Cond + + head *element // the buffer that will be read first + tail *element // the buffer that will be read last + + closed bool +} + +// An element represents a single link in a linked list. +type element struct { + buf []byte + next *element +} + +// newBuffer returns an empty buffer that is not closed. +func newBuffer() *buffer { + e := new(element) + b := &buffer{ + Cond: newCond(), + head: e, + tail: e, + } + return b +} + +// write makes buf available for Read to receive. +// buf must not be modified after the call to write. +func (b *buffer) write(buf []byte) { + b.Cond.L.Lock() + e := &element{buf: buf} + b.tail.next = e + b.tail = e + b.Cond.Signal() + b.Cond.L.Unlock() +} + +// eof closes the buffer. Reads from the buffer once all +// the data has been consumed will receive io.EOF. +func (b *buffer) eof() { + b.Cond.L.Lock() + b.closed = true + b.Cond.Signal() + b.Cond.L.Unlock() +} + +// Read reads data from the internal buffer in buf. Reads will block +// if no data is available, or until the buffer is closed. +func (b *buffer) Read(buf []byte) (n int, err error) { + b.Cond.L.Lock() + defer b.Cond.L.Unlock() + + for len(buf) > 0 { + // if there is data in b.head, copy it + if len(b.head.buf) > 0 { + r := copy(buf, b.head.buf) + buf, b.head.buf = buf[r:], b.head.buf[r:] + n += r + continue + } + // if there is a next buffer, make it the head + if len(b.head.buf) == 0 && b.head != b.tail { + b.head = b.head.next + continue + } + + // if at least one byte has been copied, return + if n > 0 { + break + } + + // if nothing was read, and there is nothing outstanding + // check to see if the buffer is closed. + if b.closed { + err = io.EOF + break + } + // out of buffers, wait for producer + b.Cond.Wait() + } + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..00ed9923e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/certs.go @@ -0,0 +1,535 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "sort" + "time" +) + +// These constants from [PROTOCOL.certkeys] represent the algorithm names +// for certificate types supported by this package. +const ( + CertAlgoRSAv01 = "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoDSAv01 = "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoECDSA256v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoECDSA384v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoECDSA521v01 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" + CertAlgoED25519v01 = "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" +) + +// Certificate types distinguish between host and user +// certificates. The values can be set in the CertType field of +// Certificate. +const ( + UserCert = 1 + HostCert = 2 +) + +// Signature represents a cryptographic signature. +type Signature struct { + Format string + Blob []byte +} + +// CertTimeInfinity can be used for OpenSSHCertV01.ValidBefore to indicate that +// a certificate does not expire. +const CertTimeInfinity = 1<<64 - 1 + +// An Certificate represents an OpenSSH certificate as defined in +// [PROTOCOL.certkeys]?rev=1.8. The Certificate type implements the +// PublicKey interface, so it can be unmarshaled using +// ParsePublicKey. +type Certificate struct { + Nonce []byte + Key PublicKey + Serial uint64 + CertType uint32 + KeyId string + ValidPrincipals []string + ValidAfter uint64 + ValidBefore uint64 + Permissions + Reserved []byte + SignatureKey PublicKey + Signature *Signature +} + +// genericCertData holds the key-independent part of the certificate data. +// Overall, certificates contain an nonce, public key fields and +// key-independent fields. +type genericCertData struct { + Serial uint64 + CertType uint32 + KeyId string + ValidPrincipals []byte + ValidAfter uint64 + ValidBefore uint64 + CriticalOptions []byte + Extensions []byte + Reserved []byte + SignatureKey []byte + Signature []byte +} + +func marshalStringList(namelist []string) []byte { + var to []byte + for _, name := range namelist { + s := struct{ N string }{name} + to = append(to, Marshal(&s)...) + } + return to +} + +type optionsTuple struct { + Key string + Value []byte +} + +type optionsTupleValue struct { + Value string +} + +// serialize a map of critical options or extensions +// issue #10569 - per [PROTOCOL.certkeys] and SSH implementation, +// we need two length prefixes for a non-empty string value +func marshalTuples(tups map[string]string) []byte { + keys := make([]string, 0, len(tups)) + for key := range tups { + keys = append(keys, key) + } + sort.Strings(keys) + + var ret []byte + for _, key := range keys { + s := optionsTuple{Key: key} + if value := tups[key]; len(value) > 0 { + s.Value = Marshal(&optionsTupleValue{value}) + } + ret = append(ret, Marshal(&s)...) + } + return ret +} + +// issue #10569 - per [PROTOCOL.certkeys] and SSH implementation, +// we need two length prefixes for a non-empty option value +func parseTuples(in []byte) (map[string]string, error) { + tups := map[string]string{} + var lastKey string + var haveLastKey bool + + for len(in) > 0 { + var key, val, extra []byte + var ok bool + + if key, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + keyStr := string(key) + // according to [PROTOCOL.certkeys], the names must be in + // lexical order. + if haveLastKey && keyStr <= lastKey { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate options are not in lexical order") + } + lastKey, haveLastKey = keyStr, true + // the next field is a data field, which if non-empty has a string embedded + if val, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + if len(val) > 0 { + val, extra, ok = parseString(val) + if !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + if len(extra) > 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected trailing data after certificate option value") + } + tups[keyStr] = string(val) + } else { + tups[keyStr] = "" + } + } + return tups, nil +} + +func parseCert(in []byte, privAlgo string) (*Certificate, error) { + nonce, rest, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + + key, rest, err := parsePubKey(rest, privAlgo) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var g genericCertData + if err := Unmarshal(rest, &g); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + c := &Certificate{ + Nonce: nonce, + Key: key, + Serial: g.Serial, + CertType: g.CertType, + KeyId: g.KeyId, + ValidAfter: g.ValidAfter, + ValidBefore: g.ValidBefore, + } + + for principals := g.ValidPrincipals; len(principals) > 0; { + principal, rest, ok := parseString(principals) + if !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + c.ValidPrincipals = append(c.ValidPrincipals, string(principal)) + principals = rest + } + + c.CriticalOptions, err = parseTuples(g.CriticalOptions) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c.Extensions, err = parseTuples(g.Extensions) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c.Reserved = g.Reserved + k, err := ParsePublicKey(g.SignatureKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + c.SignatureKey = k + c.Signature, rest, ok = parseSignatureBody(g.Signature) + if !ok || len(rest) > 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: signature parse error") + } + + return c, nil +} + +type openSSHCertSigner struct { + pub *Certificate + signer Signer +} + +type algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner struct { + *openSSHCertSigner + algorithmSigner AlgorithmSigner +} + +// NewCertSigner returns a Signer that signs with the given Certificate, whose +// private key is held by signer. It returns an error if the public key in cert +// doesn't match the key used by signer. +func NewCertSigner(cert *Certificate, signer Signer) (Signer, error) { + if bytes.Compare(cert.Key.Marshal(), signer.PublicKey().Marshal()) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: signer and cert have different public key") + } + + if algorithmSigner, ok := signer.(AlgorithmSigner); ok { + return &algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner{ + &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, algorithmSigner}, nil + } else { + return &openSSHCertSigner{cert, signer}, nil + } +} + +func (s *openSSHCertSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { + return s.signer.Sign(rand, data) +} + +func (s *openSSHCertSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey { + return s.pub +} + +func (s *algorithmOpenSSHCertSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + return s.algorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, algorithm) +} + +const sourceAddressCriticalOption = "source-address" + +// CertChecker does the work of verifying a certificate. Its methods +// can be plugged into ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback and +// ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback. For the CertChecker to work, +// minimally, the IsAuthority callback should be set. +type CertChecker struct { + // SupportedCriticalOptions lists the CriticalOptions that the + // server application layer understands. These are only used + // for user certificates. + SupportedCriticalOptions []string + + // IsUserAuthority should return true if the key is recognized as an + // authority for the given user certificate. This allows for + // certificates to be signed by other certificates. This must be set + // if this CertChecker will be checking user certificates. + IsUserAuthority func(auth PublicKey) bool + + // IsHostAuthority should report whether the key is recognized as + // an authority for this host. This allows for certificates to be + // signed by other keys, and for those other keys to only be valid + // signers for particular hostnames. This must be set if this + // CertChecker will be checking host certificates. + IsHostAuthority func(auth PublicKey, address string) bool + + // Clock is used for verifying time stamps. If nil, time.Now + // is used. + Clock func() time.Time + + // UserKeyFallback is called when CertChecker.Authenticate encounters a + // public key that is not a certificate. It must implement validation + // of user keys or else, if nil, all such keys are rejected. + UserKeyFallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) + + // HostKeyFallback is called when CertChecker.CheckHostKey encounters a + // public key that is not a certificate. It must implement host key + // validation or else, if nil, all such keys are rejected. + HostKeyFallback HostKeyCallback + + // IsRevoked is called for each certificate so that revocation checking + // can be implemented. It should return true if the given certificate + // is revoked and false otherwise. If nil, no certificates are + // considered to have been revoked. + IsRevoked func(cert *Certificate) bool +} + +// CheckHostKey checks a host key certificate. This method can be +// plugged into ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback. +func (c *CertChecker) CheckHostKey(addr string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error { + cert, ok := key.(*Certificate) + if !ok { + if c.HostKeyFallback != nil { + return c.HostKeyFallback(addr, remote, key) + } + return errors.New("ssh: non-certificate host key") + } + if cert.CertType != HostCert { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate presented as a host key has type %d", cert.CertType) + } + if !c.IsHostAuthority(cert.SignatureKey, addr) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: no authorities for hostname: %v", addr) + } + + hostname, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + // Pass hostname only as principal for host certificates (consistent with OpenSSH) + return c.CheckCert(hostname, cert) +} + +// Authenticate checks a user certificate. Authenticate can be used as +// a value for ServerConfig.PublicKeyCallback. +func (c *CertChecker) Authenticate(conn ConnMetadata, pubKey PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) { + cert, ok := pubKey.(*Certificate) + if !ok { + if c.UserKeyFallback != nil { + return c.UserKeyFallback(conn, pubKey) + } + return nil, errors.New("ssh: normal key pairs not accepted") + } + + if cert.CertType != UserCert { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert has type %d", cert.CertType) + } + if !c.IsUserAuthority(cert.SignatureKey) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signed by unrecognized authority") + } + + if err := c.CheckCert(conn.User(), cert); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &cert.Permissions, nil +} + +// CheckCert checks CriticalOptions, ValidPrincipals, revocation, timestamp and +// the signature of the certificate. +func (c *CertChecker) CheckCert(principal string, cert *Certificate) error { + if c.IsRevoked != nil && c.IsRevoked(cert) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate serial %d revoked", cert.Serial) + } + + for opt := range cert.CriticalOptions { + // sourceAddressCriticalOption will be enforced by + // serverAuthenticate + if opt == sourceAddressCriticalOption { + continue + } + + found := false + for _, supp := range c.SupportedCriticalOptions { + if supp == opt { + found = true + break + } + } + if !found { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported critical option %q in certificate", opt) + } + } + + if len(cert.ValidPrincipals) > 0 { + // By default, certs are valid for all users/hosts. + found := false + for _, p := range cert.ValidPrincipals { + if p == principal { + found = true + break + } + } + if !found { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: principal %q not in the set of valid principals for given certificate: %q", principal, cert.ValidPrincipals) + } + } + + clock := c.Clock + if clock == nil { + clock = time.Now + } + + unixNow := clock().Unix() + if after := int64(cert.ValidAfter); after < 0 || unixNow < int64(cert.ValidAfter) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert is not yet valid") + } + if before := int64(cert.ValidBefore); cert.ValidBefore != uint64(CertTimeInfinity) && (unixNow >= before || before < 0) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: cert has expired") + } + if err := cert.SignatureKey.Verify(cert.bytesForSigning(), cert.Signature); err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: certificate signature does not verify") + } + + return nil +} + +// SignCert sets c.SignatureKey to the authority's public key and stores a +// Signature, by authority, in the certificate. +func (c *Certificate) SignCert(rand io.Reader, authority Signer) error { + c.Nonce = make([]byte, 32) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.Nonce); err != nil { + return err + } + c.SignatureKey = authority.PublicKey() + + sig, err := authority.Sign(rand, c.bytesForSigning()) + if err != nil { + return err + } + c.Signature = sig + return nil +} + +var certAlgoNames = map[string]string{ + KeyAlgoRSA: CertAlgoRSAv01, + KeyAlgoDSA: CertAlgoDSAv01, + KeyAlgoECDSA256: CertAlgoECDSA256v01, + KeyAlgoECDSA384: CertAlgoECDSA384v01, + KeyAlgoECDSA521: CertAlgoECDSA521v01, + KeyAlgoED25519: CertAlgoED25519v01, +} + +// certToPrivAlgo returns the underlying algorithm for a certificate algorithm. +// Panics if a non-certificate algorithm is passed. +func certToPrivAlgo(algo string) string { + for privAlgo, pubAlgo := range certAlgoNames { + if pubAlgo == algo { + return privAlgo + } + } + panic("unknown cert algorithm") +} + +func (cert *Certificate) bytesForSigning() []byte { + c2 := *cert + c2.Signature = nil + out := c2.Marshal() + // Drop trailing signature length. + return out[:len(out)-4] +} + +// Marshal serializes c into OpenSSH's wire format. It is part of the +// PublicKey interface. +func (c *Certificate) Marshal() []byte { + generic := genericCertData{ + Serial: c.Serial, + CertType: c.CertType, + KeyId: c.KeyId, + ValidPrincipals: marshalStringList(c.ValidPrincipals), + ValidAfter: uint64(c.ValidAfter), + ValidBefore: uint64(c.ValidBefore), + CriticalOptions: marshalTuples(c.CriticalOptions), + Extensions: marshalTuples(c.Extensions), + Reserved: c.Reserved, + SignatureKey: c.SignatureKey.Marshal(), + } + if c.Signature != nil { + generic.Signature = Marshal(c.Signature) + } + genericBytes := Marshal(&generic) + keyBytes := c.Key.Marshal() + _, keyBytes, _ = parseString(keyBytes) + prefix := Marshal(&struct { + Name string + Nonce []byte + Key []byte `ssh:"rest"` + }{c.Type(), c.Nonce, keyBytes}) + + result := make([]byte, 0, len(prefix)+len(genericBytes)) + result = append(result, prefix...) + result = append(result, genericBytes...) + return result +} + +// Type returns the key name. It is part of the PublicKey interface. +func (c *Certificate) Type() string { + algo, ok := certAlgoNames[c.Key.Type()] + if !ok { + panic("unknown cert key type " + c.Key.Type()) + } + return algo +} + +// Verify verifies a signature against the certificate's public +// key. It is part of the PublicKey interface. +func (c *Certificate) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + return c.Key.Verify(data, sig) +} + +func parseSignatureBody(in []byte) (out *Signature, rest []byte, ok bool) { + format, in, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return + } + + out = &Signature{ + Format: string(format), + } + + if out.Blob, in, ok = parseString(in); !ok { + return + } + + return out, in, ok +} + +func parseSignature(in []byte) (out *Signature, rest []byte, ok bool) { + sigBytes, rest, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return + } + + out, trailing, ok := parseSignatureBody(sigBytes) + if !ok || len(trailing) > 0 { + return nil, nil, false + } + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c0834c00d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/channel.go @@ -0,0 +1,633 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" + "sync" +) + +const ( + minPacketLength = 9 + // channelMaxPacket contains the maximum number of bytes that will be + // sent in a single packet. As per RFC 4253, section 6.1, 32k is also + // the minimum. + channelMaxPacket = 1 << 15 + // We follow OpenSSH here. + channelWindowSize = 64 * channelMaxPacket +) + +// NewChannel represents an incoming request to a channel. It must either be +// accepted for use by calling Accept, or rejected by calling Reject. +type NewChannel interface { + // Accept accepts the channel creation request. It returns the Channel + // and a Go channel containing SSH requests. The Go channel must be + // serviced otherwise the Channel will hang. + Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) + + // Reject rejects the channel creation request. After calling + // this, no other methods on the Channel may be called. + Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error + + // ChannelType returns the type of the channel, as supplied by the + // client. + ChannelType() string + + // ExtraData returns the arbitrary payload for this channel, as supplied + // by the client. This data is specific to the channel type. + ExtraData() []byte +} + +// A Channel is an ordered, reliable, flow-controlled, duplex stream +// that is multiplexed over an SSH connection. +type Channel interface { + // Read reads up to len(data) bytes from the channel. + Read(data []byte) (int, error) + + // Write writes len(data) bytes to the channel. + Write(data []byte) (int, error) + + // Close signals end of channel use. No data may be sent after this + // call. + Close() error + + // CloseWrite signals the end of sending in-band + // data. Requests may still be sent, and the other side may + // still send data + CloseWrite() error + + // SendRequest sends a channel request. If wantReply is true, + // it will wait for a reply and return the result as a + // boolean, otherwise the return value will be false. Channel + // requests are out-of-band messages so they may be sent even + // if the data stream is closed or blocked by flow control. + // If the channel is closed before a reply is returned, io.EOF + // is returned. + SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) + + // Stderr returns an io.ReadWriter that writes to this channel + // with the extended data type set to stderr. Stderr may + // safely be read and written from a different goroutine than + // Read and Write respectively. + Stderr() io.ReadWriter +} + +// Request is a request sent outside of the normal stream of +// data. Requests can either be specific to an SSH channel, or they +// can be global. +type Request struct { + Type string + WantReply bool + Payload []byte + + ch *channel + mux *mux +} + +// Reply sends a response to a request. It must be called for all requests +// where WantReply is true and is a no-op otherwise. The payload argument is +// ignored for replies to channel-specific requests. +func (r *Request) Reply(ok bool, payload []byte) error { + if !r.WantReply { + return nil + } + + if r.ch == nil { + return r.mux.ackRequest(ok, payload) + } + + return r.ch.ackRequest(ok) +} + +// RejectionReason is an enumeration used when rejecting channel creation +// requests. See RFC 4254, section 5.1. +type RejectionReason uint32 + +const ( + Prohibited RejectionReason = iota + 1 + ConnectionFailed + UnknownChannelType + ResourceShortage +) + +// String converts the rejection reason to human readable form. +func (r RejectionReason) String() string { + switch r { + case Prohibited: + return "administratively prohibited" + case ConnectionFailed: + return "connect failed" + case UnknownChannelType: + return "unknown channel type" + case ResourceShortage: + return "resource shortage" + } + return fmt.Sprintf("unknown reason %d", int(r)) +} + +func min(a uint32, b int) uint32 { + if a < uint32(b) { + return a + } + return uint32(b) +} + +type channelDirection uint8 + +const ( + channelInbound channelDirection = iota + channelOutbound +) + +// channel is an implementation of the Channel interface that works +// with the mux class. +type channel struct { + // R/O after creation + chanType string + extraData []byte + localId, remoteId uint32 + + // maxIncomingPayload and maxRemotePayload are the maximum + // payload sizes of normal and extended data packets for + // receiving and sending, respectively. The wire packet will + // be 9 or 13 bytes larger (excluding encryption overhead). + maxIncomingPayload uint32 + maxRemotePayload uint32 + + mux *mux + + // decided is set to true if an accept or reject message has been sent + // (for outbound channels) or received (for inbound channels). + decided bool + + // direction contains either channelOutbound, for channels created + // locally, or channelInbound, for channels created by the peer. + direction channelDirection + + // Pending internal channel messages. + msg chan interface{} + + // Since requests have no ID, there can be only one request + // with WantReply=true outstanding. This lock is held by a + // goroutine that has such an outgoing request pending. + sentRequestMu sync.Mutex + + incomingRequests chan *Request + + sentEOF bool + + // thread-safe data + remoteWin window + pending *buffer + extPending *buffer + + // windowMu protects myWindow, the flow-control window. + windowMu sync.Mutex + myWindow uint32 + + // writeMu serializes calls to mux.conn.writePacket() and + // protects sentClose and packetPool. This mutex must be + // different from windowMu, as writePacket can block if there + // is a key exchange pending. + writeMu sync.Mutex + sentClose bool + + // packetPool has a buffer for each extended channel ID to + // save allocations during writes. + packetPool map[uint32][]byte +} + +// writePacket sends a packet. If the packet is a channel close, it updates +// sentClose. This method takes the lock c.writeMu. +func (ch *channel) writePacket(packet []byte) error { + ch.writeMu.Lock() + if ch.sentClose { + ch.writeMu.Unlock() + return io.EOF + } + ch.sentClose = (packet[0] == msgChannelClose) + err := ch.mux.conn.writePacket(packet) + ch.writeMu.Unlock() + return err +} + +func (ch *channel) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error { + if debugMux { + log.Printf("send(%d): %#v", ch.mux.chanList.offset, msg) + } + + p := Marshal(msg) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p[1:], ch.remoteId) + return ch.writePacket(p) +} + +// WriteExtended writes data to a specific extended stream. These streams are +// used, for example, for stderr. +func (ch *channel) WriteExtended(data []byte, extendedCode uint32) (n int, err error) { + if ch.sentEOF { + return 0, io.EOF + } + // 1 byte message type, 4 bytes remoteId, 4 bytes data length + opCode := byte(msgChannelData) + headerLength := uint32(9) + if extendedCode > 0 { + headerLength += 4 + opCode = msgChannelExtendedData + } + + ch.writeMu.Lock() + packet := ch.packetPool[extendedCode] + // We don't remove the buffer from packetPool, so + // WriteExtended calls from different goroutines will be + // flagged as errors by the race detector. + ch.writeMu.Unlock() + + for len(data) > 0 { + space := min(ch.maxRemotePayload, len(data)) + if space, err = ch.remoteWin.reserve(space); err != nil { + return n, err + } + if want := headerLength + space; uint32(cap(packet)) < want { + packet = make([]byte, want) + } else { + packet = packet[:want] + } + + todo := data[:space] + + packet[0] = opCode + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[1:], ch.remoteId) + if extendedCode > 0 { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[5:], uint32(extendedCode)) + } + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(packet[headerLength-4:], uint32(len(todo))) + copy(packet[headerLength:], todo) + if err = ch.writePacket(packet); err != nil { + return n, err + } + + n += len(todo) + data = data[len(todo):] + } + + ch.writeMu.Lock() + ch.packetPool[extendedCode] = packet + ch.writeMu.Unlock() + + return n, err +} + +func (ch *channel) handleData(packet []byte) error { + headerLen := 9 + isExtendedData := packet[0] == msgChannelExtendedData + if isExtendedData { + headerLen = 13 + } + if len(packet) < headerLen { + // malformed data packet + return parseError(packet[0]) + } + + var extended uint32 + if isExtendedData { + extended = binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[5:]) + } + + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[headerLen-4 : headerLen]) + if length == 0 { + return nil + } + if length > ch.maxIncomingPayload { + // TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect? + return errors.New("ssh: incoming packet exceeds maximum payload size") + } + + data := packet[headerLen:] + if length != uint32(len(data)) { + return errors.New("ssh: wrong packet length") + } + + ch.windowMu.Lock() + if ch.myWindow < length { + ch.windowMu.Unlock() + // TODO(hanwen): should send Disconnect with reason? + return errors.New("ssh: remote side wrote too much") + } + ch.myWindow -= length + ch.windowMu.Unlock() + + if extended == 1 { + ch.extPending.write(data) + } else if extended > 0 { + // discard other extended data. + } else { + ch.pending.write(data) + } + return nil +} + +func (c *channel) adjustWindow(n uint32) error { + c.windowMu.Lock() + // Since myWindow is managed on our side, and can never exceed + // the initial window setting, we don't worry about overflow. + c.myWindow += uint32(n) + c.windowMu.Unlock() + return c.sendMessage(windowAdjustMsg{ + AdditionalBytes: uint32(n), + }) +} + +func (c *channel) ReadExtended(data []byte, extended uint32) (n int, err error) { + switch extended { + case 1: + n, err = c.extPending.Read(data) + case 0: + n, err = c.pending.Read(data) + default: + return 0, fmt.Errorf("ssh: extended code %d unimplemented", extended) + } + + if n > 0 { + err = c.adjustWindow(uint32(n)) + // sendWindowAdjust can return io.EOF if the remote + // peer has closed the connection, however we want to + // defer forwarding io.EOF to the caller of Read until + // the buffer has been drained. + if n > 0 && err == io.EOF { + err = nil + } + } + + return n, err +} + +func (c *channel) close() { + c.pending.eof() + c.extPending.eof() + close(c.msg) + close(c.incomingRequests) + c.writeMu.Lock() + // This is not necessary for a normal channel teardown, but if + // there was another error, it is. + c.sentClose = true + c.writeMu.Unlock() + // Unblock writers. + c.remoteWin.close() +} + +// responseMessageReceived is called when a success or failure message is +// received on a channel to check that such a message is reasonable for the +// given channel. +func (ch *channel) responseMessageReceived() error { + if ch.direction == channelInbound { + return errors.New("ssh: channel response message received on inbound channel") + } + if ch.decided { + return errors.New("ssh: duplicate response received for channel") + } + ch.decided = true + return nil +} + +func (ch *channel) handlePacket(packet []byte) error { + switch packet[0] { + case msgChannelData, msgChannelExtendedData: + return ch.handleData(packet) + case msgChannelClose: + ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{PeersID: ch.remoteId}) + ch.mux.chanList.remove(ch.localId) + ch.close() + return nil + case msgChannelEOF: + // RFC 4254 is mute on how EOF affects dataExt messages but + // it is logical to signal EOF at the same time. + ch.extPending.eof() + ch.pending.eof() + return nil + } + + decoded, err := decode(packet) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + switch msg := decoded.(type) { + case *channelOpenFailureMsg: + if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil { + return err + } + ch.mux.chanList.remove(msg.PeersID) + ch.msg <- msg + case *channelOpenConfirmMsg: + if err := ch.responseMessageReceived(); err != nil { + return err + } + if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid MaxPacketSize %d from peer", msg.MaxPacketSize) + } + ch.remoteId = msg.MyID + ch.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize + ch.remoteWin.add(msg.MyWindow) + ch.msg <- msg + case *windowAdjustMsg: + if !ch.remoteWin.add(msg.AdditionalBytes) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid window update for %d bytes", msg.AdditionalBytes) + } + case *channelRequestMsg: + req := Request{ + Type: msg.Request, + WantReply: msg.WantReply, + Payload: msg.RequestSpecificData, + ch: ch, + } + + ch.incomingRequests <- &req + default: + ch.msg <- msg + } + return nil +} + +func (m *mux) newChannel(chanType string, direction channelDirection, extraData []byte) *channel { + ch := &channel{ + remoteWin: window{Cond: newCond()}, + myWindow: channelWindowSize, + pending: newBuffer(), + extPending: newBuffer(), + direction: direction, + incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, chanSize), + msg: make(chan interface{}, chanSize), + chanType: chanType, + extraData: extraData, + mux: m, + packetPool: make(map[uint32][]byte), + } + ch.localId = m.chanList.add(ch) + return ch +} + +var errUndecided = errors.New("ssh: must Accept or Reject channel") +var errDecidedAlready = errors.New("ssh: can call Accept or Reject only once") + +type extChannel struct { + code uint32 + ch *channel +} + +func (e *extChannel) Write(data []byte) (n int, err error) { + return e.ch.WriteExtended(data, e.code) +} + +func (e *extChannel) Read(data []byte) (n int, err error) { + return e.ch.ReadExtended(data, e.code) +} + +func (ch *channel) Accept() (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) { + if ch.decided { + return nil, nil, errDecidedAlready + } + ch.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket + confirm := channelOpenConfirmMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + MyID: ch.localId, + MyWindow: ch.myWindow, + MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload, + } + ch.decided = true + if err := ch.sendMessage(confirm); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + return ch, ch.incomingRequests, nil +} + +func (ch *channel) Reject(reason RejectionReason, message string) error { + if ch.decided { + return errDecidedAlready + } + reject := channelOpenFailureMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + Reason: reason, + Message: message, + Language: "en", + } + ch.decided = true + return ch.sendMessage(reject) +} + +func (ch *channel) Read(data []byte) (int, error) { + if !ch.decided { + return 0, errUndecided + } + return ch.ReadExtended(data, 0) +} + +func (ch *channel) Write(data []byte) (int, error) { + if !ch.decided { + return 0, errUndecided + } + return ch.WriteExtended(data, 0) +} + +func (ch *channel) CloseWrite() error { + if !ch.decided { + return errUndecided + } + ch.sentEOF = true + return ch.sendMessage(channelEOFMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId}) +} + +func (ch *channel) Close() error { + if !ch.decided { + return errUndecided + } + + return ch.sendMessage(channelCloseMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId}) +} + +// Extended returns an io.ReadWriter that sends and receives data on the given, +// SSH extended stream. Such streams are used, for example, for stderr. +func (ch *channel) Extended(code uint32) io.ReadWriter { + if !ch.decided { + return nil + } + return &extChannel{code, ch} +} + +func (ch *channel) Stderr() io.ReadWriter { + return ch.Extended(1) +} + +func (ch *channel) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) { + if !ch.decided { + return false, errUndecided + } + + if wantReply { + ch.sentRequestMu.Lock() + defer ch.sentRequestMu.Unlock() + } + + msg := channelRequestMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + Request: name, + WantReply: wantReply, + RequestSpecificData: payload, + } + + if err := ch.sendMessage(msg); err != nil { + return false, err + } + + if wantReply { + m, ok := (<-ch.msg) + if !ok { + return false, io.EOF + } + switch m.(type) { + case *channelRequestFailureMsg: + return false, nil + case *channelRequestSuccessMsg: + return true, nil + default: + return false, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected response to channel request: %#v", m) + } + } + + return false, nil +} + +// ackRequest either sends an ack or nack to the channel request. +func (ch *channel) ackRequest(ok bool) error { + if !ch.decided { + return errUndecided + } + + var msg interface{} + if !ok { + msg = channelRequestFailureMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + } + } else { + msg = channelRequestSuccessMsg{ + PeersID: ch.remoteId, + } + } + return ch.sendMessage(msg) +} + +func (ch *channel) ChannelType() string { + return ch.chanType +} + +func (ch *channel) ExtraData() []byte { + return ch.extraData +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b0204ee59 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/cipher.go @@ -0,0 +1,781 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "crypto/aes" + "crypto/cipher" + "crypto/des" + "crypto/rc4" + "crypto/subtle" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "hash" + "io" + "io/ioutil" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20" + "golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305" +) + +const ( + packetSizeMultiple = 16 // TODO(huin) this should be determined by the cipher. + + // RFC 4253 section 6.1 defines a minimum packet size of 32768 that implementations + // MUST be able to process (plus a few more kilobytes for padding and mac). The RFC + // indicates implementations SHOULD be able to handle larger packet sizes, but then + // waffles on about reasonable limits. + // + // OpenSSH caps their maxPacket at 256kB so we choose to do + // the same. maxPacket is also used to ensure that uint32 + // length fields do not overflow, so it should remain well + // below 4G. + maxPacket = 256 * 1024 +) + +// noneCipher implements cipher.Stream and provides no encryption. It is used +// by the transport before the first key-exchange. +type noneCipher struct{} + +func (c noneCipher) XORKeyStream(dst, src []byte) { + copy(dst, src) +} + +func newAESCTR(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) { + c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return cipher.NewCTR(c, iv), nil +} + +func newRC4(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error) { + return rc4.NewCipher(key) +} + +type cipherMode struct { + keySize int + ivSize int + create func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) +} + +func streamCipherMode(skip int, createFunc func(key, iv []byte) (cipher.Stream, error)) func(key, iv []byte, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + return func(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + stream, err := createFunc(key, iv) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var streamDump []byte + if skip > 0 { + streamDump = make([]byte, 512) + } + + for remainingToDump := skip; remainingToDump > 0; { + dumpThisTime := remainingToDump + if dumpThisTime > len(streamDump) { + dumpThisTime = len(streamDump) + } + stream.XORKeyStream(streamDump[:dumpThisTime], streamDump[:dumpThisTime]) + remainingToDump -= dumpThisTime + } + + mac := macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey) + return &streamPacketCipher{ + mac: mac, + etm: macModes[algs.MAC].etm, + macResult: make([]byte, mac.Size()), + cipher: stream, + }, nil + } +} + +// cipherModes documents properties of supported ciphers. Ciphers not included +// are not supported and will not be negotiated, even if explicitly requested in +// ClientConfig.Crypto.Ciphers. +var cipherModes = map[string]*cipherMode{ + // Ciphers from RFC4344, which introduced many CTR-based ciphers. Algorithms + // are defined in the order specified in the RFC. + "aes128-ctr": {16, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}, + "aes192-ctr": {24, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}, + "aes256-ctr": {32, aes.BlockSize, streamCipherMode(0, newAESCTR)}, + + // Ciphers from RFC4345, which introduces security-improved arcfour ciphers. + // They are defined in the order specified in the RFC. + "arcfour128": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)}, + "arcfour256": {32, 0, streamCipherMode(1536, newRC4)}, + + // Cipher defined in RFC 4253, which describes SSH Transport Layer Protocol. + // Note that this cipher is not safe, as stated in RFC 4253: "Arcfour (and + // RC4) has problems with weak keys, and should be used with caution." + // RFC4345 introduces improved versions of Arcfour. + "arcfour": {16, 0, streamCipherMode(0, newRC4)}, + + // AEAD ciphers + gcmCipherID: {16, 12, newGCMCipher}, + chacha20Poly1305ID: {64, 0, newChaCha20Cipher}, + + // CBC mode is insecure and so is not included in the default config. + // (See http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/SandPfinal.pdf). If absolutely + // needed, it's possible to specify a custom Config to enable it. + // You should expect that an active attacker can recover plaintext if + // you do. + aes128cbcID: {16, aes.BlockSize, newAESCBCCipher}, + + // 3des-cbc is insecure and is not included in the default + // config. + tripledescbcID: {24, des.BlockSize, newTripleDESCBCCipher}, +} + +// prefixLen is the length of the packet prefix that contains the packet length +// and number of padding bytes. +const prefixLen = 5 + +// streamPacketCipher is a packetCipher using a stream cipher. +type streamPacketCipher struct { + mac hash.Hash + cipher cipher.Stream + etm bool + + // The following members are to avoid per-packet allocations. + prefix [prefixLen]byte + seqNumBytes [4]byte + padding [2 * packetSizeMultiple]byte + packetData []byte + macResult []byte +} + +// readCipherPacket reads and decrypt a single packet from the reader argument. +func (s *streamPacketCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, s.prefix[:]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var encryptedPaddingLength [1]byte + if s.mac != nil && s.etm { + copy(encryptedPaddingLength[:], s.prefix[4:5]) + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[4:5], s.prefix[4:5]) + } else { + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:]) + } + + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(s.prefix[0:4]) + paddingLength := uint32(s.prefix[4]) + + var macSize uint32 + if s.mac != nil { + s.mac.Reset() + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) + s.mac.Write(s.seqNumBytes[:]) + if s.etm { + s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:4]) + s.mac.Write(encryptedPaddingLength[:]) + } else { + s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:]) + } + macSize = uint32(s.mac.Size()) + } + + if length <= paddingLength+1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too small") + } + + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too large") + } + + // the maxPacket check above ensures that length-1+macSize + // does not overflow. + if uint32(cap(s.packetData)) < length-1+macSize { + s.packetData = make([]byte, length-1+macSize) + } else { + s.packetData = s.packetData[:length-1+macSize] + } + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, s.packetData); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + mac := s.packetData[length-1:] + data := s.packetData[:length-1] + + if s.mac != nil && s.etm { + s.mac.Write(data) + } + + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(data, data) + + if s.mac != nil { + if !s.etm { + s.mac.Write(data) + } + s.macResult = s.mac.Sum(s.macResult[:0]) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(s.macResult, mac) != 1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure") + } + } + + return s.packetData[:length-paddingLength-1], nil +} + +// writeCipherPacket encrypts and sends a packet of data to the writer argument +func (s *streamPacketCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { + if len(packet) > maxPacket { + return errors.New("ssh: packet too large") + } + + aadlen := 0 + if s.mac != nil && s.etm { + // packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes + aadlen = 4 + } + + paddingLength := packetSizeMultiple - (prefixLen+len(packet)-aadlen)%packetSizeMultiple + if paddingLength < 4 { + paddingLength += packetSizeMultiple + } + + length := len(packet) + 1 + paddingLength + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.prefix[:], uint32(length)) + s.prefix[4] = byte(paddingLength) + padding := s.padding[:paddingLength] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, padding); err != nil { + return err + } + + if s.mac != nil { + s.mac.Reset() + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(s.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) + s.mac.Write(s.seqNumBytes[:]) + + if s.etm { + // For EtM algorithms, the packet length must stay unencrypted, + // but the following data (padding length) must be encrypted + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[4:5], s.prefix[4:5]) + } + + s.mac.Write(s.prefix[:]) + + if !s.etm { + // For non-EtM algorithms, the algorithm is applied on unencrypted data + s.mac.Write(packet) + s.mac.Write(padding) + } + } + + if !(s.mac != nil && s.etm) { + // For EtM algorithms, the padding length has already been encrypted + // and the packet length must remain unencrypted + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(s.prefix[:], s.prefix[:]) + } + + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(packet, packet) + s.cipher.XORKeyStream(padding, padding) + + if s.mac != nil && s.etm { + // For EtM algorithms, packet and padding must be encrypted + s.mac.Write(packet) + s.mac.Write(padding) + } + + if _, err := w.Write(s.prefix[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := w.Write(packet); err != nil { + return err + } + if _, err := w.Write(padding); err != nil { + return err + } + + if s.mac != nil { + s.macResult = s.mac.Sum(s.macResult[:0]) + if _, err := w.Write(s.macResult); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + return nil +} + +type gcmCipher struct { + aead cipher.AEAD + prefix [4]byte + iv []byte + buf []byte +} + +func newGCMCipher(key, iv, unusedMacKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + aead, err := cipher.NewGCM(c) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &gcmCipher{ + aead: aead, + iv: iv, + }, nil +} + +const gcmTagSize = 16 + +func (c *gcmCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { + // Pad out to multiple of 16 bytes. This is different from the + // stream cipher because that encrypts the length too. + padding := byte(packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(packet))%packetSizeMultiple) + if padding < 4 { + padding += packetSizeMultiple + } + + length := uint32(len(packet) + int(padding) + 1) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.prefix[:], length) + if _, err := w.Write(c.prefix[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + + if cap(c.buf) < int(length) { + c.buf = make([]byte, length) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:length] + } + + c.buf[0] = padding + copy(c.buf[1:], packet) + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.buf[1+len(packet):]); err != nil { + return err + } + c.buf = c.aead.Seal(c.buf[:0], c.iv, c.buf, c.prefix[:]) + if _, err := w.Write(c.buf); err != nil { + return err + } + c.incIV() + + return nil +} + +func (c *gcmCipher) incIV() { + for i := 4 + 7; i >= 4; i-- { + c.iv[i]++ + if c.iv[i] != 0 { + break + } + } +} + +func (c *gcmCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.prefix[:]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(c.prefix[:]) + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: max packet length exceeded") + } + + if cap(c.buf) < int(length+gcmTagSize) { + c.buf = make([]byte, length+gcmTagSize) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:length+gcmTagSize] + } + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.buf); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + plain, err := c.aead.Open(c.buf[:0], c.iv, c.buf, c.prefix[:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c.incIV() + + padding := plain[0] + if padding < 4 { + // padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies + // the maximum size, which is 255. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding) + } + + if int(padding+1) >= len(plain) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding) + } + plain = plain[1 : length-uint32(padding)] + return plain, nil +} + +// cbcCipher implements aes128-cbc cipher defined in RFC 4253 section 6.1 +type cbcCipher struct { + mac hash.Hash + macSize uint32 + decrypter cipher.BlockMode + encrypter cipher.BlockMode + + // The following members are to avoid per-packet allocations. + seqNumBytes [4]byte + packetData []byte + macResult []byte + + // Amount of data we should still read to hide which + // verification error triggered. + oracleCamouflage uint32 +} + +func newCBCCipher(c cipher.Block, key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + cbc := &cbcCipher{ + mac: macModes[algs.MAC].new(macKey), + decrypter: cipher.NewCBCDecrypter(c, iv), + encrypter: cipher.NewCBCEncrypter(c, iv), + packetData: make([]byte, 1024), + } + if cbc.mac != nil { + cbc.macSize = uint32(cbc.mac.Size()) + } + + return cbc, nil +} + +func newAESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + c, err := aes.NewCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return cbc, nil +} + +func newTripleDESCBCCipher(key, iv, macKey []byte, algs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + c, err := des.NewTripleDESCipher(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + cbc, err := newCBCCipher(c, key, iv, macKey, algs) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return cbc, nil +} + +func maxUInt32(a, b int) uint32 { + if a > b { + return uint32(a) + } + return uint32(b) +} + +const ( + cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple = 8 + cbcMinPacketSize = 16 + cbcMinPaddingSize = 4 +) + +// cbcError represents a verification error that may leak information. +type cbcError string + +func (e cbcError) Error() string { return string(e) } + +func (c *cbcCipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + p, err := c.readCipherPacketLeaky(seqNum, r) + if err != nil { + if _, ok := err.(cbcError); ok { + // Verification error: read a fixed amount of + // data, to make distinguishing between + // failing MAC and failing length check more + // difficult. + io.CopyN(ioutil.Discard, r, int64(c.oracleCamouflage)) + } + } + return p, err +} + +func (c *cbcCipher) readCipherPacketLeaky(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + blockSize := c.decrypter.BlockSize() + + // Read the header, which will include some of the subsequent data in the + // case of block ciphers - this is copied back to the payload later. + // How many bytes of payload/padding will be read with this first read. + firstBlockLength := uint32((prefixLen + blockSize - 1) / blockSize * blockSize) + firstBlock := c.packetData[:firstBlockLength] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, firstBlock); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + c.oracleCamouflage = maxPacket + 4 + c.macSize - firstBlockLength + + c.decrypter.CryptBlocks(firstBlock, firstBlock) + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(firstBlock[:4]) + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, cbcError("ssh: packet too large") + } + if length+4 < maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSize, blockSize) { + // The minimum size of a packet is 16 (or the cipher block size, whichever + // is larger) bytes. + return nil, cbcError("ssh: packet too small") + } + // The length of the packet (including the length field but not the MAC) must + // be a multiple of the block size or 8, whichever is larger. + if (length+4)%maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple, blockSize) != 0 { + return nil, cbcError("ssh: invalid packet length multiple") + } + + paddingLength := uint32(firstBlock[4]) + if paddingLength < cbcMinPaddingSize || length <= paddingLength+1 { + return nil, cbcError("ssh: invalid packet length") + } + + // Positions within the c.packetData buffer: + macStart := 4 + length + paddingStart := macStart - paddingLength + + // Entire packet size, starting before length, ending at end of mac. + entirePacketSize := macStart + c.macSize + + // Ensure c.packetData is large enough for the entire packet data. + if uint32(cap(c.packetData)) < entirePacketSize { + // Still need to upsize and copy, but this should be rare at runtime, only + // on upsizing the packetData buffer. + c.packetData = make([]byte, entirePacketSize) + copy(c.packetData, firstBlock) + } else { + c.packetData = c.packetData[:entirePacketSize] + } + + n, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.packetData[firstBlockLength:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c.oracleCamouflage -= uint32(n) + + remainingCrypted := c.packetData[firstBlockLength:macStart] + c.decrypter.CryptBlocks(remainingCrypted, remainingCrypted) + + mac := c.packetData[macStart:] + if c.mac != nil { + c.mac.Reset() + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) + c.mac.Write(c.seqNumBytes[:]) + c.mac.Write(c.packetData[:macStart]) + c.macResult = c.mac.Sum(c.macResult[:0]) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(c.macResult, mac) != 1 { + return nil, cbcError("ssh: MAC failure") + } + } + + return c.packetData[prefixLen:paddingStart], nil +} + +func (c *cbcCipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { + effectiveBlockSize := maxUInt32(cbcMinPacketSizeMultiple, c.encrypter.BlockSize()) + + // Length of encrypted portion of the packet (header, payload, padding). + // Enforce minimum padding and packet size. + encLength := maxUInt32(prefixLen+len(packet)+cbcMinPaddingSize, cbcMinPaddingSize) + // Enforce block size. + encLength = (encLength + effectiveBlockSize - 1) / effectiveBlockSize * effectiveBlockSize + + length := encLength - 4 + paddingLength := int(length) - (1 + len(packet)) + + // Overall buffer contains: header, payload, padding, mac. + // Space for the MAC is reserved in the capacity but not the slice length. + bufferSize := encLength + c.macSize + if uint32(cap(c.packetData)) < bufferSize { + c.packetData = make([]byte, encLength, bufferSize) + } else { + c.packetData = c.packetData[:encLength] + } + + p := c.packetData + + // Packet header. + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(p, length) + p = p[4:] + p[0] = byte(paddingLength) + + // Payload. + p = p[1:] + copy(p, packet) + + // Padding. + p = p[len(packet):] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, p); err != nil { + return err + } + + if c.mac != nil { + c.mac.Reset() + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.seqNumBytes[:], seqNum) + c.mac.Write(c.seqNumBytes[:]) + c.mac.Write(c.packetData) + // The MAC is now appended into the capacity reserved for it earlier. + c.packetData = c.mac.Sum(c.packetData) + } + + c.encrypter.CryptBlocks(c.packetData[:encLength], c.packetData[:encLength]) + + if _, err := w.Write(c.packetData); err != nil { + return err + } + + return nil +} + +const chacha20Poly1305ID = "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com" + +// chacha20Poly1305Cipher implements the chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com +// AEAD, which is described here: +// +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-josefsson-ssh-chacha20-poly1305-openssh-00 +// +// the methods here also implement padding, which RFC4253 Section 6 +// also requires of stream ciphers. +type chacha20Poly1305Cipher struct { + lengthKey [32]byte + contentKey [32]byte + buf []byte +} + +func newChaCha20Cipher(key, unusedIV, unusedMACKey []byte, unusedAlgs directionAlgorithms) (packetCipher, error) { + if len(key) != 64 { + panic(len(key)) + } + + c := &chacha20Poly1305Cipher{ + buf: make([]byte, 256), + } + + copy(c.contentKey[:], key[:32]) + copy(c.lengthKey[:], key[32:]) + return c, nil +} + +func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) readCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + nonce := make([]byte, 12) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum) + s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte + s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) + s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes + + encryptedLength := c.buf[:4] + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, encryptedLength); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var lenBytes [4]byte + ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ls.XORKeyStream(lenBytes[:], encryptedLength) + + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(lenBytes[:]) + if length > maxPacket { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid packet length, packet too large") + } + + contentEnd := 4 + length + packetEnd := contentEnd + poly1305.TagSize + if uint32(cap(c.buf)) < packetEnd { + c.buf = make([]byte, packetEnd) + copy(c.buf[:], encryptedLength) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:packetEnd] + } + + if _, err := io.ReadFull(r, c.buf[4:packetEnd]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte + copy(mac[:], c.buf[contentEnd:packetEnd]) + if !poly1305.Verify(&mac, c.buf[:contentEnd], &polyKey) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: MAC failure") + } + + plain := c.buf[4:contentEnd] + s.XORKeyStream(plain, plain) + + padding := plain[0] + if padding < 4 { + // padding is a byte, so it automatically satisfies + // the maximum size, which is 255. + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: illegal padding %d", padding) + } + + if int(padding)+1 >= len(plain) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: padding %d too large", padding) + } + + plain = plain[1 : len(plain)-int(padding)] + + return plain, nil +} + +func (c *chacha20Poly1305Cipher) writeCipherPacket(seqNum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, payload []byte) error { + nonce := make([]byte, 12) + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(nonce[8:], seqNum) + s, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.contentKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return err + } + var polyKey, discardBuf [32]byte + s.XORKeyStream(polyKey[:], polyKey[:]) + s.XORKeyStream(discardBuf[:], discardBuf[:]) // skip the next 32 bytes + + // There is no blocksize, so fall back to multiple of 8 byte + // padding, as described in RFC 4253, Sec 6. + const packetSizeMultiple = 8 + + padding := packetSizeMultiple - (1+len(payload))%packetSizeMultiple + if padding < 4 { + padding += packetSizeMultiple + } + + // size (4 bytes), padding (1), payload, padding, tag. + totalLength := 4 + 1 + len(payload) + padding + poly1305.TagSize + if cap(c.buf) < totalLength { + c.buf = make([]byte, totalLength) + } else { + c.buf = c.buf[:totalLength] + } + + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(c.buf, uint32(1+len(payload)+padding)) + ls, err := chacha20.NewUnauthenticatedCipher(c.lengthKey[:], nonce) + if err != nil { + return err + } + ls.XORKeyStream(c.buf, c.buf[:4]) + c.buf[4] = byte(padding) + copy(c.buf[5:], payload) + packetEnd := 5 + len(payload) + padding + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, c.buf[5+len(payload):packetEnd]); err != nil { + return err + } + + s.XORKeyStream(c.buf[4:], c.buf[4:packetEnd]) + + var mac [poly1305.TagSize]byte + poly1305.Sum(&mac, c.buf[:packetEnd], &polyKey) + + copy(c.buf[packetEnd:], mac[:]) + + if _, err := w.Write(c.buf); err != nil { + return err + } + return nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7b00bff1c --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client.go @@ -0,0 +1,278 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "net" + "os" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// Client implements a traditional SSH client that supports shells, +// subprocesses, TCP port/streamlocal forwarding and tunneled dialing. +type Client struct { + Conn + + handleForwardsOnce sync.Once // guards calling (*Client).handleForwards + + forwards forwardList // forwarded tcpip connections from the remote side + mu sync.Mutex + channelHandlers map[string]chan NewChannel +} + +// HandleChannelOpen returns a channel on which NewChannel requests +// for the given type are sent. If the type already is being handled, +// nil is returned. The channel is closed when the connection is closed. +func (c *Client) HandleChannelOpen(channelType string) <-chan NewChannel { + c.mu.Lock() + defer c.mu.Unlock() + if c.channelHandlers == nil { + // The SSH channel has been closed. + c := make(chan NewChannel) + close(c) + return c + } + + ch := c.channelHandlers[channelType] + if ch != nil { + return nil + } + + ch = make(chan NewChannel, chanSize) + c.channelHandlers[channelType] = ch + return ch +} + +// NewClient creates a Client on top of the given connection. +func NewClient(c Conn, chans <-chan NewChannel, reqs <-chan *Request) *Client { + conn := &Client{ + Conn: c, + channelHandlers: make(map[string]chan NewChannel, 1), + } + + go conn.handleGlobalRequests(reqs) + go conn.handleChannelOpens(chans) + go func() { + conn.Wait() + conn.forwards.closeAll() + }() + return conn +} + +// NewClientConn establishes an authenticated SSH connection using c +// as the underlying transport. The Request and NewChannel channels +// must be serviced or the connection will hang. +func NewClientConn(c net.Conn, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (Conn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) { + fullConf := *config + fullConf.SetDefaults() + if fullConf.HostKeyCallback == nil { + c.Close() + return nil, nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: must specify HostKeyCallback") + } + + conn := &connection{ + sshConn: sshConn{conn: c}, + } + + if err := conn.clientHandshake(addr, &fullConf); err != nil { + c.Close() + return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: handshake failed: %v", err) + } + conn.mux = newMux(conn.transport) + return conn, conn.mux.incomingChannels, conn.mux.incomingRequests, nil +} + +// clientHandshake performs the client side key exchange. See RFC 4253 Section +// 7. +func (c *connection) clientHandshake(dialAddress string, config *ClientConfig) error { + if config.ClientVersion != "" { + c.clientVersion = []byte(config.ClientVersion) + } else { + c.clientVersion = []byte(packageVersion) + } + var err error + c.serverVersion, err = exchangeVersions(c.sshConn.conn, c.clientVersion) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + c.transport = newClientTransport( + newTransport(c.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, true /* is client */), + c.clientVersion, c.serverVersion, config, dialAddress, c.sshConn.RemoteAddr()) + if err := c.transport.waitSession(); err != nil { + return err + } + + c.sessionID = c.transport.getSessionID() + return c.clientAuthenticate(config) +} + +// verifyHostKeySignature verifies the host key obtained in the key +// exchange. +func verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey PublicKey, result *kexResult) error { + sig, rest, ok := parseSignatureBody(result.Signature) + if len(rest) > 0 || !ok { + return errors.New("ssh: signature parse error") + } + + return hostKey.Verify(result.H, sig) +} + +// NewSession opens a new Session for this client. (A session is a remote +// execution of a program.) +func (c *Client) NewSession() (*Session, error) { + ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("session", nil) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return newSession(ch, in) +} + +func (c *Client) handleGlobalRequests(incoming <-chan *Request) { + for r := range incoming { + // This handles keepalive messages and matches + // the behaviour of OpenSSH. + r.Reply(false, nil) + } +} + +// handleChannelOpens channel open messages from the remote side. +func (c *Client) handleChannelOpens(in <-chan NewChannel) { + for ch := range in { + c.mu.Lock() + handler := c.channelHandlers[ch.ChannelType()] + c.mu.Unlock() + + if handler != nil { + handler <- ch + } else { + ch.Reject(UnknownChannelType, fmt.Sprintf("unknown channel type: %v", ch.ChannelType())) + } + } + + c.mu.Lock() + for _, ch := range c.channelHandlers { + close(ch) + } + c.channelHandlers = nil + c.mu.Unlock() +} + +// Dial starts a client connection to the given SSH server. It is a +// convenience function that connects to the given network address, +// initiates the SSH handshake, and then sets up a Client. For access +// to incoming channels and requests, use net.Dial with NewClientConn +// instead. +func Dial(network, addr string, config *ClientConfig) (*Client, error) { + conn, err := net.DialTimeout(network, addr, config.Timeout) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + c, chans, reqs, err := NewClientConn(conn, addr, config) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return NewClient(c, chans, reqs), nil +} + +// HostKeyCallback is the function type used for verifying server +// keys. A HostKeyCallback must return nil if the host key is OK, or +// an error to reject it. It receives the hostname as passed to Dial +// or NewClientConn. The remote address is the RemoteAddr of the +// net.Conn underlying the SSH connection. +type HostKeyCallback func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error + +// BannerCallback is the function type used for treat the banner sent by +// the server. A BannerCallback receives the message sent by the remote server. +type BannerCallback func(message string) error + +// A ClientConfig structure is used to configure a Client. It must not be +// modified after having been passed to an SSH function. +type ClientConfig struct { + // Config contains configuration that is shared between clients and + // servers. + Config + + // User contains the username to authenticate as. + User string + + // Auth contains possible authentication methods to use with the + // server. Only the first instance of a particular RFC 4252 method will + // be used during authentication. + Auth []AuthMethod + + // HostKeyCallback is called during the cryptographic + // handshake to validate the server's host key. The client + // configuration must supply this callback for the connection + // to succeed. The functions InsecureIgnoreHostKey or + // FixedHostKey can be used for simplistic host key checks. + HostKeyCallback HostKeyCallback + + // BannerCallback is called during the SSH dance to display a custom + // server's message. The client configuration can supply this callback to + // handle it as wished. The function BannerDisplayStderr can be used for + // simplistic display on Stderr. + BannerCallback BannerCallback + + // ClientVersion contains the version identification string that will + // be used for the connection. If empty, a reasonable default is used. + ClientVersion string + + // HostKeyAlgorithms lists the key types that the client will + // accept from the server as host key, in order of + // preference. If empty, a reasonable default is used. Any + // string returned from PublicKey.Type method may be used, or + // any of the CertAlgoXxxx and KeyAlgoXxxx constants. + HostKeyAlgorithms []string + + // Timeout is the maximum amount of time for the TCP connection to establish. + // + // A Timeout of zero means no timeout. + Timeout time.Duration +} + +// InsecureIgnoreHostKey returns a function that can be used for +// ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback to accept any host key. It should +// not be used for production code. +func InsecureIgnoreHostKey() HostKeyCallback { + return func(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error { + return nil + } +} + +type fixedHostKey struct { + key PublicKey +} + +func (f *fixedHostKey) check(hostname string, remote net.Addr, key PublicKey) error { + if f.key == nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: required host key was nil") + } + if !bytes.Equal(key.Marshal(), f.key.Marshal()) { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: host key mismatch") + } + return nil +} + +// FixedHostKey returns a function for use in +// ClientConfig.HostKeyCallback to accept only a specific host key. +func FixedHostKey(key PublicKey) HostKeyCallback { + hk := &fixedHostKey{key} + return hk.check +} + +// BannerDisplayStderr returns a function that can be used for +// ClientConfig.BannerCallback to display banners on os.Stderr. +func BannerDisplayStderr() BannerCallback { + return func(banner string) error { + _, err := os.Stderr.WriteString(banner) + + return err + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..0590070e2 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/client_auth.go @@ -0,0 +1,639 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" +) + +type authResult int + +const ( + authFailure authResult = iota + authPartialSuccess + authSuccess +) + +// clientAuthenticate authenticates with the remote server. See RFC 4252. +func (c *connection) clientAuthenticate(config *ClientConfig) error { + // initiate user auth session + if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceRequestMsg{serviceUserAuth})); err != nil { + return err + } + packet, err := c.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return err + } + var serviceAccept serviceAcceptMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &serviceAccept); err != nil { + return err + } + + // during the authentication phase the client first attempts the "none" method + // then any untried methods suggested by the server. + tried := make(map[string]bool) + var lastMethods []string + + sessionID := c.transport.getSessionID() + for auth := AuthMethod(new(noneAuth)); auth != nil; { + ok, methods, err := auth.auth(sessionID, config.User, c.transport, config.Rand) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if ok == authSuccess { + // success + return nil + } else if ok == authFailure { + tried[auth.method()] = true + } + if methods == nil { + methods = lastMethods + } + lastMethods = methods + + auth = nil + + findNext: + for _, a := range config.Auth { + candidateMethod := a.method() + if tried[candidateMethod] { + continue + } + for _, meth := range methods { + if meth == candidateMethod { + auth = a + break findNext + } + } + } + } + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unable to authenticate, attempted methods %v, no supported methods remain", keys(tried)) +} + +func keys(m map[string]bool) []string { + s := make([]string, 0, len(m)) + + for key := range m { + s = append(s, key) + } + return s +} + +// An AuthMethod represents an instance of an RFC 4252 authentication method. +type AuthMethod interface { + // auth authenticates user over transport t. + // Returns true if authentication is successful. + // If authentication is not successful, a []string of alternative + // method names is returned. If the slice is nil, it will be ignored + // and the previous set of possible methods will be reused. + auth(session []byte, user string, p packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) + + // method returns the RFC 4252 method name. + method() string +} + +// "none" authentication, RFC 4252 section 5.2. +type noneAuth int + +func (n *noneAuth) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) { + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthRequestMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: "none", + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + return handleAuthResponse(c) +} + +func (n *noneAuth) method() string { + return "none" +} + +// passwordCallback is an AuthMethod that fetches the password through +// a function call, e.g. by prompting the user. +type passwordCallback func() (password string, err error) + +func (cb passwordCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) { + type passwordAuthMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"50"` + Service string + Method string + Reply bool + Password string + } + + pw, err := cb() + // REVIEW NOTE: is there a need to support skipping a password attempt? + // The program may only find out that the user doesn't have a password + // when prompting. + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&passwordAuthMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: cb.method(), + Reply: false, + Password: pw, + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + return handleAuthResponse(c) +} + +func (cb passwordCallback) method() string { + return "password" +} + +// Password returns an AuthMethod using the given password. +func Password(secret string) AuthMethod { + return passwordCallback(func() (string, error) { return secret, nil }) +} + +// PasswordCallback returns an AuthMethod that uses a callback for +// fetching a password. +func PasswordCallback(prompt func() (secret string, err error)) AuthMethod { + return passwordCallback(prompt) +} + +type publickeyAuthMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"50"` + Service string + Method string + // HasSig indicates to the receiver packet that the auth request is signed and + // should be used for authentication of the request. + HasSig bool + Algoname string + PubKey []byte + // Sig is tagged with "rest" so Marshal will exclude it during + // validateKey + Sig []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// publicKeyCallback is an AuthMethod that uses a set of key +// pairs for authentication. +type publicKeyCallback func() ([]Signer, error) + +func (cb publicKeyCallback) method() string { + return "publickey" +} + +func (cb publicKeyCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) { + // Authentication is performed by sending an enquiry to test if a key is + // acceptable to the remote. If the key is acceptable, the client will + // attempt to authenticate with the valid key. If not the client will repeat + // the process with the remaining keys. + + signers, err := cb() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + var methods []string + for _, signer := range signers { + ok, err := validateKey(signer.PublicKey(), user, c) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if !ok { + continue + } + + pub := signer.PublicKey() + pubKey := pub.Marshal() + sign, err := signer.Sign(rand, buildDataSignedForAuth(session, userAuthRequestMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: cb.method(), + }, []byte(pub.Type()), pubKey)) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + // manually wrap the serialized signature in a string + s := Marshal(sign) + sig := make([]byte, stringLength(len(s))) + marshalString(sig, s) + msg := publickeyAuthMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: cb.method(), + HasSig: true, + Algoname: pub.Type(), + PubKey: pubKey, + Sig: sig, + } + p := Marshal(&msg) + if err := c.writePacket(p); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + var success authResult + success, methods, err = handleAuthResponse(c) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + // If authentication succeeds or the list of available methods does not + // contain the "publickey" method, do not attempt to authenticate with any + // other keys. According to RFC 4252 Section 7, the latter can occur when + // additional authentication methods are required. + if success == authSuccess || !containsMethod(methods, cb.method()) { + return success, methods, err + } + } + + return authFailure, methods, nil +} + +func containsMethod(methods []string, method string) bool { + for _, m := range methods { + if m == method { + return true + } + } + + return false +} + +// validateKey validates the key provided is acceptable to the server. +func validateKey(key PublicKey, user string, c packetConn) (bool, error) { + pubKey := key.Marshal() + msg := publickeyAuthMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: "publickey", + HasSig: false, + Algoname: key.Type(), + PubKey: pubKey, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&msg)); err != nil { + return false, err + } + + return confirmKeyAck(key, c) +} + +func confirmKeyAck(key PublicKey, c packetConn) (bool, error) { + pubKey := key.Marshal() + algoname := key.Type() + + for { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return false, err + } + switch packet[0] { + case msgUserAuthBanner: + if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { + return false, err + } + case msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: + var msg userAuthPubKeyOkMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return false, err + } + if msg.Algo != algoname || !bytes.Equal(msg.PubKey, pubKey) { + return false, nil + } + return true, nil + case msgUserAuthFailure: + return false, nil + default: + return false, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0]) + } + } +} + +// PublicKeys returns an AuthMethod that uses the given key +// pairs. +func PublicKeys(signers ...Signer) AuthMethod { + return publicKeyCallback(func() ([]Signer, error) { return signers, nil }) +} + +// PublicKeysCallback returns an AuthMethod that runs the given +// function to obtain a list of key pairs. +func PublicKeysCallback(getSigners func() (signers []Signer, err error)) AuthMethod { + return publicKeyCallback(getSigners) +} + +// handleAuthResponse returns whether the preceding authentication request succeeded +// along with a list of remaining authentication methods to try next and +// an error if an unexpected response was received. +func handleAuthResponse(c packetConn) (authResult, []string, error) { + for { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + switch packet[0] { + case msgUserAuthBanner: + if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + case msgUserAuthFailure: + var msg userAuthFailureMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if msg.PartialSuccess { + return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil + } + return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil + case msgUserAuthSuccess: + return authSuccess, nil, nil + default: + return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthSuccess, packet[0]) + } + } +} + +func handleBannerResponse(c packetConn, packet []byte) error { + var msg userAuthBannerMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return err + } + + transport, ok := c.(*handshakeTransport) + if !ok { + return nil + } + + if transport.bannerCallback != nil { + return transport.bannerCallback(msg.Message) + } + + return nil +} + +// KeyboardInteractiveChallenge should print questions, optionally +// disabling echoing (e.g. for passwords), and return all the answers. +// Challenge may be called multiple times in a single session. After +// successful authentication, the server may send a challenge with no +// questions, for which the user and instruction messages should be +// printed. RFC 4256 section 3.3 details how the UI should behave for +// both CLI and GUI environments. +type KeyboardInteractiveChallenge func(user, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) + +// KeyboardInteractive returns an AuthMethod using a prompt/response +// sequence controlled by the server. +func KeyboardInteractive(challenge KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) AuthMethod { + return challenge +} + +func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) method() string { + return "keyboard-interactive" +} + +func (cb KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) { + type initiateMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"50"` + Service string + Method string + Language string + Submethods string + } + + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&initiateMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: "keyboard-interactive", + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + for { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + // like handleAuthResponse, but with less options. + switch packet[0] { + case msgUserAuthBanner: + if err := handleBannerResponse(c, packet); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + continue + case msgUserAuthInfoRequest: + // OK + case msgUserAuthFailure: + var msg userAuthFailureMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if msg.PartialSuccess { + return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil + } + return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil + case msgUserAuthSuccess: + return authSuccess, nil, nil + default: + return authFailure, nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoRequest, packet[0]) + } + + var msg userAuthInfoRequestMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + // Manually unpack the prompt/echo pairs. + rest := msg.Prompts + var prompts []string + var echos []bool + for i := 0; i < int(msg.NumPrompts); i++ { + prompt, r, ok := parseString(rest) + if !ok || len(r) == 0 { + return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: prompt format error") + } + prompts = append(prompts, string(prompt)) + echos = append(echos, r[0] != 0) + rest = r[1:] + } + + if len(rest) != 0 { + return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: extra data following keyboard-interactive pairs") + } + + answers, err := cb(msg.User, msg.Instruction, prompts, echos) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + + if len(answers) != len(prompts) { + return authFailure, nil, errors.New("ssh: not enough answers from keyboard-interactive callback") + } + responseLength := 1 + 4 + for _, a := range answers { + responseLength += stringLength(len(a)) + } + serialized := make([]byte, responseLength) + p := serialized + p[0] = msgUserAuthInfoResponse + p = p[1:] + p = marshalUint32(p, uint32(len(answers))) + for _, a := range answers { + p = marshalString(p, []byte(a)) + } + + if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + } +} + +type retryableAuthMethod struct { + authMethod AuthMethod + maxTries int +} + +func (r *retryableAuthMethod) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (ok authResult, methods []string, err error) { + for i := 0; r.maxTries <= 0 || i < r.maxTries; i++ { + ok, methods, err = r.authMethod.auth(session, user, c, rand) + if ok != authFailure || err != nil { // either success, partial success or error terminate + return ok, methods, err + } + } + return ok, methods, err +} + +func (r *retryableAuthMethod) method() string { + return r.authMethod.method() +} + +// RetryableAuthMethod is a decorator for other auth methods enabling them to +// be retried up to maxTries before considering that AuthMethod itself failed. +// If maxTries is <= 0, will retry indefinitely +// +// This is useful for interactive clients using challenge/response type +// authentication (e.g. Keyboard-Interactive, Password, etc) where the user +// could mistype their response resulting in the server issuing a +// SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE (rfc4252 #8 [password] and rfc4256 #3.4 +// [keyboard-interactive]); Without this decorator, the non-retryable +// AuthMethod would be removed from future consideration, and never tried again +// (and so the user would never be able to retry their entry). +func RetryableAuthMethod(auth AuthMethod, maxTries int) AuthMethod { + return &retryableAuthMethod{authMethod: auth, maxTries: maxTries} +} + +// GSSAPIWithMICAuthMethod is an AuthMethod with "gssapi-with-mic" authentication. +// See RFC 4462 section 3 +// gssAPIClient is implementation of the GSSAPIClient interface, see the definition of the interface for details. +// target is the server host you want to log in to. +func GSSAPIWithMICAuthMethod(gssAPIClient GSSAPIClient, target string) AuthMethod { + if gssAPIClient == nil { + panic("gss-api client must be not nil with enable gssapi-with-mic") + } + return &gssAPIWithMICCallback{gssAPIClient: gssAPIClient, target: target} +} + +type gssAPIWithMICCallback struct { + gssAPIClient GSSAPIClient + target string +} + +func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) auth(session []byte, user string, c packetConn, rand io.Reader) (authResult, []string, error) { + m := &userAuthRequestMsg{ + User: user, + Service: serviceSSH, + Method: g.method(), + } + // The GSS-API authentication method is initiated when the client sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST. + // See RFC 4462 section 3.2. + m.Payload = appendU32(m.Payload, 1) + m.Payload = appendString(m.Payload, string(krb5OID)) + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(m)); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + // The server responds to the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST with either an + // SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE if none of the mechanisms are supported or + // with an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE. + // See RFC 4462 section 3.3. + // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication,so I don't want to check + // selected mech if it is valid. + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + userAuthGSSAPIResp := &userAuthGSSAPIResponse{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIResp); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + // Start the loop into the exchange token. + // See RFC 4462 section 3.4. + var token []byte + defer g.gssAPIClient.DeleteSecContext() + for { + // Initiates the establishment of a security context between the application and a remote peer. + nextToken, needContinue, err := g.gssAPIClient.InitSecContext("host@"+g.target, token, false) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if len(nextToken) > 0 { + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{ + Token: nextToken, + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + } + if !needContinue { + break + } + packet, err = c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + switch packet[0] { + case msgUserAuthFailure: + var msg userAuthFailureMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if msg.PartialSuccess { + return authPartialSuccess, msg.Methods, nil + } + return authFailure, msg.Methods, nil + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIError: + userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp := &userAuthGSSAPIError{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + return authFailure, nil, fmt.Errorf("GSS-API Error:\n"+ + "Major Status: %d\n"+ + "Minor Status: %d\n"+ + "Error Message: %s\n", userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.MajorStatus, userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.MinorStatus, + userAuthGSSAPIErrorResp.Message) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken: + userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + token = userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token + } + } + // Binding Encryption Keys. + // See RFC 4462 section 3.5. + micField := buildMIC(string(session), user, "ssh-connection", "gssapi-with-mic") + micToken, err := g.gssAPIClient.GetMIC(micField) + if err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIMIC{ + MIC: micToken, + })); err != nil { + return authFailure, nil, err + } + return handleAuthResponse(c) +} + +func (g *gssAPIWithMICCallback) method() string { + return "gssapi-with-mic" +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..290382d05 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/common.go @@ -0,0 +1,404 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/rand" + "fmt" + "io" + "math" + "sync" + + _ "crypto/sha1" + _ "crypto/sha256" + _ "crypto/sha512" +) + +// These are string constants in the SSH protocol. +const ( + compressionNone = "none" + serviceUserAuth = "ssh-userauth" + serviceSSH = "ssh-connection" +) + +// supportedCiphers lists ciphers we support but might not recommend. +var supportedCiphers = []string{ + "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", + "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", + chacha20Poly1305ID, + "arcfour256", "arcfour128", "arcfour", + aes128cbcID, + tripledescbcID, +} + +// preferredCiphers specifies the default preference for ciphers. +var preferredCiphers = []string{ + "aes128-gcm@openssh.com", + chacha20Poly1305ID, + "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", +} + +// supportedKexAlgos specifies the supported key-exchange algorithms in +// preference order. +var supportedKexAlgos = []string{ + kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256, + // P384 and P521 are not constant-time yet, but since we don't + // reuse ephemeral keys, using them for ECDH should be OK. + kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521, + kexAlgoDH14SHA1, kexAlgoDH1SHA1, +} + +// serverForbiddenKexAlgos contains key exchange algorithms, that are forbidden +// for the server half. +var serverForbiddenKexAlgos = map[string]struct{}{ + kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1: {}, // server half implementation is only minimal to satisfy the automated tests + kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256: {}, // server half implementation is only minimal to satisfy the automated tests +} + +// preferredKexAlgos specifies the default preference for key-exchange algorithms +// in preference order. +var preferredKexAlgos = []string{ + kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256, + kexAlgoECDH256, kexAlgoECDH384, kexAlgoECDH521, + kexAlgoDH14SHA1, +} + +// supportedHostKeyAlgos specifies the supported host-key algorithms (i.e. methods +// of authenticating servers) in preference order. +var supportedHostKeyAlgos = []string{ + CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, + CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01, + + KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, + KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA, + + KeyAlgoED25519, +} + +// supportedMACs specifies a default set of MAC algorithms in preference order. +// This is based on RFC 4253, section 6.4, but with hmac-md5 variants removed +// because they have reached the end of their useful life. +var supportedMACs = []string{ + "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com", "hmac-sha2-256", "hmac-sha1", "hmac-sha1-96", +} + +var supportedCompressions = []string{compressionNone} + +// hashFuncs keeps the mapping of supported algorithms to their respective +// hashes needed for signature verification. +var hashFuncs = map[string]crypto.Hash{ + KeyAlgoRSA: crypto.SHA1, + KeyAlgoDSA: crypto.SHA1, + KeyAlgoECDSA256: crypto.SHA256, + KeyAlgoECDSA384: crypto.SHA384, + KeyAlgoECDSA521: crypto.SHA512, + CertAlgoRSAv01: crypto.SHA1, + CertAlgoDSAv01: crypto.SHA1, + CertAlgoECDSA256v01: crypto.SHA256, + CertAlgoECDSA384v01: crypto.SHA384, + CertAlgoECDSA521v01: crypto.SHA512, +} + +// unexpectedMessageError results when the SSH message that we received didn't +// match what we wanted. +func unexpectedMessageError(expected, got uint8) error { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected message type %d (expected %d)", got, expected) +} + +// parseError results from a malformed SSH message. +func parseError(tag uint8) error { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: parse error in message type %d", tag) +} + +func findCommon(what string, client []string, server []string) (common string, err error) { + for _, c := range client { + for _, s := range server { + if c == s { + return c, nil + } + } + } + return "", fmt.Errorf("ssh: no common algorithm for %s; client offered: %v, server offered: %v", what, client, server) +} + +// directionAlgorithms records algorithm choices in one direction (either read or write) +type directionAlgorithms struct { + Cipher string + MAC string + Compression string +} + +// rekeyBytes returns a rekeying intervals in bytes. +func (a *directionAlgorithms) rekeyBytes() int64 { + // According to RFC4344 block ciphers should rekey after + // 2^(BLOCKSIZE/4) blocks. For all AES flavors BLOCKSIZE is + // 128. + switch a.Cipher { + case "aes128-ctr", "aes192-ctr", "aes256-ctr", gcmCipherID, aes128cbcID: + return 16 * (1 << 32) + + } + + // For others, stick with RFC4253 recommendation to rekey after 1 Gb of data. + return 1 << 30 +} + +type algorithms struct { + kex string + hostKey string + w directionAlgorithms + r directionAlgorithms +} + +func findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient bool, clientKexInit, serverKexInit *kexInitMsg) (algs *algorithms, err error) { + result := &algorithms{} + + result.kex, err = findCommon("key exchange", clientKexInit.KexAlgos, serverKexInit.KexAlgos) + if err != nil { + return + } + + result.hostKey, err = findCommon("host key", clientKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos, serverKexInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos) + if err != nil { + return + } + + stoc, ctos := &result.w, &result.r + if isClient { + ctos, stoc = stoc, ctos + } + + ctos.Cipher, err = findCommon("client to server cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersClientServer, serverKexInit.CiphersClientServer) + if err != nil { + return + } + + stoc.Cipher, err = findCommon("server to client cipher", clientKexInit.CiphersServerClient, serverKexInit.CiphersServerClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + + ctos.MAC, err = findCommon("client to server MAC", clientKexInit.MACsClientServer, serverKexInit.MACsClientServer) + if err != nil { + return + } + + stoc.MAC, err = findCommon("server to client MAC", clientKexInit.MACsServerClient, serverKexInit.MACsServerClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + + ctos.Compression, err = findCommon("client to server compression", clientKexInit.CompressionClientServer, serverKexInit.CompressionClientServer) + if err != nil { + return + } + + stoc.Compression, err = findCommon("server to client compression", clientKexInit.CompressionServerClient, serverKexInit.CompressionServerClient) + if err != nil { + return + } + + return result, nil +} + +// If rekeythreshold is too small, we can't make any progress sending +// stuff. +const minRekeyThreshold uint64 = 256 + +// Config contains configuration data common to both ServerConfig and +// ClientConfig. +type Config struct { + // Rand provides the source of entropy for cryptographic + // primitives. If Rand is nil, the cryptographic random reader + // in package crypto/rand will be used. + Rand io.Reader + + // The maximum number of bytes sent or received after which a + // new key is negotiated. It must be at least 256. If + // unspecified, a size suitable for the chosen cipher is used. + RekeyThreshold uint64 + + // The allowed key exchanges algorithms. If unspecified then a + // default set of algorithms is used. + KeyExchanges []string + + // The allowed cipher algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible + // default is used. + Ciphers []string + + // The allowed MAC algorithms. If unspecified then a sensible default + // is used. + MACs []string +} + +// SetDefaults sets sensible values for unset fields in config. This is +// exported for testing: Configs passed to SSH functions are copied and have +// default values set automatically. +func (c *Config) SetDefaults() { + if c.Rand == nil { + c.Rand = rand.Reader + } + if c.Ciphers == nil { + c.Ciphers = preferredCiphers + } + var ciphers []string + for _, c := range c.Ciphers { + if cipherModes[c] != nil { + // reject the cipher if we have no cipherModes definition + ciphers = append(ciphers, c) + } + } + c.Ciphers = ciphers + + if c.KeyExchanges == nil { + c.KeyExchanges = preferredKexAlgos + } + + if c.MACs == nil { + c.MACs = supportedMACs + } + + if c.RekeyThreshold == 0 { + // cipher specific default + } else if c.RekeyThreshold < minRekeyThreshold { + c.RekeyThreshold = minRekeyThreshold + } else if c.RekeyThreshold >= math.MaxInt64 { + // Avoid weirdness if somebody uses -1 as a threshold. + c.RekeyThreshold = math.MaxInt64 + } +} + +// buildDataSignedForAuth returns the data that is signed in order to prove +// possession of a private key. See RFC 4252, section 7. +func buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID []byte, req userAuthRequestMsg, algo, pubKey []byte) []byte { + data := struct { + Session []byte + Type byte + User string + Service string + Method string + Sign bool + Algo []byte + PubKey []byte + }{ + sessionID, + msgUserAuthRequest, + req.User, + req.Service, + req.Method, + true, + algo, + pubKey, + } + return Marshal(data) +} + +func appendU16(buf []byte, n uint16) []byte { + return append(buf, byte(n>>8), byte(n)) +} + +func appendU32(buf []byte, n uint32) []byte { + return append(buf, byte(n>>24), byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n)) +} + +func appendU64(buf []byte, n uint64) []byte { + return append(buf, + byte(n>>56), byte(n>>48), byte(n>>40), byte(n>>32), + byte(n>>24), byte(n>>16), byte(n>>8), byte(n)) +} + +func appendInt(buf []byte, n int) []byte { + return appendU32(buf, uint32(n)) +} + +func appendString(buf []byte, s string) []byte { + buf = appendU32(buf, uint32(len(s))) + buf = append(buf, s...) + return buf +} + +func appendBool(buf []byte, b bool) []byte { + if b { + return append(buf, 1) + } + return append(buf, 0) +} + +// newCond is a helper to hide the fact that there is no usable zero +// value for sync.Cond. +func newCond() *sync.Cond { return sync.NewCond(new(sync.Mutex)) } + +// window represents the buffer available to clients +// wishing to write to a channel. +type window struct { + *sync.Cond + win uint32 // RFC 4254 5.2 says the window size can grow to 2^32-1 + writeWaiters int + closed bool +} + +// add adds win to the amount of window available +// for consumers. +func (w *window) add(win uint32) bool { + // a zero sized window adjust is a noop. + if win == 0 { + return true + } + w.L.Lock() + if w.win+win < win { + w.L.Unlock() + return false + } + w.win += win + // It is unusual that multiple goroutines would be attempting to reserve + // window space, but not guaranteed. Use broadcast to notify all waiters + // that additional window is available. + w.Broadcast() + w.L.Unlock() + return true +} + +// close sets the window to closed, so all reservations fail +// immediately. +func (w *window) close() { + w.L.Lock() + w.closed = true + w.Broadcast() + w.L.Unlock() +} + +// reserve reserves win from the available window capacity. +// If no capacity remains, reserve will block. reserve may +// return less than requested. +func (w *window) reserve(win uint32) (uint32, error) { + var err error + w.L.Lock() + w.writeWaiters++ + w.Broadcast() + for w.win == 0 && !w.closed { + w.Wait() + } + w.writeWaiters-- + if w.win < win { + win = w.win + } + w.win -= win + if w.closed { + err = io.EOF + } + w.L.Unlock() + return win, err +} + +// waitWriterBlocked waits until some goroutine is blocked for further +// writes. It is used in tests only. +func (w *window) waitWriterBlocked() { + w.Cond.L.Lock() + for w.writeWaiters == 0 { + w.Cond.Wait() + } + w.Cond.L.Unlock() +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fd6b0681b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/connection.go @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "fmt" + "net" +) + +// OpenChannelError is returned if the other side rejects an +// OpenChannel request. +type OpenChannelError struct { + Reason RejectionReason + Message string +} + +func (e *OpenChannelError) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: rejected: %s (%s)", e.Reason, e.Message) +} + +// ConnMetadata holds metadata for the connection. +type ConnMetadata interface { + // User returns the user ID for this connection. + User() string + + // SessionID returns the session hash, also denoted by H. + SessionID() []byte + + // ClientVersion returns the client's version string as hashed + // into the session ID. + ClientVersion() []byte + + // ServerVersion returns the server's version string as hashed + // into the session ID. + ServerVersion() []byte + + // RemoteAddr returns the remote address for this connection. + RemoteAddr() net.Addr + + // LocalAddr returns the local address for this connection. + LocalAddr() net.Addr +} + +// Conn represents an SSH connection for both server and client roles. +// Conn is the basis for implementing an application layer, such +// as ClientConn, which implements the traditional shell access for +// clients. +type Conn interface { + ConnMetadata + + // SendRequest sends a global request, and returns the + // reply. If wantReply is true, it returns the response status + // and payload. See also RFC4254, section 4. + SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, []byte, error) + + // OpenChannel tries to open an channel. If the request is + // rejected, it returns *OpenChannelError. On success it returns + // the SSH Channel and a Go channel for incoming, out-of-band + // requests. The Go channel must be serviced, or the + // connection will hang. + OpenChannel(name string, data []byte) (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) + + // Close closes the underlying network connection + Close() error + + // Wait blocks until the connection has shut down, and returns the + // error causing the shutdown. + Wait() error + + // TODO(hanwen): consider exposing: + // RequestKeyChange + // Disconnect +} + +// DiscardRequests consumes and rejects all requests from the +// passed-in channel. +func DiscardRequests(in <-chan *Request) { + for req := range in { + if req.WantReply { + req.Reply(false, nil) + } + } +} + +// A connection represents an incoming connection. +type connection struct { + transport *handshakeTransport + sshConn + + // The connection protocol. + *mux +} + +func (c *connection) Close() error { + return c.sshConn.conn.Close() +} + +// sshconn provides net.Conn metadata, but disallows direct reads and +// writes. +type sshConn struct { + conn net.Conn + + user string + sessionID []byte + clientVersion []byte + serverVersion []byte +} + +func dup(src []byte) []byte { + dst := make([]byte, len(src)) + copy(dst, src) + return dst +} + +func (c *sshConn) User() string { + return c.user +} + +func (c *sshConn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { + return c.conn.RemoteAddr() +} + +func (c *sshConn) Close() error { + return c.conn.Close() +} + +func (c *sshConn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { + return c.conn.LocalAddr() +} + +func (c *sshConn) SessionID() []byte { + return dup(c.sessionID) +} + +func (c *sshConn) ClientVersion() []byte { + return dup(c.clientVersion) +} + +func (c *sshConn) ServerVersion() []byte { + return dup(c.serverVersion) +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..67b7322c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/doc.go @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +/* +Package ssh implements an SSH client and server. + +SSH is a transport security protocol, an authentication protocol and a +family of application protocols. The most typical application level +protocol is a remote shell and this is specifically implemented. However, +the multiplexed nature of SSH is exposed to users that wish to support +others. + +References: + [PROTOCOL.certkeys]: http://cvsweb.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/cvsweb/src/usr.bin/ssh/PROTOCOL.certkeys?rev=HEAD + [SSH-PARAMETERS]: http://www.iana.org/assignments/ssh-parameters/ssh-parameters.xml#ssh-parameters-1 + +This package does not fall under the stability promise of the Go language itself, +so its API may be changed when pressing needs arise. +*/ +package ssh // import "golang.org/x/crypto/ssh" diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2b10b05a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/handshake.go @@ -0,0 +1,647 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "crypto/rand" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" + "net" + "sync" +) + +// debugHandshake, if set, prints messages sent and received. Key +// exchange messages are printed as if DH were used, so the debug +// messages are wrong when using ECDH. +const debugHandshake = false + +// chanSize sets the amount of buffering SSH connections. This is +// primarily for testing: setting chanSize=0 uncovers deadlocks more +// quickly. +const chanSize = 16 + +// keyingTransport is a packet based transport that supports key +// changes. It need not be thread-safe. It should pass through +// msgNewKeys in both directions. +type keyingTransport interface { + packetConn + + // prepareKeyChange sets up a key change. The key change for a + // direction will be effected if a msgNewKeys message is sent + // or received. + prepareKeyChange(*algorithms, *kexResult) error +} + +// handshakeTransport implements rekeying on top of a keyingTransport +// and offers a thread-safe writePacket() interface. +type handshakeTransport struct { + conn keyingTransport + config *Config + + serverVersion []byte + clientVersion []byte + + // hostKeys is non-empty if we are the server. In that case, + // it contains all host keys that can be used to sign the + // connection. + hostKeys []Signer + + // hostKeyAlgorithms is non-empty if we are the client. In that case, + // we accept these key types from the server as host key. + hostKeyAlgorithms []string + + // On read error, incoming is closed, and readError is set. + incoming chan []byte + readError error + + mu sync.Mutex + writeError error + sentInitPacket []byte + sentInitMsg *kexInitMsg + pendingPackets [][]byte // Used when a key exchange is in progress. + + // If the read loop wants to schedule a kex, it pings this + // channel, and the write loop will send out a kex + // message. + requestKex chan struct{} + + // If the other side requests or confirms a kex, its kexInit + // packet is sent here for the write loop to find it. + startKex chan *pendingKex + + // data for host key checking + hostKeyCallback HostKeyCallback + dialAddress string + remoteAddr net.Addr + + // bannerCallback is non-empty if we are the client and it has been set in + // ClientConfig. In that case it is called during the user authentication + // dance to handle a custom server's message. + bannerCallback BannerCallback + + // Algorithms agreed in the last key exchange. + algorithms *algorithms + + readPacketsLeft uint32 + readBytesLeft int64 + + writePacketsLeft uint32 + writeBytesLeft int64 + + // The session ID or nil if first kex did not complete yet. + sessionID []byte +} + +type pendingKex struct { + otherInit []byte + done chan error +} + +func newHandshakeTransport(conn keyingTransport, config *Config, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte) *handshakeTransport { + t := &handshakeTransport{ + conn: conn, + serverVersion: serverVersion, + clientVersion: clientVersion, + incoming: make(chan []byte, chanSize), + requestKex: make(chan struct{}, 1), + startKex: make(chan *pendingKex, 1), + + config: config, + } + t.resetReadThresholds() + t.resetWriteThresholds() + + // We always start with a mandatory key exchange. + t.requestKex <- struct{}{} + return t +} + +func newClientTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte, config *ClientConfig, dialAddr string, addr net.Addr) *handshakeTransport { + t := newHandshakeTransport(conn, &config.Config, clientVersion, serverVersion) + t.dialAddress = dialAddr + t.remoteAddr = addr + t.hostKeyCallback = config.HostKeyCallback + t.bannerCallback = config.BannerCallback + if config.HostKeyAlgorithms != nil { + t.hostKeyAlgorithms = config.HostKeyAlgorithms + } else { + t.hostKeyAlgorithms = supportedHostKeyAlgos + } + go t.readLoop() + go t.kexLoop() + return t +} + +func newServerTransport(conn keyingTransport, clientVersion, serverVersion []byte, config *ServerConfig) *handshakeTransport { + t := newHandshakeTransport(conn, &config.Config, clientVersion, serverVersion) + t.hostKeys = config.hostKeys + go t.readLoop() + go t.kexLoop() + return t +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) getSessionID() []byte { + return t.sessionID +} + +// waitSession waits for the session to be established. This should be +// the first thing to call after instantiating handshakeTransport. +func (t *handshakeTransport) waitSession() error { + p, err := t.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return err + } + if p[0] != msgNewKeys { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: first packet should be msgNewKeys") + } + + return nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) id() string { + if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 { + return "server" + } + return "client" +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) { + action := "got" + if write { + action = "sent" + } + + if p[0] == msgChannelData || p[0] == msgChannelExtendedData { + log.Printf("%s %s data (packet %d bytes)", t.id(), action, len(p)) + } else { + msg, err := decode(p) + log.Printf("%s %s %T %v (%v)", t.id(), action, msg, msg, err) + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) readPacket() ([]byte, error) { + p, ok := <-t.incoming + if !ok { + return nil, t.readError + } + return p, nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) readLoop() { + first := true + for { + p, err := t.readOnePacket(first) + first = false + if err != nil { + t.readError = err + close(t.incoming) + break + } + if p[0] == msgIgnore || p[0] == msgDebug { + continue + } + t.incoming <- p + } + + // Stop writers too. + t.recordWriteError(t.readError) + + // Unblock the writer should it wait for this. + close(t.startKex) + + // Don't close t.requestKex; it's also written to from writePacket. +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) pushPacket(p []byte) error { + if debugHandshake { + t.printPacket(p, true) + } + return t.conn.writePacket(p) +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) getWriteError() error { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + return t.writeError +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) recordWriteError(err error) { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + if t.writeError == nil && err != nil { + t.writeError = err + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) requestKeyExchange() { + select { + case t.requestKex <- struct{}{}: + default: + // something already requested a kex, so do nothing. + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) resetWriteThresholds() { + t.writePacketsLeft = packetRekeyThreshold + if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 { + t.writeBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold) + } else if t.algorithms != nil { + t.writeBytesLeft = t.algorithms.w.rekeyBytes() + } else { + t.writeBytesLeft = 1 << 30 + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) kexLoop() { + +write: + for t.getWriteError() == nil { + var request *pendingKex + var sent bool + + for request == nil || !sent { + var ok bool + select { + case request, ok = <-t.startKex: + if !ok { + break write + } + case <-t.requestKex: + break + } + + if !sent { + if err := t.sendKexInit(); err != nil { + t.recordWriteError(err) + break + } + sent = true + } + } + + if err := t.getWriteError(); err != nil { + if request != nil { + request.done <- err + } + break + } + + // We're not servicing t.requestKex, but that is OK: + // we never block on sending to t.requestKex. + + // We're not servicing t.startKex, but the remote end + // has just sent us a kexInitMsg, so it can't send + // another key change request, until we close the done + // channel on the pendingKex request. + + err := t.enterKeyExchange(request.otherInit) + + t.mu.Lock() + t.writeError = err + t.sentInitPacket = nil + t.sentInitMsg = nil + + t.resetWriteThresholds() + + // we have completed the key exchange. Since the + // reader is still blocked, it is safe to clear out + // the requestKex channel. This avoids the situation + // where: 1) we consumed our own request for the + // initial kex, and 2) the kex from the remote side + // caused another send on the requestKex channel, + clear: + for { + select { + case <-t.requestKex: + // + default: + break clear + } + } + + request.done <- t.writeError + + // kex finished. Push packets that we received while + // the kex was in progress. Don't look at t.startKex + // and don't increment writtenSinceKex: if we trigger + // another kex while we are still busy with the last + // one, things will become very confusing. + for _, p := range t.pendingPackets { + t.writeError = t.pushPacket(p) + if t.writeError != nil { + break + } + } + t.pendingPackets = t.pendingPackets[:0] + t.mu.Unlock() + } + + // drain startKex channel. We don't service t.requestKex + // because nobody does blocking sends there. + go func() { + for init := range t.startKex { + init.done <- t.writeError + } + }() + + // Unblock reader. + t.conn.Close() +} + +// The protocol uses uint32 for packet counters, so we can't let them +// reach 1<<32. We will actually read and write more packets than +// this, though: the other side may send more packets, and after we +// hit this limit on writing we will send a few more packets for the +// key exchange itself. +const packetRekeyThreshold = (1 << 31) + +func (t *handshakeTransport) resetReadThresholds() { + t.readPacketsLeft = packetRekeyThreshold + if t.config.RekeyThreshold > 0 { + t.readBytesLeft = int64(t.config.RekeyThreshold) + } else if t.algorithms != nil { + t.readBytesLeft = t.algorithms.r.rekeyBytes() + } else { + t.readBytesLeft = 1 << 30 + } +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) readOnePacket(first bool) ([]byte, error) { + p, err := t.conn.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if t.readPacketsLeft > 0 { + t.readPacketsLeft-- + } else { + t.requestKeyExchange() + } + + if t.readBytesLeft > 0 { + t.readBytesLeft -= int64(len(p)) + } else { + t.requestKeyExchange() + } + + if debugHandshake { + t.printPacket(p, false) + } + + if first && p[0] != msgKexInit { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: first packet should be msgKexInit") + } + + if p[0] != msgKexInit { + return p, nil + } + + firstKex := t.sessionID == nil + + kex := pendingKex{ + done: make(chan error, 1), + otherInit: p, + } + t.startKex <- &kex + err = <-kex.done + + if debugHandshake { + log.Printf("%s exited key exchange (first %v), err %v", t.id(), firstKex, err) + } + + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + t.resetReadThresholds() + + // By default, a key exchange is hidden from higher layers by + // translating it into msgIgnore. + successPacket := []byte{msgIgnore} + if firstKex { + // sendKexInit() for the first kex waits for + // msgNewKeys so the authentication process is + // guaranteed to happen over an encrypted transport. + successPacket = []byte{msgNewKeys} + } + + return successPacket, nil +} + +// sendKexInit sends a key change message. +func (t *handshakeTransport) sendKexInit() error { + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + if t.sentInitMsg != nil { + // kexInits may be sent either in response to the other side, + // or because our side wants to initiate a key change, so we + // may have already sent a kexInit. In that case, don't send a + // second kexInit. + return nil + } + + msg := &kexInitMsg{ + KexAlgos: t.config.KeyExchanges, + CiphersClientServer: t.config.Ciphers, + CiphersServerClient: t.config.Ciphers, + MACsClientServer: t.config.MACs, + MACsServerClient: t.config.MACs, + CompressionClientServer: supportedCompressions, + CompressionServerClient: supportedCompressions, + } + io.ReadFull(rand.Reader, msg.Cookie[:]) + + if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 { + for _, k := range t.hostKeys { + msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = append( + msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos, k.PublicKey().Type()) + } + } else { + msg.ServerHostKeyAlgos = t.hostKeyAlgorithms + } + packet := Marshal(msg) + + // writePacket destroys the contents, so save a copy. + packetCopy := make([]byte, len(packet)) + copy(packetCopy, packet) + + if err := t.pushPacket(packetCopy); err != nil { + return err + } + + t.sentInitMsg = msg + t.sentInitPacket = packet + + return nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) writePacket(p []byte) error { + switch p[0] { + case msgKexInit: + return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send kexInit") + case msgNewKeys: + return errors.New("ssh: only handshakeTransport can send newKeys") + } + + t.mu.Lock() + defer t.mu.Unlock() + if t.writeError != nil { + return t.writeError + } + + if t.sentInitMsg != nil { + // Copy the packet so the writer can reuse the buffer. + cp := make([]byte, len(p)) + copy(cp, p) + t.pendingPackets = append(t.pendingPackets, cp) + return nil + } + + if t.writeBytesLeft > 0 { + t.writeBytesLeft -= int64(len(p)) + } else { + t.requestKeyExchange() + } + + if t.writePacketsLeft > 0 { + t.writePacketsLeft-- + } else { + t.requestKeyExchange() + } + + if err := t.pushPacket(p); err != nil { + t.writeError = err + } + + return nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) Close() error { + return t.conn.Close() +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) enterKeyExchange(otherInitPacket []byte) error { + if debugHandshake { + log.Printf("%s entered key exchange", t.id()) + } + + otherInit := &kexInitMsg{} + if err := Unmarshal(otherInitPacket, otherInit); err != nil { + return err + } + + magics := handshakeMagics{ + clientVersion: t.clientVersion, + serverVersion: t.serverVersion, + clientKexInit: otherInitPacket, + serverKexInit: t.sentInitPacket, + } + + clientInit := otherInit + serverInit := t.sentInitMsg + isClient := len(t.hostKeys) == 0 + if isClient { + clientInit, serverInit = serverInit, clientInit + + magics.clientKexInit = t.sentInitPacket + magics.serverKexInit = otherInitPacket + } + + var err error + t.algorithms, err = findAgreedAlgorithms(isClient, clientInit, serverInit) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + // We don't send FirstKexFollows, but we handle receiving it. + // + // RFC 4253 section 7 defines the kex and the agreement method for + // first_kex_packet_follows. It states that the guessed packet + // should be ignored if the "kex algorithm and/or the host + // key algorithm is guessed wrong (server and client have + // different preferred algorithm), or if any of the other + // algorithms cannot be agreed upon". The other algorithms have + // already been checked above so the kex algorithm and host key + // algorithm are checked here. + if otherInit.FirstKexFollows && (clientInit.KexAlgos[0] != serverInit.KexAlgos[0] || clientInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos[0] != serverInit.ServerHostKeyAlgos[0]) { + // other side sent a kex message for the wrong algorithm, + // which we have to ignore. + if _, err := t.conn.readPacket(); err != nil { + return err + } + } + + kex, ok := kexAlgoMap[t.algorithms.kex] + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected key exchange algorithm %v", t.algorithms.kex) + } + + var result *kexResult + if len(t.hostKeys) > 0 { + result, err = t.server(kex, t.algorithms, &magics) + } else { + result, err = t.client(kex, t.algorithms, &magics) + } + + if err != nil { + return err + } + + if t.sessionID == nil { + t.sessionID = result.H + } + result.SessionID = t.sessionID + + if err := t.conn.prepareKeyChange(t.algorithms, result); err != nil { + return err + } + if err = t.conn.writePacket([]byte{msgNewKeys}); err != nil { + return err + } + if packet, err := t.conn.readPacket(); err != nil { + return err + } else if packet[0] != msgNewKeys { + return unexpectedMessageError(msgNewKeys, packet[0]) + } + + return nil +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) server(kex kexAlgorithm, algs *algorithms, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + var hostKey Signer + for _, k := range t.hostKeys { + if algs.hostKey == k.PublicKey().Type() { + hostKey = k + } + } + + r, err := kex.Server(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics, hostKey) + return r, err +} + +func (t *handshakeTransport) client(kex kexAlgorithm, algs *algorithms, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + result, err := kex.Client(t.conn, t.config.Rand, magics) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + hostKey, err := ParsePublicKey(result.HostKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if err := verifyHostKeySignature(hostKey, result); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + err = t.hostKeyCallback(t.dialAddress, t.remoteAddr, hostKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return result, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6c3c648fc --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/kex.go @@ -0,0 +1,789 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "crypto" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/rand" + "crypto/subtle" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/big" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519" +) + +const ( + kexAlgoDH1SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group1-sha1" + kexAlgoDH14SHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1" + kexAlgoECDH256 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp256" + kexAlgoECDH384 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp384" + kexAlgoECDH521 = "ecdh-sha2-nistp521" + kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256 = "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org" + + // For the following kex only the client half contains a production + // ready implementation. The server half only consists of a minimal + // implementation to satisfy the automated tests. + kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1 = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1" + kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256 = "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256" +) + +// kexResult captures the outcome of a key exchange. +type kexResult struct { + // Session hash. See also RFC 4253, section 8. + H []byte + + // Shared secret. See also RFC 4253, section 8. + K []byte + + // Host key as hashed into H. + HostKey []byte + + // Signature of H. + Signature []byte + + // A cryptographic hash function that matches the security + // level of the key exchange algorithm. It is used for + // calculating H, and for deriving keys from H and K. + Hash crypto.Hash + + // The session ID, which is the first H computed. This is used + // to derive key material inside the transport. + SessionID []byte +} + +// handshakeMagics contains data that is always included in the +// session hash. +type handshakeMagics struct { + clientVersion, serverVersion []byte + clientKexInit, serverKexInit []byte +} + +func (m *handshakeMagics) write(w io.Writer) { + writeString(w, m.clientVersion) + writeString(w, m.serverVersion) + writeString(w, m.clientKexInit) + writeString(w, m.serverKexInit) +} + +// kexAlgorithm abstracts different key exchange algorithms. +type kexAlgorithm interface { + // Server runs server-side key agreement, signing the result + // with a hostkey. + Server(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, s Signer) (*kexResult, error) + + // Client runs the client-side key agreement. Caller is + // responsible for verifying the host key signature. + Client(p packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) +} + +// dhGroup is a multiplicative group suitable for implementing Diffie-Hellman key agreement. +type dhGroup struct { + g, p, pMinus1 *big.Int +} + +func (group *dhGroup) diffieHellman(theirPublic, myPrivate *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) { + if theirPublic.Cmp(bigOne) <= 0 || theirPublic.Cmp(group.pMinus1) >= 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds") + } + return new(big.Int).Exp(theirPublic, myPrivate, group.p), nil +} + +func (group *dhGroup) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + hashFunc := crypto.SHA1 + + var x *big.Int + for { + var err error + if x, err = rand.Int(randSource, group.pMinus1); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if x.Sign() > 0 { + break + } + } + + X := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, x, group.p) + kexDHInit := kexDHInitMsg{ + X: X, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHInit)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var kexDHReply kexDHReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHReply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHReply.Y, x) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + h := hashFunc.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, kexDHReply.HostKey) + writeInt(h, X) + writeInt(h, kexDHReply.Y) + K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) + marshalInt(K, ki) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: kexDHReply.HostKey, + Signature: kexDHReply.Signature, + Hash: crypto.SHA1, + }, nil +} + +func (group *dhGroup) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) { + hashFunc := crypto.SHA1 + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return + } + var kexDHInit kexDHInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHInit); err != nil { + return + } + + var y *big.Int + for { + if y, err = rand.Int(randSource, group.pMinus1); err != nil { + return + } + if y.Sign() > 0 { + break + } + } + + Y := new(big.Int).Exp(group.g, y, group.p) + ki, err := group.diffieHellman(kexDHInit.X, y) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + h := hashFunc.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + writeInt(h, kexDHInit.X) + writeInt(h, Y) + + K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) + marshalInt(K, ki) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + // H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its + // own key-specific hash algorithm. + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + kexDHReply := kexDHReplyMsg{ + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Y: Y, + Signature: sig, + } + packet = Marshal(&kexDHReply) + + err = c.writePacket(packet) + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + Hash: crypto.SHA1, + }, err +} + +// ecdh performs Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange as +// described in RFC 5656, section 4. +type ecdh struct { + curve elliptic.Curve +} + +func (kex *ecdh) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + ephKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(kex.curve, rand) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + kexInit := kexECDHInitMsg{ + ClientPubKey: elliptic.Marshal(kex.curve, ephKey.PublicKey.X, ephKey.PublicKey.Y), + } + + serialized := Marshal(&kexInit) + if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var reply kexECDHReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + x, y, err := unmarshalECKey(kex.curve, reply.EphemeralPubKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // generate shared secret + secret, _ := kex.curve.ScalarMult(x, y, ephKey.D.Bytes()) + + h := ecHash(kex.curve).New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, reply.HostKey) + writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey) + writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey) + K := make([]byte, intLength(secret)) + marshalInt(K, secret) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: reply.HostKey, + Signature: reply.Signature, + Hash: ecHash(kex.curve), + }, nil +} + +// unmarshalECKey parses and checks an EC key. +func unmarshalECKey(curve elliptic.Curve, pubkey []byte) (x, y *big.Int, err error) { + x, y = elliptic.Unmarshal(curve, pubkey) + if x == nil { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: elliptic.Unmarshal failure") + } + if !validateECPublicKey(curve, x, y) { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: public key not on curve") + } + return x, y, nil +} + +// validateECPublicKey checks that the point is a valid public key for +// the given curve. See [SEC1], 3.2.2 +func validateECPublicKey(curve elliptic.Curve, x, y *big.Int) bool { + if x.Sign() == 0 && y.Sign() == 0 { + return false + } + + if x.Cmp(curve.Params().P) >= 0 { + return false + } + + if y.Cmp(curve.Params().P) >= 0 { + return false + } + + if !curve.IsOnCurve(x, y) { + return false + } + + // We don't check if N * PubKey == 0, since + // + // - the NIST curves have cofactor = 1, so this is implicit. + // (We don't foresee an implementation that supports non NIST + // curves) + // + // - for ephemeral keys, we don't need to worry about small + // subgroup attacks. + return true +} + +func (kex *ecdh) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var kexECDHInit kexECDHInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexECDHInit); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + clientX, clientY, err := unmarshalECKey(kex.curve, kexECDHInit.ClientPubKey) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // We could cache this key across multiple users/multiple + // connection attempts, but the benefit is small. OpenSSH + // generates a new key for each incoming connection. + ephKey, err := ecdsa.GenerateKey(kex.curve, rand) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + serializedEphKey := elliptic.Marshal(kex.curve, ephKey.PublicKey.X, ephKey.PublicKey.Y) + + // generate shared secret + secret, _ := kex.curve.ScalarMult(clientX, clientY, ephKey.D.Bytes()) + + h := ecHash(kex.curve).New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + writeString(h, kexECDHInit.ClientPubKey) + writeString(h, serializedEphKey) + + K := make([]byte, intLength(secret)) + marshalInt(K, secret) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + // H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its + // own key-specific hash algorithm. + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{ + EphemeralPubKey: serializedEphKey, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + } + + serialized := Marshal(&reply) + if err := c.writePacket(serialized); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: reply.HostKey, + Signature: sig, + Hash: ecHash(kex.curve), + }, nil +} + +var kexAlgoMap = map[string]kexAlgorithm{} + +func init() { + // This is the group called diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 in RFC + // 4253 and Oakley Group 2 in RFC 2409. + p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16) + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH1SHA1] = &dhGroup{ + g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), + p: p, + pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne), + } + + // This is the group called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 in RFC + // 4253 and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526. + p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString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kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDH14SHA1] = &dhGroup{ + g: new(big.Int).SetInt64(2), + p: p, + pMinus1: new(big.Int).Sub(p, bigOne), + } + + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH521] = &ecdh{elliptic.P521()} + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH384] = &ecdh{elliptic.P384()} + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoECDH256] = &ecdh{elliptic.P256()} + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoCurve25519SHA256] = &curve25519sha256{} + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDHGEXSHA1] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA1} + kexAlgoMap[kexAlgoDHGEXSHA256] = &dhGEXSHA{hashFunc: crypto.SHA256} +} + +// curve25519sha256 implements the curve25519-sha256@libssh.org key +// agreement protocol, as described in +// https://git.libssh.org/projects/libssh.git/tree/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt +type curve25519sha256 struct{} + +type curve25519KeyPair struct { + priv [32]byte + pub [32]byte +} + +func (kp *curve25519KeyPair) generate(rand io.Reader) error { + if _, err := io.ReadFull(rand, kp.priv[:]); err != nil { + return err + } + curve25519.ScalarBaseMult(&kp.pub, &kp.priv) + return nil +} + +// curve25519Zeros is just an array of 32 zero bytes so that we have something +// convenient to compare against in order to reject curve25519 points with the +// wrong order. +var curve25519Zeros [32]byte + +func (kex *curve25519sha256) Client(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + var kp curve25519KeyPair + if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexECDHInitMsg{kp.pub[:]})); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var reply kexECDHReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &reply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if len(reply.EphemeralPubKey) != 32 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length") + } + + var servPub, secret [32]byte + copy(servPub[:], reply.EphemeralPubKey) + curve25519.ScalarMult(&secret, &kp.priv, &servPub) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(secret[:], curve25519Zeros[:]) == 1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong order") + } + + h := crypto.SHA256.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, reply.HostKey) + writeString(h, kp.pub[:]) + writeString(h, reply.EphemeralPubKey) + + ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:]) + K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) + marshalInt(K, ki) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: reply.HostKey, + Signature: reply.Signature, + Hash: crypto.SHA256, + }, nil +} + +func (kex *curve25519sha256) Server(c packetConn, rand io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) { + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return + } + var kexInit kexECDHInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexInit); err != nil { + return + } + + if len(kexInit.ClientPubKey) != 32 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong length") + } + + var kp curve25519KeyPair + if err := kp.generate(rand); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var clientPub, secret [32]byte + copy(clientPub[:], kexInit.ClientPubKey) + curve25519.ScalarMult(&secret, &kp.priv, &clientPub) + if subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(secret[:], curve25519Zeros[:]) == 1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: peer's curve25519 public value has wrong order") + } + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + h := crypto.SHA256.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + writeString(h, kexInit.ClientPubKey) + writeString(h, kp.pub[:]) + + ki := new(big.Int).SetBytes(secret[:]) + K := make([]byte, intLength(ki)) + marshalInt(K, ki) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, rand, H) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + reply := kexECDHReplyMsg{ + EphemeralPubKey: kp.pub[:], + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&reply)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + Hash: crypto.SHA256, + }, nil +} + +// dhGEXSHA implements the diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 and +// diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 key agreement protocols, +// as described in RFC 4419 +type dhGEXSHA struct { + g, p *big.Int + hashFunc crypto.Hash +} + +const numMRTests = 64 + +const ( + dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits = 2048 + dhGroupExchangePreferredBits = 2048 + dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits = 8192 +) + +func (gex *dhGEXSHA) diffieHellman(theirPublic, myPrivate *big.Int) (*big.Int, error) { + if theirPublic.Sign() <= 0 || theirPublic.Cmp(gex.p) >= 0 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: DH parameter out of bounds") + } + return new(big.Int).Exp(theirPublic, myPrivate, gex.p), nil +} + +func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Client(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics) (*kexResult, error) { + // Send GexRequest + kexDHGexRequest := kexDHGexRequestMsg{ + MinBits: dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits, + PreferedBits: dhGroupExchangePreferredBits, + MaxBits: dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexRequest)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Receive GexGroup + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var kexDHGexGroup kexDHGexGroupMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexGroup); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // reject if p's bit length < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits or > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits + if kexDHGexGroup.P.BitLen() < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits || kexDHGexGroup.P.BitLen() > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server-generated gex p is out of range (%d bits)", kexDHGexGroup.P.BitLen()) + } + + gex.p = kexDHGexGroup.P + gex.g = kexDHGexGroup.G + + // Check if p is safe by verifing that p and (p-1)/2 are primes + one := big.NewInt(1) + var pHalf = &big.Int{} + pHalf.Rsh(gex.p, 1) + if !gex.p.ProbablyPrime(numMRTests) || !pHalf.ProbablyPrime(numMRTests) { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server provided gex p is not safe") + } + + // Check if g is safe by verifing that g > 1 and g < p - 1 + var pMinusOne = &big.Int{} + pMinusOne.Sub(gex.p, one) + if gex.g.Cmp(one) != 1 && gex.g.Cmp(pMinusOne) != -1 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: server provided gex g is not safe") + } + + // Send GexInit + x, err := rand.Int(randSource, pHalf) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + X := new(big.Int).Exp(gex.g, x, gex.p) + kexDHGexInit := kexDHGexInitMsg{ + X: X, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexInit)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Receive GexReply + packet, err = c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var kexDHGexReply kexDHGexReplyMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexReply); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + kInt, err := gex.diffieHellman(kexDHGexReply.Y, x) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Check if k is safe by verifing that k > 1 and k < p - 1 + if kInt.Cmp(one) != 1 && kInt.Cmp(pMinusOne) != -1 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: derived k is not safe") + } + + h := gex.hashFunc.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, kexDHGexReply.HostKey) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits)) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangePreferredBits)) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits)) + writeInt(h, gex.p) + writeInt(h, gex.g) + writeInt(h, X) + writeInt(h, kexDHGexReply.Y) + K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt)) + marshalInt(K, kInt) + h.Write(K) + + return &kexResult{ + H: h.Sum(nil), + K: K, + HostKey: kexDHGexReply.HostKey, + Signature: kexDHGexReply.Signature, + Hash: gex.hashFunc, + }, nil +} + +// Server half implementation of the Diffie Hellman Key Exchange with SHA1 and SHA256. +// +// This is a minimal implementation to satisfy the automated tests. +func (gex *dhGEXSHA) Server(c packetConn, randSource io.Reader, magics *handshakeMagics, priv Signer) (result *kexResult, err error) { + // Receive GexRequest + packet, err := c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return + } + var kexDHGexRequest kexDHGexRequestMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexRequest); err != nil { + return + } + + // smoosh the user's preferred size into our own limits + if kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits > dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits { + kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits = dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits + } + if kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits < dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits { + kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits = dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits + } + // fix min/max if they're inconsistent. technically, we could just pout + // and hang up, but there's no harm in giving them the benefit of the + // doubt and just picking a bitsize for them. + if kexDHGexRequest.MinBits > kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits { + kexDHGexRequest.MinBits = kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits + } + if kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits < kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits { + kexDHGexRequest.MaxBits = kexDHGexRequest.PreferedBits + } + + // Send GexGroup + // This is the group called diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 in RFC + // 4253 and Oakley Group 14 in RFC 3526. + p, _ := new(big.Int).SetString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gex.p = p + gex.g = big.NewInt(2) + + kexDHGexGroup := kexDHGexGroupMsg{ + P: gex.p, + G: gex.g, + } + if err := c.writePacket(Marshal(&kexDHGexGroup)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // Receive GexInit + packet, err = c.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return + } + var kexDHGexInit kexDHGexInitMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &kexDHGexInit); err != nil { + return + } + + var pHalf = &big.Int{} + pHalf.Rsh(gex.p, 1) + + y, err := rand.Int(randSource, pHalf) + if err != nil { + return + } + + Y := new(big.Int).Exp(gex.g, y, gex.p) + kInt, err := gex.diffieHellman(kexDHGexInit.X, y) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + hostKeyBytes := priv.PublicKey().Marshal() + + h := gex.hashFunc.New() + magics.write(h) + writeString(h, hostKeyBytes) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMinimumBits)) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangePreferredBits)) + binary.Write(h, binary.BigEndian, uint32(dhGroupExchangeMaximumBits)) + writeInt(h, gex.p) + writeInt(h, gex.g) + writeInt(h, kexDHGexInit.X) + writeInt(h, Y) + + K := make([]byte, intLength(kInt)) + marshalInt(K, kInt) + h.Write(K) + + H := h.Sum(nil) + + // H is already a hash, but the hostkey signing will apply its + // own key-specific hash algorithm. + sig, err := signAndMarshal(priv, randSource, H) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + kexDHGexReply := kexDHGexReplyMsg{ + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Y: Y, + Signature: sig, + } + packet = Marshal(&kexDHGexReply) + + err = c.writePacket(packet) + + return &kexResult{ + H: H, + K: K, + HostKey: hostKeyBytes, + Signature: sig, + Hash: gex.hashFunc, + }, err +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..969804794 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/keys.go @@ -0,0 +1,1100 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "crypto" + "crypto/dsa" + "crypto/ecdsa" + "crypto/elliptic" + "crypto/md5" + "crypto/rsa" + "crypto/sha256" + "crypto/x509" + "encoding/asn1" + "encoding/base64" + "encoding/hex" + "encoding/pem" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/big" + "strings" + + "golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519" +) + +// These constants represent the algorithm names for key types supported by this +// package. +const ( + KeyAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa" + KeyAlgoDSA = "ssh-dss" + KeyAlgoECDSA256 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256" + KeyAlgoECDSA384 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384" + KeyAlgoECDSA521 = "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521" + KeyAlgoED25519 = "ssh-ed25519" +) + +// These constants represent non-default signature algorithms that are supported +// as algorithm parameters to AlgorithmSigner.SignWithAlgorithm methods. See +// [PROTOCOL.agent] section 4.5.1 and +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-curdle-rsa-sha2-10 +const ( + SigAlgoRSA = "ssh-rsa" + SigAlgoRSASHA2256 = "rsa-sha2-256" + SigAlgoRSASHA2512 = "rsa-sha2-512" +) + +// parsePubKey parses a public key of the given algorithm. +// Use ParsePublicKey for keys with prepended algorithm. +func parsePubKey(in []byte, algo string) (pubKey PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + switch algo { + case KeyAlgoRSA: + return parseRSA(in) + case KeyAlgoDSA: + return parseDSA(in) + case KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521: + return parseECDSA(in) + case KeyAlgoED25519: + return parseED25519(in) + case CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01: + cert, err := parseCert(in, certToPrivAlgo(algo)) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + return cert, nil, nil + } + return nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown key algorithm: %v", algo) +} + +// parseAuthorizedKey parses a public key in OpenSSH authorized_keys format +// (see sshd(8) manual page) once the options and key type fields have been +// removed. +func parseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, err error) { + in = bytes.TrimSpace(in) + + i := bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") + if i == -1 { + i = len(in) + } + base64Key := in[:i] + + key := make([]byte, base64.StdEncoding.DecodedLen(len(base64Key))) + n, err := base64.StdEncoding.Decode(key, base64Key) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + key = key[:n] + out, err = ParsePublicKey(key) + if err != nil { + return nil, "", err + } + comment = string(bytes.TrimSpace(in[i:])) + return out, comment, nil +} + +// ParseKnownHosts parses an entry in the format of the known_hosts file. +// +// The known_hosts format is documented in the sshd(8) manual page. This +// function will parse a single entry from in. On successful return, marker +// will contain the optional marker value (i.e. "cert-authority" or "revoked") +// or else be empty, hosts will contain the hosts that this entry matches, +// pubKey will contain the public key and comment will contain any trailing +// comment at the end of the line. See the sshd(8) manual page for the various +// forms that a host string can take. +// +// The unparsed remainder of the input will be returned in rest. This function +// can be called repeatedly to parse multiple entries. +// +// If no entries were found in the input then err will be io.EOF. Otherwise a +// non-nil err value indicates a parse error. +func ParseKnownHosts(in []byte) (marker string, hosts []string, pubKey PublicKey, comment string, rest []byte, err error) { + for len(in) > 0 { + end := bytes.IndexByte(in, '\n') + if end != -1 { + rest = in[end+1:] + in = in[:end] + } else { + rest = nil + } + + end = bytes.IndexByte(in, '\r') + if end != -1 { + in = in[:end] + } + + in = bytes.TrimSpace(in) + if len(in) == 0 || in[0] == '#' { + in = rest + continue + } + + i := bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") + if i == -1 { + in = rest + continue + } + + // Strip out the beginning of the known_host key. + // This is either an optional marker or a (set of) hostname(s). + keyFields := bytes.Fields(in) + if len(keyFields) < 3 || len(keyFields) > 5 { + return "", nil, nil, "", nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid entry in known_hosts data") + } + + // keyFields[0] is either "@cert-authority", "@revoked" or a comma separated + // list of hosts + marker := "" + if keyFields[0][0] == '@' { + marker = string(keyFields[0][1:]) + keyFields = keyFields[1:] + } + + hosts := string(keyFields[0]) + // keyFields[1] contains the key type (e.g. “ssh-rsa”). + // However, that information is duplicated inside the + // base64-encoded key and so is ignored here. + + key := bytes.Join(keyFields[2:], []byte(" ")) + if pubKey, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(key); err != nil { + return "", nil, nil, "", nil, err + } + + return marker, strings.Split(hosts, ","), pubKey, comment, rest, nil + } + + return "", nil, nil, "", nil, io.EOF +} + +// ParseAuthorizedKeys parses a public key from an authorized_keys +// file used in OpenSSH according to the sshd(8) manual page. +func ParseAuthorizedKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, comment string, options []string, rest []byte, err error) { + for len(in) > 0 { + end := bytes.IndexByte(in, '\n') + if end != -1 { + rest = in[end+1:] + in = in[:end] + } else { + rest = nil + } + + end = bytes.IndexByte(in, '\r') + if end != -1 { + in = in[:end] + } + + in = bytes.TrimSpace(in) + if len(in) == 0 || in[0] == '#' { + in = rest + continue + } + + i := bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") + if i == -1 { + in = rest + continue + } + + if out, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(in[i:]); err == nil { + return out, comment, options, rest, nil + } + + // No key type recognised. Maybe there's an options field at + // the beginning. + var b byte + inQuote := false + var candidateOptions []string + optionStart := 0 + for i, b = range in { + isEnd := !inQuote && (b == ' ' || b == '\t') + if (b == ',' && !inQuote) || isEnd { + if i-optionStart > 0 { + candidateOptions = append(candidateOptions, string(in[optionStart:i])) + } + optionStart = i + 1 + } + if isEnd { + break + } + if b == '"' && (i == 0 || (i > 0 && in[i-1] != '\\')) { + inQuote = !inQuote + } + } + for i < len(in) && (in[i] == ' ' || in[i] == '\t') { + i++ + } + if i == len(in) { + // Invalid line: unmatched quote + in = rest + continue + } + + in = in[i:] + i = bytes.IndexAny(in, " \t") + if i == -1 { + in = rest + continue + } + + if out, comment, err = parseAuthorizedKey(in[i:]); err == nil { + options = candidateOptions + return out, comment, options, rest, nil + } + + in = rest + continue + } + + return nil, "", nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found") +} + +// ParsePublicKey parses an SSH public key formatted for use in +// the SSH wire protocol according to RFC 4253, section 6.6. +func ParsePublicKey(in []byte) (out PublicKey, err error) { + algo, in, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return nil, errShortRead + } + var rest []byte + out, rest, err = parsePubKey(in, string(algo)) + if len(rest) > 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: trailing junk in public key") + } + + return out, err +} + +// MarshalAuthorizedKey serializes key for inclusion in an OpenSSH +// authorized_keys file. The return value ends with newline. +func MarshalAuthorizedKey(key PublicKey) []byte { + b := &bytes.Buffer{} + b.WriteString(key.Type()) + b.WriteByte(' ') + e := base64.NewEncoder(base64.StdEncoding, b) + e.Write(key.Marshal()) + e.Close() + b.WriteByte('\n') + return b.Bytes() +} + +// PublicKey is an abstraction of different types of public keys. +type PublicKey interface { + // Type returns the key's type, e.g. "ssh-rsa". + Type() string + + // Marshal returns the serialized key data in SSH wire format, + // with the name prefix. To unmarshal the returned data, use + // the ParsePublicKey function. + Marshal() []byte + + // Verify that sig is a signature on the given data using this + // key. This function will hash the data appropriately first. + Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error +} + +// CryptoPublicKey, if implemented by a PublicKey, +// returns the underlying crypto.PublicKey form of the key. +type CryptoPublicKey interface { + CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey +} + +// A Signer can create signatures that verify against a public key. +type Signer interface { + // PublicKey returns an associated PublicKey instance. + PublicKey() PublicKey + + // Sign returns raw signature for the given data. This method + // will apply the hash specified for the keytype to the data. + Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) +} + +// A AlgorithmSigner is a Signer that also supports specifying a specific +// algorithm to use for signing. +type AlgorithmSigner interface { + Signer + + // SignWithAlgorithm is like Signer.Sign, but allows specification of a + // non-default signing algorithm. See the SigAlgo* constants in this + // package for signature algorithms supported by this package. Callers may + // pass an empty string for the algorithm in which case the AlgorithmSigner + // will use its default algorithm. + SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) +} + +type rsaPublicKey rsa.PublicKey + +func (r *rsaPublicKey) Type() string { + return "ssh-rsa" +} + +// parseRSA parses an RSA key according to RFC 4253, section 6.6. +func parseRSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + E *big.Int + N *big.Int + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + if w.E.BitLen() > 24 { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: exponent too large") + } + e := w.E.Int64() + if e < 3 || e&1 == 0 { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: incorrect exponent") + } + + var key rsa.PublicKey + key.E = int(e) + key.N = w.N + return (*rsaPublicKey)(&key), w.Rest, nil +} + +func (r *rsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + e := new(big.Int).SetInt64(int64(r.E)) + // RSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by + // parseRSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package. + wirekey := struct { + Name string + E *big.Int + N *big.Int + }{ + KeyAlgoRSA, + e, + r.N, + } + return Marshal(&wirekey) +} + +func (r *rsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + var hash crypto.Hash + switch sig.Format { + case SigAlgoRSA: + hash = crypto.SHA1 + case SigAlgoRSASHA2256: + hash = crypto.SHA256 + case SigAlgoRSASHA2512: + hash = crypto.SHA512 + default: + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, r.Type()) + } + h := hash.New() + h.Write(data) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + return rsa.VerifyPKCS1v15((*rsa.PublicKey)(r), hash, digest, sig.Blob) +} + +func (r *rsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return (*rsa.PublicKey)(r) +} + +type dsaPublicKey dsa.PublicKey + +func (k *dsaPublicKey) Type() string { + return "ssh-dss" +} + +func checkDSAParams(param *dsa.Parameters) error { + // SSH specifies FIPS 186-2, which only provided a single size + // (1024 bits) DSA key. FIPS 186-3 allows for larger key + // sizes, which would confuse SSH. + if l := param.P.BitLen(); l != 1024 { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported DSA key size %d", l) + } + + return nil +} + +// parseDSA parses an DSA key according to RFC 4253, section 6.6. +func parseDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + P, Q, G, Y *big.Int + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + param := dsa.Parameters{ + P: w.P, + Q: w.Q, + G: w.G, + } + if err := checkDSAParams(¶m); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + key := &dsaPublicKey{ + Parameters: param, + Y: w.Y, + } + return key, w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k *dsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + // DSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by + // parseDSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package. + w := struct { + Name string + P, Q, G, Y *big.Int + }{ + k.Type(), + k.P, + k.Q, + k.G, + k.Y, + } + + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k *dsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + h := crypto.SHA1.New() + h.Write(data) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + + // Per RFC 4253, section 6.6, + // The value for 'dss_signature_blob' is encoded as a string containing + // r, followed by s (which are 160-bit integers, without lengths or + // padding, unsigned, and in network byte order). + // For DSS purposes, sig.Blob should be exactly 40 bytes in length. + if len(sig.Blob) != 40 { + return errors.New("ssh: DSA signature parse error") + } + r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.Blob[:20]) + s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig.Blob[20:]) + if dsa.Verify((*dsa.PublicKey)(k), digest, r, s) { + return nil + } + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") +} + +func (k *dsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return (*dsa.PublicKey)(k) +} + +type dsaPrivateKey struct { + *dsa.PrivateKey +} + +func (k *dsaPrivateKey) PublicKey() PublicKey { + return (*dsaPublicKey)(&k.PrivateKey.PublicKey) +} + +func (k *dsaPrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { + return k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, "") +} + +func (k *dsaPrivateKey) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + if algorithm != "" && algorithm != k.PublicKey().Type() { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm) + } + + h := crypto.SHA1.New() + h.Write(data) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + r, s, err := dsa.Sign(rand, k.PrivateKey, digest) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + sig := make([]byte, 40) + rb := r.Bytes() + sb := s.Bytes() + + copy(sig[20-len(rb):20], rb) + copy(sig[40-len(sb):], sb) + + return &Signature{ + Format: k.PublicKey().Type(), + Blob: sig, + }, nil +} + +type ecdsaPublicKey ecdsa.PublicKey + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Type() string { + return "ecdsa-sha2-" + k.nistID() +} + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) nistID() string { + switch k.Params().BitSize { + case 256: + return "nistp256" + case 384: + return "nistp384" + case 521: + return "nistp521" + } + panic("ssh: unsupported ecdsa key size") +} + +type ed25519PublicKey ed25519.PublicKey + +func (k ed25519PublicKey) Type() string { + return KeyAlgoED25519 +} + +func parseED25519(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + KeyBytes []byte + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + key := ed25519.PublicKey(w.KeyBytes) + + return (ed25519PublicKey)(key), w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k ed25519PublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + w := struct { + Name string + KeyBytes []byte + }{ + KeyAlgoED25519, + []byte(k), + } + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k ed25519PublicKey) Verify(b []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + + edKey := (ed25519.PublicKey)(k) + if ok := ed25519.Verify(edKey, b, sig.Blob); !ok { + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") + } + + return nil +} + +func (k ed25519PublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return ed25519.PublicKey(k) +} + +func supportedEllipticCurve(curve elliptic.Curve) bool { + return curve == elliptic.P256() || curve == elliptic.P384() || curve == elliptic.P521() +} + +// ecHash returns the hash to match the given elliptic curve, see RFC +// 5656, section 6.2.1 +func ecHash(curve elliptic.Curve) crypto.Hash { + bitSize := curve.Params().BitSize + switch { + case bitSize <= 256: + return crypto.SHA256 + case bitSize <= 384: + return crypto.SHA384 + } + return crypto.SHA512 +} + +// parseECDSA parses an ECDSA key according to RFC 5656, section 3.1. +func parseECDSA(in []byte) (out PublicKey, rest []byte, err error) { + var w struct { + Curve string + KeyBytes []byte + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + } + + if err := Unmarshal(in, &w); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + key := new(ecdsa.PublicKey) + + switch w.Curve { + case "nistp256": + key.Curve = elliptic.P256() + case "nistp384": + key.Curve = elliptic.P384() + case "nistp521": + key.Curve = elliptic.P521() + default: + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: unsupported curve") + } + + key.X, key.Y = elliptic.Unmarshal(key.Curve, w.KeyBytes) + if key.X == nil || key.Y == nil { + return nil, nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid curve point") + } + return (*ecdsaPublicKey)(key), w.Rest, nil +} + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Marshal() []byte { + // See RFC 5656, section 3.1. + keyBytes := elliptic.Marshal(k.Curve, k.X, k.Y) + // ECDSA publickey struct layout should match the struct used by + // parseECDSACert in the x/crypto/ssh/agent package. + w := struct { + Name string + ID string + Key []byte + }{ + k.Type(), + k.nistID(), + keyBytes, + } + + return Marshal(&w) +} + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) Verify(data []byte, sig *Signature) error { + if sig.Format != k.Type() { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature type %s for key type %s", sig.Format, k.Type()) + } + + h := ecHash(k.Curve).New() + h.Write(data) + digest := h.Sum(nil) + + // Per RFC 5656, section 3.1.2, + // The ecdsa_signature_blob value has the following specific encoding: + // mpint r + // mpint s + var ecSig struct { + R *big.Int + S *big.Int + } + + if err := Unmarshal(sig.Blob, &ecSig); err != nil { + return err + } + + if ecdsa.Verify((*ecdsa.PublicKey)(k), digest, ecSig.R, ecSig.S) { + return nil + } + return errors.New("ssh: signature did not verify") +} + +func (k *ecdsaPublicKey) CryptoPublicKey() crypto.PublicKey { + return (*ecdsa.PublicKey)(k) +} + +// NewSignerFromKey takes an *rsa.PrivateKey, *dsa.PrivateKey, +// *ecdsa.PrivateKey or any other crypto.Signer and returns a +// corresponding Signer instance. ECDSA keys must use P-256, P-384 or +// P-521. DSA keys must use parameter size L1024N160. +func NewSignerFromKey(key interface{}) (Signer, error) { + switch key := key.(type) { + case crypto.Signer: + return NewSignerFromSigner(key) + case *dsa.PrivateKey: + return newDSAPrivateKey(key) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key) + } +} + +func newDSAPrivateKey(key *dsa.PrivateKey) (Signer, error) { + if err := checkDSAParams(&key.PublicKey.Parameters); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &dsaPrivateKey{key}, nil +} + +type wrappedSigner struct { + signer crypto.Signer + pubKey PublicKey +} + +// NewSignerFromSigner takes any crypto.Signer implementation and +// returns a corresponding Signer interface. This can be used, for +// example, with keys kept in hardware modules. +func NewSignerFromSigner(signer crypto.Signer) (Signer, error) { + pubKey, err := NewPublicKey(signer.Public()) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return &wrappedSigner{signer, pubKey}, nil +} + +func (s *wrappedSigner) PublicKey() PublicKey { + return s.pubKey +} + +func (s *wrappedSigner) Sign(rand io.Reader, data []byte) (*Signature, error) { + return s.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, "") +} + +func (s *wrappedSigner) SignWithAlgorithm(rand io.Reader, data []byte, algorithm string) (*Signature, error) { + var hashFunc crypto.Hash + + if _, ok := s.pubKey.(*rsaPublicKey); ok { + // RSA keys support a few hash functions determined by the requested signature algorithm + switch algorithm { + case "", SigAlgoRSA: + algorithm = SigAlgoRSA + hashFunc = crypto.SHA1 + case SigAlgoRSASHA2256: + hashFunc = crypto.SHA256 + case SigAlgoRSASHA2512: + hashFunc = crypto.SHA512 + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm) + } + } else { + // The only supported algorithm for all other key types is the same as the type of the key + if algorithm == "" { + algorithm = s.pubKey.Type() + } else if algorithm != s.pubKey.Type() { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported signature algorithm %s", algorithm) + } + + switch key := s.pubKey.(type) { + case *dsaPublicKey: + hashFunc = crypto.SHA1 + case *ecdsaPublicKey: + hashFunc = ecHash(key.Curve) + case ed25519PublicKey: + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key) + } + } + + var digest []byte + if hashFunc != 0 { + h := hashFunc.New() + h.Write(data) + digest = h.Sum(nil) + } else { + digest = data + } + + signature, err := s.signer.Sign(rand, digest, hashFunc) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // crypto.Signer.Sign is expected to return an ASN.1-encoded signature + // for ECDSA and DSA, but that's not the encoding expected by SSH, so + // re-encode. + switch s.pubKey.(type) { + case *ecdsaPublicKey, *dsaPublicKey: + type asn1Signature struct { + R, S *big.Int + } + asn1Sig := new(asn1Signature) + _, err := asn1.Unmarshal(signature, asn1Sig) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + switch s.pubKey.(type) { + case *ecdsaPublicKey: + signature = Marshal(asn1Sig) + + case *dsaPublicKey: + signature = make([]byte, 40) + r := asn1Sig.R.Bytes() + s := asn1Sig.S.Bytes() + copy(signature[20-len(r):20], r) + copy(signature[40-len(s):40], s) + } + } + + return &Signature{ + Format: algorithm, + Blob: signature, + }, nil +} + +// NewPublicKey takes an *rsa.PublicKey, *dsa.PublicKey, *ecdsa.PublicKey, +// or ed25519.PublicKey returns a corresponding PublicKey instance. +// ECDSA keys must use P-256, P-384 or P-521. +func NewPublicKey(key interface{}) (PublicKey, error) { + switch key := key.(type) { + case *rsa.PublicKey: + return (*rsaPublicKey)(key), nil + case *ecdsa.PublicKey: + if !supportedEllipticCurve(key.Curve) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: only P-256, P-384 and P-521 EC keys are supported") + } + return (*ecdsaPublicKey)(key), nil + case *dsa.PublicKey: + return (*dsaPublicKey)(key), nil + case ed25519.PublicKey: + return (ed25519PublicKey)(key), nil + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %T", key) + } +} + +// ParsePrivateKey returns a Signer from a PEM encoded private key. It supports +// the same keys as ParseRawPrivateKey. +func ParsePrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (Signer, error) { + key, err := ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return NewSignerFromKey(key) +} + +// ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a Signer from a PEM encoded private +// key and passphrase. It supports the same keys as +// ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase. +func ParsePrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passPhrase []byte) (Signer, error) { + key, err := ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passPhrase) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return NewSignerFromKey(key) +} + +// encryptedBlock tells whether a private key is +// encrypted by examining its Proc-Type header +// for a mention of ENCRYPTED +// according to RFC 1421 Section 4.6.1.1. +func encryptedBlock(block *pem.Block) bool { + return strings.Contains(block.Headers["Proc-Type"], "ENCRYPTED") +} + +// ParseRawPrivateKey returns a private key from a PEM encoded private key. It +// supports RSA (PKCS#1), PKCS#8, DSA (OpenSSL), and ECDSA private keys. +func ParseRawPrivateKey(pemBytes []byte) (interface{}, error) { + block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes) + if block == nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found") + } + + if encryptedBlock(block) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: cannot decode encrypted private keys") + } + + switch block.Type { + case "RSA PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(block.Bytes) + // RFC5208 - https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5208 + case "PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParsePKCS8PrivateKey(block.Bytes) + case "EC PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParseECPrivateKey(block.Bytes) + case "DSA PRIVATE KEY": + return ParseDSAPrivateKey(block.Bytes) + case "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY": + return parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(block.Bytes) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %q", block.Type) + } +} + +// ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase returns a private key decrypted with +// passphrase from a PEM encoded private key. If wrong passphrase, return +// x509.IncorrectPasswordError. +func ParseRawPrivateKeyWithPassphrase(pemBytes, passPhrase []byte) (interface{}, error) { + block, _ := pem.Decode(pemBytes) + if block == nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: no key found") + } + buf := block.Bytes + + if encryptedBlock(block) { + if x509.IsEncryptedPEMBlock(block) { + var err error + buf, err = x509.DecryptPEMBlock(block, passPhrase) + if err != nil { + if err == x509.IncorrectPasswordError { + return nil, err + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot decode encrypted private keys: %v", err) + } + } + } + + switch block.Type { + case "RSA PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParsePKCS1PrivateKey(buf) + case "EC PRIVATE KEY": + return x509.ParseECPrivateKey(buf) + case "DSA PRIVATE KEY": + return ParseDSAPrivateKey(buf) + case "OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY": + return parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(buf) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key type %q", block.Type) + } +} + +// ParseDSAPrivateKey returns a DSA private key from its ASN.1 DER encoding, as +// specified by the OpenSSL DSA man page. +func ParseDSAPrivateKey(der []byte) (*dsa.PrivateKey, error) { + var k struct { + Version int + P *big.Int + Q *big.Int + G *big.Int + Pub *big.Int + Priv *big.Int + } + rest, err := asn1.Unmarshal(der, &k) + if err != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: failed to parse DSA key: " + err.Error()) + } + if len(rest) > 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: garbage after DSA key") + } + + return &dsa.PrivateKey{ + PublicKey: dsa.PublicKey{ + Parameters: dsa.Parameters{ + P: k.P, + Q: k.Q, + G: k.G, + }, + Y: k.Pub, + }, + X: k.Priv, + }, nil +} + +// Implemented based on the documentation at +// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL.key +func parseOpenSSHPrivateKey(key []byte) (crypto.PrivateKey, error) { + const magic = "openssh-key-v1\x00" + if len(key) < len(magic) || string(key[:len(magic)]) != magic { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: invalid openssh private key format") + } + remaining := key[len(magic):] + + var w struct { + CipherName string + KdfName string + KdfOpts string + NumKeys uint32 + PubKey []byte + PrivKeyBlock []byte + } + + if err := Unmarshal(remaining, &w); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if w.KdfName != "none" || w.CipherName != "none" { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: cannot decode encrypted private keys") + } + + pk1 := struct { + Check1 uint32 + Check2 uint32 + Keytype string + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` + }{} + + if err := Unmarshal(w.PrivKeyBlock, &pk1); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if pk1.Check1 != pk1.Check2 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: checkint mismatch") + } + + // we only handle ed25519 and rsa keys currently + switch pk1.Keytype { + case KeyAlgoRSA: + // https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/sshkey.c#L2760-L2773 + key := struct { + N *big.Int + E *big.Int + D *big.Int + Iqmp *big.Int + P *big.Int + Q *big.Int + Comment string + Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"` + }{} + + if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + for i, b := range key.Pad { + if int(b) != i+1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: padding not as expected") + } + } + + pk := &rsa.PrivateKey{ + PublicKey: rsa.PublicKey{ + N: key.N, + E: int(key.E.Int64()), + }, + D: key.D, + Primes: []*big.Int{key.P, key.Q}, + } + + if err := pk.Validate(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + pk.Precompute() + + return pk, nil + case KeyAlgoED25519: + key := struct { + Pub []byte + Priv []byte + Comment string + Pad []byte `ssh:"rest"` + }{} + + if err := Unmarshal(pk1.Rest, &key); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if len(key.Priv) != ed25519.PrivateKeySize { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: private key unexpected length") + } + + for i, b := range key.Pad { + if int(b) != i+1 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: padding not as expected") + } + } + + pk := ed25519.PrivateKey(make([]byte, ed25519.PrivateKeySize)) + copy(pk, key.Priv) + return &pk, nil + default: + return nil, errors.New("ssh: unhandled key type") + } +} + +// FingerprintLegacyMD5 returns the user presentation of the key's +// fingerprint as described by RFC 4716 section 4. +func FingerprintLegacyMD5(pubKey PublicKey) string { + md5sum := md5.Sum(pubKey.Marshal()) + hexarray := make([]string, len(md5sum)) + for i, c := range md5sum { + hexarray[i] = hex.EncodeToString([]byte{c}) + } + return strings.Join(hexarray, ":") +} + +// FingerprintSHA256 returns the user presentation of the key's +// fingerprint as unpadded base64 encoded sha256 hash. +// This format was introduced from OpenSSH 6.8. +// https://www.openssh.com/txt/release-6.8 +// https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4648#section-3.2 (unpadded base64 encoding) +func FingerprintSHA256(pubKey PublicKey) string { + sha256sum := sha256.Sum256(pubKey.Marshal()) + hash := base64.RawStdEncoding.EncodeToString(sha256sum[:]) + return "SHA256:" + hash +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..c07a06285 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mac.go @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +// Message authentication support + +import ( + "crypto/hmac" + "crypto/sha1" + "crypto/sha256" + "hash" +) + +type macMode struct { + keySize int + etm bool + new func(key []byte) hash.Hash +} + +// truncatingMAC wraps around a hash.Hash and truncates the output digest to +// a given size. +type truncatingMAC struct { + length int + hmac hash.Hash +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) Write(data []byte) (int, error) { + return t.hmac.Write(data) +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) Sum(in []byte) []byte { + out := t.hmac.Sum(in) + return out[:len(in)+t.length] +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) Reset() { + t.hmac.Reset() +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) Size() int { + return t.length +} + +func (t truncatingMAC) BlockSize() int { return t.hmac.BlockSize() } + +var macModes = map[string]*macMode{ + "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com": {32, true, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha256.New, key) + }}, + "hmac-sha2-256": {32, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha256.New, key) + }}, + "hmac-sha1": {20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return hmac.New(sha1.New, key) + }}, + "hmac-sha1-96": {20, false, func(key []byte) hash.Hash { + return truncatingMAC{12, hmac.New(sha1.New, key)} + }}, +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ac41a4168 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/messages.go @@ -0,0 +1,866 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/big" + "reflect" + "strconv" + "strings" +) + +// These are SSH message type numbers. They are scattered around several +// documents but many were taken from [SSH-PARAMETERS]. +const ( + msgIgnore = 2 + msgUnimplemented = 3 + msgDebug = 4 + msgNewKeys = 21 +) + +// SSH messages: +// +// These structures mirror the wire format of the corresponding SSH messages. +// They are marshaled using reflection with the marshal and unmarshal functions +// in this file. The only wrinkle is that a final member of type []byte with a +// ssh tag of "rest" receives the remainder of a packet when unmarshaling. + +// See RFC 4253, section 11.1. +const msgDisconnect = 1 + +// disconnectMsg is the message that signals a disconnect. It is also +// the error type returned from mux.Wait() +type disconnectMsg struct { + Reason uint32 `sshtype:"1"` + Message string + Language string +} + +func (d *disconnectMsg) Error() string { + return fmt.Sprintf("ssh: disconnect, reason %d: %s", d.Reason, d.Message) +} + +// See RFC 4253, section 7.1. +const msgKexInit = 20 + +type kexInitMsg struct { + Cookie [16]byte `sshtype:"20"` + KexAlgos []string + ServerHostKeyAlgos []string + CiphersClientServer []string + CiphersServerClient []string + MACsClientServer []string + MACsServerClient []string + CompressionClientServer []string + CompressionServerClient []string + LanguagesClientServer []string + LanguagesServerClient []string + FirstKexFollows bool + Reserved uint32 +} + +// See RFC 4253, section 8. + +// Diffie-Helman +const msgKexDHInit = 30 + +type kexDHInitMsg struct { + X *big.Int `sshtype:"30"` +} + +const msgKexECDHInit = 30 + +type kexECDHInitMsg struct { + ClientPubKey []byte `sshtype:"30"` +} + +const msgKexECDHReply = 31 + +type kexECDHReplyMsg struct { + HostKey []byte `sshtype:"31"` + EphemeralPubKey []byte + Signature []byte +} + +const msgKexDHReply = 31 + +type kexDHReplyMsg struct { + HostKey []byte `sshtype:"31"` + Y *big.Int + Signature []byte +} + +// See RFC 4419, section 5. +const msgKexDHGexGroup = 31 + +type kexDHGexGroupMsg struct { + P *big.Int `sshtype:"31"` + G *big.Int +} + +const msgKexDHGexInit = 32 + +type kexDHGexInitMsg struct { + X *big.Int `sshtype:"32"` +} + +const msgKexDHGexReply = 33 + +type kexDHGexReplyMsg struct { + HostKey []byte `sshtype:"33"` + Y *big.Int + Signature []byte +} + +const msgKexDHGexRequest = 34 + +type kexDHGexRequestMsg struct { + MinBits uint32 `sshtype:"34"` + PreferedBits uint32 + MaxBits uint32 +} + +// See RFC 4253, section 10. +const msgServiceRequest = 5 + +type serviceRequestMsg struct { + Service string `sshtype:"5"` +} + +// See RFC 4253, section 10. +const msgServiceAccept = 6 + +type serviceAcceptMsg struct { + Service string `sshtype:"6"` +} + +// See RFC 4252, section 5. +const msgUserAuthRequest = 50 + +type userAuthRequestMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"50"` + Service string + Method string + Payload []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// Used for debug printouts of packets. +type userAuthSuccessMsg struct { +} + +// See RFC 4252, section 5.1 +const msgUserAuthFailure = 51 + +type userAuthFailureMsg struct { + Methods []string `sshtype:"51"` + PartialSuccess bool +} + +// See RFC 4252, section 5.1 +const msgUserAuthSuccess = 52 + +// See RFC 4252, section 5.4 +const msgUserAuthBanner = 53 + +type userAuthBannerMsg struct { + Message string `sshtype:"53"` + // unused, but required to allow message parsing + Language string +} + +// See RFC 4256, section 3.2 +const msgUserAuthInfoRequest = 60 +const msgUserAuthInfoResponse = 61 + +type userAuthInfoRequestMsg struct { + User string `sshtype:"60"` + Instruction string + DeprecatedLanguage string + NumPrompts uint32 + Prompts []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.1. +const msgChannelOpen = 90 + +type channelOpenMsg struct { + ChanType string `sshtype:"90"` + PeersID uint32 + PeersWindow uint32 + MaxPacketSize uint32 + TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +const msgChannelExtendedData = 95 +const msgChannelData = 94 + +// Used for debug print outs of packets. +type channelDataMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"94"` + Length uint32 + Rest []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.1. +const msgChannelOpenConfirm = 91 + +type channelOpenConfirmMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"91"` + MyID uint32 + MyWindow uint32 + MaxPacketSize uint32 + TypeSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.1. +const msgChannelOpenFailure = 92 + +type channelOpenFailureMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"92"` + Reason RejectionReason + Message string + Language string +} + +const msgChannelRequest = 98 + +type channelRequestMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"98"` + Request string + WantReply bool + RequestSpecificData []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.4. +const msgChannelSuccess = 99 + +type channelRequestSuccessMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"99"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.4. +const msgChannelFailure = 100 + +type channelRequestFailureMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"100"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.3 +const msgChannelClose = 97 + +type channelCloseMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"97"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.3 +const msgChannelEOF = 96 + +type channelEOFMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"96"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 4 +const msgGlobalRequest = 80 + +type globalRequestMsg struct { + Type string `sshtype:"80"` + WantReply bool + Data []byte `ssh:"rest"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 4 +const msgRequestSuccess = 81 + +type globalRequestSuccessMsg struct { + Data []byte `ssh:"rest" sshtype:"81"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 4 +const msgRequestFailure = 82 + +type globalRequestFailureMsg struct { + Data []byte `ssh:"rest" sshtype:"82"` +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 5.2 +const msgChannelWindowAdjust = 93 + +type windowAdjustMsg struct { + PeersID uint32 `sshtype:"93"` + AdditionalBytes uint32 +} + +// See RFC 4252, section 7 +const msgUserAuthPubKeyOk = 60 + +type userAuthPubKeyOkMsg struct { + Algo string `sshtype:"60"` + PubKey []byte +} + +// See RFC 4462, section 3 +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIResponse = 60 + +type userAuthGSSAPIResponse struct { + SupportMech []byte `sshtype:"60"` +} + +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken = 61 + +type userAuthGSSAPIToken struct { + Token []byte `sshtype:"61"` +} + +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIMIC = 66 + +type userAuthGSSAPIMIC struct { + MIC []byte `sshtype:"66"` +} + +// See RFC 4462, section 3.9 +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIErrTok = 64 + +type userAuthGSSAPIErrTok struct { + ErrorToken []byte `sshtype:"64"` +} + +// See RFC 4462, section 3.8 +const msgUserAuthGSSAPIError = 65 + +type userAuthGSSAPIError struct { + MajorStatus uint32 `sshtype:"65"` + MinorStatus uint32 + Message string + LanguageTag string +} + +// typeTags returns the possible type bytes for the given reflect.Type, which +// should be a struct. The possible values are separated by a '|' character. +func typeTags(structType reflect.Type) (tags []byte) { + tagStr := structType.Field(0).Tag.Get("sshtype") + + for _, tag := range strings.Split(tagStr, "|") { + i, err := strconv.Atoi(tag) + if err == nil { + tags = append(tags, byte(i)) + } + } + + return tags +} + +func fieldError(t reflect.Type, field int, problem string) error { + if problem != "" { + problem = ": " + problem + } + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unmarshal error for field %s of type %s%s", t.Field(field).Name, t.Name(), problem) +} + +var errShortRead = errors.New("ssh: short read") + +// Unmarshal parses data in SSH wire format into a structure. The out +// argument should be a pointer to struct. If the first member of the +// struct has the "sshtype" tag set to a '|'-separated set of numbers +// in decimal, the packet must start with one of those numbers. In +// case of error, Unmarshal returns a ParseError or +// UnexpectedMessageError. +func Unmarshal(data []byte, out interface{}) error { + v := reflect.ValueOf(out).Elem() + structType := v.Type() + expectedTypes := typeTags(structType) + + var expectedType byte + if len(expectedTypes) > 0 { + expectedType = expectedTypes[0] + } + + if len(data) == 0 { + return parseError(expectedType) + } + + if len(expectedTypes) > 0 { + goodType := false + for _, e := range expectedTypes { + if e > 0 && data[0] == e { + goodType = true + break + } + } + if !goodType { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected message type %d (expected one of %v)", data[0], expectedTypes) + } + data = data[1:] + } + + var ok bool + for i := 0; i < v.NumField(); i++ { + field := v.Field(i) + t := field.Type() + switch t.Kind() { + case reflect.Bool: + if len(data) < 1 { + return errShortRead + } + field.SetBool(data[0] != 0) + data = data[1:] + case reflect.Array: + if t.Elem().Kind() != reflect.Uint8 { + return fieldError(structType, i, "array of unsupported type") + } + if len(data) < t.Len() { + return errShortRead + } + for j, n := 0, t.Len(); j < n; j++ { + field.Index(j).Set(reflect.ValueOf(data[j])) + } + data = data[t.Len():] + case reflect.Uint64: + var u64 uint64 + if u64, data, ok = parseUint64(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.SetUint(u64) + case reflect.Uint32: + var u32 uint32 + if u32, data, ok = parseUint32(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.SetUint(uint64(u32)) + case reflect.Uint8: + if len(data) < 1 { + return errShortRead + } + field.SetUint(uint64(data[0])) + data = data[1:] + case reflect.String: + var s []byte + if s, data, ok = parseString(data); !ok { + return fieldError(structType, i, "") + } + field.SetString(string(s)) + case reflect.Slice: + switch t.Elem().Kind() { + case reflect.Uint8: + if structType.Field(i).Tag.Get("ssh") == "rest" { + field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(data)) + data = nil + } else { + var s []byte + if s, data, ok = parseString(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(s)) + } + case reflect.String: + var nl []string + if nl, data, ok = parseNameList(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(nl)) + default: + return fieldError(structType, i, "slice of unsupported type") + } + case reflect.Ptr: + if t == bigIntType { + var n *big.Int + if n, data, ok = parseInt(data); !ok { + return errShortRead + } + field.Set(reflect.ValueOf(n)) + } else { + return fieldError(structType, i, "pointer to unsupported type") + } + default: + return fieldError(structType, i, fmt.Sprintf("unsupported type: %v", t)) + } + } + + if len(data) != 0 { + return parseError(expectedType) + } + + return nil +} + +// Marshal serializes the message in msg to SSH wire format. The msg +// argument should be a struct or pointer to struct. If the first +// member has the "sshtype" tag set to a number in decimal, that +// number is prepended to the result. If the last of member has the +// "ssh" tag set to "rest", its contents are appended to the output. +func Marshal(msg interface{}) []byte { + out := make([]byte, 0, 64) + return marshalStruct(out, msg) +} + +func marshalStruct(out []byte, msg interface{}) []byte { + v := reflect.Indirect(reflect.ValueOf(msg)) + msgTypes := typeTags(v.Type()) + if len(msgTypes) > 0 { + out = append(out, msgTypes[0]) + } + + for i, n := 0, v.NumField(); i < n; i++ { + field := v.Field(i) + switch t := field.Type(); t.Kind() { + case reflect.Bool: + var v uint8 + if field.Bool() { + v = 1 + } + out = append(out, v) + case reflect.Array: + if t.Elem().Kind() != reflect.Uint8 { + panic(fmt.Sprintf("array of non-uint8 in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface())) + } + for j, l := 0, t.Len(); j < l; j++ { + out = append(out, uint8(field.Index(j).Uint())) + } + case reflect.Uint32: + out = appendU32(out, uint32(field.Uint())) + case reflect.Uint64: + out = appendU64(out, uint64(field.Uint())) + case reflect.Uint8: + out = append(out, uint8(field.Uint())) + case reflect.String: + s := field.String() + out = appendInt(out, len(s)) + out = append(out, s...) + case reflect.Slice: + switch t.Elem().Kind() { + case reflect.Uint8: + if v.Type().Field(i).Tag.Get("ssh") != "rest" { + out = appendInt(out, field.Len()) + } + out = append(out, field.Bytes()...) + case reflect.String: + offset := len(out) + out = appendU32(out, 0) + if n := field.Len(); n > 0 { + for j := 0; j < n; j++ { + f := field.Index(j) + if j != 0 { + out = append(out, ',') + } + out = append(out, f.String()...) + } + // overwrite length value + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(out[offset:], uint32(len(out)-offset-4)) + } + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("slice of unknown type in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface())) + } + case reflect.Ptr: + if t == bigIntType { + var n *big.Int + nValue := reflect.ValueOf(&n) + nValue.Elem().Set(field) + needed := intLength(n) + oldLength := len(out) + + if cap(out)-len(out) < needed { + newOut := make([]byte, len(out), 2*(len(out)+needed)) + copy(newOut, out) + out = newOut + } + out = out[:oldLength+needed] + marshalInt(out[oldLength:], n) + } else { + panic(fmt.Sprintf("pointer to unknown type in field %d: %T", i, field.Interface())) + } + } + } + + return out +} + +var bigOne = big.NewInt(1) + +func parseString(in []byte) (out, rest []byte, ok bool) { + if len(in) < 4 { + return + } + length := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(in) + in = in[4:] + if uint32(len(in)) < length { + return + } + out = in[:length] + rest = in[length:] + ok = true + return +} + +var ( + comma = []byte{','} + emptyNameList = []string{} +) + +func parseNameList(in []byte) (out []string, rest []byte, ok bool) { + contents, rest, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return + } + if len(contents) == 0 { + out = emptyNameList + return + } + parts := bytes.Split(contents, comma) + out = make([]string, len(parts)) + for i, part := range parts { + out[i] = string(part) + } + return +} + +func parseInt(in []byte) (out *big.Int, rest []byte, ok bool) { + contents, rest, ok := parseString(in) + if !ok { + return + } + out = new(big.Int) + + if len(contents) > 0 && contents[0]&0x80 == 0x80 { + // This is a negative number + notBytes := make([]byte, len(contents)) + for i := range notBytes { + notBytes[i] = ^contents[i] + } + out.SetBytes(notBytes) + out.Add(out, bigOne) + out.Neg(out) + } else { + // Positive number + out.SetBytes(contents) + } + ok = true + return +} + +func parseUint32(in []byte) (uint32, []byte, bool) { + if len(in) < 4 { + return 0, nil, false + } + return binary.BigEndian.Uint32(in), in[4:], true +} + +func parseUint64(in []byte) (uint64, []byte, bool) { + if len(in) < 8 { + return 0, nil, false + } + return binary.BigEndian.Uint64(in), in[8:], true +} + +func intLength(n *big.Int) int { + length := 4 /* length bytes */ + if n.Sign() < 0 { + nMinus1 := new(big.Int).Neg(n) + nMinus1.Sub(nMinus1, bigOne) + bitLen := nMinus1.BitLen() + if bitLen%8 == 0 { + // The number will need 0xff padding + length++ + } + length += (bitLen + 7) / 8 + } else if n.Sign() == 0 { + // A zero is the zero length string + } else { + bitLen := n.BitLen() + if bitLen%8 == 0 { + // The number will need 0x00 padding + length++ + } + length += (bitLen + 7) / 8 + } + + return length +} + +func marshalUint32(to []byte, n uint32) []byte { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(to, n) + return to[4:] +} + +func marshalUint64(to []byte, n uint64) []byte { + binary.BigEndian.PutUint64(to, n) + return to[8:] +} + +func marshalInt(to []byte, n *big.Int) []byte { + lengthBytes := to + to = to[4:] + length := 0 + + if n.Sign() < 0 { + // A negative number has to be converted to two's-complement + // form. So we'll subtract 1 and invert. If the + // most-significant-bit isn't set then we'll need to pad the + // beginning with 0xff in order to keep the number negative. + nMinus1 := new(big.Int).Neg(n) + nMinus1.Sub(nMinus1, bigOne) + bytes := nMinus1.Bytes() + for i := range bytes { + bytes[i] ^= 0xff + } + if len(bytes) == 0 || bytes[0]&0x80 == 0 { + to[0] = 0xff + to = to[1:] + length++ + } + nBytes := copy(to, bytes) + to = to[nBytes:] + length += nBytes + } else if n.Sign() == 0 { + // A zero is the zero length string + } else { + bytes := n.Bytes() + if len(bytes) > 0 && bytes[0]&0x80 != 0 { + // We'll have to pad this with a 0x00 in order to + // stop it looking like a negative number. + to[0] = 0 + to = to[1:] + length++ + } + nBytes := copy(to, bytes) + to = to[nBytes:] + length += nBytes + } + + lengthBytes[0] = byte(length >> 24) + lengthBytes[1] = byte(length >> 16) + lengthBytes[2] = byte(length >> 8) + lengthBytes[3] = byte(length) + return to +} + +func writeInt(w io.Writer, n *big.Int) { + length := intLength(n) + buf := make([]byte, length) + marshalInt(buf, n) + w.Write(buf) +} + +func writeString(w io.Writer, s []byte) { + var lengthBytes [4]byte + lengthBytes[0] = byte(len(s) >> 24) + lengthBytes[1] = byte(len(s) >> 16) + lengthBytes[2] = byte(len(s) >> 8) + lengthBytes[3] = byte(len(s)) + w.Write(lengthBytes[:]) + w.Write(s) +} + +func stringLength(n int) int { + return 4 + n +} + +func marshalString(to []byte, s []byte) []byte { + to[0] = byte(len(s) >> 24) + to[1] = byte(len(s) >> 16) + to[2] = byte(len(s) >> 8) + to[3] = byte(len(s)) + to = to[4:] + copy(to, s) + return to[len(s):] +} + +var bigIntType = reflect.TypeOf((*big.Int)(nil)) + +// Decode a packet into its corresponding message. +func decode(packet []byte) (interface{}, error) { + var msg interface{} + switch packet[0] { + case msgDisconnect: + msg = new(disconnectMsg) + case msgServiceRequest: + msg = new(serviceRequestMsg) + case msgServiceAccept: + msg = new(serviceAcceptMsg) + case msgKexInit: + msg = new(kexInitMsg) + case msgKexDHInit: + msg = new(kexDHInitMsg) + case msgKexDHReply: + msg = new(kexDHReplyMsg) + case msgUserAuthRequest: + msg = new(userAuthRequestMsg) + case msgUserAuthSuccess: + return new(userAuthSuccessMsg), nil + case msgUserAuthFailure: + msg = new(userAuthFailureMsg) + case msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: + msg = new(userAuthPubKeyOkMsg) + case msgGlobalRequest: + msg = new(globalRequestMsg) + case msgRequestSuccess: + msg = new(globalRequestSuccessMsg) + case msgRequestFailure: + msg = new(globalRequestFailureMsg) + case msgChannelOpen: + msg = new(channelOpenMsg) + case msgChannelData: + msg = new(channelDataMsg) + case msgChannelOpenConfirm: + msg = new(channelOpenConfirmMsg) + case msgChannelOpenFailure: + msg = new(channelOpenFailureMsg) + case msgChannelWindowAdjust: + msg = new(windowAdjustMsg) + case msgChannelEOF: + msg = new(channelEOFMsg) + case msgChannelClose: + msg = new(channelCloseMsg) + case msgChannelRequest: + msg = new(channelRequestMsg) + case msgChannelSuccess: + msg = new(channelRequestSuccessMsg) + case msgChannelFailure: + msg = new(channelRequestFailureMsg) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIToken: + msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIToken) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIMIC: + msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIMIC) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIErrTok: + msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIErrTok) + case msgUserAuthGSSAPIError: + msg = new(userAuthGSSAPIError) + default: + return nil, unexpectedMessageError(0, packet[0]) + } + if err := Unmarshal(packet, msg); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return msg, nil +} + +var packetTypeNames = map[byte]string{ + msgDisconnect: "disconnectMsg", + msgServiceRequest: "serviceRequestMsg", + msgServiceAccept: "serviceAcceptMsg", + msgKexInit: "kexInitMsg", + msgKexDHInit: "kexDHInitMsg", + msgKexDHReply: "kexDHReplyMsg", + msgUserAuthRequest: "userAuthRequestMsg", + msgUserAuthSuccess: "userAuthSuccessMsg", + msgUserAuthFailure: "userAuthFailureMsg", + msgUserAuthPubKeyOk: "userAuthPubKeyOkMsg", + msgGlobalRequest: "globalRequestMsg", + msgRequestSuccess: "globalRequestSuccessMsg", + msgRequestFailure: "globalRequestFailureMsg", + msgChannelOpen: "channelOpenMsg", + msgChannelData: "channelDataMsg", + msgChannelOpenConfirm: "channelOpenConfirmMsg", + msgChannelOpenFailure: "channelOpenFailureMsg", + msgChannelWindowAdjust: "windowAdjustMsg", + msgChannelEOF: "channelEOFMsg", + msgChannelClose: "channelCloseMsg", + msgChannelRequest: "channelRequestMsg", + msgChannelSuccess: "channelRequestSuccessMsg", + msgChannelFailure: "channelRequestFailureMsg", +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f19016270 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/mux.go @@ -0,0 +1,330 @@ +// Copyright 2013 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "encoding/binary" + "fmt" + "io" + "log" + "sync" + "sync/atomic" +) + +// debugMux, if set, causes messages in the connection protocol to be +// logged. +const debugMux = false + +// chanList is a thread safe channel list. +type chanList struct { + // protects concurrent access to chans + sync.Mutex + + // chans are indexed by the local id of the channel, which the + // other side should send in the PeersId field. + chans []*channel + + // This is a debugging aid: it offsets all IDs by this + // amount. This helps distinguish otherwise identical + // server/client muxes + offset uint32 +} + +// Assigns a channel ID to the given channel. +func (c *chanList) add(ch *channel) uint32 { + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + for i := range c.chans { + if c.chans[i] == nil { + c.chans[i] = ch + return uint32(i) + c.offset + } + } + c.chans = append(c.chans, ch) + return uint32(len(c.chans)-1) + c.offset +} + +// getChan returns the channel for the given ID. +func (c *chanList) getChan(id uint32) *channel { + id -= c.offset + + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + if id < uint32(len(c.chans)) { + return c.chans[id] + } + return nil +} + +func (c *chanList) remove(id uint32) { + id -= c.offset + c.Lock() + if id < uint32(len(c.chans)) { + c.chans[id] = nil + } + c.Unlock() +} + +// dropAll forgets all channels it knows, returning them in a slice. +func (c *chanList) dropAll() []*channel { + c.Lock() + defer c.Unlock() + var r []*channel + + for _, ch := range c.chans { + if ch == nil { + continue + } + r = append(r, ch) + } + c.chans = nil + return r +} + +// mux represents the state for the SSH connection protocol, which +// multiplexes many channels onto a single packet transport. +type mux struct { + conn packetConn + chanList chanList + + incomingChannels chan NewChannel + + globalSentMu sync.Mutex + globalResponses chan interface{} + incomingRequests chan *Request + + errCond *sync.Cond + err error +} + +// When debugging, each new chanList instantiation has a different +// offset. +var globalOff uint32 + +func (m *mux) Wait() error { + m.errCond.L.Lock() + defer m.errCond.L.Unlock() + for m.err == nil { + m.errCond.Wait() + } + return m.err +} + +// newMux returns a mux that runs over the given connection. +func newMux(p packetConn) *mux { + m := &mux{ + conn: p, + incomingChannels: make(chan NewChannel, chanSize), + globalResponses: make(chan interface{}, 1), + incomingRequests: make(chan *Request, chanSize), + errCond: newCond(), + } + if debugMux { + m.chanList.offset = atomic.AddUint32(&globalOff, 1) + } + + go m.loop() + return m +} + +func (m *mux) sendMessage(msg interface{}) error { + p := Marshal(msg) + if debugMux { + log.Printf("send global(%d): %#v", m.chanList.offset, msg) + } + return m.conn.writePacket(p) +} + +func (m *mux) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, []byte, error) { + if wantReply { + m.globalSentMu.Lock() + defer m.globalSentMu.Unlock() + } + + if err := m.sendMessage(globalRequestMsg{ + Type: name, + WantReply: wantReply, + Data: payload, + }); err != nil { + return false, nil, err + } + + if !wantReply { + return false, nil, nil + } + + msg, ok := <-m.globalResponses + if !ok { + return false, nil, io.EOF + } + switch msg := msg.(type) { + case *globalRequestFailureMsg: + return false, msg.Data, nil + case *globalRequestSuccessMsg: + return true, msg.Data, nil + default: + return false, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected response to request: %#v", msg) + } +} + +// ackRequest must be called after processing a global request that +// has WantReply set. +func (m *mux) ackRequest(ok bool, data []byte) error { + if ok { + return m.sendMessage(globalRequestSuccessMsg{Data: data}) + } + return m.sendMessage(globalRequestFailureMsg{Data: data}) +} + +func (m *mux) Close() error { + return m.conn.Close() +} + +// loop runs the connection machine. It will process packets until an +// error is encountered. To synchronize on loop exit, use mux.Wait. +func (m *mux) loop() { + var err error + for err == nil { + err = m.onePacket() + } + + for _, ch := range m.chanList.dropAll() { + ch.close() + } + + close(m.incomingChannels) + close(m.incomingRequests) + close(m.globalResponses) + + m.conn.Close() + + m.errCond.L.Lock() + m.err = err + m.errCond.Broadcast() + m.errCond.L.Unlock() + + if debugMux { + log.Println("loop exit", err) + } +} + +// onePacket reads and processes one packet. +func (m *mux) onePacket() error { + packet, err := m.conn.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return err + } + + if debugMux { + if packet[0] == msgChannelData || packet[0] == msgChannelExtendedData { + log.Printf("decoding(%d): data packet - %d bytes", m.chanList.offset, len(packet)) + } else { + p, _ := decode(packet) + log.Printf("decoding(%d): %d %#v - %d bytes", m.chanList.offset, packet[0], p, len(packet)) + } + } + + switch packet[0] { + case msgChannelOpen: + return m.handleChannelOpen(packet) + case msgGlobalRequest, msgRequestSuccess, msgRequestFailure: + return m.handleGlobalPacket(packet) + } + + // assume a channel packet. + if len(packet) < 5 { + return parseError(packet[0]) + } + id := binary.BigEndian.Uint32(packet[1:]) + ch := m.chanList.getChan(id) + if ch == nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: invalid channel %d", id) + } + + return ch.handlePacket(packet) +} + +func (m *mux) handleGlobalPacket(packet []byte) error { + msg, err := decode(packet) + if err != nil { + return err + } + + switch msg := msg.(type) { + case *globalRequestMsg: + m.incomingRequests <- &Request{ + Type: msg.Type, + WantReply: msg.WantReply, + Payload: msg.Data, + mux: m, + } + case *globalRequestSuccessMsg, *globalRequestFailureMsg: + m.globalResponses <- msg + default: + panic(fmt.Sprintf("not a global message %#v", msg)) + } + + return nil +} + +// handleChannelOpen schedules a channel to be Accept()ed. +func (m *mux) handleChannelOpen(packet []byte) error { + var msg channelOpenMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return err + } + + if msg.MaxPacketSize < minPacketLength || msg.MaxPacketSize > 1<<31 { + failMsg := channelOpenFailureMsg{ + PeersID: msg.PeersID, + Reason: ConnectionFailed, + Message: "invalid request", + Language: "en_US.UTF-8", + } + return m.sendMessage(failMsg) + } + + c := m.newChannel(msg.ChanType, channelInbound, msg.TypeSpecificData) + c.remoteId = msg.PeersID + c.maxRemotePayload = msg.MaxPacketSize + c.remoteWin.add(msg.PeersWindow) + m.incomingChannels <- c + return nil +} + +func (m *mux) OpenChannel(chanType string, extra []byte) (Channel, <-chan *Request, error) { + ch, err := m.openChannel(chanType, extra) + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + + return ch, ch.incomingRequests, nil +} + +func (m *mux) openChannel(chanType string, extra []byte) (*channel, error) { + ch := m.newChannel(chanType, channelOutbound, extra) + + ch.maxIncomingPayload = channelMaxPacket + + open := channelOpenMsg{ + ChanType: chanType, + PeersWindow: ch.myWindow, + MaxPacketSize: ch.maxIncomingPayload, + TypeSpecificData: extra, + PeersID: ch.localId, + } + if err := m.sendMessage(open); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + switch msg := (<-ch.msg).(type) { + case *channelOpenConfirmMsg: + return ch, nil + case *channelOpenFailureMsg: + return nil, &OpenChannelError{msg.Reason, msg.Message} + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unexpected packet in response to channel open: %T", msg) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..7a5a1d7ad --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/server.go @@ -0,0 +1,716 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bytes" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "net" + "strings" +) + +// The Permissions type holds fine-grained permissions that are +// specific to a user or a specific authentication method for a user. +// The Permissions value for a successful authentication attempt is +// available in ServerConn, so it can be used to pass information from +// the user-authentication phase to the application layer. +type Permissions struct { + // CriticalOptions indicate restrictions to the default + // permissions, and are typically used in conjunction with + // user certificates. The standard for SSH certificates + // defines "force-command" (only allow the given command to + // execute) and "source-address" (only allow connections from + // the given address). The SSH package currently only enforces + // the "source-address" critical option. It is up to server + // implementations to enforce other critical options, such as + // "force-command", by checking them after the SSH handshake + // is successful. In general, SSH servers should reject + // connections that specify critical options that are unknown + // or not supported. + CriticalOptions map[string]string + + // Extensions are extra functionality that the server may + // offer on authenticated connections. Lack of support for an + // extension does not preclude authenticating a user. Common + // extensions are "permit-agent-forwarding", + // "permit-X11-forwarding". The Go SSH library currently does + // not act on any extension, and it is up to server + // implementations to honor them. Extensions can be used to + // pass data from the authentication callbacks to the server + // application layer. + Extensions map[string]string +} + +type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct { + // AllowLogin, must be set, is called when gssapi-with-mic + // authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). The srcName is from the + // results of the GSS-API authentication. The format is username@DOMAIN. + // GSSAPI just guarantees to the server who the user is, but not if they can log in, and with what permissions. + // This callback is called after the user identity is established with GSSAPI to decide if the user can login with + // which permissions. If the user is allowed to login, it should return a nil error. + AllowLogin func(conn ConnMetadata, srcName string) (*Permissions, error) + + // Server must be set. It's the implementation + // of the GSSAPIServer interface. See GSSAPIServer interface for details. + Server GSSAPIServer +} + +// ServerConfig holds server specific configuration data. +type ServerConfig struct { + // Config contains configuration shared between client and server. + Config + + hostKeys []Signer + + // NoClientAuth is true if clients are allowed to connect without + // authenticating. + NoClientAuth bool + + // MaxAuthTries specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts + // permitted per connection. If set to a negative number, the number of + // attempts are unlimited. If set to zero, the number of attempts are limited + // to 6. + MaxAuthTries int + + // PasswordCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user + // attempts to authenticate using a password. + PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error) + + // PublicKeyCallback, if non-nil, is called when a client + // offers a public key for authentication. It must return a nil error + // if the given public key can be used to authenticate the + // given user. For example, see CertChecker.Authenticate. A + // call to this function does not guarantee that the key + // offered is in fact used to authenticate. To record any data + // depending on the public key, store it inside a + // Permissions.Extensions entry. + PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error) + + // KeyboardInteractiveCallback, if non-nil, is called when + // keyboard-interactive authentication is selected (RFC + // 4256). The client object's Challenge function should be + // used to query the user. The callback may offer multiple + // Challenge rounds. To avoid information leaks, the client + // should be presented a challenge even if the user is + // unknown. + KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error) + + // AuthLogCallback, if non-nil, is called to log all authentication + // attempts. + AuthLogCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, method string, err error) + + // ServerVersion is the version identification string to announce in + // the public handshake. + // If empty, a reasonable default is used. + // Note that RFC 4253 section 4.2 requires that this string start with + // "SSH-2.0-". + ServerVersion string + + // BannerCallback, if present, is called and the return string is sent to + // the client after key exchange completed but before authentication. + BannerCallback func(conn ConnMetadata) string + + // GSSAPIWithMICConfig includes gssapi server and callback, which if both non-nil, is used + // when gssapi-with-mic authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). + GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig +} + +// AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host +// key exists with the same algorithm, it is overwritten. Each server +// config must have at least one host key. +func (s *ServerConfig) AddHostKey(key Signer) { + for i, k := range s.hostKeys { + if k.PublicKey().Type() == key.PublicKey().Type() { + s.hostKeys[i] = key + return + } + } + + s.hostKeys = append(s.hostKeys, key) +} + +// cachedPubKey contains the results of querying whether a public key is +// acceptable for a user. +type cachedPubKey struct { + user string + pubKeyData []byte + result error + perms *Permissions +} + +const maxCachedPubKeys = 16 + +// pubKeyCache caches tests for public keys. Since SSH clients +// will query whether a public key is acceptable before attempting to +// authenticate with it, we end up with duplicate queries for public +// key validity. The cache only applies to a single ServerConn. +type pubKeyCache struct { + keys []cachedPubKey +} + +// get returns the result for a given user/algo/key tuple. +func (c *pubKeyCache) get(user string, pubKeyData []byte) (cachedPubKey, bool) { + for _, k := range c.keys { + if k.user == user && bytes.Equal(k.pubKeyData, pubKeyData) { + return k, true + } + } + return cachedPubKey{}, false +} + +// add adds the given tuple to the cache. +func (c *pubKeyCache) add(candidate cachedPubKey) { + if len(c.keys) < maxCachedPubKeys { + c.keys = append(c.keys, candidate) + } +} + +// ServerConn is an authenticated SSH connection, as seen from the +// server +type ServerConn struct { + Conn + + // If the succeeding authentication callback returned a + // non-nil Permissions pointer, it is stored here. + Permissions *Permissions +} + +// NewServerConn starts a new SSH server with c as the underlying +// transport. It starts with a handshake and, if the handshake is +// unsuccessful, it closes the connection and returns an error. The +// Request and NewChannel channels must be serviced, or the connection +// will hang. +// +// The returned error may be of type *ServerAuthError for +// authentication errors. +func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) { + fullConf := *config + fullConf.SetDefaults() + if fullConf.MaxAuthTries == 0 { + fullConf.MaxAuthTries = 6 + } + // Check if the config contains any unsupported key exchanges + for _, kex := range fullConf.KeyExchanges { + if _, ok := serverForbiddenKexAlgos[kex]; ok { + return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key exchange %s for server", kex) + } + } + + s := &connection{ + sshConn: sshConn{conn: c}, + } + perms, err := s.serverHandshake(&fullConf) + if err != nil { + c.Close() + return nil, nil, nil, err + } + return &ServerConn{s, perms}, s.mux.incomingChannels, s.mux.incomingRequests, nil +} + +// signAndMarshal signs the data with the appropriate algorithm, +// and serializes the result in SSH wire format. +func signAndMarshal(k Signer, rand io.Reader, data []byte) ([]byte, error) { + sig, err := k.Sign(rand, data) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return Marshal(sig), nil +} + +// handshake performs key exchange and user authentication. +func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) { + if len(config.hostKeys) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: server has no host keys") + } + + if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil && + config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && (config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil || + config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin == nil || config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server == nil) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false") + } + + if config.ServerVersion != "" { + s.serverVersion = []byte(config.ServerVersion) + } else { + s.serverVersion = []byte(packageVersion) + } + var err error + s.clientVersion, err = exchangeVersions(s.sshConn.conn, s.serverVersion) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + tr := newTransport(s.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, false /* not client */) + s.transport = newServerTransport(tr, s.clientVersion, s.serverVersion, config) + + if err := s.transport.waitSession(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + // We just did the key change, so the session ID is established. + s.sessionID = s.transport.getSessionID() + + var packet []byte + if packet, err = s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + var serviceRequest serviceRequestMsg + if err = Unmarshal(packet, &serviceRequest); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if serviceRequest.Service != serviceUserAuth { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: requested service '" + serviceRequest.Service + "' before authenticating") + } + serviceAccept := serviceAcceptMsg{ + Service: serviceUserAuth, + } + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceAccept)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + perms, err := s.serverAuthenticate(config) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + s.mux = newMux(s.transport) + return perms, err +} + +func isAcceptableAlgo(algo string) bool { + switch algo { + case KeyAlgoRSA, KeyAlgoDSA, KeyAlgoECDSA256, KeyAlgoECDSA384, KeyAlgoECDSA521, KeyAlgoED25519, + CertAlgoRSAv01, CertAlgoDSAv01, CertAlgoECDSA256v01, CertAlgoECDSA384v01, CertAlgoECDSA521v01, CertAlgoED25519v01: + return true + } + return false +} + +func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error { + if addr == nil { + return errors.New("ssh: no address known for client, but source-address match required") + } + + tcpAddr, ok := addr.(*net.TCPAddr) + if !ok { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not an TCP address when checking source-address match", addr) + } + + for _, sourceAddr := range strings.Split(sourceAddrs, ",") { + if allowedIP := net.ParseIP(sourceAddr); allowedIP != nil { + if allowedIP.Equal(tcpAddr.IP) { + return nil + } + } else { + _, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(sourceAddr) + if err != nil { + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: error parsing source-address restriction %q: %v", sourceAddr, err) + } + + if ipNet.Contains(tcpAddr.IP) { + return nil + } + } + } + + return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr) +} + +func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, firstToken []byte, s *connection, + sessionID []byte, userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg) (authErr error, perms *Permissions, err error) { + gssAPIServer := gssapiConfig.Server + defer gssAPIServer.DeleteSecContext() + var srcName string + for { + var ( + outToken []byte + needContinue bool + ) + outToken, srcName, needContinue, err = gssAPIServer.AcceptSecContext(firstToken) + if err != nil { + return err, nil, nil + } + if len(outToken) != 0 { + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{ + Token: outToken, + })); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + } + if !needContinue { + break + } + packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + } + packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + userAuthGSSAPIMICReq := &userAuthGSSAPIMIC{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq); err != nil { + return nil, nil, err + } + mic := buildMIC(string(sessionID), userAuthReq.User, userAuthReq.Service, userAuthReq.Method) + if err := gssAPIServer.VerifyMIC(mic, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq.MIC); err != nil { + return err, nil, nil + } + perms, authErr = gssapiConfig.AllowLogin(s, srcName) + return authErr, perms, nil +} + +// ServerAuthError represents server authentication errors and is +// sometimes returned by NewServerConn. It appends any authentication +// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication +// methods provided by the user failed to authenticate. +type ServerAuthError struct { + // Errors contains authentication errors returned by the authentication + // callback methods. The first entry is typically ErrNoAuth. + Errors []error +} + +func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string { + var errs []string + for _, err := range l.Errors { + errs = append(errs, err.Error()) + } + return "[" + strings.Join(errs, ", ") + "]" +} + +// ErrNoAuth is the error value returned if no +// authentication method has been passed yet. This happens as a normal +// part of the authentication loop, since the client first tries +// 'none' authentication to discover available methods. +// It is returned in ServerAuthError.Errors from NewServerConn. +var ErrNoAuth = errors.New("ssh: no auth passed yet") + +func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) { + sessionID := s.transport.getSessionID() + var cache pubKeyCache + var perms *Permissions + + authFailures := 0 + var authErrs []error + var displayedBanner bool + +userAuthLoop: + for { + if authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries && config.MaxAuthTries > 0 { + discMsg := &disconnectMsg{ + Reason: 2, + Message: "too many authentication failures", + } + + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(discMsg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + return nil, discMsg + } + + var userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg + if packet, err := s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil { + if err == io.EOF { + return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs} + } + return nil, err + } else if err = Unmarshal(packet, &userAuthReq); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + if userAuthReq.Service != serviceSSH { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: client attempted to negotiate for unknown service: " + userAuthReq.Service) + } + + s.user = userAuthReq.User + + if !displayedBanner && config.BannerCallback != nil { + displayedBanner = true + msg := config.BannerCallback(s) + if msg != "" { + bannerMsg := &userAuthBannerMsg{ + Message: msg, + } + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(bannerMsg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + } + + perms = nil + authErr := ErrNoAuth + + switch userAuthReq.Method { + case "none": + if config.NoClientAuth { + authErr = nil + } + + // allow initial attempt of 'none' without penalty + if authFailures == 0 { + authFailures-- + } + case "password": + if config.PasswordCallback == nil { + authErr = errors.New("ssh: password auth not configured") + break + } + payload := userAuthReq.Payload + if len(payload) < 1 || payload[0] != 0 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + payload = payload[1:] + password, payload, ok := parseString(payload) + if !ok || len(payload) > 0 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + + perms, authErr = config.PasswordCallback(s, password) + case "keyboard-interactive": + if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil { + authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configured") + break + } + + prompter := &sshClientKeyboardInteractive{s} + perms, authErr = config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback(s, prompter.Challenge) + case "publickey": + if config.PublicKeyCallback == nil { + authErr = errors.New("ssh: publickey auth not configured") + break + } + payload := userAuthReq.Payload + if len(payload) < 1 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + isQuery := payload[0] == 0 + payload = payload[1:] + algoBytes, payload, ok := parseString(payload) + if !ok { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + algo := string(algoBytes) + if !isAcceptableAlgo(algo) { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", algo) + break + } + + pubKeyData, payload, ok := parseString(payload) + if !ok { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + + pubKey, err := ParsePublicKey(pubKeyData) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + candidate, ok := cache.get(s.user, pubKeyData) + if !ok { + candidate.user = s.user + candidate.pubKeyData = pubKeyData + candidate.perms, candidate.result = config.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey) + if candidate.result == nil && candidate.perms != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption] != "" { + candidate.result = checkSourceAddress( + s.RemoteAddr(), + candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption]) + } + cache.add(candidate) + } + + if isQuery { + // The client can query if the given public key + // would be okay. + + if len(payload) > 0 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + + if candidate.result == nil { + okMsg := userAuthPubKeyOkMsg{ + Algo: algo, + PubKey: pubKeyData, + } + if err = s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&okMsg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + continue userAuthLoop + } + authErr = candidate.result + } else { + sig, payload, ok := parseSignature(payload) + if !ok || len(payload) > 0 { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + // Ensure the public key algo and signature algo + // are supported. Compare the private key + // algorithm name that corresponds to algo with + // sig.Format. This is usually the same, but + // for certs, the names differ. + if !isAcceptableAlgo(sig.Format) { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", sig.Format) + break + } + signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algoBytes, pubKeyData) + + if err := pubKey.Verify(signedData, sig); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + authErr = candidate.result + perms = candidate.perms + } + case "gssapi-with-mic": + gssapiConfig := config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig + userAuthRequestGSSAPI, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(userAuthReq.Payload) + if err != nil { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest) + } + // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication. + if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N == 0 { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: Mechanism negotiation is not supported") + break + } + var i uint32 + present := false + for i = 0; i < userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N; i++ { + if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.OIDS[i].Equal(krb5Mesh) { + present = true + break + } + } + if !present { + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: GSSAPI authentication must use the Kerberos V5 mechanism") + break + } + // Initial server response, see RFC 4462 section 3.3. + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIResponse{ + SupportMech: krb5OID, + })); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Exchange token, see RFC 4462 section 3.4. + packet, err := s.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{} + if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + authErr, perms, err = gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token, s, sessionID, + userAuthReq) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + default: + authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown method %q", userAuthReq.Method) + } + + authErrs = append(authErrs, authErr) + + if config.AuthLogCallback != nil { + config.AuthLogCallback(s, userAuthReq.Method, authErr) + } + + if authErr == nil { + break userAuthLoop + } + + authFailures++ + + var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg + if config.PasswordCallback != nil { + failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "password") + } + if config.PublicKeyCallback != nil { + failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "publickey") + } + if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil { + failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive") + } + if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil && + config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil { + failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic") + } + + if len(failureMsg.Methods) == 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false") + } + + if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&failureMsg)); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + } + + if err := s.transport.writePacket([]byte{msgUserAuthSuccess}); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return perms, nil +} + +// sshClientKeyboardInteractive implements a ClientKeyboardInteractive by +// asking the client on the other side of a ServerConn. +type sshClientKeyboardInteractive struct { + *connection +} + +func (c *sshClientKeyboardInteractive) Challenge(user, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) { + if len(questions) != len(echos) { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: echos and questions must have equal length") + } + + var prompts []byte + for i := range questions { + prompts = appendString(prompts, questions[i]) + prompts = appendBool(prompts, echos[i]) + } + + if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthInfoRequestMsg{ + Instruction: instruction, + NumPrompts: uint32(len(questions)), + Prompts: prompts, + })); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + packet, err := c.transport.readPacket() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if packet[0] != msgUserAuthInfoResponse { + return nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse, packet[0]) + } + packet = packet[1:] + + n, packet, ok := parseUint32(packet) + if !ok || int(n) != len(questions) { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse) + } + + for i := uint32(0); i < n; i++ { + ans, rest, ok := parseString(packet) + if !ok { + return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse) + } + + answers = append(answers, string(ans)) + packet = rest + } + if len(packet) != 0 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk at end of message") + } + + return answers, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d3321f6b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/session.go @@ -0,0 +1,647 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +// Session implements an interactive session described in +// "RFC 4254, section 6". + +import ( + "bytes" + "encoding/binary" + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "io/ioutil" + "sync" +) + +type Signal string + +// POSIX signals as listed in RFC 4254 Section 6.10. +const ( + SIGABRT Signal = "ABRT" + SIGALRM Signal = "ALRM" + SIGFPE Signal = "FPE" + SIGHUP Signal = "HUP" + SIGILL Signal = "ILL" + SIGINT Signal = "INT" + SIGKILL Signal = "KILL" + SIGPIPE Signal = "PIPE" + SIGQUIT Signal = "QUIT" + SIGSEGV Signal = "SEGV" + SIGTERM Signal = "TERM" + SIGUSR1 Signal = "USR1" + SIGUSR2 Signal = "USR2" +) + +var signals = map[Signal]int{ + SIGABRT: 6, + SIGALRM: 14, + SIGFPE: 8, + SIGHUP: 1, + SIGILL: 4, + SIGINT: 2, + SIGKILL: 9, + SIGPIPE: 13, + SIGQUIT: 3, + SIGSEGV: 11, + SIGTERM: 15, +} + +type TerminalModes map[uint8]uint32 + +// POSIX terminal mode flags as listed in RFC 4254 Section 8. +const ( + tty_OP_END = 0 + VINTR = 1 + VQUIT = 2 + VERASE = 3 + VKILL = 4 + VEOF = 5 + VEOL = 6 + VEOL2 = 7 + VSTART = 8 + VSTOP = 9 + VSUSP = 10 + VDSUSP = 11 + VREPRINT = 12 + VWERASE = 13 + VLNEXT = 14 + VFLUSH = 15 + VSWTCH = 16 + VSTATUS = 17 + VDISCARD = 18 + IGNPAR = 30 + PARMRK = 31 + INPCK = 32 + ISTRIP = 33 + INLCR = 34 + IGNCR = 35 + ICRNL = 36 + IUCLC = 37 + IXON = 38 + IXANY = 39 + IXOFF = 40 + IMAXBEL = 41 + ISIG = 50 + ICANON = 51 + XCASE = 52 + ECHO = 53 + ECHOE = 54 + ECHOK = 55 + ECHONL = 56 + NOFLSH = 57 + TOSTOP = 58 + IEXTEN = 59 + ECHOCTL = 60 + ECHOKE = 61 + PENDIN = 62 + OPOST = 70 + OLCUC = 71 + ONLCR = 72 + OCRNL = 73 + ONOCR = 74 + ONLRET = 75 + CS7 = 90 + CS8 = 91 + PARENB = 92 + PARODD = 93 + TTY_OP_ISPEED = 128 + TTY_OP_OSPEED = 129 +) + +// A Session represents a connection to a remote command or shell. +type Session struct { + // Stdin specifies the remote process's standard input. + // If Stdin is nil, the remote process reads from an empty + // bytes.Buffer. + Stdin io.Reader + + // Stdout and Stderr specify the remote process's standard + // output and error. + // + // If either is nil, Run connects the corresponding file + // descriptor to an instance of ioutil.Discard. There is a + // fixed amount of buffering that is shared for the two streams. + // If either blocks it may eventually cause the remote + // command to block. + Stdout io.Writer + Stderr io.Writer + + ch Channel // the channel backing this session + started bool // true once Start, Run or Shell is invoked. + copyFuncs []func() error + errors chan error // one send per copyFunc + + // true if pipe method is active + stdinpipe, stdoutpipe, stderrpipe bool + + // stdinPipeWriter is non-nil if StdinPipe has not been called + // and Stdin was specified by the user; it is the write end of + // a pipe connecting Session.Stdin to the stdin channel. + stdinPipeWriter io.WriteCloser + + exitStatus chan error +} + +// SendRequest sends an out-of-band channel request on the SSH channel +// underlying the session. +func (s *Session) SendRequest(name string, wantReply bool, payload []byte) (bool, error) { + return s.ch.SendRequest(name, wantReply, payload) +} + +func (s *Session) Close() error { + return s.ch.Close() +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.4. +type setenvRequest struct { + Name string + Value string +} + +// Setenv sets an environment variable that will be applied to any +// command executed by Shell or Run. +func (s *Session) Setenv(name, value string) error { + msg := setenvRequest{ + Name: name, + Value: value, + } + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("env", true, Marshal(&msg)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: setenv failed") + } + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.2. +type ptyRequestMsg struct { + Term string + Columns uint32 + Rows uint32 + Width uint32 + Height uint32 + Modelist string +} + +// RequestPty requests the association of a pty with the session on the remote host. +func (s *Session) RequestPty(term string, h, w int, termmodes TerminalModes) error { + var tm []byte + for k, v := range termmodes { + kv := struct { + Key byte + Val uint32 + }{k, v} + + tm = append(tm, Marshal(&kv)...) + } + tm = append(tm, tty_OP_END) + req := ptyRequestMsg{ + Term: term, + Columns: uint32(w), + Rows: uint32(h), + Width: uint32(w * 8), + Height: uint32(h * 8), + Modelist: string(tm), + } + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("pty-req", true, Marshal(&req)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: pty-req failed") + } + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.5. +type subsystemRequestMsg struct { + Subsystem string +} + +// RequestSubsystem requests the association of a subsystem with the session on the remote host. +// A subsystem is a predefined command that runs in the background when the ssh session is initiated +func (s *Session) RequestSubsystem(subsystem string) error { + msg := subsystemRequestMsg{ + Subsystem: subsystem, + } + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("subsystem", true, Marshal(&msg)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: subsystem request failed") + } + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.7. +type ptyWindowChangeMsg struct { + Columns uint32 + Rows uint32 + Width uint32 + Height uint32 +} + +// WindowChange informs the remote host about a terminal window dimension change to h rows and w columns. +func (s *Session) WindowChange(h, w int) error { + req := ptyWindowChangeMsg{ + Columns: uint32(w), + Rows: uint32(h), + Width: uint32(w * 8), + Height: uint32(h * 8), + } + _, err := s.ch.SendRequest("window-change", false, Marshal(&req)) + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.9. +type signalMsg struct { + Signal string +} + +// Signal sends the given signal to the remote process. +// sig is one of the SIG* constants. +func (s *Session) Signal(sig Signal) error { + msg := signalMsg{ + Signal: string(sig), + } + + _, err := s.ch.SendRequest("signal", false, Marshal(&msg)) + return err +} + +// RFC 4254 Section 6.5. +type execMsg struct { + Command string +} + +// Start runs cmd on the remote host. Typically, the remote +// server passes cmd to the shell for interpretation. +// A Session only accepts one call to Run, Start or Shell. +func (s *Session) Start(cmd string) error { + if s.started { + return errors.New("ssh: session already started") + } + req := execMsg{ + Command: cmd, + } + + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("exec", true, Marshal(&req)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = fmt.Errorf("ssh: command %v failed", cmd) + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + return s.start() +} + +// Run runs cmd on the remote host. Typically, the remote +// server passes cmd to the shell for interpretation. +// A Session only accepts one call to Run, Start, Shell, Output, +// or CombinedOutput. +// +// The returned error is nil if the command runs, has no problems +// copying stdin, stdout, and stderr, and exits with a zero exit +// status. +// +// If the remote server does not send an exit status, an error of type +// *ExitMissingError is returned. If the command completes +// unsuccessfully or is interrupted by a signal, the error is of type +// *ExitError. Other error types may be returned for I/O problems. +func (s *Session) Run(cmd string) error { + err := s.Start(cmd) + if err != nil { + return err + } + return s.Wait() +} + +// Output runs cmd on the remote host and returns its standard output. +func (s *Session) Output(cmd string) ([]byte, error) { + if s.Stdout != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set") + } + var b bytes.Buffer + s.Stdout = &b + err := s.Run(cmd) + return b.Bytes(), err +} + +type singleWriter struct { + b bytes.Buffer + mu sync.Mutex +} + +func (w *singleWriter) Write(p []byte) (int, error) { + w.mu.Lock() + defer w.mu.Unlock() + return w.b.Write(p) +} + +// CombinedOutput runs cmd on the remote host and returns its combined +// standard output and standard error. +func (s *Session) CombinedOutput(cmd string) ([]byte, error) { + if s.Stdout != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set") + } + if s.Stderr != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stderr already set") + } + var b singleWriter + s.Stdout = &b + s.Stderr = &b + err := s.Run(cmd) + return b.b.Bytes(), err +} + +// Shell starts a login shell on the remote host. A Session only +// accepts one call to Run, Start, Shell, Output, or CombinedOutput. +func (s *Session) Shell() error { + if s.started { + return errors.New("ssh: session already started") + } + + ok, err := s.ch.SendRequest("shell", true, nil) + if err == nil && !ok { + return errors.New("ssh: could not start shell") + } + if err != nil { + return err + } + return s.start() +} + +func (s *Session) start() error { + s.started = true + + type F func(*Session) + for _, setupFd := range []F{(*Session).stdin, (*Session).stdout, (*Session).stderr} { + setupFd(s) + } + + s.errors = make(chan error, len(s.copyFuncs)) + for _, fn := range s.copyFuncs { + go func(fn func() error) { + s.errors <- fn() + }(fn) + } + return nil +} + +// Wait waits for the remote command to exit. +// +// The returned error is nil if the command runs, has no problems +// copying stdin, stdout, and stderr, and exits with a zero exit +// status. +// +// If the remote server does not send an exit status, an error of type +// *ExitMissingError is returned. If the command completes +// unsuccessfully or is interrupted by a signal, the error is of type +// *ExitError. Other error types may be returned for I/O problems. +func (s *Session) Wait() error { + if !s.started { + return errors.New("ssh: session not started") + } + waitErr := <-s.exitStatus + + if s.stdinPipeWriter != nil { + s.stdinPipeWriter.Close() + } + var copyError error + for range s.copyFuncs { + if err := <-s.errors; err != nil && copyError == nil { + copyError = err + } + } + if waitErr != nil { + return waitErr + } + return copyError +} + +func (s *Session) wait(reqs <-chan *Request) error { + wm := Waitmsg{status: -1} + // Wait for msg channel to be closed before returning. + for msg := range reqs { + switch msg.Type { + case "exit-status": + wm.status = int(binary.BigEndian.Uint32(msg.Payload)) + case "exit-signal": + var sigval struct { + Signal string + CoreDumped bool + Error string + Lang string + } + if err := Unmarshal(msg.Payload, &sigval); err != nil { + return err + } + + // Must sanitize strings? + wm.signal = sigval.Signal + wm.msg = sigval.Error + wm.lang = sigval.Lang + default: + // This handles keepalives and matches + // OpenSSH's behaviour. + if msg.WantReply { + msg.Reply(false, nil) + } + } + } + if wm.status == 0 { + return nil + } + if wm.status == -1 { + // exit-status was never sent from server + if wm.signal == "" { + // signal was not sent either. RFC 4254 + // section 6.10 recommends against this + // behavior, but it is allowed, so we let + // clients handle it. + return &ExitMissingError{} + } + wm.status = 128 + if _, ok := signals[Signal(wm.signal)]; ok { + wm.status += signals[Signal(wm.signal)] + } + } + + return &ExitError{wm} +} + +// ExitMissingError is returned if a session is torn down cleanly, but +// the server sends no confirmation of the exit status. +type ExitMissingError struct{} + +func (e *ExitMissingError) Error() string { + return "wait: remote command exited without exit status or exit signal" +} + +func (s *Session) stdin() { + if s.stdinpipe { + return + } + var stdin io.Reader + if s.Stdin == nil { + stdin = new(bytes.Buffer) + } else { + r, w := io.Pipe() + go func() { + _, err := io.Copy(w, s.Stdin) + w.CloseWithError(err) + }() + stdin, s.stdinPipeWriter = r, w + } + s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error { + _, err := io.Copy(s.ch, stdin) + if err1 := s.ch.CloseWrite(); err == nil && err1 != io.EOF { + err = err1 + } + return err + }) +} + +func (s *Session) stdout() { + if s.stdoutpipe { + return + } + if s.Stdout == nil { + s.Stdout = ioutil.Discard + } + s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error { + _, err := io.Copy(s.Stdout, s.ch) + return err + }) +} + +func (s *Session) stderr() { + if s.stderrpipe { + return + } + if s.Stderr == nil { + s.Stderr = ioutil.Discard + } + s.copyFuncs = append(s.copyFuncs, func() error { + _, err := io.Copy(s.Stderr, s.ch.Stderr()) + return err + }) +} + +// sessionStdin reroutes Close to CloseWrite. +type sessionStdin struct { + io.Writer + ch Channel +} + +func (s *sessionStdin) Close() error { + return s.ch.CloseWrite() +} + +// StdinPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the +// remote command's standard input when the command starts. +func (s *Session) StdinPipe() (io.WriteCloser, error) { + if s.Stdin != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdin already set") + } + if s.started { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: StdinPipe after process started") + } + s.stdinpipe = true + return &sessionStdin{s.ch, s.ch}, nil +} + +// StdoutPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the +// remote command's standard output when the command starts. +// There is a fixed amount of buffering that is shared between +// stdout and stderr streams. If the StdoutPipe reader is +// not serviced fast enough it may eventually cause the +// remote command to block. +func (s *Session) StdoutPipe() (io.Reader, error) { + if s.Stdout != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stdout already set") + } + if s.started { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: StdoutPipe after process started") + } + s.stdoutpipe = true + return s.ch, nil +} + +// StderrPipe returns a pipe that will be connected to the +// remote command's standard error when the command starts. +// There is a fixed amount of buffering that is shared between +// stdout and stderr streams. If the StderrPipe reader is +// not serviced fast enough it may eventually cause the +// remote command to block. +func (s *Session) StderrPipe() (io.Reader, error) { + if s.Stderr != nil { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: Stderr already set") + } + if s.started { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: StderrPipe after process started") + } + s.stderrpipe = true + return s.ch.Stderr(), nil +} + +// newSession returns a new interactive session on the remote host. +func newSession(ch Channel, reqs <-chan *Request) (*Session, error) { + s := &Session{ + ch: ch, + } + s.exitStatus = make(chan error, 1) + go func() { + s.exitStatus <- s.wait(reqs) + }() + + return s, nil +} + +// An ExitError reports unsuccessful completion of a remote command. +type ExitError struct { + Waitmsg +} + +func (e *ExitError) Error() string { + return e.Waitmsg.String() +} + +// Waitmsg stores the information about an exited remote command +// as reported by Wait. +type Waitmsg struct { + status int + signal string + msg string + lang string +} + +// ExitStatus returns the exit status of the remote command. +func (w Waitmsg) ExitStatus() int { + return w.status +} + +// Signal returns the exit signal of the remote command if +// it was terminated violently. +func (w Waitmsg) Signal() string { + return w.signal +} + +// Msg returns the exit message given by the remote command +func (w Waitmsg) Msg() string { + return w.msg +} + +// Lang returns the language tag. See RFC 3066 +func (w Waitmsg) Lang() string { + return w.lang +} + +func (w Waitmsg) String() string { + str := fmt.Sprintf("Process exited with status %v", w.status) + if w.signal != "" { + str += fmt.Sprintf(" from signal %v", w.signal) + } + if w.msg != "" { + str += fmt.Sprintf(". Reason was: %v", w.msg) + } + return str +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..24bd7c8e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/ssh_gss.go @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "encoding/asn1" + "errors" +) + +var krb5OID []byte + +func init() { + krb5OID, _ = asn1.Marshal(krb5Mesh) +} + +// GSSAPIClient provides the API to plug-in GSSAPI authentication for client logins. +type GSSAPIClient interface { + // InitSecContext initiates the establishment of a security context for GSS-API between the + // ssh client and ssh server. Initially the token parameter should be specified as nil. + // The routine may return a outputToken which should be transferred to + // the ssh server, where the ssh server will present it to + // AcceptSecContext. If no token need be sent, InitSecContext will indicate this by setting + // needContinue to false. To complete the context + // establishment, one or more reply tokens may be required from the ssh + // server;if so, InitSecContext will return a needContinue which is true. + // In this case, InitSecContext should be called again when the + // reply token is received from the ssh server, passing the reply + // token to InitSecContext via the token parameters. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.1 and RFC 4462 section 3.4. + InitSecContext(target string, token []byte, isGSSDelegCreds bool) (outputToken []byte, needContinue bool, err error) + // GetMIC generates a cryptographic MIC for the SSH2 message, and places + // the MIC in a token for transfer to the ssh server. + // The contents of the MIC field are obtained by calling GSS_GetMIC() + // over the following, using the GSS-API context that was just + // established: + // string session identifier + // byte SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST + // string user name + // string service + // string "gssapi-with-mic" + // See RFC 2743 section 2.3.1 and RFC 4462 3.5. + GetMIC(micFiled []byte) ([]byte, error) + // Whenever possible, it should be possible for + // DeleteSecContext() calls to be successfully processed even + // if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related + // resources to be released. + // In addition to deleting established security contexts, + // gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built" + // security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of + // InitSecContext()/AcceptSecContext() calls. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.3. + DeleteSecContext() error +} + +// GSSAPIServer provides the API to plug in GSSAPI authentication for server logins. +type GSSAPIServer interface { + // AcceptSecContext allows a remotely initiated security context between the application + // and a remote peer to be established by the ssh client. The routine may return a + // outputToken which should be transferred to the ssh client, + // where the ssh client will present it to InitSecContext. + // If no token need be sent, AcceptSecContext will indicate this + // by setting the needContinue to false. To + // complete the context establishment, one or more reply tokens may be + // required from the ssh client. if so, AcceptSecContext + // will return a needContinue which is true, in which case it + // should be called again when the reply token is received from the ssh + // client, passing the token to AcceptSecContext via the + // token parameters. + // The srcName return value is the authenticated username. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.2 and RFC 4462 section 3.4. + AcceptSecContext(token []byte) (outputToken []byte, srcName string, needContinue bool, err error) + // VerifyMIC verifies that a cryptographic MIC, contained in the token parameter, + // fits the supplied message is received from the ssh client. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.3.2. + VerifyMIC(micField []byte, micToken []byte) error + // Whenever possible, it should be possible for + // DeleteSecContext() calls to be successfully processed even + // if other calls cannot succeed, thereby enabling context-related + // resources to be released. + // In addition to deleting established security contexts, + // gss_delete_sec_context must also be able to delete "half-built" + // security contexts resulting from an incomplete sequence of + // InitSecContext()/AcceptSecContext() calls. + // See RFC 2743 section 2.2.3. + DeleteSecContext() error +} + +var ( + // OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication, + // so we also support the krb5 mechanism only. + // See RFC 1964 section 1. + krb5Mesh = asn1.ObjectIdentifier{1, 2, 840, 113554, 1, 2, 2} +) + +// The GSS-API authentication method is initiated when the client sends an SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST +// See RFC 4462 section 3.2. +type userAuthRequestGSSAPI struct { + N uint32 + OIDS []asn1.ObjectIdentifier +} + +func parseGSSAPIPayload(payload []byte) (*userAuthRequestGSSAPI, error) { + n, rest, ok := parseUint32(payload) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("parse uint32 failed") + } + s := &userAuthRequestGSSAPI{ + N: n, + OIDS: make([]asn1.ObjectIdentifier, n), + } + for i := 0; i < int(n); i++ { + var ( + desiredMech []byte + err error + ) + desiredMech, rest, ok = parseString(rest) + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("parse string failed") + } + if rest, err = asn1.Unmarshal(desiredMech, &s.OIDS[i]); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + + } + return s, nil +} + +// See RFC 4462 section 3.6. +func buildMIC(sessionID string, username string, service string, authMethod string) []byte { + out := make([]byte, 0, 0) + out = appendString(out, sessionID) + out = append(out, msgUserAuthRequest) + out = appendString(out, username) + out = appendString(out, service) + out = appendString(out, authMethod) + return out +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b171b330b --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/streamlocal.go @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +package ssh + +import ( + "errors" + "io" + "net" +) + +// streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg is a struct used for SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN message +// with "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com" string. +// +// See openssh-portable/PROTOCOL, section 2.4. connection: Unix domain socket forwarding +// https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/blob/master/PROTOCOL#L235 +type streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg struct { + socketPath string + reserved0 string + reserved1 uint32 +} + +// forwardedStreamLocalPayload is a struct used for SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN message +// with "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com" string. +type forwardedStreamLocalPayload struct { + SocketPath string + Reserved0 string +} + +// streamLocalChannelForwardMsg is a struct used for SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST message +// with "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com"/"cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com" string. +type streamLocalChannelForwardMsg struct { + socketPath string +} + +// ListenUnix is similar to ListenTCP but uses a Unix domain socket. +func (c *Client) ListenUnix(socketPath string) (net.Listener, error) { + c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards) + m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{ + socketPath, + } + // send message + ok, _, err := c.SendRequest("streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", true, Marshal(&m)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: streamlocal-forward@openssh.com request denied by peer") + } + ch := c.forwards.add(&net.UnixAddr{Name: socketPath, Net: "unix"}) + + return &unixListener{socketPath, c, ch}, nil +} + +func (c *Client) dialStreamLocal(socketPath string) (Channel, error) { + msg := streamLocalChannelOpenDirectMsg{ + socketPath: socketPath, + } + ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", Marshal(&msg)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + go DiscardRequests(in) + return ch, err +} + +type unixListener struct { + socketPath string + + conn *Client + in <-chan forward +} + +// Accept waits for and returns the next connection to the listener. +func (l *unixListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { + s, ok := <-l.in + if !ok { + return nil, io.EOF + } + ch, incoming, err := s.newCh.Accept() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + go DiscardRequests(incoming) + + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: l.socketPath, + Net: "unix", + }, + raddr: &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: "@", + Net: "unix", + }, + }, nil +} + +// Close closes the listener. +func (l *unixListener) Close() error { + // this also closes the listener. + l.conn.forwards.remove(&net.UnixAddr{Name: l.socketPath, Net: "unix"}) + m := streamLocalChannelForwardMsg{ + l.socketPath, + } + ok, _, err := l.conn.SendRequest("cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", true, Marshal(&m)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com failed") + } + return err +} + +// Addr returns the listener's network address. +func (l *unixListener) Addr() net.Addr { + return &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: l.socketPath, + Net: "unix", + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..80d35f5ec --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/tcpip.go @@ -0,0 +1,474 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "errors" + "fmt" + "io" + "math/rand" + "net" + "strconv" + "strings" + "sync" + "time" +) + +// Listen requests the remote peer open a listening socket on +// addr. Incoming connections will be available by calling Accept on +// the returned net.Listener. The listener must be serviced, or the +// SSH connection may hang. +// N must be "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6", or "unix". +func (c *Client) Listen(n, addr string) (net.Listener, error) { + switch n { + case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6": + laddr, err := net.ResolveTCPAddr(n, addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return c.ListenTCP(laddr) + case "unix": + return c.ListenUnix(addr) + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported protocol: %s", n) + } +} + +// Automatic port allocation is broken with OpenSSH before 6.0. See +// also https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2017. In +// particular, OpenSSH 5.9 sends a channelOpenMsg with port number 0, +// rather than the actual port number. This means you can never open +// two different listeners with auto allocated ports. We work around +// this by trying explicit ports until we succeed. + +const openSSHPrefix = "OpenSSH_" + +var portRandomizer = rand.New(rand.NewSource(time.Now().UnixNano())) + +// isBrokenOpenSSHVersion returns true if the given version string +// specifies a version of OpenSSH that is known to have a bug in port +// forwarding. +func isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(versionStr string) bool { + i := strings.Index(versionStr, openSSHPrefix) + if i < 0 { + return false + } + i += len(openSSHPrefix) + j := i + for ; j < len(versionStr); j++ { + if versionStr[j] < '0' || versionStr[j] > '9' { + break + } + } + version, _ := strconv.Atoi(versionStr[i:j]) + return version < 6 +} + +// autoPortListenWorkaround simulates automatic port allocation by +// trying random ports repeatedly. +func (c *Client) autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) { + var sshListener net.Listener + var err error + const tries = 10 + for i := 0; i < tries; i++ { + addr := *laddr + addr.Port = 1024 + portRandomizer.Intn(60000) + sshListener, err = c.ListenTCP(&addr) + if err == nil { + laddr.Port = addr.Port + return sshListener, err + } + } + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: listen on random port failed after %d tries: %v", tries, err) +} + +// RFC 4254 7.1 +type channelForwardMsg struct { + addr string + rport uint32 +} + +// handleForwards starts goroutines handling forwarded connections. +// It's called on first use by (*Client).ListenTCP to not launch +// goroutines until needed. +func (c *Client) handleForwards() { + go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-tcpip")) + go c.forwards.handleChannels(c.HandleChannelOpen("forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com")) +} + +// ListenTCP requests the remote peer open a listening socket +// on laddr. Incoming connections will be available by calling +// Accept on the returned net.Listener. +func (c *Client) ListenTCP(laddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Listener, error) { + c.handleForwardsOnce.Do(c.handleForwards) + if laddr.Port == 0 && isBrokenOpenSSHVersion(string(c.ServerVersion())) { + return c.autoPortListenWorkaround(laddr) + } + + m := channelForwardMsg{ + laddr.IP.String(), + uint32(laddr.Port), + } + // send message + ok, resp, err := c.SendRequest("tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: tcpip-forward request denied by peer") + } + + // If the original port was 0, then the remote side will + // supply a real port number in the response. + if laddr.Port == 0 { + var p struct { + Port uint32 + } + if err := Unmarshal(resp, &p); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + laddr.Port = int(p.Port) + } + + // Register this forward, using the port number we obtained. + ch := c.forwards.add(laddr) + + return &tcpListener{laddr, c, ch}, nil +} + +// forwardList stores a mapping between remote +// forward requests and the tcpListeners. +type forwardList struct { + sync.Mutex + entries []forwardEntry +} + +// forwardEntry represents an established mapping of a laddr on a +// remote ssh server to a channel connected to a tcpListener. +type forwardEntry struct { + laddr net.Addr + c chan forward +} + +// forward represents an incoming forwarded tcpip connection. The +// arguments to add/remove/lookup should be address as specified in +// the original forward-request. +type forward struct { + newCh NewChannel // the ssh client channel underlying this forward + raddr net.Addr // the raddr of the incoming connection +} + +func (l *forwardList) add(addr net.Addr) chan forward { + l.Lock() + defer l.Unlock() + f := forwardEntry{ + laddr: addr, + c: make(chan forward, 1), + } + l.entries = append(l.entries, f) + return f.c +} + +// See RFC 4254, section 7.2 +type forwardedTCPPayload struct { + Addr string + Port uint32 + OriginAddr string + OriginPort uint32 +} + +// parseTCPAddr parses the originating address from the remote into a *net.TCPAddr. +func parseTCPAddr(addr string, port uint32) (*net.TCPAddr, error) { + if port == 0 || port > 65535 { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: port number out of range: %d", port) + } + ip := net.ParseIP(string(addr)) + if ip == nil { + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: cannot parse IP address %q", addr) + } + return &net.TCPAddr{IP: ip, Port: int(port)}, nil +} + +func (l *forwardList) handleChannels(in <-chan NewChannel) { + for ch := range in { + var ( + laddr net.Addr + raddr net.Addr + err error + ) + switch channelType := ch.ChannelType(); channelType { + case "forwarded-tcpip": + var payload forwardedTCPPayload + if err = Unmarshal(ch.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil { + ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "could not parse forwarded-tcpip payload: "+err.Error()) + continue + } + + // RFC 4254 section 7.2 specifies that incoming + // addresses should list the address, in string + // format. It is implied that this should be an IP + // address, as it would be impossible to connect to it + // otherwise. + laddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.Addr, payload.Port) + if err != nil { + ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error()) + continue + } + raddr, err = parseTCPAddr(payload.OriginAddr, payload.OriginPort) + if err != nil { + ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, err.Error()) + continue + } + + case "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com": + var payload forwardedStreamLocalPayload + if err = Unmarshal(ch.ExtraData(), &payload); err != nil { + ch.Reject(ConnectionFailed, "could not parse forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com payload: "+err.Error()) + continue + } + laddr = &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: payload.SocketPath, + Net: "unix", + } + raddr = &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: "@", + Net: "unix", + } + default: + panic(fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown channel type %s", channelType)) + } + if ok := l.forward(laddr, raddr, ch); !ok { + // Section 7.2, implementations MUST reject spurious incoming + // connections. + ch.Reject(Prohibited, "no forward for address") + continue + } + + } +} + +// remove removes the forward entry, and the channel feeding its +// listener. +func (l *forwardList) remove(addr net.Addr) { + l.Lock() + defer l.Unlock() + for i, f := range l.entries { + if addr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && addr.String() == f.laddr.String() { + l.entries = append(l.entries[:i], l.entries[i+1:]...) + close(f.c) + return + } + } +} + +// closeAll closes and clears all forwards. +func (l *forwardList) closeAll() { + l.Lock() + defer l.Unlock() + for _, f := range l.entries { + close(f.c) + } + l.entries = nil +} + +func (l *forwardList) forward(laddr, raddr net.Addr, ch NewChannel) bool { + l.Lock() + defer l.Unlock() + for _, f := range l.entries { + if laddr.Network() == f.laddr.Network() && laddr.String() == f.laddr.String() { + f.c <- forward{newCh: ch, raddr: raddr} + return true + } + } + return false +} + +type tcpListener struct { + laddr *net.TCPAddr + + conn *Client + in <-chan forward +} + +// Accept waits for and returns the next connection to the listener. +func (l *tcpListener) Accept() (net.Conn, error) { + s, ok := <-l.in + if !ok { + return nil, io.EOF + } + ch, incoming, err := s.newCh.Accept() + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + go DiscardRequests(incoming) + + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: l.laddr, + raddr: s.raddr, + }, nil +} + +// Close closes the listener. +func (l *tcpListener) Close() error { + m := channelForwardMsg{ + l.laddr.IP.String(), + uint32(l.laddr.Port), + } + + // this also closes the listener. + l.conn.forwards.remove(l.laddr) + ok, _, err := l.conn.SendRequest("cancel-tcpip-forward", true, Marshal(&m)) + if err == nil && !ok { + err = errors.New("ssh: cancel-tcpip-forward failed") + } + return err +} + +// Addr returns the listener's network address. +func (l *tcpListener) Addr() net.Addr { + return l.laddr +} + +// Dial initiates a connection to the addr from the remote host. +// The resulting connection has a zero LocalAddr() and RemoteAddr(). +func (c *Client) Dial(n, addr string) (net.Conn, error) { + var ch Channel + switch n { + case "tcp", "tcp4", "tcp6": + // Parse the address into host and numeric port. + host, portString, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + port, err := strconv.ParseUint(portString, 10, 16) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + ch, err = c.dial(net.IPv4zero.String(), 0, host, int(port)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // Use a zero address for local and remote address. + zeroAddr := &net.TCPAddr{ + IP: net.IPv4zero, + Port: 0, + } + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: zeroAddr, + raddr: zeroAddr, + }, nil + case "unix": + var err error + ch, err = c.dialStreamLocal(addr) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: "@", + Net: "unix", + }, + raddr: &net.UnixAddr{ + Name: addr, + Net: "unix", + }, + }, nil + default: + return nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported protocol: %s", n) + } +} + +// DialTCP connects to the remote address raddr on the network net, +// which must be "tcp", "tcp4", or "tcp6". If laddr is not nil, it is used +// as the local address for the connection. +func (c *Client) DialTCP(n string, laddr, raddr *net.TCPAddr) (net.Conn, error) { + if laddr == nil { + laddr = &net.TCPAddr{ + IP: net.IPv4zero, + Port: 0, + } + } + ch, err := c.dial(laddr.IP.String(), laddr.Port, raddr.IP.String(), raddr.Port) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return &chanConn{ + Channel: ch, + laddr: laddr, + raddr: raddr, + }, nil +} + +// RFC 4254 7.2 +type channelOpenDirectMsg struct { + raddr string + rport uint32 + laddr string + lport uint32 +} + +func (c *Client) dial(laddr string, lport int, raddr string, rport int) (Channel, error) { + msg := channelOpenDirectMsg{ + raddr: raddr, + rport: uint32(rport), + laddr: laddr, + lport: uint32(lport), + } + ch, in, err := c.OpenChannel("direct-tcpip", Marshal(&msg)) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + go DiscardRequests(in) + return ch, err +} + +type tcpChan struct { + Channel // the backing channel +} + +// chanConn fulfills the net.Conn interface without +// the tcpChan having to hold laddr or raddr directly. +type chanConn struct { + Channel + laddr, raddr net.Addr +} + +// LocalAddr returns the local network address. +func (t *chanConn) LocalAddr() net.Addr { + return t.laddr +} + +// RemoteAddr returns the remote network address. +func (t *chanConn) RemoteAddr() net.Addr { + return t.raddr +} + +// SetDeadline sets the read and write deadlines associated +// with the connection. +func (t *chanConn) SetDeadline(deadline time.Time) error { + if err := t.SetReadDeadline(deadline); err != nil { + return err + } + return t.SetWriteDeadline(deadline) +} + +// SetReadDeadline sets the read deadline. +// A zero value for t means Read will not time out. +// After the deadline, the error from Read will implement net.Error +// with Timeout() == true. +func (t *chanConn) SetReadDeadline(deadline time.Time) error { + // for compatibility with previous version, + // the error message contains "tcpChan" + return errors.New("ssh: tcpChan: deadline not supported") +} + +// SetWriteDeadline exists to satisfy the net.Conn interface +// but is not implemented by this type. It always returns an error. +func (t *chanConn) SetWriteDeadline(deadline time.Time) error { + return errors.New("ssh: tcpChan: deadline not supported") +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..49ddc2e7d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/transport.go @@ -0,0 +1,353 @@ +// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package ssh + +import ( + "bufio" + "bytes" + "errors" + "io" + "log" +) + +// debugTransport if set, will print packet types as they go over the +// wire. No message decoding is done, to minimize the impact on timing. +const debugTransport = false + +const ( + gcmCipherID = "aes128-gcm@openssh.com" + aes128cbcID = "aes128-cbc" + tripledescbcID = "3des-cbc" +) + +// packetConn represents a transport that implements packet based +// operations. +type packetConn interface { + // Encrypt and send a packet of data to the remote peer. + writePacket(packet []byte) error + + // Read a packet from the connection. The read is blocking, + // i.e. if error is nil, then the returned byte slice is + // always non-empty. + readPacket() ([]byte, error) + + // Close closes the write-side of the connection. + Close() error +} + +// transport is the keyingTransport that implements the SSH packet +// protocol. +type transport struct { + reader connectionState + writer connectionState + + bufReader *bufio.Reader + bufWriter *bufio.Writer + rand io.Reader + isClient bool + io.Closer +} + +// packetCipher represents a combination of SSH encryption/MAC +// protocol. A single instance should be used for one direction only. +type packetCipher interface { + // writeCipherPacket encrypts the packet and writes it to w. The + // contents of the packet are generally scrambled. + writeCipherPacket(seqnum uint32, w io.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error + + // readCipherPacket reads and decrypts a packet of data. The + // returned packet may be overwritten by future calls of + // readPacket. + readCipherPacket(seqnum uint32, r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) +} + +// connectionState represents one side (read or write) of the +// connection. This is necessary because each direction has its own +// keys, and can even have its own algorithms +type connectionState struct { + packetCipher + seqNum uint32 + dir direction + pendingKeyChange chan packetCipher +} + +// prepareKeyChange sets up key material for a keychange. The key changes in +// both directions are triggered by reading and writing a msgNewKey packet +// respectively. +func (t *transport) prepareKeyChange(algs *algorithms, kexResult *kexResult) error { + ciph, err := newPacketCipher(t.reader.dir, algs.r, kexResult) + if err != nil { + return err + } + t.reader.pendingKeyChange <- ciph + + ciph, err = newPacketCipher(t.writer.dir, algs.w, kexResult) + if err != nil { + return err + } + t.writer.pendingKeyChange <- ciph + + return nil +} + +func (t *transport) printPacket(p []byte, write bool) { + if len(p) == 0 { + return + } + who := "server" + if t.isClient { + who = "client" + } + what := "read" + if write { + what = "write" + } + + log.Println(what, who, p[0]) +} + +// Read and decrypt next packet. +func (t *transport) readPacket() (p []byte, err error) { + for { + p, err = t.reader.readPacket(t.bufReader) + if err != nil { + break + } + if len(p) == 0 || (p[0] != msgIgnore && p[0] != msgDebug) { + break + } + } + if debugTransport { + t.printPacket(p, false) + } + + return p, err +} + +func (s *connectionState) readPacket(r *bufio.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + packet, err := s.packetCipher.readCipherPacket(s.seqNum, r) + s.seqNum++ + if err == nil && len(packet) == 0 { + err = errors.New("ssh: zero length packet") + } + + if len(packet) > 0 { + switch packet[0] { + case msgNewKeys: + select { + case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange: + s.packetCipher = cipher + default: + return nil, errors.New("ssh: got bogus newkeys message") + } + + case msgDisconnect: + // Transform a disconnect message into an + // error. Since this is lowest level at which + // we interpret message types, doing it here + // ensures that we don't have to handle it + // elsewhere. + var msg disconnectMsg + if err := Unmarshal(packet, &msg); err != nil { + return nil, err + } + return nil, &msg + } + } + + // The packet may point to an internal buffer, so copy the + // packet out here. + fresh := make([]byte, len(packet)) + copy(fresh, packet) + + return fresh, err +} + +func (t *transport) writePacket(packet []byte) error { + if debugTransport { + t.printPacket(packet, true) + } + return t.writer.writePacket(t.bufWriter, t.rand, packet) +} + +func (s *connectionState) writePacket(w *bufio.Writer, rand io.Reader, packet []byte) error { + changeKeys := len(packet) > 0 && packet[0] == msgNewKeys + + err := s.packetCipher.writeCipherPacket(s.seqNum, w, rand, packet) + if err != nil { + return err + } + if err = w.Flush(); err != nil { + return err + } + s.seqNum++ + if changeKeys { + select { + case cipher := <-s.pendingKeyChange: + s.packetCipher = cipher + default: + panic("ssh: no key material for msgNewKeys") + } + } + return err +} + +func newTransport(rwc io.ReadWriteCloser, rand io.Reader, isClient bool) *transport { + t := &transport{ + bufReader: bufio.NewReader(rwc), + bufWriter: bufio.NewWriter(rwc), + rand: rand, + reader: connectionState{ + packetCipher: &streamPacketCipher{cipher: noneCipher{}}, + pendingKeyChange: make(chan packetCipher, 1), + }, + writer: connectionState{ + packetCipher: &streamPacketCipher{cipher: noneCipher{}}, + pendingKeyChange: make(chan packetCipher, 1), + }, + Closer: rwc, + } + t.isClient = isClient + + if isClient { + t.reader.dir = serverKeys + t.writer.dir = clientKeys + } else { + t.reader.dir = clientKeys + t.writer.dir = serverKeys + } + + return t +} + +type direction struct { + ivTag []byte + keyTag []byte + macKeyTag []byte +} + +var ( + serverKeys = direction{[]byte{'B'}, []byte{'D'}, []byte{'F'}} + clientKeys = direction{[]byte{'A'}, []byte{'C'}, []byte{'E'}} +) + +// setupKeys sets the cipher and MAC keys from kex.K, kex.H and sessionId, as +// described in RFC 4253, section 6.4. direction should either be serverKeys +// (to setup server->client keys) or clientKeys (for client->server keys). +func newPacketCipher(d direction, algs directionAlgorithms, kex *kexResult) (packetCipher, error) { + cipherMode := cipherModes[algs.Cipher] + macMode := macModes[algs.MAC] + + iv := make([]byte, cipherMode.ivSize) + key := make([]byte, cipherMode.keySize) + macKey := make([]byte, macMode.keySize) + + generateKeyMaterial(iv, d.ivTag, kex) + generateKeyMaterial(key, d.keyTag, kex) + generateKeyMaterial(macKey, d.macKeyTag, kex) + + return cipherModes[algs.Cipher].create(key, iv, macKey, algs) +} + +// generateKeyMaterial fills out with key material generated from tag, K, H +// and sessionId, as specified in RFC 4253, section 7.2. +func generateKeyMaterial(out, tag []byte, r *kexResult) { + var digestsSoFar []byte + + h := r.Hash.New() + for len(out) > 0 { + h.Reset() + h.Write(r.K) + h.Write(r.H) + + if len(digestsSoFar) == 0 { + h.Write(tag) + h.Write(r.SessionID) + } else { + h.Write(digestsSoFar) + } + + digest := h.Sum(nil) + n := copy(out, digest) + out = out[n:] + if len(out) > 0 { + digestsSoFar = append(digestsSoFar, digest...) + } + } +} + +const packageVersion = "SSH-2.0-Go" + +// Sends and receives a version line. The versionLine string should +// be US ASCII, start with "SSH-2.0-", and should not include a +// newline. exchangeVersions returns the other side's version line. +func exchangeVersions(rw io.ReadWriter, versionLine []byte) (them []byte, err error) { + // Contrary to the RFC, we do not ignore lines that don't + // start with "SSH-2.0-" to make the library usable with + // nonconforming servers. + for _, c := range versionLine { + // The spec disallows non US-ASCII chars, and + // specifically forbids null chars. + if c < 32 { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk character in version line") + } + } + if _, err = rw.Write(append(versionLine, '\r', '\n')); err != nil { + return + } + + them, err = readVersion(rw) + return them, err +} + +// maxVersionStringBytes is the maximum number of bytes that we'll +// accept as a version string. RFC 4253 section 4.2 limits this at 255 +// chars +const maxVersionStringBytes = 255 + +// Read version string as specified by RFC 4253, section 4.2. +func readVersion(r io.Reader) ([]byte, error) { + versionString := make([]byte, 0, 64) + var ok bool + var buf [1]byte + + for length := 0; length < maxVersionStringBytes; length++ { + _, err := io.ReadFull(r, buf[:]) + if err != nil { + return nil, err + } + // The RFC says that the version should be terminated with \r\n + // but several SSH servers actually only send a \n. + if buf[0] == '\n' { + if !bytes.HasPrefix(versionString, []byte("SSH-")) { + // RFC 4253 says we need to ignore all version string lines + // except the one containing the SSH version (provided that + // all the lines do not exceed 255 bytes in total). + versionString = versionString[:0] + continue + } + ok = true + break + } + + // non ASCII chars are disallowed, but we are lenient, + // since Go doesn't use null-terminated strings. + + // The RFC allows a comment after a space, however, + // all of it (version and comments) goes into the + // session hash. + versionString = append(versionString, buf[0]) + } + + if !ok { + return nil, errors.New("ssh: overflow reading version string") + } + + // There might be a '\r' on the end which we should remove. + if len(versionString) > 0 && versionString[len(versionString)-1] == '\r' { + versionString = versionString[:len(versionString)-1] + } + return versionString, nil +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..06f84b855 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/asm_aix_ppc64.s @@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !gccgo + +#include "textflag.h" + +// +// System calls for ppc64, AIX are implemented in runtime/syscall_aix.go +// + +TEXT ·syscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-88 + JMP syscall·syscall6(SB) + +TEXT ·rawSyscall6(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-88 + JMP syscall·rawSyscall6(SB) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ed8da8dea --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/byteorder.go @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +import ( + "runtime" +) + +// byteOrder is a subset of encoding/binary.ByteOrder. +type byteOrder interface { + Uint32([]byte) uint32 + Uint64([]byte) uint64 +} + +type littleEndian struct{} +type bigEndian struct{} + +func (littleEndian) Uint32(b []byte) uint32 { + _ = b[3] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808 + return uint32(b[0]) | uint32(b[1])<<8 | uint32(b[2])<<16 | uint32(b[3])<<24 +} + +func (littleEndian) Uint64(b []byte) uint64 { + _ = b[7] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808 + return uint64(b[0]) | uint64(b[1])<<8 | uint64(b[2])<<16 | uint64(b[3])<<24 | + uint64(b[4])<<32 | uint64(b[5])<<40 | uint64(b[6])<<48 | uint64(b[7])<<56 +} + +func (bigEndian) Uint32(b []byte) uint32 { + _ = b[3] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808 + return uint32(b[3]) | uint32(b[2])<<8 | uint32(b[1])<<16 | uint32(b[0])<<24 +} + +func (bigEndian) Uint64(b []byte) uint64 { + _ = b[7] // bounds check hint to compiler; see golang.org/issue/14808 + return uint64(b[7]) | uint64(b[6])<<8 | uint64(b[5])<<16 | uint64(b[4])<<24 | + uint64(b[3])<<32 | uint64(b[2])<<40 | uint64(b[1])<<48 | uint64(b[0])<<56 +} + +// hostByteOrder returns binary.LittleEndian on little-endian machines and +// binary.BigEndian on big-endian machines. +func hostByteOrder() byteOrder { + switch runtime.GOARCH { + case "386", "amd64", "amd64p32", + "arm", "arm64", + "mipsle", "mips64le", "mips64p32le", + "ppc64le", + "riscv", "riscv64": + return littleEndian{} + case "armbe", "arm64be", + "mips", "mips64", "mips64p32", + "ppc", "ppc64", + "s390", "s390x", + "sparc", "sparc64": + return bigEndian{} + } + panic("unknown architecture") +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..b4e6ecb2d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu.go @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Package cpu implements processor feature detection for +// various CPU architectures. +package cpu + +// Initialized reports whether the CPU features were initialized. +// +// For some GOOS/GOARCH combinations initialization of the CPU features depends +// on reading an operating specific file, e.g. /proc/self/auxv on linux/arm +// Initialized will report false if reading the file fails. +var Initialized bool + +// CacheLinePad is used to pad structs to avoid false sharing. +type CacheLinePad struct{ _ [cacheLineSize]byte } + +// X86 contains the supported CPU features of the +// current X86/AMD64 platform. If the current platform +// is not X86/AMD64 then all feature flags are false. +// +// X86 is padded to avoid false sharing. Further the HasAVX +// and HasAVX2 are only set if the OS supports XMM and YMM +// registers in addition to the CPUID feature bit being set. +var X86 struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasAES bool // AES hardware implementation (AES NI) + HasADX bool // Multi-precision add-carry instruction extensions + HasAVX bool // Advanced vector extension + HasAVX2 bool // Advanced vector extension 2 + HasBMI1 bool // Bit manipulation instruction set 1 + HasBMI2 bool // Bit manipulation instruction set 2 + HasERMS bool // Enhanced REP for MOVSB and STOSB + HasFMA bool // Fused-multiply-add instructions + HasOSXSAVE bool // OS supports XSAVE/XRESTOR for saving/restoring XMM registers. + HasPCLMULQDQ bool // PCLMULQDQ instruction - most often used for AES-GCM + HasPOPCNT bool // Hamming weight instruction POPCNT. + HasRDRAND bool // RDRAND instruction (on-chip random number generator) + HasRDSEED bool // RDSEED instruction (on-chip random number generator) + HasSSE2 bool // Streaming SIMD extension 2 (always available on amd64) + HasSSE3 bool // Streaming SIMD extension 3 + HasSSSE3 bool // Supplemental streaming SIMD extension 3 + HasSSE41 bool // Streaming SIMD extension 4 and 4.1 + HasSSE42 bool // Streaming SIMD extension 4 and 4.2 + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// ARM64 contains the supported CPU features of the +// current ARMv8(aarch64) platform. If the current platform +// is not arm64 then all feature flags are false. +var ARM64 struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasFP bool // Floating-point instruction set (always available) + HasASIMD bool // Advanced SIMD (always available) + HasEVTSTRM bool // Event stream support + HasAES bool // AES hardware implementation + HasPMULL bool // Polynomial multiplication instruction set + HasSHA1 bool // SHA1 hardware implementation + HasSHA2 bool // SHA2 hardware implementation + HasCRC32 bool // CRC32 hardware implementation + HasATOMICS bool // Atomic memory operation instruction set + HasFPHP bool // Half precision floating-point instruction set + HasASIMDHP bool // Advanced SIMD half precision instruction set + HasCPUID bool // CPUID identification scheme registers + HasASIMDRDM bool // Rounding double multiply add/subtract instruction set + HasJSCVT bool // Javascript conversion from floating-point to integer + HasFCMA bool // Floating-point multiplication and addition of complex numbers + HasLRCPC bool // Release Consistent processor consistent support + HasDCPOP bool // Persistent memory support + HasSHA3 bool // SHA3 hardware implementation + HasSM3 bool // SM3 hardware implementation + HasSM4 bool // SM4 hardware implementation + HasASIMDDP bool // Advanced SIMD double precision instruction set + HasSHA512 bool // SHA512 hardware implementation + HasSVE bool // Scalable Vector Extensions + HasASIMDFHM bool // Advanced SIMD multiplication FP16 to FP32 + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// ARM contains the supported CPU features of the current ARM (32-bit) platform. +// All feature flags are false if: +// 1. the current platform is not arm, or +// 2. the current operating system is not Linux. +var ARM struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasSWP bool // SWP instruction support + HasHALF bool // Half-word load and store support + HasTHUMB bool // ARM Thumb instruction set + Has26BIT bool // Address space limited to 26-bits + HasFASTMUL bool // 32-bit operand, 64-bit result multiplication support + HasFPA bool // Floating point arithmetic support + HasVFP bool // Vector floating point support + HasEDSP bool // DSP Extensions support + HasJAVA bool // Java instruction set + HasIWMMXT bool // Intel Wireless MMX technology support + HasCRUNCH bool // MaverickCrunch context switching and handling + HasTHUMBEE bool // Thumb EE instruction set + HasNEON bool // NEON instruction set + HasVFPv3 bool // Vector floating point version 3 support + HasVFPv3D16 bool // Vector floating point version 3 D8-D15 + HasTLS bool // Thread local storage support + HasVFPv4 bool // Vector floating point version 4 support + HasIDIVA bool // Integer divide instruction support in ARM mode + HasIDIVT bool // Integer divide instruction support in Thumb mode + HasVFPD32 bool // Vector floating point version 3 D15-D31 + HasLPAE bool // Large Physical Address Extensions + HasEVTSTRM bool // Event stream support + HasAES bool // AES hardware implementation + HasPMULL bool // Polynomial multiplication instruction set + HasSHA1 bool // SHA1 hardware implementation + HasSHA2 bool // SHA2 hardware implementation + HasCRC32 bool // CRC32 hardware implementation + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// PPC64 contains the supported CPU features of the current ppc64/ppc64le platforms. +// If the current platform is not ppc64/ppc64le then all feature flags are false. +// +// For ppc64/ppc64le, it is safe to check only for ISA level starting on ISA v3.00, +// since there are no optional categories. There are some exceptions that also +// require kernel support to work (DARN, SCV), so there are feature bits for +// those as well. The minimum processor requirement is POWER8 (ISA 2.07). +// The struct is padded to avoid false sharing. +var PPC64 struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasDARN bool // Hardware random number generator (requires kernel enablement) + HasSCV bool // Syscall vectored (requires kernel enablement) + IsPOWER8 bool // ISA v2.07 (POWER8) + IsPOWER9 bool // ISA v3.00 (POWER9) + _ CacheLinePad +} + +// S390X contains the supported CPU features of the current IBM Z +// (s390x) platform. If the current platform is not IBM Z then all +// feature flags are false. +// +// S390X is padded to avoid false sharing. Further HasVX is only set +// if the OS supports vector registers in addition to the STFLE +// feature bit being set. +var S390X struct { + _ CacheLinePad + HasZARCH bool // z/Architecture mode is active [mandatory] + HasSTFLE bool // store facility list extended + HasLDISP bool // long (20-bit) displacements + HasEIMM bool // 32-bit immediates + HasDFP bool // decimal floating point + HasETF3EH bool // ETF-3 enhanced + HasMSA bool // message security assist (CPACF) + HasAES bool // KM-AES{128,192,256} functions + HasAESCBC bool // KMC-AES{128,192,256} functions + HasAESCTR bool // KMCTR-AES{128,192,256} functions + HasAESGCM bool // KMA-GCM-AES{128,192,256} functions + HasGHASH bool // KIMD-GHASH function + HasSHA1 bool // K{I,L}MD-SHA-1 functions + HasSHA256 bool // K{I,L}MD-SHA-256 functions + HasSHA512 bool // K{I,L}MD-SHA-512 functions + HasSHA3 bool // K{I,L}MD-SHA3-{224,256,384,512} and K{I,L}MD-SHAKE-{128,256} functions + HasVX bool // vector facility + HasVXE bool // vector-enhancements facility 1 + _ CacheLinePad +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix_ppc64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix_ppc64.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..be6027224 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_aix_ppc64.go @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build aix,ppc64 + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 128 + +const ( + // getsystemcfg constants + _SC_IMPL = 2 + _IMPL_POWER8 = 0x10000 + _IMPL_POWER9 = 0x20000 +) + +func init() { + impl := getsystemcfg(_SC_IMPL) + if impl&_IMPL_POWER8 != 0 { + PPC64.IsPOWER8 = true + } + if impl&_IMPL_POWER9 != 0 { + PPC64.IsPOWER9 = true + } + + Initialized = true +} + +func getsystemcfg(label int) (n uint64) { + r0, _ := callgetsystemcfg(label) + n = uint64(r0) + return +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..981af6818 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_arm.go @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 32 + +// HWCAP/HWCAP2 bits. +// These are specific to Linux. +const ( + hwcap_SWP = 1 << 0 + hwcap_HALF = 1 << 1 + hwcap_THUMB = 1 << 2 + hwcap_26BIT = 1 << 3 + hwcap_FAST_MULT = 1 << 4 + hwcap_FPA = 1 << 5 + hwcap_VFP = 1 << 6 + hwcap_EDSP = 1 << 7 + hwcap_JAVA = 1 << 8 + hwcap_IWMMXT = 1 << 9 + hwcap_CRUNCH = 1 << 10 + hwcap_THUMBEE = 1 << 11 + hwcap_NEON = 1 << 12 + hwcap_VFPv3 = 1 << 13 + hwcap_VFPv3D16 = 1 << 14 + hwcap_TLS = 1 << 15 + hwcap_VFPv4 = 1 << 16 + hwcap_IDIVA = 1 << 17 + hwcap_IDIVT = 1 << 18 + hwcap_VFPD32 = 1 << 19 + hwcap_LPAE = 1 << 20 + hwcap_EVTSTRM = 1 << 21 + + hwcap2_AES = 1 << 0 + hwcap2_PMULL = 1 << 1 + hwcap2_SHA1 = 1 << 2 + hwcap2_SHA2 = 1 << 3 + hwcap2_CRC32 = 1 << 4 +) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..568bcd031 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !gccgo + +package cpu + +// haveAsmFunctions reports whether the other functions in this file can +// be safely called. +func haveAsmFunctions() bool { return true } + +// The following feature detection functions are defined in cpu_s390x.s. +// They are likely to be expensive to call so the results should be cached. +func stfle() facilityList +func kmQuery() queryResult +func kmcQuery() queryResult +func kmctrQuery() queryResult +func kmaQuery() queryResult +func kimdQuery() queryResult +func klmdQuery() queryResult diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f7cb46971 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gc_x86.go @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build 386 amd64 amd64p32 +// +build !gccgo + +package cpu + +// cpuid is implemented in cpu_x86.s for gc compiler +// and in cpu_gccgo.c for gccgo. +func cpuid(eaxArg, ecxArg uint32) (eax, ebx, ecx, edx uint32) + +// xgetbv with ecx = 0 is implemented in cpu_x86.s for gc compiler +// and in cpu_gccgo.c for gccgo. +func xgetbv() (eax, edx uint32) diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo.c b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e363c7d13 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo.c @@ -0,0 +1,43 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build 386 amd64 amd64p32 +// +build gccgo + +#include <cpuid.h> +#include <stdint.h> + +// Need to wrap __get_cpuid_count because it's declared as static. +int +gccgoGetCpuidCount(uint32_t leaf, uint32_t subleaf, + uint32_t *eax, uint32_t *ebx, + uint32_t *ecx, uint32_t *edx) +{ + return __get_cpuid_count(leaf, subleaf, eax, ebx, ecx, edx); +} + +// xgetbv reads the contents of an XCR (Extended Control Register) +// specified in the ECX register into registers EDX:EAX. +// Currently, the only supported value for XCR is 0. +// +// TODO: Replace with a better alternative: +// +// #include <xsaveintrin.h> +// +// #pragma GCC target("xsave") +// +// void gccgoXgetbv(uint32_t *eax, uint32_t *edx) { +// unsigned long long x = _xgetbv(0); +// *eax = x & 0xffffffff; +// *edx = (x >> 32) & 0xffffffff; +// } +// +// Note that _xgetbv is defined starting with GCC 8. +void +gccgoXgetbv(uint32_t *eax, uint32_t *edx) +{ + __asm(" xorl %%ecx, %%ecx\n" + " xgetbv" + : "=a"(*eax), "=d"(*edx)); +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..ba49b91bd --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo.go @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build 386 amd64 amd64p32 +// +build gccgo + +package cpu + +//extern gccgoGetCpuidCount +func gccgoGetCpuidCount(eaxArg, ecxArg uint32, eax, ebx, ecx, edx *uint32) + +func cpuid(eaxArg, ecxArg uint32) (eax, ebx, ecx, edx uint32) { + var a, b, c, d uint32 + gccgoGetCpuidCount(eaxArg, ecxArg, &a, &b, &c, &d) + return a, b, c, d +} + +//extern gccgoXgetbv +func gccgoXgetbv(eax, edx *uint32) + +func xgetbv() (eax, edx uint32) { + var a, d uint32 + gccgoXgetbv(&a, &d) + return a, d +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..aa986f778 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_gccgo_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build gccgo + +package cpu + +// haveAsmFunctions reports whether the other functions in this file can +// be safely called. +func haveAsmFunctions() bool { return false } + +// TODO(mundaym): the following feature detection functions are currently +// stubs. See https://golang.org/cl/162887 for how to fix this. +// They are likely to be expensive to call so the results should be cached. +func stfle() facilityList { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kmQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kmcQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kmctrQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kmaQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func kimdQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } +func klmdQuery() queryResult { panic("not implemented for gccgo") } diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..10e712dc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux.go @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !amd64,!amd64p32,!386 + +package cpu + +import ( + "io/ioutil" +) + +const ( + _AT_HWCAP = 16 + _AT_HWCAP2 = 26 + + procAuxv = "/proc/self/auxv" + + uintSize = int(32 << (^uint(0) >> 63)) +) + +// For those platforms don't have a 'cpuid' equivalent we use HWCAP/HWCAP2 +// These are initialized in cpu_$GOARCH.go +// and should not be changed after they are initialized. +var hwCap uint +var hwCap2 uint + +func init() { + buf, err := ioutil.ReadFile(procAuxv) + if err != nil { + // e.g. on android /proc/self/auxv is not accessible, so silently + // ignore the error and leave Initialized = false + return + } + + bo := hostByteOrder() + for len(buf) >= 2*(uintSize/8) { + var tag, val uint + switch uintSize { + case 32: + tag = uint(bo.Uint32(buf[0:])) + val = uint(bo.Uint32(buf[4:])) + buf = buf[8:] + case 64: + tag = uint(bo.Uint64(buf[0:])) + val = uint(bo.Uint64(buf[8:])) + buf = buf[16:] + } + switch tag { + case _AT_HWCAP: + hwCap = val + case _AT_HWCAP2: + hwCap2 = val + } + } + doinit() + + Initialized = true +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..2057006dc --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm.go @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +func doinit() { + ARM.HasSWP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SWP) + ARM.HasHALF = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_HALF) + ARM.HasTHUMB = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_THUMB) + ARM.Has26BIT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_26BIT) + ARM.HasFASTMUL = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FAST_MULT) + ARM.HasFPA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FPA) + ARM.HasVFP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFP) + ARM.HasEDSP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_EDSP) + ARM.HasJAVA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_JAVA) + ARM.HasIWMMXT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_IWMMXT) + ARM.HasCRUNCH = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_CRUNCH) + ARM.HasTHUMBEE = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_THUMBEE) + ARM.HasNEON = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_NEON) + ARM.HasVFPv3 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFPv3) + ARM.HasVFPv3D16 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFPv3D16) + ARM.HasTLS = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_TLS) + ARM.HasVFPv4 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFPv4) + ARM.HasIDIVA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_IDIVA) + ARM.HasIDIVT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_IDIVT) + ARM.HasVFPD32 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_VFPD32) + ARM.HasLPAE = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_LPAE) + ARM.HasEVTSTRM = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_EVTSTRM) + ARM.HasAES = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_AES) + ARM.HasPMULL = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_PMULL) + ARM.HasSHA1 = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_SHA1) + ARM.HasSHA2 = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_SHA2) + ARM.HasCRC32 = isSet(hwCap2, hwcap2_CRC32) +} + +func isSet(hwc uint, value uint) bool { + return hwc&value != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..fa7fb1bd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,67 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 64 + +// HWCAP/HWCAP2 bits. These are exposed by Linux. +const ( + hwcap_FP = 1 << 0 + hwcap_ASIMD = 1 << 1 + hwcap_EVTSTRM = 1 << 2 + hwcap_AES = 1 << 3 + hwcap_PMULL = 1 << 4 + hwcap_SHA1 = 1 << 5 + hwcap_SHA2 = 1 << 6 + hwcap_CRC32 = 1 << 7 + hwcap_ATOMICS = 1 << 8 + hwcap_FPHP = 1 << 9 + hwcap_ASIMDHP = 1 << 10 + hwcap_CPUID = 1 << 11 + hwcap_ASIMDRDM = 1 << 12 + hwcap_JSCVT = 1 << 13 + hwcap_FCMA = 1 << 14 + hwcap_LRCPC = 1 << 15 + hwcap_DCPOP = 1 << 16 + hwcap_SHA3 = 1 << 17 + hwcap_SM3 = 1 << 18 + hwcap_SM4 = 1 << 19 + hwcap_ASIMDDP = 1 << 20 + hwcap_SHA512 = 1 << 21 + hwcap_SVE = 1 << 22 + hwcap_ASIMDFHM = 1 << 23 +) + +func doinit() { + // HWCAP feature bits + ARM64.HasFP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FP) + ARM64.HasASIMD = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMD) + ARM64.HasEVTSTRM = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_EVTSTRM) + ARM64.HasAES = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_AES) + ARM64.HasPMULL = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_PMULL) + ARM64.HasSHA1 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SHA1) + ARM64.HasSHA2 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SHA2) + ARM64.HasCRC32 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_CRC32) + ARM64.HasATOMICS = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ATOMICS) + ARM64.HasFPHP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FPHP) + ARM64.HasASIMDHP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMDHP) + ARM64.HasCPUID = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_CPUID) + ARM64.HasASIMDRDM = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMDRDM) + ARM64.HasJSCVT = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_JSCVT) + ARM64.HasFCMA = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_FCMA) + ARM64.HasLRCPC = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_LRCPC) + ARM64.HasDCPOP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_DCPOP) + ARM64.HasSHA3 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SHA3) + ARM64.HasSM3 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SM3) + ARM64.HasSM4 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SM4) + ARM64.HasASIMDDP = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMDDP) + ARM64.HasSHA512 = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SHA512) + ARM64.HasSVE = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_SVE) + ARM64.HasASIMDFHM = isSet(hwCap, hwcap_ASIMDFHM) +} + +func isSet(hwc uint, value uint) bool { + return hwc&value != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..f65134f67 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_noinit.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build linux,!arm,!arm64,!ppc64,!ppc64le,!s390x + +package cpu + +func doinit() {} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6c8d975d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_ppc64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build linux +// +build ppc64 ppc64le + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 128 + +// HWCAP/HWCAP2 bits. These are exposed by the kernel. +const ( + // ISA Level + _PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_2_07 = 0x80000000 + _PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_3_00 = 0x00800000 + + // CPU features + _PPC_FEATURE2_DARN = 0x00200000 + _PPC_FEATURE2_SCV = 0x00100000 +) + +func doinit() { + // HWCAP2 feature bits + PPC64.IsPOWER8 = isSet(hwCap2, _PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_2_07) + PPC64.IsPOWER9 = isSet(hwCap2, _PPC_FEATURE2_ARCH_3_00) + PPC64.HasDARN = isSet(hwCap2, _PPC_FEATURE2_DARN) + PPC64.HasSCV = isSet(hwCap2, _PPC_FEATURE2_SCV) +} + +func isSet(hwc uint, value uint) bool { + return hwc&value != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d579eaef4 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_linux_s390x.go @@ -0,0 +1,161 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 256 + +const ( + // bit mask values from /usr/include/bits/hwcap.h + hwcap_ZARCH = 2 + hwcap_STFLE = 4 + hwcap_MSA = 8 + hwcap_LDISP = 16 + hwcap_EIMM = 32 + hwcap_DFP = 64 + hwcap_ETF3EH = 256 + hwcap_VX = 2048 + hwcap_VXE = 8192 +) + +// bitIsSet reports whether the bit at index is set. The bit index +// is in big endian order, so bit index 0 is the leftmost bit. +func bitIsSet(bits []uint64, index uint) bool { + return bits[index/64]&((1<<63)>>(index%64)) != 0 +} + +// function is the code for the named cryptographic function. +type function uint8 + +const ( + // KM{,A,C,CTR} function codes + aes128 function = 18 // AES-128 + aes192 function = 19 // AES-192 + aes256 function = 20 // AES-256 + + // K{I,L}MD function codes + sha1 function = 1 // SHA-1 + sha256 function = 2 // SHA-256 + sha512 function = 3 // SHA-512 + sha3_224 function = 32 // SHA3-224 + sha3_256 function = 33 // SHA3-256 + sha3_384 function = 34 // SHA3-384 + sha3_512 function = 35 // SHA3-512 + shake128 function = 36 // SHAKE-128 + shake256 function = 37 // SHAKE-256 + + // KLMD function codes + ghash function = 65 // GHASH +) + +// queryResult contains the result of a Query function +// call. Bits are numbered in big endian order so the +// leftmost bit (the MSB) is at index 0. +type queryResult struct { + bits [2]uint64 +} + +// Has reports whether the given functions are present. +func (q *queryResult) Has(fns ...function) bool { + if len(fns) == 0 { + panic("no function codes provided") + } + for _, f := range fns { + if !bitIsSet(q.bits[:], uint(f)) { + return false + } + } + return true +} + +// facility is a bit index for the named facility. +type facility uint8 + +const ( + // cryptography facilities + msa4 facility = 77 // message-security-assist extension 4 + msa8 facility = 146 // message-security-assist extension 8 +) + +// facilityList contains the result of an STFLE call. +// Bits are numbered in big endian order so the +// leftmost bit (the MSB) is at index 0. +type facilityList struct { + bits [4]uint64 +} + +// Has reports whether the given facilities are present. +func (s *facilityList) Has(fs ...facility) bool { + if len(fs) == 0 { + panic("no facility bits provided") + } + for _, f := range fs { + if !bitIsSet(s.bits[:], uint(f)) { + return false + } + } + return true +} + +func doinit() { + // test HWCAP bit vector + has := func(featureMask uint) bool { + return hwCap&featureMask == featureMask + } + + // mandatory + S390X.HasZARCH = has(hwcap_ZARCH) + + // optional + S390X.HasSTFLE = has(hwcap_STFLE) + S390X.HasLDISP = has(hwcap_LDISP) + S390X.HasEIMM = has(hwcap_EIMM) + S390X.HasETF3EH = has(hwcap_ETF3EH) + S390X.HasDFP = has(hwcap_DFP) + S390X.HasMSA = has(hwcap_MSA) + S390X.HasVX = has(hwcap_VX) + if S390X.HasVX { + S390X.HasVXE = has(hwcap_VXE) + } + + // We need implementations of stfle, km and so on + // to detect cryptographic features. + if !haveAsmFunctions() { + return + } + + // optional cryptographic functions + if S390X.HasMSA { + aes := []function{aes128, aes192, aes256} + + // cipher message + km, kmc := kmQuery(), kmcQuery() + S390X.HasAES = km.Has(aes...) + S390X.HasAESCBC = kmc.Has(aes...) + if S390X.HasSTFLE { + facilities := stfle() + if facilities.Has(msa4) { + kmctr := kmctrQuery() + S390X.HasAESCTR = kmctr.Has(aes...) + } + if facilities.Has(msa8) { + kma := kmaQuery() + S390X.HasAESGCM = kma.Has(aes...) + } + } + + // compute message digest + kimd := kimdQuery() // intermediate (no padding) + klmd := klmdQuery() // last (padding) + S390X.HasSHA1 = kimd.Has(sha1) && klmd.Has(sha1) + S390X.HasSHA256 = kimd.Has(sha256) && klmd.Has(sha256) + S390X.HasSHA512 = kimd.Has(sha512) && klmd.Has(sha512) + S390X.HasGHASH = kimd.Has(ghash) // KLMD-GHASH does not exist + sha3 := []function{ + sha3_224, sha3_256, sha3_384, sha3_512, + shake128, shake256, + } + S390X.HasSHA3 = kimd.Has(sha3...) && klmd.Has(sha3...) + } +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..6165f1212 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mips64x.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build mips64 mips64le + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 32 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..1269eee88 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_mipsx.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build mips mipsle + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 32 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e1f31dd2d --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_other_arm64.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !linux,arm64 + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 64 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..efe2b7a84 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_riscv64.go @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build riscv64 + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 32 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..e5037d92e --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_s390x.s @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build !gccgo + +#include "textflag.h" + +// func stfle() facilityList +TEXT ·stfle(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-32 + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 + MOVD $3, R0 // last doubleword index to store + XC $32, (R1), (R1) // clear 4 doublewords (32 bytes) + WORD $0xb2b01000 // store facility list extended (STFLE) + RET + +// func kmQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kmQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KM-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB92E0024 // cipher message (KM) + RET + +// func kmcQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kmcQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KMC-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB92F0024 // cipher message with chaining (KMC) + RET + +// func kmctrQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kmctrQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KMCTR-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB92D4024 // cipher message with counter (KMCTR) + RET + +// func kmaQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kmaQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KMA-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xb9296024 // cipher message with authentication (KMA) + RET + +// func kimdQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·kimdQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KIMD-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB93E0024 // compute intermediate message digest (KIMD) + RET + +// func klmdQuery() queryResult +TEXT ·klmdQuery(SB), NOSPLIT|NOFRAME, $0-16 + MOVD $0, R0 // set function code to 0 (KLMD-Query) + MOVD $ret+0(FP), R1 // address of 16-byte return value + WORD $0xB93F0024 // compute last message digest (KLMD) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..8681e876a --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_wasm.go @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build wasm + +package cpu + +// We're compiling the cpu package for an unknown (software-abstracted) CPU. +// Make CacheLinePad an empty struct and hope that the usual struct alignment +// rules are good enough. + +const cacheLineSize = 0 diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..d70d317f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.go @@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build 386 amd64 amd64p32 + +package cpu + +const cacheLineSize = 64 + +func init() { + Initialized = true + + maxID, _, _, _ := cpuid(0, 0) + + if maxID < 1 { + return + } + + _, _, ecx1, edx1 := cpuid(1, 0) + X86.HasSSE2 = isSet(26, edx1) + + X86.HasSSE3 = isSet(0, ecx1) + X86.HasPCLMULQDQ = isSet(1, ecx1) + X86.HasSSSE3 = isSet(9, ecx1) + X86.HasFMA = isSet(12, ecx1) + X86.HasSSE41 = isSet(19, ecx1) + X86.HasSSE42 = isSet(20, ecx1) + X86.HasPOPCNT = isSet(23, ecx1) + X86.HasAES = isSet(25, ecx1) + X86.HasOSXSAVE = isSet(27, ecx1) + X86.HasRDRAND = isSet(30, ecx1) + + osSupportsAVX := false + // For XGETBV, OSXSAVE bit is required and sufficient. + if X86.HasOSXSAVE { + eax, _ := xgetbv() + // Check if XMM and YMM registers have OS support. + osSupportsAVX = isSet(1, eax) && isSet(2, eax) + } + + X86.HasAVX = isSet(28, ecx1) && osSupportsAVX + + if maxID < 7 { + return + } + + _, ebx7, _, _ := cpuid(7, 0) + X86.HasBMI1 = isSet(3, ebx7) + X86.HasAVX2 = isSet(5, ebx7) && osSupportsAVX + X86.HasBMI2 = isSet(8, ebx7) + X86.HasERMS = isSet(9, ebx7) + X86.HasRDSEED = isSet(18, ebx7) + X86.HasADX = isSet(19, ebx7) +} + +func isSet(bitpos uint, value uint32) bool { + return value&(1<<bitpos) != 0 +} diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.s b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.s new file mode 100644 index 000000000..47f084128 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/cpu_x86.s @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +// Copyright 2018 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// +build 386 amd64 amd64p32 +// +build !gccgo + +#include "textflag.h" + +// func cpuid(eaxArg, ecxArg uint32) (eax, ebx, ecx, edx uint32) +TEXT ·cpuid(SB), NOSPLIT, $0-24 + MOVL eaxArg+0(FP), AX + MOVL ecxArg+4(FP), CX + CPUID + MOVL AX, eax+8(FP) + MOVL BX, ebx+12(FP) + MOVL CX, ecx+16(FP) + MOVL DX, edx+20(FP) + RET + +// func xgetbv() (eax, edx uint32) +TEXT ·xgetbv(SB),NOSPLIT,$0-8 + MOVL $0, CX + XGETBV + MOVL AX, eax+0(FP) + MOVL DX, edx+4(FP) + RET diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go new file mode 100644 index 000000000..78fe25e86 --- /dev/null +++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/sys/cpu/syscall_aix_ppc64_gc.go @@ -0,0 +1,36 @@ +// Copyright 2019 The Go Authors. All rights reserved. +// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style +// license that can be found in the LICENSE file. + +// Minimal copy of x/sys/unix so the cpu package can make a +// system call on AIX without depending on x/sys/unix. +// (See golang.org/issue/32102) + +// +build aix,ppc64 +// +build !gccgo + +package cpu + +import ( + "syscall" + "unsafe" +) + +//go:cgo_import_dynamic libc_getsystemcfg getsystemcfg "libc.a/shr_64.o" + +//go:linkname libc_getsystemcfg libc_getsystemcfg + +type syscallFunc uintptr + +var libc_getsystemcfg syscallFunc + +type errno = syscall.Errno + +// Implemented in runtime/syscall_aix.go. +func rawSyscall6(trap, nargs, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr, err errno) +func syscall6(trap, nargs, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6 uintptr) (r1, r2 uintptr, err errno) + +func callgetsystemcfg(label int) (r1 uintptr, e1 errno) { + r1, _, e1 = syscall6(uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&libc_getsystemcfg)), 1, uintptr(label), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) + return +} diff --git a/vendor/modules.txt b/vendor/modules.txt index ffaf888ea..fa01fbeec 100644 --- a/vendor/modules.txt +++ b/vendor/modules.txt @@ -535,8 +535,11 @@ go.opencensus.io/trace/tracestate go.uber.org/atomic # golang.org/x/crypto v0.0.0-20191112222119-e1110fd1c708 golang.org/x/crypto/cast5 +golang.org/x/crypto/chacha20 +golang.org/x/crypto/curve25519 golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519 golang.org/x/crypto/ed25519/internal/edwards25519 +golang.org/x/crypto/internal/subtle golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/armor golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/elgamal @@ -544,6 +547,8 @@ golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/errors golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/packet golang.org/x/crypto/openpgp/s2k golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2 +golang.org/x/crypto/poly1305 +golang.org/x/crypto/ssh golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal # golang.org/x/net v0.0.0-20191004110552-13f9640d40b9 golang.org/x/net/context @@ -564,6 +569,7 @@ golang.org/x/oauth2/internal golang.org/x/sync/errgroup golang.org/x/sync/semaphore # golang.org/x/sys v0.0.0-20191127021746-63cb32ae39b2 +golang.org/x/sys/cpu golang.org/x/sys/unix golang.org/x/sys/windows # golang.org/x/text v0.3.2 |