vendor: update everything

* If possible, update each dependency to the latest available version.

* Use releases over commit IDs and avoid vendoring branches.

Signed-off-by: Valentin Rothberg <rothberg@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 1415 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/otr/otr.go b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/otr/otr.go
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..173b753db
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/golang.org/x/crypto/otr/otr.go
@@ -0,0 +1,1415 @@
+// Copyright 2012 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
+// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
+// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
+
+// Package otr implements the Off The Record protocol as specified in
+// http://www.cypherpunks.ca/otr/Protocol-v2-3.1.0.html
+package otr // import "golang.org/x/crypto/otr"
+
+import (
+	"bytes"
+	"crypto/aes"
+	"crypto/cipher"
+	"crypto/dsa"
+	"crypto/hmac"
+	"crypto/rand"
+	"crypto/sha1"
+	"crypto/sha256"
+	"crypto/subtle"
+	"encoding/base64"
+	"encoding/hex"
+	"errors"
+	"hash"
+	"io"
+	"math/big"
+	"strconv"
+)
+
+// SecurityChange describes a change in the security state of a Conversation.
+type SecurityChange int
+
+const (
+	NoChange SecurityChange = iota
+	// NewKeys indicates that a key exchange has completed. This occurs
+	// when a conversation first becomes encrypted, and when the keys are
+	// renegotiated within an encrypted conversation.
+	NewKeys
+	// SMPSecretNeeded indicates that the peer has started an
+	// authentication and that we need to supply a secret. Call SMPQuestion
+	// to get the optional, human readable challenge and then Authenticate
+	// to supply the matching secret.
+	SMPSecretNeeded
+	// SMPComplete indicates that an authentication completed. The identity
+	// of the peer has now been confirmed.
+	SMPComplete
+	// SMPFailed indicates that an authentication failed.
+	SMPFailed
+	// ConversationEnded indicates that the peer ended the secure
+	// conversation.
+	ConversationEnded
+)
+
+// QueryMessage can be sent to a peer to start an OTR conversation.
+var QueryMessage = "?OTRv2?"
+
+// ErrorPrefix can be used to make an OTR error by appending an error message
+// to it.
+var ErrorPrefix = "?OTR Error:"
+
+var (
+	fragmentPartSeparator = []byte(",")
+	fragmentPrefix        = []byte("?OTR,")
+	msgPrefix             = []byte("?OTR:")
+	queryMarker           = []byte("?OTR")
+)
+
+// isQuery attempts to parse an OTR query from msg and returns the greatest
+// common version, or 0 if msg is not an OTR query.
+func isQuery(msg []byte) (greatestCommonVersion int) {
+	pos := bytes.Index(msg, queryMarker)
+	if pos == -1 {
+		return 0
+	}
+	for i, c := range msg[pos+len(queryMarker):] {
+		if i == 0 {
+			if c == '?' {
+				// Indicates support for version 1, but we don't
+				// implement that.
+				continue
+			}
+
+			if c != 'v' {
+				// Invalid message
+				return 0
+			}
+
+			continue
+		}
+
+		if c == '?' {
+			// End of message
+			return
+		}
+
+		if c == ' ' || c == '\t' {
+			// Probably an invalid message
+			return 0
+		}
+
+		if c == '2' {
+			greatestCommonVersion = 2
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0
+}
+
+const (
+	statePlaintext = iota
+	stateEncrypted
+	stateFinished
+)
+
+const (
+	authStateNone = iota
+	authStateAwaitingDHKey
+	authStateAwaitingRevealSig
+	authStateAwaitingSig
+)
+
+const (
+	msgTypeDHCommit  = 2
+	msgTypeData      = 3
+	msgTypeDHKey     = 10
+	msgTypeRevealSig = 17
+	msgTypeSig       = 18
+)
+
+const (
+	// If the requested fragment size is less than this, it will be ignored.
+	minFragmentSize = 18
+	// Messages are padded to a multiple of this number of bytes.
+	paddingGranularity = 256
+	// The number of bytes in a Diffie-Hellman private value (320-bits).
+	dhPrivateBytes = 40
+	// The number of bytes needed to represent an element of the DSA
+	// subgroup (160-bits).
+	dsaSubgroupBytes = 20
+	// The number of bytes of the MAC that are sent on the wire (160-bits).
+	macPrefixBytes = 20
+)
+
+// These are the global, common group parameters for OTR.
+var (
+	p       *big.Int // group prime
+	g       *big.Int // group generator
+	q       *big.Int // group order
+	pMinus2 *big.Int
+)
+
+func init() {
+	p, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E088A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE649286651ECE45B3DC2007CB8A163BF0598DA48361C55D39A69163FA8FD24CF5F83655D23DCA3AD961C62F356208552BB9ED529077096966D670C354E4ABC9804F1746C08CA237327FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16)
+	q, _ = new(big.Int).SetString("7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFE487ED5110B4611A62633145C06E0E68948127044533E63A0105DF531D89CD9128A5043CC71A026EF7CA8CD9E69D218D98158536F92F8A1BA7F09AB6B6A8E122F242DABB312F3F637A262174D31BF6B585FFAE5B7A035BF6F71C35FDAD44CFD2D74F9208BE258FF324943328F6722D9EE1003E5C50B1DF82CC6D241B0E2AE9CD348B1FD47E9267AFC1B2AE91EE51D6CB0E3179AB1042A95DCF6A9483B84B4B36B3861AA7255E4C0278BA36046511B993FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF", 16)
+	g = new(big.Int).SetInt64(2)
+	pMinus2 = new(big.Int).Sub(p, g)
+}
+
+// Conversation represents a relation with a peer. The zero value is a valid
+// Conversation, although PrivateKey must be set.
+//
+// When communicating with a peer, all inbound messages should be passed to
+// Conversation.Receive and all outbound messages to Conversation.Send. The
+// Conversation will take care of maintaining the encryption state and
+// negotiating encryption as needed.
+type Conversation struct {
+	// PrivateKey contains the private key to use to sign key exchanges.
+	PrivateKey *PrivateKey
+
+	// Rand can be set to override the entropy source. Otherwise,
+	// crypto/rand will be used.
+	Rand io.Reader
+	// If FragmentSize is set, all messages produced by Receive and Send
+	// will be fragmented into messages of, at most, this number of bytes.
+	FragmentSize int
+
+	// Once Receive has returned NewKeys once, the following fields are
+	// valid.
+	SSID           [8]byte
+	TheirPublicKey PublicKey
+
+	state, authState int
+
+	r       [16]byte
+	x, y    *big.Int
+	gx, gy  *big.Int
+	gxBytes []byte
+	digest  [sha256.Size]byte
+
+	revealKeys, sigKeys akeKeys
+
+	myKeyId         uint32
+	myCurrentDHPub  *big.Int
+	myCurrentDHPriv *big.Int
+	myLastDHPub     *big.Int
+	myLastDHPriv    *big.Int
+
+	theirKeyId        uint32
+	theirCurrentDHPub *big.Int
+	theirLastDHPub    *big.Int
+
+	keySlots [4]keySlot
+
+	myCounter    [8]byte
+	theirLastCtr [8]byte
+	oldMACs      []byte
+
+	k, n int // fragment state
+	frag []byte
+
+	smp smpState
+}
+
+// A keySlot contains key material for a specific (their keyid, my keyid) pair.
+type keySlot struct {
+	// used is true if this slot is valid. If false, it's free for reuse.
+	used                   bool
+	theirKeyId             uint32
+	myKeyId                uint32
+	sendAESKey, recvAESKey []byte
+	sendMACKey, recvMACKey []byte
+	theirLastCtr           [8]byte
+}
+
+// akeKeys are generated during key exchange. There's one set for the reveal
+// signature message and another for the signature message. In the protocol
+// spec the latter are indicated with a prime mark.
+type akeKeys struct {
+	c      [16]byte
+	m1, m2 [32]byte
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) rand() io.Reader {
+	if c.Rand != nil {
+		return c.Rand
+	}
+	return rand.Reader
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) randMPI(buf []byte) *big.Int {
+	_, err := io.ReadFull(c.rand(), buf)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("otr: short read from random source")
+	}
+
+	return new(big.Int).SetBytes(buf)
+}
+
+// tlv represents the type-length value from the protocol.
+type tlv struct {
+	typ, length uint16
+	data        []byte
+}
+
+const (
+	tlvTypePadding          = 0
+	tlvTypeDisconnected     = 1
+	tlvTypeSMP1             = 2
+	tlvTypeSMP2             = 3
+	tlvTypeSMP3             = 4
+	tlvTypeSMP4             = 5
+	tlvTypeSMPAbort         = 6
+	tlvTypeSMP1WithQuestion = 7
+)
+
+// Receive handles a message from a peer. It returns a human readable message,
+// an indicator of whether that message was encrypted, a hint about the
+// encryption state and zero or more messages to send back to the peer.
+// These messages do not need to be passed to Send before transmission.
+func (c *Conversation) Receive(in []byte) (out []byte, encrypted bool, change SecurityChange, toSend [][]byte, err error) {
+	if bytes.HasPrefix(in, fragmentPrefix) {
+		in, err = c.processFragment(in)
+		if in == nil || err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	if bytes.HasPrefix(in, msgPrefix) && in[len(in)-1] == '.' {
+		in = in[len(msgPrefix) : len(in)-1]
+	} else if version := isQuery(in); version > 0 {
+		c.authState = authStateAwaitingDHKey
+		c.reset()
+		toSend = c.encode(c.generateDHCommit())
+		return
+	} else {
+		// plaintext message
+		out = in
+		return
+	}
+
+	msg := make([]byte, base64.StdEncoding.DecodedLen(len(in)))
+	msgLen, err := base64.StdEncoding.Decode(msg, in)
+	if err != nil {
+		err = errors.New("otr: invalid base64 encoding in message")
+		return
+	}
+	msg = msg[:msgLen]
+
+	// The first two bytes are the protocol version (2)
+	if len(msg) < 3 || msg[0] != 0 || msg[1] != 2 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: invalid OTR message")
+		return
+	}
+
+	msgType := int(msg[2])
+	msg = msg[3:]
+
+	switch msgType {
+	case msgTypeDHCommit:
+		switch c.authState {
+		case authStateNone:
+			c.authState = authStateAwaitingRevealSig
+			if err = c.processDHCommit(msg); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			c.reset()
+			toSend = c.encode(c.generateDHKey())
+			return
+		case authStateAwaitingDHKey:
+			// This is a 'SYN-crossing'. The greater digest wins.
+			var cmp int
+			if cmp, err = c.compareToDHCommit(msg); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			if cmp > 0 {
+				// We win. Retransmit DH commit.
+				toSend = c.encode(c.serializeDHCommit())
+				return
+			} else {
+				// They win. We forget about our DH commit.
+				c.authState = authStateAwaitingRevealSig
+				if err = c.processDHCommit(msg); err != nil {
+					return
+				}
+				c.reset()
+				toSend = c.encode(c.generateDHKey())
+				return
+			}
+		case authStateAwaitingRevealSig:
+			if err = c.processDHCommit(msg); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			toSend = c.encode(c.serializeDHKey())
+		case authStateAwaitingSig:
+			if err = c.processDHCommit(msg); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			c.reset()
+			toSend = c.encode(c.generateDHKey())
+			c.authState = authStateAwaitingRevealSig
+		default:
+			panic("bad state")
+		}
+	case msgTypeDHKey:
+		switch c.authState {
+		case authStateAwaitingDHKey:
+			var isSame bool
+			if isSame, err = c.processDHKey(msg); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			if isSame {
+				err = errors.New("otr: unexpected duplicate DH key")
+				return
+			}
+			toSend = c.encode(c.generateRevealSig())
+			c.authState = authStateAwaitingSig
+		case authStateAwaitingSig:
+			var isSame bool
+			if isSame, err = c.processDHKey(msg); err != nil {
+				return
+			}
+			if isSame {
+				toSend = c.encode(c.serializeDHKey())
+			}
+		}
+	case msgTypeRevealSig:
+		if c.authState != authStateAwaitingRevealSig {
+			return
+		}
+		if err = c.processRevealSig(msg); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		toSend = c.encode(c.generateSig())
+		c.authState = authStateNone
+		c.state = stateEncrypted
+		change = NewKeys
+	case msgTypeSig:
+		if c.authState != authStateAwaitingSig {
+			return
+		}
+		if err = c.processSig(msg); err != nil {
+			return
+		}
+		c.authState = authStateNone
+		c.state = stateEncrypted
+		change = NewKeys
+	case msgTypeData:
+		if c.state != stateEncrypted {
+			err = errors.New("otr: encrypted message received without encrypted session established")
+			return
+		}
+		var tlvs []tlv
+		out, tlvs, err = c.processData(msg)
+		encrypted = true
+
+	EachTLV:
+		for _, inTLV := range tlvs {
+			switch inTLV.typ {
+			case tlvTypeDisconnected:
+				change = ConversationEnded
+				c.state = stateFinished
+				break EachTLV
+			case tlvTypeSMP1, tlvTypeSMP2, tlvTypeSMP3, tlvTypeSMP4, tlvTypeSMPAbort, tlvTypeSMP1WithQuestion:
+				var reply tlv
+				var complete bool
+				reply, complete, err = c.processSMP(inTLV)
+				if err == smpSecretMissingError {
+					err = nil
+					change = SMPSecretNeeded
+					c.smp.saved = &inTLV
+					return
+				}
+				if err == smpFailureError {
+					err = nil
+					change = SMPFailed
+				} else if complete {
+					change = SMPComplete
+				}
+				if reply.typ != 0 {
+					toSend = c.encode(c.generateData(nil, &reply))
+				}
+				break EachTLV
+			default:
+				// skip unknown TLVs
+			}
+		}
+	default:
+		err = errors.New("otr: unknown message type " + strconv.Itoa(msgType))
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+// Send takes a human readable message from the local user, possibly encrypts
+// it and returns zero one or more messages to send to the peer.
+func (c *Conversation) Send(msg []byte) ([][]byte, error) {
+	switch c.state {
+	case statePlaintext:
+		return [][]byte{msg}, nil
+	case stateEncrypted:
+		return c.encode(c.generateData(msg, nil)), nil
+	case stateFinished:
+		return nil, errors.New("otr: cannot send message because secure conversation has finished")
+	}
+
+	return nil, errors.New("otr: cannot send message in current state")
+}
+
+// SMPQuestion returns the human readable challenge question from the peer.
+// It's only valid after Receive has returned SMPSecretNeeded.
+func (c *Conversation) SMPQuestion() string {
+	return c.smp.question
+}
+
+// Authenticate begins an authentication with the peer. Authentication involves
+// an optional challenge message and a shared secret. The authentication
+// proceeds until either Receive returns SMPComplete, SMPSecretNeeded (which
+// indicates that a new authentication is happening and thus this one was
+// aborted) or SMPFailed.
+func (c *Conversation) Authenticate(question string, mutualSecret []byte) (toSend [][]byte, err error) {
+	if c.state != stateEncrypted {
+		err = errors.New("otr: can't authenticate a peer without a secure conversation established")
+		return
+	}
+
+	if c.smp.saved != nil {
+		c.calcSMPSecret(mutualSecret, false /* they started it */)
+
+		var out tlv
+		var complete bool
+		out, complete, err = c.processSMP(*c.smp.saved)
+		if complete {
+			panic("SMP completed on the first message")
+		}
+		c.smp.saved = nil
+		if out.typ != 0 {
+			toSend = c.encode(c.generateData(nil, &out))
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
+	c.calcSMPSecret(mutualSecret, true /* we started it */)
+	outs := c.startSMP(question)
+	for _, out := range outs {
+		toSend = append(toSend, c.encode(c.generateData(nil, &out))...)
+	}
+	return
+}
+
+// End ends a secure conversation by generating a termination message for
+// the peer and switches to unencrypted communication.
+func (c *Conversation) End() (toSend [][]byte) {
+	switch c.state {
+	case statePlaintext:
+		return nil
+	case stateEncrypted:
+		c.state = statePlaintext
+		return c.encode(c.generateData(nil, &tlv{typ: tlvTypeDisconnected}))
+	case stateFinished:
+		c.state = statePlaintext
+		return nil
+	}
+	panic("unreachable")
+}
+
+// IsEncrypted returns true if a message passed to Send would be encrypted
+// before transmission. This result remains valid until the next call to
+// Receive or End, which may change the state of the Conversation.
+func (c *Conversation) IsEncrypted() bool {
+	return c.state == stateEncrypted
+}
+
+var fragmentError = errors.New("otr: invalid OTR fragment")
+
+// processFragment processes a fragmented OTR message and possibly returns a
+// complete message. Fragmented messages look like "?OTR,k,n,msg," where k is
+// the fragment number (starting from 1), n is the number of fragments in this
+// message and msg is a substring of the base64 encoded message.
+func (c *Conversation) processFragment(in []byte) (out []byte, err error) {
+	in = in[len(fragmentPrefix):] // remove "?OTR,"
+	parts := bytes.Split(in, fragmentPartSeparator)
+	if len(parts) != 4 || len(parts[3]) != 0 {
+		return nil, fragmentError
+	}
+
+	k, err := strconv.Atoi(string(parts[0]))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fragmentError
+	}
+
+	n, err := strconv.Atoi(string(parts[1]))
+	if err != nil {
+		return nil, fragmentError
+	}
+
+	if k < 1 || n < 1 || k > n {
+		return nil, fragmentError
+	}
+
+	if k == 1 {
+		c.frag = append(c.frag[:0], parts[2]...)
+		c.k, c.n = k, n
+	} else if n == c.n && k == c.k+1 {
+		c.frag = append(c.frag, parts[2]...)
+		c.k++
+	} else {
+		c.frag = c.frag[:0]
+		c.n, c.k = 0, 0
+	}
+
+	if c.n > 0 && c.k == c.n {
+		c.n, c.k = 0, 0
+		return c.frag, nil
+	}
+
+	return nil, nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateDHCommit() []byte {
+	_, err := io.ReadFull(c.rand(), c.r[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("otr: short read from random source")
+	}
+
+	var xBytes [dhPrivateBytes]byte
+	c.x = c.randMPI(xBytes[:])
+	c.gx = new(big.Int).Exp(g, c.x, p)
+	c.gy = nil
+	c.gxBytes = appendMPI(nil, c.gx)
+
+	h := sha256.New()
+	h.Write(c.gxBytes)
+	h.Sum(c.digest[:0])
+
+	aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(c.r[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	ctr := cipher.NewCTR(aesCipher, iv[:])
+	ctr.XORKeyStream(c.gxBytes, c.gxBytes)
+
+	return c.serializeDHCommit()
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) serializeDHCommit() []byte {
+	var ret []byte
+	ret = appendU16(ret, 2) // protocol version
+	ret = append(ret, msgTypeDHCommit)
+	ret = appendData(ret, c.gxBytes)
+	ret = appendData(ret, c.digest[:])
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processDHCommit(in []byte) error {
+	var ok1, ok2 bool
+	c.gxBytes, in, ok1 = getData(in)
+	digest, in, ok2 := getData(in)
+	if !ok1 || !ok2 || len(in) > 0 {
+		return errors.New("otr: corrupt DH commit message")
+	}
+	copy(c.digest[:], digest)
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) compareToDHCommit(in []byte) (int, error) {
+	_, in, ok1 := getData(in)
+	digest, in, ok2 := getData(in)
+	if !ok1 || !ok2 || len(in) > 0 {
+		return 0, errors.New("otr: corrupt DH commit message")
+	}
+	return bytes.Compare(c.digest[:], digest), nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateDHKey() []byte {
+	var yBytes [dhPrivateBytes]byte
+	c.y = c.randMPI(yBytes[:])
+	c.gy = new(big.Int).Exp(g, c.y, p)
+	return c.serializeDHKey()
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) serializeDHKey() []byte {
+	var ret []byte
+	ret = appendU16(ret, 2) // protocol version
+	ret = append(ret, msgTypeDHKey)
+	ret = appendMPI(ret, c.gy)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processDHKey(in []byte) (isSame bool, err error) {
+	gy, in, ok := getMPI(in)
+	if !ok {
+		err = errors.New("otr: corrupt DH key message")
+		return
+	}
+	if gy.Cmp(g) < 0 || gy.Cmp(pMinus2) > 0 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: DH value out of range")
+		return
+	}
+	if c.gy != nil {
+		isSame = c.gy.Cmp(gy) == 0
+		return
+	}
+	c.gy = gy
+	return
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateEncryptedSignature(keys *akeKeys, xFirst bool) ([]byte, []byte) {
+	var xb []byte
+	xb = c.PrivateKey.PublicKey.Serialize(xb)
+
+	var verifyData []byte
+	if xFirst {
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gx)
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gy)
+	} else {
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gy)
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gx)
+	}
+	verifyData = append(verifyData, xb...)
+	verifyData = appendU32(verifyData, c.myKeyId)
+
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, keys.m1[:])
+	mac.Write(verifyData)
+	mb := mac.Sum(nil)
+
+	xb = appendU32(xb, c.myKeyId)
+	xb = append(xb, c.PrivateKey.Sign(c.rand(), mb)...)
+
+	aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(keys.c[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	ctr := cipher.NewCTR(aesCipher, iv[:])
+	ctr.XORKeyStream(xb, xb)
+
+	mac = hmac.New(sha256.New, keys.m2[:])
+	encryptedSig := appendData(nil, xb)
+	mac.Write(encryptedSig)
+
+	return encryptedSig, mac.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateRevealSig() []byte {
+	s := new(big.Int).Exp(c.gy, c.x, p)
+	c.calcAKEKeys(s)
+	c.myKeyId++
+
+	encryptedSig, mac := c.generateEncryptedSignature(&c.revealKeys, true /* gx comes first */)
+
+	c.myCurrentDHPub = c.gx
+	c.myCurrentDHPriv = c.x
+	c.rotateDHKeys()
+	incCounter(&c.myCounter)
+
+	var ret []byte
+	ret = appendU16(ret, 2)
+	ret = append(ret, msgTypeRevealSig)
+	ret = appendData(ret, c.r[:])
+	ret = append(ret, encryptedSig...)
+	ret = append(ret, mac[:20]...)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processEncryptedSig(encryptedSig, theirMAC []byte, keys *akeKeys, xFirst bool) error {
+	mac := hmac.New(sha256.New, keys.m2[:])
+	mac.Write(appendData(nil, encryptedSig))
+	myMAC := mac.Sum(nil)[:20]
+
+	if len(myMAC) != len(theirMAC) || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(myMAC, theirMAC) == 0 {
+		return errors.New("bad signature MAC in encrypted signature")
+	}
+
+	aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(keys.c[:])
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	ctr := cipher.NewCTR(aesCipher, iv[:])
+	ctr.XORKeyStream(encryptedSig, encryptedSig)
+
+	sig := encryptedSig
+	sig, ok1 := c.TheirPublicKey.Parse(sig)
+	keyId, sig, ok2 := getU32(sig)
+	if !ok1 || !ok2 {
+		return errors.New("otr: corrupt encrypted signature")
+	}
+
+	var verifyData []byte
+	if xFirst {
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gx)
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gy)
+	} else {
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gy)
+		verifyData = appendMPI(verifyData, c.gx)
+	}
+	verifyData = c.TheirPublicKey.Serialize(verifyData)
+	verifyData = appendU32(verifyData, keyId)
+
+	mac = hmac.New(sha256.New, keys.m1[:])
+	mac.Write(verifyData)
+	mb := mac.Sum(nil)
+
+	sig, ok1 = c.TheirPublicKey.Verify(mb, sig)
+	if !ok1 {
+		return errors.New("bad signature in encrypted signature")
+	}
+	if len(sig) > 0 {
+		return errors.New("corrupt encrypted signature")
+	}
+
+	c.theirKeyId = keyId
+	zero(c.theirLastCtr[:])
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processRevealSig(in []byte) error {
+	r, in, ok1 := getData(in)
+	encryptedSig, in, ok2 := getData(in)
+	theirMAC := in
+	if !ok1 || !ok2 || len(theirMAC) != 20 {
+		return errors.New("otr: corrupt reveal signature message")
+	}
+
+	aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(r)
+	if err != nil {
+		return errors.New("otr: cannot create AES cipher from reveal signature message: " + err.Error())
+	}
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	ctr := cipher.NewCTR(aesCipher, iv[:])
+	ctr.XORKeyStream(c.gxBytes, c.gxBytes)
+	h := sha256.New()
+	h.Write(c.gxBytes)
+	digest := h.Sum(nil)
+	if len(digest) != len(c.digest) || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(digest, c.digest[:]) == 0 {
+		return errors.New("otr: bad commit MAC in reveal signature message")
+	}
+	var rest []byte
+	c.gx, rest, ok1 = getMPI(c.gxBytes)
+	if !ok1 || len(rest) > 0 {
+		return errors.New("otr: gx corrupt after decryption")
+	}
+	if c.gx.Cmp(g) < 0 || c.gx.Cmp(pMinus2) > 0 {
+		return errors.New("otr: DH value out of range")
+	}
+	s := new(big.Int).Exp(c.gx, c.y, p)
+	c.calcAKEKeys(s)
+
+	if err := c.processEncryptedSig(encryptedSig, theirMAC, &c.revealKeys, true /* gx comes first */); err != nil {
+		return errors.New("otr: in reveal signature message: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	c.theirCurrentDHPub = c.gx
+	c.theirLastDHPub = nil
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateSig() []byte {
+	c.myKeyId++
+
+	encryptedSig, mac := c.generateEncryptedSignature(&c.sigKeys, false /* gy comes first */)
+
+	c.myCurrentDHPub = c.gy
+	c.myCurrentDHPriv = c.y
+	c.rotateDHKeys()
+	incCounter(&c.myCounter)
+
+	var ret []byte
+	ret = appendU16(ret, 2)
+	ret = append(ret, msgTypeSig)
+	ret = append(ret, encryptedSig...)
+	ret = append(ret, mac[:macPrefixBytes]...)
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processSig(in []byte) error {
+	encryptedSig, in, ok1 := getData(in)
+	theirMAC := in
+	if !ok1 || len(theirMAC) != macPrefixBytes {
+		return errors.New("otr: corrupt signature message")
+	}
+
+	if err := c.processEncryptedSig(encryptedSig, theirMAC, &c.sigKeys, false /* gy comes first */); err != nil {
+		return errors.New("otr: in signature message: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	c.theirCurrentDHPub = c.gy
+	c.theirLastDHPub = nil
+
+	return nil
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) rotateDHKeys() {
+	// evict slots using our retired key id
+	for i := range c.keySlots {
+		slot := &c.keySlots[i]
+		if slot.used && slot.myKeyId == c.myKeyId-1 {
+			slot.used = false
+			c.oldMACs = append(c.oldMACs, slot.recvMACKey...)
+		}
+	}
+
+	c.myLastDHPriv = c.myCurrentDHPriv
+	c.myLastDHPub = c.myCurrentDHPub
+
+	var xBytes [dhPrivateBytes]byte
+	c.myCurrentDHPriv = c.randMPI(xBytes[:])
+	c.myCurrentDHPub = new(big.Int).Exp(g, c.myCurrentDHPriv, p)
+	c.myKeyId++
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) processData(in []byte) (out []byte, tlvs []tlv, err error) {
+	origIn := in
+	flags, in, ok1 := getU8(in)
+	theirKeyId, in, ok2 := getU32(in)
+	myKeyId, in, ok3 := getU32(in)
+	y, in, ok4 := getMPI(in)
+	counter, in, ok5 := getNBytes(in, 8)
+	encrypted, in, ok6 := getData(in)
+	macedData := origIn[:len(origIn)-len(in)]
+	theirMAC, in, ok7 := getNBytes(in, macPrefixBytes)
+	_, in, ok8 := getData(in)
+	if !ok1 || !ok2 || !ok3 || !ok4 || !ok5 || !ok6 || !ok7 || !ok8 || len(in) > 0 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: corrupt data message")
+		return
+	}
+
+	ignoreErrors := flags&1 != 0
+
+	slot, err := c.calcDataKeys(myKeyId, theirKeyId)
+	if err != nil {
+		if ignoreErrors {
+			err = nil
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
+	mac := hmac.New(sha1.New, slot.recvMACKey)
+	mac.Write([]byte{0, 2, 3})
+	mac.Write(macedData)
+	myMAC := mac.Sum(nil)
+	if len(myMAC) != len(theirMAC) || subtle.ConstantTimeCompare(myMAC, theirMAC) == 0 {
+		if !ignoreErrors {
+			err = errors.New("otr: bad MAC on data message")
+		}
+		return
+	}
+
+	if bytes.Compare(counter, slot.theirLastCtr[:]) <= 0 {
+		err = errors.New("otr: counter regressed")
+		return
+	}
+	copy(slot.theirLastCtr[:], counter)
+
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	copy(iv[:], counter)
+	aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(slot.recvAESKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	ctr := cipher.NewCTR(aesCipher, iv[:])
+	ctr.XORKeyStream(encrypted, encrypted)
+	decrypted := encrypted
+
+	if myKeyId == c.myKeyId {
+		c.rotateDHKeys()
+	}
+	if theirKeyId == c.theirKeyId {
+		// evict slots using their retired key id
+		for i := range c.keySlots {
+			slot := &c.keySlots[i]
+			if slot.used && slot.theirKeyId == theirKeyId-1 {
+				slot.used = false
+				c.oldMACs = append(c.oldMACs, slot.recvMACKey...)
+			}
+		}
+
+		c.theirLastDHPub = c.theirCurrentDHPub
+		c.theirKeyId++
+		c.theirCurrentDHPub = y
+	}
+
+	if nulPos := bytes.IndexByte(decrypted, 0); nulPos >= 0 {
+		out = decrypted[:nulPos]
+		tlvData := decrypted[nulPos+1:]
+		for len(tlvData) > 0 {
+			var t tlv
+			var ok1, ok2, ok3 bool
+
+			t.typ, tlvData, ok1 = getU16(tlvData)
+			t.length, tlvData, ok2 = getU16(tlvData)
+			t.data, tlvData, ok3 = getNBytes(tlvData, int(t.length))
+			if !ok1 || !ok2 || !ok3 {
+				err = errors.New("otr: corrupt tlv data")
+				return
+			}
+			tlvs = append(tlvs, t)
+		}
+	} else {
+		out = decrypted
+	}
+
+	return
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) generateData(msg []byte, extra *tlv) []byte {
+	slot, err := c.calcDataKeys(c.myKeyId-1, c.theirKeyId)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic("otr: failed to generate sending keys: " + err.Error())
+	}
+
+	var plaintext []byte
+	plaintext = append(plaintext, msg...)
+	plaintext = append(plaintext, 0)
+
+	padding := paddingGranularity - ((len(plaintext) + 4) % paddingGranularity)
+	plaintext = appendU16(plaintext, tlvTypePadding)
+	plaintext = appendU16(plaintext, uint16(padding))
+	for i := 0; i < padding; i++ {
+		plaintext = append(plaintext, 0)
+	}
+
+	if extra != nil {
+		plaintext = appendU16(plaintext, extra.typ)
+		plaintext = appendU16(plaintext, uint16(len(extra.data)))
+		plaintext = append(plaintext, extra.data...)
+	}
+
+	encrypted := make([]byte, len(plaintext))
+
+	var iv [aes.BlockSize]byte
+	copy(iv[:], c.myCounter[:])
+	aesCipher, err := aes.NewCipher(slot.sendAESKey)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	ctr := cipher.NewCTR(aesCipher, iv[:])
+	ctr.XORKeyStream(encrypted, plaintext)
+
+	var ret []byte
+	ret = appendU16(ret, 2)
+	ret = append(ret, msgTypeData)
+	ret = append(ret, 0 /* flags */)
+	ret = appendU32(ret, c.myKeyId-1)
+	ret = appendU32(ret, c.theirKeyId)
+	ret = appendMPI(ret, c.myCurrentDHPub)
+	ret = append(ret, c.myCounter[:]...)
+	ret = appendData(ret, encrypted)
+
+	mac := hmac.New(sha1.New, slot.sendMACKey)
+	mac.Write(ret)
+	ret = append(ret, mac.Sum(nil)[:macPrefixBytes]...)
+	ret = appendData(ret, c.oldMACs)
+	c.oldMACs = nil
+	incCounter(&c.myCounter)
+
+	return ret
+}
+
+func incCounter(counter *[8]byte) {
+	for i := 7; i >= 0; i-- {
+		counter[i]++
+		if counter[i] > 0 {
+			break
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+// calcDataKeys computes the keys used to encrypt a data message given the key
+// IDs.
+func (c *Conversation) calcDataKeys(myKeyId, theirKeyId uint32) (slot *keySlot, err error) {
+	// Check for a cache hit.
+	for i := range c.keySlots {
+		slot = &c.keySlots[i]
+		if slot.used && slot.theirKeyId == theirKeyId && slot.myKeyId == myKeyId {
+			return
+		}
+	}
+
+	// Find an empty slot to write into.
+	slot = nil
+	for i := range c.keySlots {
+		if !c.keySlots[i].used {
+			slot = &c.keySlots[i]
+			break
+		}
+	}
+	if slot == nil {
+		return nil, errors.New("otr: internal error: no more key slots")
+	}
+
+	var myPriv, myPub, theirPub *big.Int
+
+	if myKeyId == c.myKeyId {
+		myPriv = c.myCurrentDHPriv
+		myPub = c.myCurrentDHPub
+	} else if myKeyId == c.myKeyId-1 {
+		myPriv = c.myLastDHPriv
+		myPub = c.myLastDHPub
+	} else {
+		err = errors.New("otr: peer requested keyid " + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(myKeyId), 10) + " when I'm on " + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(c.myKeyId), 10))
+		return
+	}
+
+	if theirKeyId == c.theirKeyId {
+		theirPub = c.theirCurrentDHPub
+	} else if theirKeyId == c.theirKeyId-1 && c.theirLastDHPub != nil {
+		theirPub = c.theirLastDHPub
+	} else {
+		err = errors.New("otr: peer requested keyid " + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(myKeyId), 10) + " when they're on " + strconv.FormatUint(uint64(c.myKeyId), 10))
+		return
+	}
+
+	var sendPrefixByte, recvPrefixByte [1]byte
+
+	if myPub.Cmp(theirPub) > 0 {
+		// we're the high end
+		sendPrefixByte[0], recvPrefixByte[0] = 1, 2
+	} else {
+		// we're the low end
+		sendPrefixByte[0], recvPrefixByte[0] = 2, 1
+	}
+
+	s := new(big.Int).Exp(theirPub, myPriv, p)
+	sBytes := appendMPI(nil, s)
+
+	h := sha1.New()
+	h.Write(sendPrefixByte[:])
+	h.Write(sBytes)
+	slot.sendAESKey = h.Sum(slot.sendAESKey[:0])[:16]
+
+	h.Reset()
+	h.Write(slot.sendAESKey)
+	slot.sendMACKey = h.Sum(slot.sendMACKey[:0])
+
+	h.Reset()
+	h.Write(recvPrefixByte[:])
+	h.Write(sBytes)
+	slot.recvAESKey = h.Sum(slot.recvAESKey[:0])[:16]
+
+	h.Reset()
+	h.Write(slot.recvAESKey)
+	slot.recvMACKey = h.Sum(slot.recvMACKey[:0])
+
+	slot.theirKeyId = theirKeyId
+	slot.myKeyId = myKeyId
+	slot.used = true
+
+	zero(slot.theirLastCtr[:])
+	return
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) calcAKEKeys(s *big.Int) {
+	mpi := appendMPI(nil, s)
+	h := sha256.New()
+
+	var cBytes [32]byte
+	hashWithPrefix(c.SSID[:], 0, mpi, h)
+
+	hashWithPrefix(cBytes[:], 1, mpi, h)
+	copy(c.revealKeys.c[:], cBytes[:16])
+	copy(c.sigKeys.c[:], cBytes[16:])
+
+	hashWithPrefix(c.revealKeys.m1[:], 2, mpi, h)
+	hashWithPrefix(c.revealKeys.m2[:], 3, mpi, h)
+	hashWithPrefix(c.sigKeys.m1[:], 4, mpi, h)
+	hashWithPrefix(c.sigKeys.m2[:], 5, mpi, h)
+}
+
+func hashWithPrefix(out []byte, prefix byte, in []byte, h hash.Hash) {
+	h.Reset()
+	var p [1]byte
+	p[0] = prefix
+	h.Write(p[:])
+	h.Write(in)
+	if len(out) == h.Size() {
+		h.Sum(out[:0])
+	} else {
+		digest := h.Sum(nil)
+		copy(out, digest)
+	}
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) encode(msg []byte) [][]byte {
+	b64 := make([]byte, base64.StdEncoding.EncodedLen(len(msg))+len(msgPrefix)+1)
+	base64.StdEncoding.Encode(b64[len(msgPrefix):], msg)
+	copy(b64, msgPrefix)
+	b64[len(b64)-1] = '.'
+
+	if c.FragmentSize < minFragmentSize || len(b64) <= c.FragmentSize {
+		// We can encode this in a single fragment.
+		return [][]byte{b64}
+	}
+
+	// We have to fragment this message.
+	var ret [][]byte
+	bytesPerFragment := c.FragmentSize - minFragmentSize
+	numFragments := (len(b64) + bytesPerFragment) / bytesPerFragment
+
+	for i := 0; i < numFragments; i++ {
+		frag := []byte("?OTR," + strconv.Itoa(i+1) + "," + strconv.Itoa(numFragments) + ",")
+		todo := bytesPerFragment
+		if todo > len(b64) {
+			todo = len(b64)
+		}
+		frag = append(frag, b64[:todo]...)
+		b64 = b64[todo:]
+		frag = append(frag, ',')
+		ret = append(ret, frag)
+	}
+
+	return ret
+}
+
+func (c *Conversation) reset() {
+	c.myKeyId = 0
+
+	for i := range c.keySlots {
+		c.keySlots[i].used = false
+	}
+}
+
+type PublicKey struct {
+	dsa.PublicKey
+}
+
+func (pk *PublicKey) Parse(in []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
+	var ok bool
+	var pubKeyType uint16
+
+	if pubKeyType, in, ok = getU16(in); !ok || pubKeyType != 0 {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	if pk.P, in, ok = getMPI(in); !ok {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	if pk.Q, in, ok = getMPI(in); !ok {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	if pk.G, in, ok = getMPI(in); !ok {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	if pk.Y, in, ok = getMPI(in); !ok {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+
+	return in, true
+}
+
+func (pk *PublicKey) Serialize(in []byte) []byte {
+	in = appendU16(in, 0)
+	in = appendMPI(in, pk.P)
+	in = appendMPI(in, pk.Q)
+	in = appendMPI(in, pk.G)
+	in = appendMPI(in, pk.Y)
+	return in
+}
+
+// Fingerprint returns the 20-byte, binary fingerprint of the PublicKey.
+func (pk *PublicKey) Fingerprint() []byte {
+	b := pk.Serialize(nil)
+	h := sha1.New()
+	h.Write(b[2:])
+	return h.Sum(nil)
+}
+
+func (pk *PublicKey) Verify(hashed, sig []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
+	if len(sig) != 2*dsaSubgroupBytes {
+		return nil, false
+	}
+	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[:dsaSubgroupBytes])
+	s := new(big.Int).SetBytes(sig[dsaSubgroupBytes:])
+	ok := dsa.Verify(&pk.PublicKey, hashed, r, s)
+	return sig[dsaSubgroupBytes*2:], ok
+}
+
+type PrivateKey struct {
+	PublicKey
+	dsa.PrivateKey
+}
+
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Sign(rand io.Reader, hashed []byte) []byte {
+	r, s, err := dsa.Sign(rand, &priv.PrivateKey, hashed)
+	if err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	rBytes := r.Bytes()
+	sBytes := s.Bytes()
+	if len(rBytes) > dsaSubgroupBytes || len(sBytes) > dsaSubgroupBytes {
+		panic("DSA signature too large")
+	}
+
+	out := make([]byte, 2*dsaSubgroupBytes)
+	copy(out[dsaSubgroupBytes-len(rBytes):], rBytes)
+	copy(out[len(out)-len(sBytes):], sBytes)
+	return out
+}
+
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Serialize(in []byte) []byte {
+	in = priv.PublicKey.Serialize(in)
+	in = appendMPI(in, priv.PrivateKey.X)
+	return in
+}
+
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Parse(in []byte) ([]byte, bool) {
+	in, ok := priv.PublicKey.Parse(in)
+	if !ok {
+		return in, ok
+	}
+	priv.PrivateKey.PublicKey = priv.PublicKey.PublicKey
+	priv.PrivateKey.X, in, ok = getMPI(in)
+	return in, ok
+}
+
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Generate(rand io.Reader) {
+	if err := dsa.GenerateParameters(&priv.PrivateKey.PublicKey.Parameters, rand, dsa.L1024N160); err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	if err := dsa.GenerateKey(&priv.PrivateKey, rand); err != nil {
+		panic(err.Error())
+	}
+	priv.PublicKey.PublicKey = priv.PrivateKey.PublicKey
+}
+
+func notHex(r rune) bool {
+	if r >= '0' && r <= '9' ||
+		r >= 'a' && r <= 'f' ||
+		r >= 'A' && r <= 'F' {
+		return false
+	}
+
+	return true
+}
+
+// Import parses the contents of a libotr private key file.
+func (priv *PrivateKey) Import(in []byte) bool {
+	mpiStart := []byte(" #")
+
+	mpis := make([]*big.Int, 5)
+
+	for i := 0; i < len(mpis); i++ {
+		start := bytes.Index(in, mpiStart)
+		if start == -1 {
+			return false
+		}
+		in = in[start+len(mpiStart):]
+		end := bytes.IndexFunc(in, notHex)
+		if end == -1 {
+			return false
+		}
+		hexBytes := in[:end]
+		in = in[end:]
+
+		if len(hexBytes)&1 != 0 {
+			return false
+		}
+
+		mpiBytes := make([]byte, len(hexBytes)/2)
+		if _, err := hex.Decode(mpiBytes, hexBytes); err != nil {
+			return false
+		}
+
+		mpis[i] = new(big.Int).SetBytes(mpiBytes)
+	}
+
+	for _, mpi := range mpis {
+		if mpi.Sign() <= 0 {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+
+	priv.PrivateKey.P = mpis[0]
+	priv.PrivateKey.Q = mpis[1]
+	priv.PrivateKey.G = mpis[2]
+	priv.PrivateKey.Y = mpis[3]
+	priv.PrivateKey.X = mpis[4]
+	priv.PublicKey.PublicKey = priv.PrivateKey.PublicKey
+
+	a := new(big.Int).Exp(priv.PrivateKey.G, priv.PrivateKey.X, priv.PrivateKey.P)
+	return a.Cmp(priv.PrivateKey.Y) == 0
+}
+
+func getU8(in []byte) (uint8, []byte, bool) {
+	if len(in) < 1 {
+		return 0, in, false
+	}
+	return in[0], in[1:], true
+}
+
+func getU16(in []byte) (uint16, []byte, bool) {
+	if len(in) < 2 {
+		return 0, in, false
+	}
+	r := uint16(in[0])<<8 | uint16(in[1])
+	return r, in[2:], true
+}
+
+func getU32(in []byte) (uint32, []byte, bool) {
+	if len(in) < 4 {
+		return 0, in, false
+	}
+	r := uint32(in[0])<<24 | uint32(in[1])<<16 | uint32(in[2])<<8 | uint32(in[3])
+	return r, in[4:], true
+}
+
+func getMPI(in []byte) (*big.Int, []byte, bool) {
+	l, in, ok := getU32(in)
+	if !ok || uint32(len(in)) < l {
+		return nil, in, false
+	}
+	r := new(big.Int).SetBytes(in[:l])
+	return r, in[l:], true
+}
+
+func getData(in []byte) ([]byte, []byte, bool) {
+	l, in, ok := getU32(in)
+	if !ok || uint32(len(in)) < l {
+		return nil, in, false
+	}
+	return in[:l], in[l:], true
+}
+
+func getNBytes(in []byte, n int) ([]byte, []byte, bool) {
+	if len(in) < n {
+		return nil, in, false
+	}
+	return in[:n], in[n:], true
+}
+
+func appendU16(out []byte, v uint16) []byte {
+	out = append(out, byte(v>>8), byte(v))
+	return out
+}
+
+func appendU32(out []byte, v uint32) []byte {
+	out = append(out, byte(v>>24), byte(v>>16), byte(v>>8), byte(v))
+	return out
+}
+
+func appendData(out, v []byte) []byte {
+	out = appendU32(out, uint32(len(v)))
+	out = append(out, v...)
+	return out
+}
+
+func appendMPI(out []byte, v *big.Int) []byte {
+	vBytes := v.Bytes()
+	out = appendU32(out, uint32(len(vBytes)))
+	out = append(out, vBytes...)
+	return out
+}
+
+func appendMPIs(out []byte, mpis ...*big.Int) []byte {
+	for _, mpi := range mpis {
+		out = appendMPI(out, mpi)
+	}
+	return out
+}
+
+func zero(b []byte) {
+	for i := range b {
+		b[i] = 0
+	}
+}