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authordependabot[bot] <49699333+dependabot[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>2021-05-20 10:10:22 +0000
committerGitHub <noreply@github.com>2021-05-20 10:10:22 +0000
commit26652111b8600cd43401b02628491c2a9a7a7341 (patch)
tree89dce2ec0815f248d9c9b4494626bb7ace4741a5 /vendor/github.com/opencontainers
parent49a99be5b6bd50aa0e7b4cf53ec042b0ffd9edf2 (diff)
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Bump github.com/opencontainers/runc from 1.0.0-rc94 to 1.0.0-rc95
Bumps [github.com/opencontainers/runc](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc) from 1.0.0-rc94 to 1.0.0-rc95. - [Release notes](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/releases) - [Commits](https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/compare/v1.0.0-rc94...v1.0.0-rc95) Signed-off-by: dependabot[bot] <support@github.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'vendor/github.com/opencontainers')
-rw-r--r--vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/config.go7
-rw-r--r--vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils/utils.go54
2 files changed, 58 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/config.go b/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/config.go
index 042ba1a2e..14a096038 100644
--- a/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/config.go
+++ b/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs/config.go
@@ -31,9 +31,10 @@ type IDMap struct {
// for syscalls. Additional architectures can be added by specifying them in
// Architectures.
type Seccomp struct {
- DefaultAction Action `json:"default_action"`
- Architectures []string `json:"architectures"`
- Syscalls []*Syscall `json:"syscalls"`
+ DefaultAction Action `json:"default_action"`
+ Architectures []string `json:"architectures"`
+ Syscalls []*Syscall `json:"syscalls"`
+ DefaultErrnoRet *uint `json:"default_errno_ret"`
}
// Action is taken upon rule match in Seccomp
diff --git a/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils/utils.go b/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils/utils.go
index 1b72b7a1c..cd78f23e1 100644
--- a/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils/utils.go
+++ b/vendor/github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils/utils.go
@@ -3,12 +3,15 @@ package utils
import (
"encoding/binary"
"encoding/json"
+ "fmt"
"io"
"os"
"path/filepath"
+ "strconv"
"strings"
"unsafe"
+ "github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin"
"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
)
@@ -88,6 +91,57 @@ func CleanPath(path string) string {
return filepath.Clean(path)
}
+// stripRoot returns the passed path, stripping the root path if it was
+// (lexicially) inside it. Note that both passed paths will always be treated
+// as absolute, and the returned path will also always be absolute. In
+// addition, the paths are cleaned before stripping the root.
+func stripRoot(root, path string) string {
+ // Make the paths clean and absolute.
+ root, path = CleanPath("/"+root), CleanPath("/"+path)
+ switch {
+ case path == root:
+ path = "/"
+ case root == "/":
+ // do nothing
+ case strings.HasPrefix(path, root+"/"):
+ path = strings.TrimPrefix(path, root+"/")
+ }
+ return CleanPath("/" + path)
+}
+
+// WithProcfd runs the passed closure with a procfd path (/proc/self/fd/...)
+// corresponding to the unsafePath resolved within the root. Before passing the
+// fd, this path is verified to have been inside the root -- so operating on it
+// through the passed fdpath should be safe. Do not access this path through
+// the original path strings, and do not attempt to use the pathname outside of
+// the passed closure (the file handle will be freed once the closure returns).
+func WithProcfd(root, unsafePath string, fn func(procfd string) error) error {
+ // Remove the root then forcefully resolve inside the root.
+ unsafePath = stripRoot(root, unsafePath)
+ path, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
+ if err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("resolving path inside rootfs failed: %v", err)
+ }
+
+ // Open the target path.
+ fh, err := os.OpenFile(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
+ if err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("open o_path procfd: %w", err)
+ }
+ defer fh.Close()
+
+ // Double-check the path is the one we expected.
+ procfd := "/proc/self/fd/" + strconv.Itoa(int(fh.Fd()))
+ if realpath, err := os.Readlink(procfd); err != nil {
+ return fmt.Errorf("procfd verification failed: %w", err)
+ } else if realpath != path {
+ return fmt.Errorf("possibly malicious path detected -- refusing to operate on %s", realpath)
+ }
+
+ // Run the closure.
+ return fn(procfd)
+}
+
// SearchLabels searches a list of key-value pairs for the provided key and
// returns the corresponding value. The pairs must be separated with '='.
func SearchLabels(labels []string, query string) string {